

# Unravelling the Sequential Patterns of Cyber Attacks: A Temporal Analysis of Attack Dependencies

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**Keywords:** Cyber-Attack Sequence Identification, Deep Learning for Cyber Attacks Detection, Network Intrusion Detection, Time-Series Attack Prediction.


**Abstract:** Cybersecurity has become increasingly challenging, particularly in understanding and predicting complex attack sequences within network traffic. In this paper, we introduce a new approach for predicting cybersecurity attacks utilizing time series data and transformer architecture, which has achieved the state-of-the-art F1-score for a time series, multiclass problem on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. This is despite earlier studies either considered binary task only (attack/non-attack) or did not deal with the problem as a time series. For the first time, we integrated time series prediction with analysis and visualization methods for detecting possible sequences of cyber-attacks, which were then verified with domain experts. Statistical methods confirmed the significance of the detected sequence, ensuring that these attacks are not random. Our findings revealed the existence of patterns of attack sequences, demonstrating how one attack type often precedes another in predictable patterns. This paper not only fills a critical gap in attack progression modelling but also introduces advanced visualization and analysis that confirm the predictions of the model.


## 1 INTRODUCTION

Network intrusion is a significant threat to businesses and organizations, and to protect against it, networks use Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) with signature-based and anomaly-based detection (Marir et al., 2018). Anomaly detection has been a main focus since the 1960s, and today's networks have a large number of datasets and complex algorithms, allowing for the efficient use of different approaches such as time series (Darban et al., 2022). Research in network intrusion detection has focused on identifying and classifying anomalies using time series data, leading to a shift from traditional statistical methods to machine learning methods (Psychogyios et al., 2023). Time series data is particularly important in cybersecurity as it can detect changes over time, identify patterns and deviations, and allow for real-time analysis and helps uncover complex anomalies that are not feasible using traditional analysis. Although research in time

series and cybersecurity has been witnessing many advancements, this field is confronted with several problems that face both traditional and deep learning approaches (Al-Ghuwairi et al., 2023). When it comes to traditional methods such as the Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and Symbolic Aggregate Approximation (SAX) models, one main problem is the nature of cybersecurity threats, which are varying and dynamic. Also, those methods are largely static and not able to handle the large volumes and high velocities of data generated within today's cybersecurity networks (Smith, 2019).

This paper introduces a new approach for predicting cyber security attacks utilizing time series data and transformer architecture, achieving a state-of-the-art macro F1-score for a time series, multiclass classification problem on the UNSW-NB15 dataset, where previous studies either only considered binary classification task or did not deal with the problem as a time series. Furthermore, the study integrates for the

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first time; time series prediction with analysis, and visualization methods for detecting possible sequences of cyber-attacks, which is verified with domain experts and shows statistical significance for the detection sequence of attacks.

## 1.1 The Paper Contribution

As detailed in the results section, this paper's contributions are listed below, ordered by their significance from the authors' point of view:

- For the first time, this study integrates time-series prediction with analysis and visualization techniques to identify and detect cyber-attack sequences,
- Investigating the possible sequence of attacks on a single IP destination, from different source IPs,
- Providing insights into how some attack types evolve,
- Improving the performance of deep learning models for temporal attack pattern prediction.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the related work, while Section 3 details the research methodology. In Section 4, the experimental setup is described, followed by results and discussions in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6.

## 2 RELATED WORK

Over the last decade, numerous approaches have been developed to address cyber-attacks, ranging from signature-based approaches to more advanced machine learning and deep learning models. The following section surveys notable contributions in this field, highlighting both traditional and state-of-the-art techniques for time series and non-time series multi-class classification in the field of cybersecurity.

### 2.1 Non-Time Series Classification

Kasongo et al. (2020) used the XGBoost algorithm on the UNSW-NB15 dataset, utilizing a filter-based feature selection. They also used other algorithms including KNN, LR, SVMs, ANNs, and DT. The experiments explored both binary and multiclass classification setups. Results indicated that employing XGBoost achieved the best performance of an F-1 score of 69% for multi-class classification. Jouhari et al. (2024) suggested a hybrid model that integrates a lightweight convolutional neural network

(CNN) with bidirectional long short-term memory (BiLSTM) for intrusion detection in IoT networks. They implemented a Chi-square feature selection technique and addressed the issue of class imbalance by implementing a weighted loss function which enhanced their model's performance. Their proposed solution achieved an F-score of 97.09% for multi-class classification respectively.

