END USER AUTHENTICATION (EUA)

George S. Oreku, Jianzhong Li

Department of Computer Science and Engineering HIT, P.O.Box 773, 92 Xi Dazhi Street

Nangang District, Harbin 150001 China

Fredrick J. Mtenzi

School of Computing, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin 8, Ireland

Keywords: Authentication, Tickets, End-User, Authorization, Kerberos.

Abstract: Authentication is one among a set of services that constitute a security sub-system in a modern computing

or communications infrastructure. End User Authentication flexibility model would proposed in this paper

allow the user to have multiple authentication mechanisms with varying levels of guarantee, and for

suppliers to request and rely on mechanisms appropriate to the service requested. Authentications to end-

user in a simple three level ticket request model algorithms solution on open distributed environment. This

paper describes the ticket used by clients, servers, and Kerberos to achieve authentication toward prevention

of unauthorized access to in sourced data on applications level. However we explore an approach to end

user authentication that generalizes the notion of a textual password that, in many cases, improves the

security. Our approach is based on the use of Kerberos authentication technique and Diffie-Hellman Key

exchange.

1 INTRODUCTION

For the vast majority of computer systems,

authentication for users and passwords are the

method of choice for access control security

mechanism. In consumer applications as diverse as

financial transactions, remote computer login,

building access control, and keyless entry is

extremely important for prove. With that idea in

mind in distributed environment, three approaches to

security can be envisioned:

1. Rely on each individual client workstations to

assure the identity of its user or users and rely

on each server to enforce a security policy based

on user based identifications (ID).

2. Require that client system authenticate

themselves to server, but trust the client system

concerning the identity of its user.

3. Require the user to prove identity for each

service invoked. Also require that servers prove

their identity to client.

Raising questions to eCommerce security this

paper presents authentications and authorization

service model algorithms to an end user by the use

of textual password. We extend the use of the last

models by Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange A Non-

Mathematician’s Explanation (Palmgren,2005) and

Kerberos authentication model (Steiner et al,1998)

quoting at length to place authentication in proper

systems context use.

2 EUA MODEL ARCHITECTURE

Internet

Policy exchange

Appl et

Certif icates

URL

Application to ISP

Authentication

Service Exchange

DBMS

ACTIVE CONTENT

HTML

JAVA

SCRIPTS

ACTIVE CONTROLS

Executable

Java Applets

Behaviour inspection

Behavi our

Profile

Authentication

ticket for access

Level 1

Level 2

2nd time

1st time

2nd time

Allow

Level 3

File Access

Registry Access

Network Access

Browser Setting

changes

Operating Systems

Unit 1

Unit 2

Unit 3

Figure 1: Architecture of a EUA access model.

406

S. Oreku G., Li J. and J. Mtenzi F. (2007).

END USER AUTHENTICATION (EUA).

In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies - Internet Technology, pages 406-409

DOI: 10.5220/0001278604060409

Copyright

c

SciTePress

Our model is built on the premise that defensive,

or exclusionary, security must be aligned with

inclusionary tools and practices that allow users to

access systems and information anytime, anywhere.

We illustrate the architecture of the access for an

end User Authentication as follows:

1 The “early request ticket for the key exchange

authentication from the DBMS unit” that

provides identification that lives beyond the

span of single first level authorizations or

interaction

2 Level two makes it possible to associate

successive message or request to third level.

3 The single use authorization, which conceals

user’s identities and also limits linkage among

given users successive actions is in third level.

4 The three different units (Unit 1, Unit 2 and

Unit 3) verify the user in application-level by

sending different request in each unit.

2.1 Message Exchange Algorithm

We analyze the semantics basing on Kerberos

authentication technique key exchange (Palmgren,

2005) and Diffie-Hellman Key exchange of each

security transcoding by using an online contracting

scenario.

Basic notations

C = Client, ADBMS = Authentication database

Management System, WS = Web Source, IDc =

Identifier of user on C, Idws= Identifier of Web

source, P

c

= Password of user on C, Kws

= secret

encryption key shared by ADBMS and WS, TS =

timestamp, || = concatenation

Steps

(6) With the ticket, C can now apply to (WS) for

service by sending a message to (WS)

containing C’s ID and the ticket.

(6.1) (Ws) decrypts the ticket and verifies that

the user ID in the ticket is the same as the

unencrypted user ID in the message.

