# A New Way to Think About Secure Computation: Language-based Secure Computation

### Florian Kerschbaum

#### 2007

#### Abstract

Assume two parties, Alice and Bob, want to compute a joint function, but they want to keep their inputs private. This problem setting and its solutions are known as secure computation. General solutions to secure computation require the construction of a binary circuit for the function to be computed. This paper proposes the concept of language-based secure computation. Instead of constructing a binary circuit program code is directly translated into a secure computation protocol. This concept is compared to the approaches for language-based information-flow security and many connections between the two approaches are identified. The major challenge in this translation is the secure translation of the program’s control-flow without leaking private information via a timing channel. The paper presents a method for translating an if statement with a secret branching condition that may not be known to any party. Furthermore, that protocol can be optimized using trusted computing, such that the overall performance of a program executed as a secure computation protocol can be greatly improved.

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#### Paper Citation

#### in Harvard Style

Kerschbaum F. (2007). **A New Way to Think About Secure Computation: Language-based Secure Computation** . In *Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security in Information Systems - Volume 1: WOSIS, (ICEIS 2007)* ISBN 978-972-8865-96-2, pages 33-42. DOI: 10.5220/0002423300330042

#### in Bibtex Style

@conference{wosis07,

author={Florian Kerschbaum},

title={A New Way to Think About Secure Computation: Language-based Secure Computation},

booktitle={Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security in Information Systems - Volume 1: WOSIS, (ICEIS 2007)},

year={2007},

pages={33-42},

publisher={SciTePress},

organization={INSTICC},

doi={10.5220/0002423300330042},

isbn={978-972-8865-96-2},

}

#### in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security in Information Systems - Volume 1: WOSIS, (ICEIS 2007)

TI - A New Way to Think About Secure Computation: Language-based Secure Computation

SN - 978-972-8865-96-2

AU - Kerschbaum F.

PY - 2007

SP - 33

EP - 42

DO - 10.5220/0002423300330042