In another study, Al-Obaidi et al., (2023) used multiple machine learning algorithms on the UNSW-NB15 to perform multi-class classification. They performed label encoding then they split the dataset into 90 % training and 10 % testing. The best model was XGBoost achieving an F-Score of 68.8% for multi-class classification. In a recent study by Talukder et al. (2024), the authors proposed the use of ML-based intrusion detection, where they used random oversampling and stacking feature embeddings. The authors performed data cleansing, feature scaling, and feature reduction using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The authors used 10-fold cross-validation to train different ML models on UNSW-NB15, CIC-IDS2017, and CIC-IDS2018 datasets. They performed multi-class classification. The highest F1-score was 99.9% achieved by the Random Forest model.

### 2.2 Time Series Classification

In a study by Psychogyios et al. (2023), the authors implemented an LSTM model to perform time series binary classification on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. They performed data pre-processing including one-hot encoding to the categorical features and min-max scaler to perform data scaling. Converting the dataset to a time series format was the last step in the pre-processing process. This was accomplished by first sorting the dataset according to its starting time feature. Next, time windows  $W$ , which are time points and labels, were created while all the features were retained. This resulted in a multi-variate time series problem, where  $W$  represents the size of the input window, and the label is the target that must be predicted. They utilized the 5-fold cross-validation technique and averaged the results across the five folds. They ran multiple experiments with different  $W$  values ranging from 1 to 200, the highest F-score achieved (80%) was in the experiment where the  $W$  was set to 200 (Psychogyios et al., 2023). In another study by Alsharaiah et al. (2024), the authors proposed integrating an LSTM with attention mechanisms to enhance the analysis of spatial and temporal features in the network data. The model was tested on the UNSW-NB15 dataset, after applying

data normalization, and feature encoding for categorical features. Then, they performed binary classification with different attention dimensions. The proposed model achieved accuracy of 82.2% and 92.2% for attention dimensions of 150 and 300 respectively outperforming the existing binary classification methods applied on the same dataset.

### 2.3 Identified Research Gap

As shown in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, no studies investigating the possibility of sequential attack patterns, while a very small number of studies considered the temporal patterns in cyber-attack prediction. Furthermore, the majority of the papers considered attack predictions as a binary classification problem (attack/non-attack) and oversampled the used data sets to achieve high prediction results. In this paper, the attack progression modelling is studied, considering the temporal nature of attacks.

## 3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 Dataset Description

The dataset used in this paper is the UNSW-NB15 dataset (Moustafa & Slay, 2015), which is widely used for benchmarking network intrusion detection systems. The dataset has around 2.5 million records representing network traffic for multiple source and destination IPs, as described by 48 features, and a label representing the attack type. The features include basic information such as source and destination IP addresses, as well as more advanced features such as the packet size, time to live, and protocol type. This dataset also contains time-based features, which enable time-series analysis and studying the temporal patterns of different attacks. There are 9 attack types, namely, Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, Denial of Service (DoS), Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode, and Worms. Shellcode and Worms were excluded from our analysis as, they have an extremely small number of records, compared to the rest of the attack types. For a more detailed description of the data set, please refer to (Azeroual et al., 2022).

### 3.2 Pre-Processing and Feature Engineering

As the main objective of this paper is to study the temporal nature, and possible sequence of attacks, for each data set, the records were grouped by the destination IP, where destination IPs with only normal traffic (with no attacks) are excluded. This splitting was necessary to study whether there are specific patterns and/or temporal dependencies between the different types of attacks and potentially capturing common attack chains. Table 1 shows the number of records for each destination IP.

Table 1: Destination IPs and their record original count.

