DYNAMIC MULTI-AGENT BASED VARIETY FORMATION
AND STEERING IN MASS CUSTOMIZATION
Thorsten Blecker, Nizar Abdelkafi
Departement of Production/Operations Management, University of Klagenfurt, Austria
Gerold Kreutler, Gerhard Friedrich
Computer Science and Manufacturing, University of Klagenfurt, Austria
Keywords: Product Configuration, Mass Customization, V
ariety Formation and Steering, Multi Agent System
Abstract: Large product variety in mass customization involves a high internal complexity level inside a company’s
operations, as well
as a high external complexity level from a customer’s perspective. To cope with both
complexity problems, an information system based on agent technology is able to be identified as a suitable
solution approach. The mass customized products are assumed to be based on a modular architecture and
each module variant is associated with an autonomous rational agent. Agents have to compete with each
other in order to join coalitions representing salable product variants which suit real customers’ require-
ments. The negotiation process is based on a market mechanism supported by the target costing concept and
a Dutch auction. Furthermore, in order to integrate the multi-agent system in the existing information sys-
tem landscape of the mass customizer, a technical architecture is proposed and a scenario depicting the main
communication steps is specified.
1 INTRODUCTION
Mass customization is a business strategy that aims
at satisfying individual customers’ needs nearly with
mass production efficiency (Pine, 1993).The
development of mass customization is essentially
due to the advances realized in modular product ar-
chitectures and flexible manufacturing systems.
However, the progress in the fields of information
technologies and artificial intelligence for the sup-
port of Internet based customer-supplier interactions
can be considered as the most relevant enablers for a
successful implementation of the strategy. Rauten-
strauch et al. (2002) pointed out that information
systems provide the necessary support for enter-
prises pursuing mass customization.
The information which arises during the interac-
t
ion process between the customer and supplier
serves to build up a long-lasting individual customer
relationship (Piller, 2001). Due to high customer ori-
entation, mass customization induces a variety-rich
environment. However, customers generally do not
seek out variety per se. They do only want the
choice that fits to their needs.
The resulting variety in mass customization trig-
gers a
high complexity level that leads to additional
costs. Moreover, because of the limited human in-
formation processing capacity and lack of technical
product knowledge, excessive variety confuses cus-
tomers who are overwhelmed by the complexity of
the decision making process. Therefore, the main
goal should be to find an optimal product variety
which leads to the optimal cost-benefit-relation. For
example, Blecker et al. (2003) propose a key metrics
system to cope with the internal variety-induced
complexity and emphasize the importance of the in-
teraction systems to reduce the external complexity
experienced by customers during the buying process.
From this point of view, we can identify two
challenges. Fi
rstly, the mass customizer must be
supported by an information system to efficiently
cope with variety. Secondly, it is relevant to assist
customers with adequate information tools during
the individualization process in order to lead them in
a fast paced manner and with a low amount of effort
to their optimal choice. In this paper, after a short
description of the main variety problems in mass
customization, we formally define a multi-agent
based approach supporting dynamic variety-forma-
3
Blecker T., Abdelkafi N., Kreutler G. and Friedrich G. (2004).
DYNAMIC MULTI-AGENT BASED VARIETY FORMATION AND STEERING IN MASS CUSTOMIZATION.
In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, pages 3-13
DOI: 10.5220/0002608400030013
Copyright
c
SciTePress
tion and steering enabling mass customizers to face
both depicted challenges. Then, we suggest a techni-
cal infrastructure for the implementation of the
multi-agent system.
2 VARIETY PROBLEMS IN
MASS CUSTOMIZATION
Due to the high individualization level in mass
customization, final products are not manufactured
until a customer order arrives. This customer-pull
system improves the planning situation in dynamic
markets and avoids costs such as those due to final
products’ inventory and special offers to incur.
However, the huge variety induced in mass customi-
zation is associated with a high complexity and in-
volves costs which arise in the form of overheads.
Rosenberg (1997) mentions that product complexity
is essentially due to two main reasons which are (a)
the variety of product types and groups and (b) the
number of components being built in the products,
as well as their connections with each other.
An empirical study of Wildemann (2001) has
shown that with the doubling of the number of prod-
uct variants, the unit costs would increase about 20-
35% for firms with traditional manufacturing sys-
tems. For segmented and flexible automated plants
the unit costs would increase about 10-15%. Wilde-
mann concluded that an increase of product variety
is associated with an inverted learning curve. Fur-
thermore, Rathnow (1993) depicts a huge product
variety is not usually profitable and points out that
there is a point V
opt.