(6.2) If the two matches, the server considers

the user authenticate and grant the

requested service.

(7) Simply stated:

(6.1)

C Ú ADB : IDc || Pc || IDws

(6.2)

ADBMS Ú

C: Ticket

(6.3)

C Ú WS: IDc || Ticket

Authentication Service Exhange: To obtain Ticket-

Granting Ticket.

(1)

C Ú ADBMS: IDc || IDtgs ||TS1

(2) ADBMS Ú

C:EKc [Kc,tgs|| IDtgs || TS2 || Lifetime2 || Tickettgs]

Ticket-Granting Service Exchange: To obtain

Service-Granting Ticket.

(3)

C Ú TGS: IDv ||Tickettgs ||Authenticator C

(4) TGS Ú

C: EKc [Kc,

¨ws

|| IDws || TS4 || Ticketv]

Client/WebService Authentication Exhange: To

Obtain Service

(5)

C Ú WS: Ticketv || Authenticator C

(6) WS Ú C: EKc,v[TS5 +1]

3 EUA ASSESSMENT

Considering today’s pervasiveness of malicious

software (Viruses, Trojan horses) and phishing

attacks, any authentications solution must be

resistant against offline credential stealing attacks.

For this we propose a Challenge/response-based

one-time passwords authentication.

3.1 Passwords

We represent these requirements (Jermyn et al 1999)

in an authentication system consisting of five

components. Components are defined inductively as

follow:

1.

The set A of authentication Information is the set

of specific information with which entities prove

their identities.

2.

The set C of complementary Information is the set

of information that the system stores and uses to

validate the authentication information.

3.

The set F of complementation functions that

generate the complimentary from the

authentication information that is: -

For

F, F : A C

∈

→f

The set L of

authentication functions that verify

identity. That is for

L, : A × C {true, false}∈→

The set S of

selection functions that enable an entity

to create or alter the authentication and

complementary information.

The goal is to find an

a

∈

A such that, for f

∈

F,

f (a) =

c

∈

c and c is associated with a particular

entity (or any entity).Because one can determine

weather

a is associated with and entity only by

computing

f (a) or by authenticating via | (a) we

have two approaches for protecting the password,

used simultaneously

1.

Hide enough information so that one of a, c, or f

can not be found.

2. Prevent access to the authentication functions L

END USER AUTHENTICATION (EUA)

407

3.2 Security Considerations

In both approaches, the goal of the defenders is to

maximize the time needed to guess the password.

- Let

P be the probability that an attacker guess a

password in specified period of time

- Let

G be the number of guesses that can be tested

in one time unit

- Let

T be the number of time units during which

guessing occurs

- Let

N be the number of possible passwords

Then

TG

N

≥P

(1)

Example1: Lets password be composed of

characters drawn from an alphabet of 96

characters. Assume that 10

4

guesses can be tested

each second. We wish the probability of a success

guess to be 0.5 once a 365-days period. What is the

minimum password length that will give us this

probability?

From the formula above, we want

()

11

4

365 24 60 60 10

TG

N6.3110

P

0.5

×××

≥= =×

(2)

Thus we must choose an integer s such that

s

i

96 N

i0

≥

∑

=

This holds when ≥

s

6 so, to meet the desired

conditions password of at least length

6 must be

required.

Assumptions

underlie example:

1. The time required to test a password is constant

2. All passwords are equally likely to be selected

Proof:

(a) The first is reasonable, because the algorithms

used to validate password are fixed and either

the algorithm are independent of the password’s

length or the variation is negligible.

(b) The second assumption is a function of the

password selection mechanism. (Morris and

Thomson, 1979)

3.3 One – time Passwords

One time password is a password that is invalidated

as soon as it is used. It uses techniques first

suggested to generate the password. (Lamport, 1981)

With this technology our System takes the

“seed” user enters and generates a list of

n

passwords. The implementation presents each

password as a sequence of

six shorts words (but the

internal presentation is an Integer).

1. User supplies his name to the server

2. The server replies with the number

i stored in the

ticket file

3. User supplies the corresponding password

pi

4. The server computes

(

)

()

hp =hk =k =p

ni+1

i

ni+2

il

and compares the results with the stored password.

If they match, the ticket file to

i1 and stores Pi in

the file. If the authentication fails the ticket file is

left unchanged

Note:

h – one-way hash function, K – Seed.