Dataset No.	Destination IP	No. Records
1	149.171.126.14	45,375
2	149.171.126.10	43,877
3	149.171.126.12	30,308
4	149.171.126.17	26,759
5	149.171.126.13	17,647
6	149.171.126.19	16,022
7	149.171.126.11	14,104
8	149.171.126.16	12,219

Common pre-processing steps have been performed, such as dropping null values, as well as excluding records with negative packet length. Feature selection has been performed to choose the best set of features, using different feature selection techniques such as sequential feature selection, random forest feature importance index, and a domain expert's opinion after understanding the dataset. We ended up with 14 features, including, transaction bytes, service type (i.e. https), protocol, TCP connection round-trip, source bits, source to destination time to live, means of packet sizes, and some aggregated counts of connection details. The target class is encoded to integers from 0 to 7. The data set for each IP is then split into 80 % training and 20% testing. It has been noticed that the normal traffic (normal class) is a minority class in all destination IPs, which is not the case in real-world scenarios, where a majority of the incoming traffic packets are normal traffic. To handle this issue, the SMOTE oversampling method has been used on the normal class only, to maintain the nature of data, where the majority class (traffic) in all destination IPs is normal. The generated data by SMOTE was equal in number to the sum of all the records of other attack types (i.e., 50% normal, 50% for all other attack types together). A check on the SMOTE data is performed to avoid any duplicates on the timestamp feature.

Due to irregular time intervals of the time series, a new feature named *time\_interval*, which is the difference in seconds, between the timestamp of each record and the previous record timestamp. This has been followed by applying a one-hot encoding technique to the selected categorical features which are 'service', and 'proto'. Another important pre-processing is data scaling, where the StandardScaler has been used for data scaling.

### 3.3 Sequence Generation

The input sequence for the model is generated by sorting the dataset according to timestamps. A lookback window in seconds (sequence size) and a future window in seconds (future size) are defined to create time-based sequences for the model's input. This process incorporates examining each timestamp in the dataset, creating a historical window according to the sequence size, and acquiring future labels from the following time interval. Consequently, this leads to sequences of variable length that are incompatible with the model input requirements. A function is employed to generate a fixed-length input sequence within the batch. This function generates an array of Boolean variables initialized to "True," representing the padding mask for sequences, based on the maximum sequence length. The function populates variable-length sequences into a fixed-length format. It also applies a padding mask to designate "real" non-padded positions as "False" within the mask for the transformer. This differentiation allows the model to distinguish between actual data and padded positions, which are to be ignored during training. This method transforms the dataset into sequences with fixed time windows, incorporating the time factor and thereby creating a multi-variate, multi-class time-series classification problem.

### 3.4 The Proposed Architecture

In this paper, a transformer architecture has been used, as transformers are highly beneficial for time-series analysis. Unlike recurrent networks, transformers process whole sequences concurrently, allowing each input element to attend to all other elements, therefore, the capacity to capture both local and global dependencies. The used transformer also has a custom encoder layer that retains attention weights for each encoder layer. This feature enables visualization of the model's attention over time steps, hence improving the model's interpretability. The model architecture comprises encoder layers, which include multi-head attention. Furthermore, positional

encoding is utilized to maintain the sequence order of the input, enabling the model to monitor both short-term variations and long-range dependencies. In each layer, multi-head attention separates the sequence representations into several subspaces to capture diverse temporal and contextual patterns. Feed-forward sub-networks perform transformations on encodings, followed by dropout and normalization steps which contributes to the stabilization of training. A final normalization layer prepares the output for the decoder layer which is the final layer in the architecture.

## 4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

In the following section, the selection of the loss function, model hyper-parameters, regularization techniques, and training protocol are outlined.

### 4.1 Model Training

The input features are fed to the Transformer, which processes sequences using positional encoding then passed to the custom encoder layers. The padding mask is passed through the encoder layers to prevent self-attention computations from ignoring padded elements. Each layer produces an attention map, capturing interaction token weights for better interpretability. Then, the model applies a mask-aware pooling mechanism, to create a real tokens mask which is the logical inverse of the padding mask, and indicates which positions are valid (i.e., non-padded). Then, it computes a weighted sum of hidden representations across the time dimension and divides it by the count of valid tokens to obtain a mean representation. The output vector is passed to the linear decoder layer for final predictions.

To handle the class imbalance problem, the Focal Loss function has been utilized. Focal Loss modifies the cross-entropy component by adjusting it according to the difficulty of predictions, by adding it in equation (1). This method is especially beneficial for time-series data in which minority classes are both rare and essential to identify.

$$((1 - p_t)^\gamma) \quad (1)$$

where  $\gamma$  represents the degree to which easily classified examples are down-weight and  $p_t$  is the predicted probability for class  $t$ . In that case, the model prioritizes challenging or minority-class instances.