(optimal variety) from which the
cost effects of product variety overcompensate its
beneficial effects. Lingnau (1994) qualitatively ex-
amines cost effects which are involved when in-
creasing variety. He considers a functional organi-
zation structure and scrutinizes the effects of variety
on sales, production, purchasing and research and
development. Lingnau points out that variety gener-
ates additional costs in each function. For example,
when introducing new variants, new distribution
channels could be necessary. Increased variety also
complicates the production planning and control and
more setups leading to longer idle times in which are
required. With higher variety the work-in-process
inventory also increases and quality assurance
measures should be intensified.
The introduction or elimination of product vari-
ants are decisions which are made within the scope
of variety steering. Blecker et al. (2003) make the
distinction between variety management and variety
steering. Variety management embraces the con-
cepts that can be applied in order to increase compo-
nent and process commonality levels during a com-
pany’s operations such as part families, building
blocks, modular product architectures, etc. Unlike
variety management concepts, variety steering con-
cepts essentially deal with external variety, which
can be perceived by customers. In this paper, we as-
sume that the mass customizer has already imple-
mented a variety management concept and that the
main decisions concern variety steering.
The excess of variety and the resulting complex-
ity can endanger the success of mass customized
products whose prices should not dramatically differ
from the corresponding ones manufactured with a
mass production system. That is why, it is relevant
to efficiently cope with the internal effects of variety
in mass customization. In addition to high internal
complexity level during a company’s operations, va-
riety induces external complexity that has bad ef-
fects from a customer’s perspective.
Due to the limited human information processing
capacity, excessive variety could confuse customers.
Furthermore, customers are not aware of their needs
until they see them violated. By looking for suitable
products in huge assortments, customers can experi-
ence stress, frustration or regret. Iyengar/Lepper
(2000) also claim that in limited-choice contexts
people are engaged in rational optimization, whereas
in extensive-choice contexts people simply end their
choice-making when they find a choice that is
merely satisfactory, rather than optimal. Further-
more, Schwartz (2000) indicates that by adding new
options, the choice situation would be less rather
than more attractive and that some people would
look for the help of e.g. experts, who make the deci-
sion for them.
On the one hand, in order to avoid customers
getting lost in huge product assortments, the mass
customizer should support them during the interac-
tion process to help them find the product variants
corresponding to their optimal choice. On the other
hand, the mass customizer has to strongly consider
the internal complexity by efficiently steering vari-
ety. Therefore, a comprehensive solution approach
must integrate both customer’s and supplier’s per-
spectives in one information system.
3 A MULTI-AGENT APPROACH
FOR VARIETY FORMATION
AND STEERING
Common configuration systems for mass cus-
tomization necessitate specific product knowledge
and often overstrain customers. Therefore, we are
convinced that these systems should be improved to
ICEIS 2004 - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
4
better support customers during the elicitation proc-
ess. Blecker et al. (2004) opt for interaction systems
which are capable of assisting customers through
advisory. Thus, the interaction system should be able
to capture a customers’ preferences and profile in
order to display only the subset of relevant product
variants which would better fulfil customers’ re-
quirements. From the huge product assortment, only
the best variants succeed to be short-listed and dis-
played to customers. Consequently, in the long run
these will better contribute to a supplier’s success.
Those which are not short-listed will only trigger
high complexity and are not relevant for customers.
This would suggest that the product variants would
compete with each other. That is why, it is necessary
to define a mechanism setting the rules which or-
ganize the competition between variants. This leads
one to consider a market mechanism supported by
multi-agent technology. The complexity and fuzzi-
ness of the problem are further reasons for the use of
a multi-agent approach.
The multi-agent based system should dynami-
cally support each user during the interaction proc-
ess. This means that the system should iteratively
generate and refine product variants according to
specific customers’ needs. Concurrently, it supports
the long term supplier’s variety steering. This is re-
alized by the decentralization of variety decisions
which are supported by autonomous agents.
At first, we present the assumption and defini-
tions required to build up the multi-agent system.
Then, we conceptually describe how agents can
reach agreements in order to form product variants.
3.1 Assumption and Definitions
Pine (1993) pointed out that the best method to
achieve mass customization is to develop products
around modular architectures. Ericsson and Erixon
(1999) defined modules as building blocks with de-
fined interfaces. By combining only a few modules,
it is possible to construct a huge number of product
variants. The economies of scale are reached
through modules instead of products and economies
of scope are attained when modules are built in dif-
ferent products. That is why the assumption of this
paper is as follows:
Assumption: Modular product architecture
We assume that the complete set of product vari-
ants can be manufactured on the basis of modules.
