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Authors: Sarah McCarthy 1 ; James Howe 2 ; Neil Smyth 3 ; Séamus Brannigan 1 and Máire O’Neill 1

Affiliations: 1 Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queen’s University Belfast and U.K. ; 2 PQShield Ltd., Oxford and U.K. ; 3 Allstate NI, Belfast and U.K.

ISBN: 978-989-758-378-0

Keyword(s): Lattice-based Cryptography, Fault Attacks, FALCON, Digital Signatures, Post-quantum Cryptography, BEARZ, Countermeasures.

Related Ontology Subjects/Areas/Topics: Applied Cryptography ; Cryptographic Techniques and Key Management ; Data Engineering ; Databases and Data Security ; Information and Systems Security

Abstract: Post-quantum cryptography is an important and growing area of research due to the threat of quantum computers, as recognised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recent call for standardisation. FALCON is a lattice-based signature candidate submitted to NIST, which has good performance but lacks in research with respect to implementation attacks and resistance. This research proposes the first fault attack analysis of FALCON and finds its lattice trapdoor sampler is as vulnerable to fault attacks as the GPV sampler used in alternative signature schemes. We simulate the post-processing component of this fault attack and achieve a 100% success rate at retrieving the private-key. This research then proposes an evaluation of countermeasures to prevent this fault attack and timing attacks of FALCON. We provide cost evaluations on the overheads of the proposed countermeasures which shows that FALCON has only up to 30% deterioration in performance of its key generatio n, and only 5% in signing, compared to runtimes without countermeasures. (More)

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Paper citation in several formats:
McCarthy, S.; Howe, J.; Smyth, N.; Brannigan, S. and O’Neill, M. (2019). BEARZ Attack FALCON: Implementation Attacks with Countermeasures on the FALCON Signature Scheme.In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 2: SECRYPT, ISBN 978-989-758-378-0, pages 61-71. DOI: 10.5220/0007834800610071

@conference{secrypt19,
author={Sarah McCarthy. and James Howe. and Neil Smyth. and Séamus Brannigan. and Máire O’Neill.},
title={BEARZ Attack FALCON: Implementation Attacks with Countermeasures on the FALCON Signature Scheme},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 2: SECRYPT,},
year={2019},
pages={61-71},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0007834800610071},
isbn={978-989-758-378-0},
}

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 2: SECRYPT,
TI - BEARZ Attack FALCON: Implementation Attacks with Countermeasures on the FALCON Signature Scheme
SN - 978-989-758-378-0
AU - McCarthy, S.
AU - Howe, J.
AU - Smyth, N.
AU - Brannigan, S.
AU - O’Neill, M.
PY - 2019
SP - 61
EP - 71
DO - 10.5220/0007834800610071

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