### 4.1.1 Model Hyper Parameters

The model is configured with an embedding dimensionality of 128 for each token and employs multi-head attention with 4 heads. 8 encoder layers have been used, to facilitate deep feature extraction from temporal sequences. Every encoder layer incorporates a dropout probability of 0.2 to prevent over-fitting. The final classification layer outputs predictions for the designated number of classes derived from the encoded sequence representation.

Regularization techniques are implemented to enhance model's generalization. A dropout rate of 0.2 is applied within the Transformer layers to reduce the risk of co-adaptation among hidden units. Secondly, weight decay of  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  is utilized in the optimizer to penalize excessively large weights. These techniques enable the model to develop more robust and generalizable patterns from the training data. The chosen architecture achieves the balance between the computational cost and successfully capturing the temporal dependencies between sequences while not overlooking the minority class and misclassifying them.

### 4.1.2 Training Parameters

The maximum number of epochs is set to 50, utilizing mini-batches of size 8, which is necessitated by the dataset's complexity. The optimizer used is Adam, with a learning rate of  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  balancing rapid convergence and the risk of overshooting local minima. In each mini-batch, the training data are randomized to decrease correlation among successive samples. Conversely, validation and testing datasets are not shuffled to maintain temporal relationships during evaluation. To avoid over-fitting an early stopping mechanism is implemented. At the end of each epoch, the model is evaluated on the validation set, and the F1 score is recorded. Training is halted if the F1-score does not improve within a patience window of five epochs. This criterion ensures that the model avoids over-fitting.

### 4.1.3 Evaluation Metrics

The models' performance is assessed by the F1 score, Precision, and Recall. These metrics are particularly vital in imbalanced datasets, as accuracy is biased to the dominant class. The F1 score, equation is shown below:

$$(F1 = 2 \times \frac{Precision \times Recall}{Precision + Recall}) \quad (2)$$

In time-series multiclass classification, handling class imbalance is crucial, as minority or unusual events may appear sporadically.

## 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

### 5.1 Model's Performance Results

The data set of the destination IP which has the largest number of samples (dataset 1) has been used. Different sets of experiments are conducted using input sequence sizes of 50, 90, 120, 150, and 200 seconds respectively, while fixing a future size of 10 seconds. In these experiments, it was noticed that larger input sequences require increased computational power for model training, yet do not necessarily produce improved results. The smaller sequence sizes tend to underperform and fail to capture the temporal dependencies necessary for the successful classification of minority classes. The experiments showed that a sequence size of 90 seconds produced the best results across all tested sizes while maintaining low computational resource usage. The experiment was further extended by increasing the future size from 10 seconds to 30 seconds. The model maintained strong performance with a sequence size of 90 seconds and a future size of 30 seconds, demonstrating its capability to capture the temporal dependencies necessary for classifying all classes, particularly the minority classes. Table 2 shows the precision, recall, and macro F1-score for each sequence size and future size evaluated on the testing dataset. From Table 2, it can be seen that the sequence size of 90 sec. and the future size of 30 sec. gave the best F1-score across all the attack classes on dataset 1. The F1 scores for different attack types in addition to the attack distribution after applying SMOTE on normal class for the data set 1 are shown in Table 3. It can be seen that all classes have been detected with an F1- score above 90%, except for the analysis attack, which has the least number of records.

Table 2: Model's performance on dataset 1 with different sequences and future sizes in seconds.

Seq. size	Future size	Pre.	Rec.	Macro F1
50	10	0.83	0.85	0.84
90	10	0.88	0.88	0.87
<b>90</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>0.92</b>	<b>0.93</b>	<b>0.92</b>
120	10	0.97	0.80	0.88
150	10	0.91	0.81	0.86
200	10	0.76	0.92	0.83

Table 3: Total No. of Records and F-score for each attack type in the test set of dataset 1.