The main idea is to consider the module variants
to be built in the different product variants as
autonomous rational agents. It is more reasonable to
consider the module variants as agents than the
product variants because with a few modules, one
can build up a very large number of product variants
which can go up to billions. Thus, by considering
modules as agents the problem remains manageable
and the computational resources are not over-
strained. Therefore, we provide the following defi-
nition:
Definition 1: Module agent
Let
be the set of all modules, M
{
}
m
MMMM , . . . , ,
21
. We call
i
M
a module class. A
module class
contains a set of module vari-
ants
)(21
.
=
i
M
, . . . , ,
iipii
MVMVMV
p
is a function associating
an index
i
of a module class with the index
referring to the number of module variants in a
module class. With each module variant
ij
we associate an autonomous ra-
tional agent, called a module agent
which disposes of resources and is
able to perform tasks.
)(ip
)( , . . . ,1 , ipjMV =
)( , . . . ,1 , ipjMA
ij
=
Modules can be classified in must- and can-
modules. Must-modules are indispensable for en-
suring the basic product functionalities, whereas
can- modules are optional. For example, an engine is
a must-module for a car. Without an engine a car
cannot ensure its basic functionality consisting of
mobility. In contrast to the engine, an air-conditioner
is a can-module because it does not disturb the main
functionalities a car must perform. In this context the
term platform is defined in the technical literature in
two distinctive views:
A product platform is the set of all modules re-
quired for the manufacturing of all possible
product variants (e.g. Ericsson/Erixon, 1999).
A product platform can also be the appellation of
a specific common module which is used in a
great range of product variants (e.g. Piller/Warin-
ger, 1999; Wildemann, 2003). This definition is
commonly used in the automobile industry.
The second definition of platforms will be
adopted in this paper because it considers the plat-
form as a module having an additional relevance in
comparison to other modules, which is mainly due to
its implementation frequency in product variants.
The corresponding agents are called platform agents
to make the distinction vis-à-vis other module
agents. Furthermore, the set of all platform and
module agents are grouped in an agent pool. All dif-
ferent agents are members of a multi-agent system
whose main goal is to present only a subset of prod-
uct variants, which would best fit customers’ needs.
Because only a subset is allowed to be displayed
to customers, the product variants have to compete
with each other. Due to the modular architecture of
products, we can argue that the module variants also
DYNAMIC MULTI-AGENT BASED VARIETY FORMATION AND STEERING IN MASS CUSTOMIZATION
5
compete to be existent in the set of the presented
product configurations. Being driven by a further
motivation of this work to support variety steering
decisions in mass customization, the module variants
which do not resist competition should be elimi-
nated. Therefore, it is legitimate to provide the sec-
ond definition:
Definition 2: Self-preservation
Each module agent
ij
strives for ensuring its
existence by having enough resources to survive.
MA
Definition 2 leads us to consider evolutionary
theory which sees evolution as the result of selection
by the environment acting on a population of organ-
isms competing for resources. The winners of the
competition, those who are most fit to gain the re-
sources necessary for survival, will be selected, the
others are eliminated (Kauffman, 1993). The re-
sources of an agent are stored in an account which is
defined as follows:
Definition 3: Module agent’s account
Each module agent
ij
MA
has revenues and ex-
penses that are summed up in an account
ij
of
monetary units.
constantly diminishes in the
course of time.
Acc
ij
Acc
It is relevant to mention that the monetary units
that a module agent has on its account do not relate
to the prices customers pay. The account only serves
as an internal steering mechanism for a multi-agent
system. The account surplus rather refers to the ac-
tual resources of an agent
ij
MA
. From definitions 2
and 3, we can conclude that each agent endeavors to
maximize its account surplus. A surplus of zero will
mean that the module agent risks death leading to
the elimination of the module variant. Furthermore,
the second part of definition 3 means that the agent’s
resources diminish in the course of time even if the
agent does not carry out any task. To explain what a
task is, we provide the following definition:
Definition 4: Module agent’s task
The task
ij
T
of module agent is to form product
variants by joining coalitions
.
, . . . ,1 , nkC
k
=
The allocation of tasks to groups of agents is
necessary when tasks cannot be performed by a sin-
gle agent. The module agents on their own are not
able to provide a solution. They need to cooperate in
order to fulfill tasks. However, the autonomy princi-
ple of agents is preserved because each agent can
decide whether to take part or not in a product vari-
ant. By forming coalitions each agent strives for its
personal utility/account via cooperation. Module
agents follow the economic principle of rationality
and attempt to form a coalition which will maximize
their own utilities. Furthermore, because of the het-
erogeneity of customer requirements, module agents
may have different efficiencies in task performance
due to their different capabilities.
