other music players is prohibited. The DRM system 
proposed in (Messerges & Dabbish, 2003) allows 
copying of licenses within a defined family domain. 
The backup/restore functionality of all these 
systems have several shortcomings. The threshold 
limit might through unfortunate circumstances be 
reached/exceeded, or it might for good reasons be 
set to zero (backup/restore is disabled) by a content 
owner who does not wish to open up for any 
possibility of potential illicit copying, e.g. because 
the content has a high commercial value. Forming 
and maintaining device domains will have an 
administrative cost and might be a hassle-factor for 
the user – and what will the rules be for allowing 
new devices into a domain? If a domain cannot be 
established and the device gets lost or becomes 
obsolete, restore can not take place. If the license 
contains stateful information, restore cannot take 
place either. In sum, there are still quite a few 
pitfalls which may hinder effective backup. 
4.3  License Transfer 
This section proposes a license transfer mechanism 
and protocol which meets some of the challenges 
pointed out above. It reconciles the apparent 
conflicting requirements for maintaining license 
backups while preventing license duplication. 
Consider a single-user, unlimited license which 
we may label L. For simplicity we ignore the past, so 
the license will be valid from now and onwards, i.e. 
within the timeframe [t
1
, unlimited〉, where t
1
 
denotes the current time. 
The basic underlying idea is to consecutively 
subtract sub-licenses from L: Initially a new license 
L
1
 is subtracted from L.  L
1
 is valid during an 
appropriately short time interval 
Δ
t=t
2
-t
1
, i.e. during 
the timeframe [t
1
, t
2
〉. At the same time, the validity 
of L is reduced accordingly, and is now valid for the 
remaining timeframe [t
2
, unlimited〉. License L is 
kept on an “online backup server”. L
1
 on the other 
hand is transferred securely via a piracy-proof 
channel (i.e. a channel which does not allow 
duplication or “double-spending” of the license L
1
) 
to its destination device, for example the SIM card 
of a portable phone, where it is consumed. Once L
1
 
expires, or preferably a short time before, either the 
destination device requests a new license from the 
backup server (license pull), or the backup server 
automatically transmits a new license L
2
 (license 
push). This license L
2
 is, and subsequent licenses L
3
, 
L
4
, … are extracted from L in the same manner as 
L
1
. 
The same mechanism can be applied to other 
license types, e.g. to time-restricted licenses, where 
the license L now has a timeframe  [t
1
, t
n
] for two 
specific points in time (e.g. from 1.1. to 31.12.). A 
time-restricted license could also be a duration 
Δ
t 
(e.g. 
Δ
t = 30d) which is converted into a fixed 
timeframe [t
1
, t
n
] upon first usage. For counter-based 
licenses, the counter (e.g. 100 views or runs) is split 
into multiple sub-counters (e.g. 10 x 10 views). 
A cryptographic protocol which is suitable for 
secure and duplication-proof transfer of license from 
A to B is described in (Carlsen, Hammerstad & 
Gorancic, 2003). This protocol has the properties 
that the licensed is transferred no more than once to 
the rightful destination token, and may never be 
transferred to any other token.  
The online backup server could be hosted by the 
vendor / content owner. It could also be a smart card 
which could then be located in the home domain 
indicated in figure 4. The sub-licenses are 
transferred to and stored on the mobile device SIM 
card. Now, if the mobile device SIM card is lost or 
corrupt the damage is reduced since only sub-
licenses are stored here. Furthermore, the time 
interval 
Δ
t can be made small to minimise the 
consequences of a lost or corrupted SIM card. 
4.4  Requirements for Future SIM 
Cards 
The paper has demonstrated content rights 
management as a potential application for future 
SIM cards. SIM functionality is not limited to DRM, 
but can have a more general functionality, being the 
security infrastructure of the user in the digital world 
(Lopez Calvet, 2005). The basic requirement for 
such functionality is that the SIM can act on behalf 
of the user, supporting different roles and 
functionalities. This includes 3
rd
 party security 
applications, e.g. keys for admittance to buildings, 
authorisation to banks and other legal entities.  
We suggest using a hierarchical structure, where 
the SIM has a master identity module (see figure 5), 
which controls the secrets.  
Such an identity module might be administrated 
by a legal entity, e.g. a network operator, a bank, or 
the state. It can then allow administrate secret keys 
for other applications, e.g.  update, backup, restore. 
We see this functionality happen over a secure 
channel over the air, and indicated the functionality 
by over the air application (OAA). 
Admittance and license management are two 
items which will require clock (CLK) functionality, 
LICENSE TRANSFER MECHANISMS THROUGH SEAMLESS SIM AUTHENTICATION - Rights Management based
on SIM Keys
337