3.4 Performance Analysis

We will derive and analyze the robustness of

passwords capabilities by probability letting

unauthorized end-user guessing capability to allow

its login within a particular time.

Parameters:

X: password length, Z: time.

The probability that randomly guessed capability

will pass a particular authorization is given by

()

X

1

PX,Z =1-1-

Z

2

⎛⎞

⎜⎟

⎜⎟

⎝⎠

(3)

and the probability that a randomly guessed

capability will pass all d authorization in a system is

simply

(

)

d

zxp , .

Recall that the capability password authorization

must be > than 6 symbols (characters). Figure 2 and

3 shows login performance over time and different

password length.

We leave the exact timing decisions to

s6≥

symbols, and simply assume in our experiments that

x is likely to be from two to six. From the graph the

probability log in comes close to matches as the

numbers of input values increases within different

time. The performance is excellently, 97.14% of the

attack using short key length per log in

from

(

)

z=1 , and increasing probability to 100% of

login match to key length ≥ six with a marking of

running time

(

)

4≥z . As we show in figure 3, X

must be at least

2, because a valid capability is 100%

that matches any of the

X capabilities in the DBMS,

small value of

X provide the smallest probability that

a randomly chosen capability will match the

password.

WEBIST 2007 - International Conference on Web Information Systems and Technologies

408

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1234

Running time (z)

Input Values per time (T)

x=1

x=2

x=3

x=4

x=5

x=6

Figure 2: Inputs per time.

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

X=2 X=3 X=4 X=5 X=6

Passwords length

Inpute values per time (T)

Z=1

Z=2

Z=3

Z=4

Figure 3: Passwords length per input values.

The value of X also affect the validity time of

capability. The minimum validity time

()

min

m

is

()

min

m

=

()

1−x .T

k

, where T

k

denotes the time a

key is typed in. The maximum validity

time

()

max =

X

.T

m

k

. Ideally, we would like to get

a small intervals for the validity time, so that we can

tightly control the validity period, so we would like

large value of X to minimize the difference between

()

min

m

and

()

max

m

. We can determine X from

Min

m

and Max

m

max

X=

max - min

m

mm

(4)

The

max

m

metric defines the longest amount

of time that passwords matches can remain idle and

still have a valid capability. Put in another way,

Max

m

defines the maximum amount of time that

an attacker can login with particular capability

before the capability is rejected by authentications.

Because the (login denial) rejection probabilities

are independent Bernoulli trials the probability that

the end user/client and server will be able to

establish correct password after one try (by

exchanging password is:

i

P (connect after 1 try) = (1 - )

i

∈

The probability that client will connect after K tries

is:-

P (connection after K tries)

=

k

1 - (1 - P (connect after 1 try))

∈

i k

= 1 - (1 - ) )

i

For a given desire connection probability

, P

(connect)

the required numbers of connection

attempts is:-

(

)

(

)

()

lo g 1 -

K=

i

lo g 1 - 1-

i

P connect

∈

⎛⎞

⎜⎟

⎝⎠

(5)

A nice feature of this formula is that the expected

number of connections attempts depends

logarithmically on the matches’ probability, which

indicates that even for large

i

∈ ; a determined client

can get a connected after a moderate waiting time.

4 CONCLUSION

We have presented an algorithm that explains the

ticket message exchange for access to an end user in

distributed systems. Using this model as a basis, we

also present a countermeasure that may be deployed

in the current passwords used, assuming that client

and server software is updated.

Our approaches exploit the input capabilities of

login that allow us to determine inputs time from the

passwords length in which it occurs. We prove our

arguments to assess the security mathematically.

REFERENCES

Palmgren, K., “Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange – A Non-

Mathematician’s Explanation” February 2005.

Steiner et al., J.G., Kerberos: An Authentication Service

for Open Network Systems March 1988.

Ian Jermyn et al, “The Design and Analysis of Graphical

Passwords,” Proceeding of the 8

th

USENIX Security

Symposium August 1999].

Morris, R., and Thomson, K., “Password Security, A case

History,” Communications of the ACM 22 (11),

pp.594597 (Nov.1979).

Lamport, L., “Password Authentication with insecure

Communication, “Communication of the ACM 24

(11), pp.770771 (Nov. 1981).

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