In order to participate in a coalition, the module
agent has to pay a certain fee. It is noteworthy that
as opposed to other work in multi-agent systems
(e.g. Shehory and Kraus, 1995), one agent may par-
ticipate in more than one coalition. Moreover, these
coalitions are dynamic and take place in real-time,
after capturing customers’ preferences. However, a
coalition may succeed or fail. This primarily de-
pends on the coalition’s result, which can be com-
plete or incomplete:
Definition 5: Complete vs. incomplete
coalitions
We say that a coalition is complete if the coali-
tion formed by the module agents builds up a salable
product variant. A coalition is incomplete if the coa-
lition formed by the module agents does not build up
a salable product variant.
Note that an agent will join a coalition only if the
payoff it will receive in the coalition is greater than,
or at least equal to, what it can obtain by staying
outside the coalition (Shehory and Kraus, 1995). In
our case a module agent that does not participate in
any coalition has a payoff of zero. Because the ac-
count surplus of an agent diminishes in the course of
time, each agent should be interested in participating
in beneficial coalitions to be able to reconstruct its
resources and thus better ensuring its existence.
However, there is no certainty about the success of
coalition results. As aforementioned, each agent has
to pay a certain fee in order to be allowed to partici-
pate in a coalition. But if the coalition that subse-
quently forms is incomplete or fails because it is not
powerful enough to be displayed to customers, then
the participation of an agent in a coalition is a waste
of resources. Therefore, each agent has to be capable
of estimating in advance the likelihood of the suc-
cess of the coalitions it joins. However, the module
agents should remain as simple as possible and
should not become very complex. The whole multi-
agent system has to contribute to problem solving
and one agent should only dispose of the intelligence
it requires in order to not waste computational re-
sources.
3.2 The Negotiation Process
Firstly, it is relevant to determine the mechanism
initiating a coalition. This being in reference to deci-
ICEIS 2004 - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
6
sions about (a) which module agents are able to be-
gin the formation of coalitions and (b) which reach-
ing agreement process should be implemented to co-
ordinate the module agents. We agree that platform
agents are most suitable for initiating coalitions. We
also assume that these agents dispose of an infinite
account surplus. Therefore, they do not have to care
about their existence. This is a legitimate assumption
because the development of product platforms is
generally cost-intensive. The development process
itself may last for a duration of many years. Plat-
forms are also created to be the basic module of a
wide range of product variants for a long period of
time. For example, by canceling a platform in the
automobile industry, this would mean to cancel all
models and the corresponding variants which are
supported by this platform. Thus, such a decision is
strategic and should not be allocated to automated
software agents. As in each decision in variety
steering it should be supported by human agents
who have the required competencies and informa-
tion. However, it is conceivable that each platform
agent strives for being successful as much as possi-
ble, e.g. by contributing to the most sales’ volumes.
On the basis of customers’ preferences, the type
and the number of product platforms to form coali-
tions are determined. Note that:
a platform agent can be selected more than once,
each product variant is based on one platform,
each platform can be found in several product
variants and,
the total number of the selected platform agents
is also the utmost limit of the product variants
which can be formed by coalitions.
The coalitions take place at a certain point in
time and form in order to fulfill the needs of one
customer. When all resulting coalitions are com-
plete, then the number of product variants will be
exactly equal to the number of selected platform
agents provided that no identical coalitions form.
The platform agents have the ability to steer the
formation of coalitions by (a) fixing the set of mod-
ule agents which could contribute to the fulfillment
of customers’ requirements and by (b) determining
the mechanism according to which module agents
can join coalitions.
We propose to base the coalition formation
mechanism on the target costing concept and a
Dutch auction. Target costing is based on the price
the customer is willing to pay. Starting from this
price, it is possible to determine the utmost limit of
the costs of each product function that is allowed to
incur by taking into account the contribution of each
function to the fulfillment of customer requirements.
Further on, because each product component or
module makes a certain contribution to the realiza-
tion of a product function it is possible to distribute
the function costs on the modules respectively com-
ponents (Seidenschwarz, 2001). Thus, the result of
target costing is an utmost limit for modules’ or
components’ costs. The platform agents which are
the auctioneers use these costs to initiate a Dutch
auction. The module agents which compete to join
the coalitions are the bidders. A Dutch auction is le-
gitimate in this case because each agent tends to de-
lay as much as possible in joining a sub-coalition in
order to (a) better evaluate whether to participate or
not in a hitherto sub-coalition and (b) minimize as
much as possible the fees to pay. But due to the
product configuration constraints, when a module
agent wins the bid, it may impose constraints on the
other bidding agents which intend to take part of the
sub-coalition. Thus, the intelligence of the module
agent should enable it to proficiently estimate when
and for which coalition it bids. These auctions will
continue until all coalitions are formed.
