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Authors: K. Chalkias ; F. Mpaldimtsi ; D. Hristu-Varsakelis and G. Stephanides

Affiliation: University of Macedonia, Greece

ISBN: 978-989-8111-12-8

Keyword(s): Two-party key establishment, one-pass protocols, key-compromise impersonation, one-way channel.

Related Ontology Subjects/Areas/Topics: Cryptographic Techniques and Key Management ; Information and Systems Security ; Public Key Crypto Applications

Abstract: Key establishment protocols are among the most important security mechanisms via which two or more parties can generate a common session key to in order to encrypt their communications over an otherwise insecure network. This paper is concerned with the vulnerability of one-pass two-party key establishment protocols to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks. The latter may occur once an adversary has obtained the long-term private key of an honest party, and represents a serious — but often underestimated — threat. This is because an entity may not be aware that her computer has been compromised and her private key is exposed, and because a successful impersonation attack may result in far greater harm than the reading of past and future conversations. Our aim is to describe two main classes of K-CI attacks that can be mounted against all of the best-known one-pass protocols, including MQV and HMQV. We show that one of the attacks described can be somewhat avoided (though not com pletely eliminated) through the combined use of digital signatures and time-stamps; however, there still remains a class of K-CI threats for which there is no obvious solution. (More)

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Paper citation in several formats:
Chalkias K.; Mpaldimtsi F.; Hristu-Varsakelis D.; Stephanides G. and (2007). ON THE KEY-COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION VULNERABILITY OF ONE-PASS KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS.In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2007) ISBN 978-989-8111-12-8, pages 222-228. DOI: 10.5220/0002125702220228

@conference{secrypt07,
author={K. Chalkias and F. Mpaldimtsi and D. Hristu{-}Varsakelis and G. Stephanides},
title={ON THE KEY-COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION VULNERABILITY OF ONE-PASS KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS},
booktitle={Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2007)},
year={2007},
pages={222-228},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0002125702220228},
isbn={978-989-8111-12-8},
}

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2007)
TI - ON THE KEY-COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION VULNERABILITY OF ONE-PASS KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS
SN - 978-989-8111-12-8
AU - Chalkias, K.
AU - Mpaldimtsi, F.
AU - Hristu-Varsakelis, D.
AU - Stephanides, G.
PY - 2007
SP - 222
EP - 228
DO - 10.5220/0002125702220228

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