Although platform agents have an infinite ac-
count, we assume that they will also try to maximize
the revenues they receive from module agents. We
will describe in the next section how the product
variants resulting from the coalitions are filtered af-
ter their formation. Only the set of product variants
that are displayed to customers will receive revenues
which are distributed on modules. The total col-
lected monetary units from all module agents are
collected in an account and then distributed on the
module agents participating in the few successful
product variants by considering their contribution in
the fulfillment of the product functions and their
participation level.
Up to now, we have only described what module
and platform agents should perform and how the
whole multi-agent system can reach agreements in
order to form coalitions. But we have not mentioned
what are the abilities an agent should have, to effec-
tively carry out its tasks. Module and platform
agents have different tasks. Therefore, they have dif-
ferent abilities. Module agents strive for maximizing
their utilities (accounts). That is why, they have to
develop strategies in order to survive. Subsequently,
they should be able to evaluate in advance the suc-
cess of the coalitions by estimating the probability
that the formed product variants can be displayed to
customers. Furthermore, they have to know when to
bid and which coalition would be beneficial to join.
Generally, as intelligent agents module agents have
to update their knowledge from their own experience
and the behavior of the other module agents per-
taining to the multi-agent environment, which means
that they have to learn.
In opposition to module agents, platform agents
do not care about their existence due to their infinite
account surplus. Furthermore, they decide which
module agents are allowed to participate in the coa-
DYNAMIC MULTI-AGENT BASED VARIETY FORMATION AND STEERING IN MASS CUSTOMIZATION
7
litions. Therefore, they are more powerful than
module agents. Platform agents initiate and coordi-
nate the formation of coalitions. They are also capa-
ble of communicating with each other to avoid the
formation of identical coalitions. Platform agents
have the overview of the coalition while forming
and can forbid the further bidding of module agents
by considering the constraints imposed by module
agents which have already joined the coalition.
In the following we concentrate on module
agents. We assume that the product platforms are
capable of initiating the Dutch auction and that only
product constraints may restrain the participation of
module agents in coalitions. In order to represent the
module agents, we use a mathematical tool from de-
cision theory. Decision theory defines a rational
agent as one that maximizes the expected utility. The
expected utility
of an action is defined as (Rus-
sel/Norvig, 1995):
EU
()
()
αωωα
ω
)( PUEU
=
{}
actions of eperformanc the
given outcomes possibleover on distributiy probabilit a :
real a
with outcomean gassociatinfunction utility a :
outcomes possible all ofset the:,,
agent,an
toavailable actions possible all ofset the: ;
P
IRU
AcAc
where
=
K
ωω
α
Let the function
opt
take as input a set of possi-
ble actions, a set of outcomes, a probability distribu-
tion and a utility function and let this function return
an action. The defined behavior of
is defined as
follows (Russel/Norvig, 1995):
f
opt
f
() ()
()
αωω
ω
α
max arg ,, ,
Ac
PUUPAcf
opt
=
Wooldridge (2000) criticizes
opt
for building
rational agents because
opt
requires an uncon-
strained search which can be very expensive when
the space of all actions and their outcomes is very
wide. But, in our case this critic does not seem to be
strong enough because the action types that a mod-
ule agent can perform are (a) to participate in a coa-
lition (Participating is the action
f
f
1=
α
) or (b) not to
participate (Not participating is the action
0
=
α
).
Thus, the number of action types a module agent
disposes of are only two. Furthermore, the outcome
of actions may be that either (a) the module agent is
a member of a product variant which is selected in
the final subset (Success of a coalition is the out-
come
1
=
ω
) or (b) the module agent is a member of
a product variant which is not selected in the subset
to be presented to customers (Failure of a coalition is
the outcome
0
=
ω
). That is why, we argue that it is
legitimate to consider
opt
to build module agents.
However,
opt
should be adapted to the requirements
of the multi-agent system problem that was pre-
sented above.
f
f
Suppose at a point in time t=0 the platform
agents initiate coalitions. Each platform agent
chooses which module agents are allowed to bid. For
each module agent, the platform agent communi-
cates a function to a module class i having the fol-
lowing form:
)()( tgKtK
iii
=
[]]]
timebidding maximal the:
and,function decreasingsteadily a :
;1)0( /1,0,0:
auction,Dutch
theof pricefirst thengrepresenticonstant a :
time,of course the
in decreasingfunction auction Dutch the:)(
T
g
gTg
K
tK
where
i
ii
i
i
=
As aforementioned, when a module agent joins a
coalition, it may restrain the participation of other
module agents also intending to join the coalition.
Therefore, each module agent must be capable of
evaluating the behavior of the other agents that
could prohibit its participation. This behavior should
be captured by the function
which is a risk
function of a module agent
:
Risk
ij
MA
]
]
)(
RTRiskRiskTRisk == and 00/1,0,0:
)
[]
agent module theof
ngnessrisk willi thereflectingconstant a is 1,0
function increaingsteadily a is
R
Risk
where
Note that the function
is a function that
leads the module agent to bid as early as possible in
order to increase its chances in being a participant of
a coalition. Let
be the function which
takes the value 0 when the agent is not a member of
the coalitions representing the product variants dis-
played to customers and the value
when the
product variants are displayed to customers.
Risk
venueRe
vRe
The utility function U of a module agent depends
on the risk function which is supposed to decrease
revenue during the auction process, the revenue
ICEIS 2004 - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
8
function and the Dutch auction function. The
adapted
for our case is:
opt
f
= ),,,Re,,,( UPgvenueRiskAcf
iopt
[]
[]
{}
()
{}
1,0
,0
)(Re)(1maxarg
ω
αω
PtgKvtRisk
ii
Tt
The adapted
opt
returns the point in time t at
which the module agent has to bid for the Dutch
auction to maximize its utility. But note that if
then
f
[
Tt ,0
]
1=
α
and if there is no
[
]
Tt ,0
maximizing the utility (
then )Tt >
0=
α
and the
module agent intends on not participating in the
coalition.
Furthermore, suppose that a module agent
is allowed to participate in p coalitions:
. For each coalition the module
agent estimates
opt
and at the point in time t=0
where an auction begins, the module agent has to
develop a plan
ij
MA
{
pkC
k
,,1 , K
}
f
()
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
ij
ppkk
ij
t
tttPlan
00000
1
0
10
,,,,,,
ααα
KK=
=
which indicates whether or not and when to bid for
each coalition. For notation purposes, when
k
0=
α
, the module agent allocates to
k
an infinite
value
0
t
(
)
=
0
k
, which is in accordance with the fact
that an agent will never bid and then not to partici-
pate. Moreover, by developing a plan the module
agent has to consider its account constraint. It is not
allowed to pay for coalitions more than the account
surplus. This means that
surplusAccountfees
t
. It
is also conceivable that the module agent wants to
allocate only a certain sum of monetary units for the
coalitions which should be formed to be presented to
one customer. This depends on the self-preservation
strategy the module wants to pursue.
However, the agent plan determined at
0
=
t
is
not fixed for the whole auction process. The module
agent has to adapt this plan according to the changes
which could occur in its environment. Suppose that
the tuples of
(
)
ij
t
0=
are arranged so that
1 pk
KK
. Suppose that
21
t
and that at a point in time
an agent from the
same class wins the bid or an agent from another
class imposes participation constraints. At this point
in time, the module agent has to estimate once again
opt
for the remaining coalitions to determine
whether and when to bid. This is legitimate because
when the participation in one coalition fails the
module agent can allocate the resources he has
planed to expend differently. The resulting plan at a
point in time
Plan
ttt
0
tand
000
0
0
1
tt <
f
1
=
t
is:
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
ij
ppkk
ij
t
tttPlan
11111
2
1
21
,,,,,,
ααα
KK=
=
.
The application of the described process will
continue until different coalitions are formed.
Recapitulating, we can say that the main advan-
tages of the developed multi-agent approach are:
the easy maintenance of the system: when intro-
ducing new module variants or eliminating old
ones, it is sufficient to introduce or eliminate
module agents,
the dynamic variety generation during the inter-
action process and variety steering as well as,
the application of a market mechanism concept
which lets the intelligent agents themselves de-
cide according to the current situation about
their suitability to fulfill real customers’ re-
quirements. Such a market mechanism based
approach enables us to efficiently carry out the
coordination mechanism, even for a high num-
ber of involved agents (Shehory et al., 1998).
DYNAMIC MULTI-AGENT BASED VARIETY FORMATION AND STEERING IN MASS CUSTOMIZATION
9
4 TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE
In this section we present a complete model for
variety formation and steering based on the multi-
agent system approach developed in the previous
section. We propose to interface the module agents’
pool to a customer advisory system to support dy-
namic variety formation during the real time cus-
tomer advisory process.
Advisory systems are software systems that
guide customers according to their profile and re-
quirements through a „personal”, customer oriented
advisory process to elicit their real needs from an
objective point of view (Blecker et al., 2004). Dur-
ing the advisory process, the system suggests the
customer product variants according to his profile
and refines them through the dialog. At the end of
the advisory process, the customer is supported with
product variants which fulfill his real needs.
At each advisory session the multi-agent system
dynamically creates coalitions of product variants
that can be recommended to the user. Therefore, we
aim at integrating the system into the existing infor-
mation system landscape. Figure 1 depicts the ar-
chitecture of such a system.
Beside the agents’ pool the architecture consists
of the following main elements:
an online interface to the data of the advisory
system that provides a customer’s preferences,
an interface to the supplier’s back office which
for instance comprises a CRM or OLAP system,
additional filtering and target costing data
sources,
librarian agents that have access to all back of-
fice systems and make proper data available for
the other components,
coordination agents that coordinate the variety
formation in the agents’ pool and,
a blackboard that supports communication be-
tween the module agents’ pool and its environ-
ment.
The system also supports variety steering. As
was mentioned in the previous section, the account
balance of the agents provides a measurement of the
success of a module variant which constantly can be
analyzed by a variety steering agent or humans.
Before we technically describe the system, we
will describe the main idea on the basis of a sce-
nario: During the advisory process the system cap-
tures the customer’s requirements according to his
knowledge level. During the advisory dialog the
system presents the user a proposal of several prod-
uct variants according to his profile and preferences.
These are refined through the advisory dialog which
leads to dynamically refined suggestions for product
variants. Finally, the system generates suggestions
of product variants that meet real customer needs.
The creation of a valid subset of product variant
coalitions is dynamically carried out by following
steps:
Module Agents' Pool
Platform
Agents
Must-
Module
Agents
Can-
Module
Agents
PA
11
PA
1n
PA
13
PA
12
MA
2n
MA
21
MA
22
MA
31
MA
3n
MA
42
MA
41
MA
m1
MA
mn
MA
m2
Coord
1
Coord
2
Coord
n
CRM-Datasource
OLAP-Datasource
Customer Interests-
Datasource
Target Costing-
Datasource
Lib
1
Lib
2
Lib
n
Valid.
Agent
Presented Subset
Var.
St.
Advisory
Online Data
Bla ckboard
Pro d. Mode l
Conf. Orders
Variety Steering
Filtering Component
Human Agent
Intelligent Agent
Customer Configuration Order
Data Exchange/Communication
External Datasource
(e.g. Webservice)
Agents:
MA (Module Agent)
PA (Platform Agent)
Coord. (Coordination Agent)
Lib. (Librarian Agent)
V.St. (Variety Steering Agent)
Valid. (Validation Agent)
Figure 1: Technical architecture for an agent based variety formation and steering
(1)
A so-called librarian agent obtains data from the
online advisory data source. These data can con-
tain both user data and product preferences – de-
ICEIS 2004 - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
10
pending on the knowledge level of the user. If
the user is familiar to the domain, he can make a
decision on the product level; otherwise the sys-
tem gathers his needs, which can be captured in
e.g. a language different form product specifica-
tion. For instance, data can contain personal data
such as the customer’s age or marital status, his
personal preferences or desired product attrib-
utes. In the automotive domain it could be about
a male customer with two children who is sporty,
but prefers an economical car.
(2)
The information about the customer is supple-
mented by the librarian agent: Depending on
whether the customer is recognized (e.g. by a
login process) this data can be obtained from the
CRM data source where both the customer’s in-
terests and his past buying behavior are stored.
Otherwise the information can be provided from
the OLAP data source where traditional web
mining techniques such as clustering are used to
extend the customer’s profile. The result of this
process is an improved profile of the customer’s
needs.
(3)
In order to support the negotiation process in the
module agents’ pool, the librarian agent calls for
service from the filtering component in order to
convert the customer attributes to product attrib-
utes. For instance, this can be based on expert
rules or statistical methods. As an example the
attributes of (1) could be inferred that the car
should be a sedan with no automatic transmis-
sion that runs on diesel.
(4)
The target costing component is used to estimate
the costs of the product’s functions that the cus-
tomer probably will have to pay for. For in-
stance, this could be based on past sales of a
clustered customer group.
(5)
The data is passed on to the coordination agent
who monitors the load of the module agents’
pool. If the number of customer configuration
orders is below a certain limit, the coordination
agent sets forth a request for new product vari-
ants with the desired product properties onto the
blackboard. Note that these product properties
derived from the customer attributes only support
the negotiation process, they are not constraints.
Besides for that, the coordination agent selects
both appropriate platform agents who should
carry out the auction, and the number of coali-
tions of product variants they should form. This
decision is based on the customer’s profile and
the product model.
(6)
Now the negotiation process is carried out as de-
scribed in the previous chapter, until all coali-
tions are formed. The resulting coalitions are put
back onto the blackboard where they are re-
moved from the coordination agents and passed
to the validation agent.
(7)
The validation agent requests data from informa-
tion agents in order choose a subset of the avail-
able coalitions of variants to present them to the
customer. This task is performed on the basis of
validation which is a kind of „reverse mapping”.
That means that the properties of the selected
coalitions are mapped to customer attributes as a
kind of verification. The best coalitions are pre-
sented and rewarded with monetary revenue for
the accounts.
(8)
If the customer makes the decision to buy a cer-
tain product variant of the presented subset, it is
conceivable that an additional reward would be
sent back to the accounts of the corresponding
module agents.
(9)
Additionally, we propose the use of the account
level of each module agent as an indicator to
support variety steering decisions. In an inde-
pendent process the system makes suggestions to
eliminate module variants. If the account level is
negative or low in comparison with competing
module variants, this is an indicator to remove
the module variant. Furthermore, the introduc-
tion of new module variants can affect the inter-
nal and external complexities which can be esti-
mated by computing suitable key metrics
(Blecker et al., 2003).
In conclusion we can see that the complexity is
spread throughout all system components in the
multi agent system:
The module agents’ pool is responsible for carry-
ing out a negotiation for forming product variant
coalitions,
coordination agents manage the blackboard and
the general interface between the agents’ pool
and its environment,
librarian agents not only interface the back office
systems, they independently obtain data and
process them in an intelligent way to support the
other agents optimally,
a validation agent carries out the validation of the
module variants coalition independently of the
decisions of the other system components.
For the implementation of such, we propose to
base the system on Java technology. This not only
ensures platform independence, it also provides a
uniform framework for the implementation of all
components.
All back office systems such as CRM, OLAP or
other data sources must be connected via custom
interfaces, for example by XML. On the variety
formation system, data can be provided by web ser-
vices so that the agents can access the services. The
agents’ pool can be realized in one virtual machine.
Due to the decision to represent module variants in-
DYNAMIC MULTI-AGENT BASED VARIETY FORMATION AND STEERING IN MASS CUSTOMIZATION
11
stead of product variants as agents, this assumption
is admissible. This way we can lower the communi-
cation costs because this enables a direct interaction
between the agent instances. The coordination be-
tween the agents’ pool and the external agents is car-
ried out via a blackboard where all agents are regis-
tered. Coordination agents, validation agents and li-
brarian agents can be distributed for reasons of load
balancing. Communication between these agents can
be performed via Java’s RMI (Remote Method In-
vocation) or CORBA to support other systems.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have depicted the main problems
which are triggered by increasing variety in mass
customization. Variety involves an internal
complexity inside a company’s operations, as well
as an external complexity from a customer’s per-
spective. To mitigate both complexities’ problems,
the main idea is to provide an information system
solution which is capable of both supporting cus-
tomers during the interaction process by proposing
and refining product variants and simultaneously
supporting variety steering decisions. The agent
technology is able to be identified as a suitable ap-
proach to cope with this problem in a decentralized,
self-coordinating way.
The developed system integrates both customer’s
and supplier’s perspectives in one information sys-
tem. We outlined how module variants can be repre-
sented as intelligent agents that negotiate with each
other to ensure their survival within the scope of va-
riety steering. Based on the decision theory’s model
for rational agents, we formally define the function
that an agent strives to optimize. The negotiation
process between the intelligent agents is based on
the target costing concept and a Dutch auction. This
is also described in a formal way defining the possi-
ble functions which have to be determined. Because
we intend to carry out simulations of the entire sys-
tem, several functions which determine the intelli-
gence of the defined agents should be tested. Based
on these simulations we will decide which imple-
mentation will lead to a working prototype. Fur-
thermore, a technical architecture for the
agent-
based variety formation and steering in mass cus-
tomization is proposed.
The main advantages of the developed approach
are the easy maintenance of the system, the dynamic
variety generation and variety steering, as well as the
application of a market mechanism concept sup-
ported by agent technology. The adopted market
mechanism presents a relevant approach enabling
one to overcome the shortcomings of existing inter-
action systems and variety steering methods. Thus,
instead of building rigid rules in the interaction sys-
tem that map customer requirements into product
attributes, the proposed market mechanism approach
lets the intelligent agents themselves decide accord-
ing to the current situation about their suitability to
fulfill real customers’ requirements. Furthermore,
the market mechanism enables us to connect two
relevant concepts in mass customization, namely
which product variants should be retained in the
product assortment and which specific ones from
this assortment should be selected and offered to a
particular customer.
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