Records	Attack Type	Test F-Score
41657	Normal	1.00
1252	Reconnaissance	0.94
3,351	Exploits	0.95
609	DoS	0.91
33661	Generic	0.94
2637	Fuzzers	0.90
74	Backdoor	0.93
73	Analysis	0.81

### 5.2 Temporal Patterns Analysis

To get more insights on possible attack dependencies, we used advanced visualization methods like the Sankey Diagram and Transition Heatmap. Each one of these diagrams reveals whether the model captured possible sequences of attacks. Figure 1 shows a Sankey Diagram that identifies dominant attack pathways and show high-level trends. It can be seen that the largest flow originates from normal in the input sequence and transits to normal in the future sequence, which indicates that the dataset has a high proportion of normal traffic. Other flows, such as from generic or reconnaissance attacks appear to be less frequent. Some transitions, such as from generic to backdoor or DoS, appear to be minimal. This indicates that such sequences are rare or that certain attacks do not typically follow one another. However, reconnaissance and generic attacks are primary precursors to a DoS attack, while a backdoor attack may result from a sequence comprising generic and exploit attacks. The diagram illustrates that one of the most prevalent attack sequences preceding a backdoor attack consists of 14 exploit attacks and 918 generic attacks. The Transition Heatmap in Figure 2 provides another perspective by showing how the distribution of past attack events correlates with each predicted class in a single visual framework. The colour gradient highlights which patterns of historical attacks is associated with a given prediction. By analysing the diagram, we can see combinations of past activities that frequently lead to specific attack types. For example, we can notice that the sequences that contain some fuzzers attacks are most likely to be followed by another fuzzers attack. These types of figures give such valuable information to the domain experts who can use those insights to prevent future attacks.

We further extended the analysis of the past sequence to analyse the actual sequence that the attacks follow within that time sequence and the predicted attack in the future after this sequence.

Figure 3 shows one of the most common sequences of attacks ordered by their time of occurrence and the predicted label for this sequence. In figure 3, normal activity (yellow) span consistently through the early (0-20) and later (60-80) time steps. The transition to a cluster of reconnaissance events (orange) between time steps 20 and 35 shows the shift to malicious behaviour. From time step 35 onward, the attack type emerges as exploits (red), with the arrow labelled recon ⇒ exploits, which highlights how reconnaissance flows into active exploitation. Such figures can be used by domain experts to prevent subsequent attacks.




Figure 1: Sankey Diagram showing attacks' distribution in the input sequence and its corresponding attack label in the future sequence.




Figure 2: Transition Heatmap showing common attacks' patterns within the sequence and its predicted future label.




Figure 3: Visualization for example key transitions in data set 1.

### 5.3 Model's Generalization

To test our model's generalizability, the model was tested on the rest of destination IP datasets from 2-7. Table 4 shows the model's generalization performance with average of 82% F1-score on the 7 datasets. However, the model performance on smaller size datasets is lower, compared to larger data sets. This can be attributed to the limited number of minority class's records in these datasets.

Table 4: Model's performance across all sub-datasets.

Dataset No.	Precision	Recall	Macro F1
2	0.95	0.92	0.93
3	0.86	0.83	0.84
4	0.87	0.83	0.85
5	0.81	0.71	0.74
6	0.81	0.77	0.79
7	0.79	0.72	0.74
8	0.67	0.67	0.67

### 5.4 Statistical Analysis

To further investigate whether the detected sequence of attacks are statistically significant, a deeper statistical analysis was conducted on dataset 1 results. A Chi-Square test on the entire transition matrix has been performed. Two of the most common attack distributions within the 90-second sequence were picked to see the probability of the predicted attacks following these sequences. Starting with the sequence that contains 5 exploits and 3 reconnaissance, the probability of the predicted attack for this sequence was assessed for each attack class and the result stated that the subsequent attack was backdoor which was recorded 22 times after this sequence with a probability of 73%, followed by fuzzers which was recorded 5 times achieving a probability of 17%. The second sequence tested was a combination of 1226 generic, 14 exploits, 7 dos, 3 reconnaissance, 1 fuzzers, and 1 backdoor and it transitioned to a DoS attack 30 times with a probability of 100%. This means that whenever such a combination of attacks is observed, a complete shift to DoS attacks will occur in the future. The Chi-square test result with  $\chi^2 = 111182.34$ ,  $p = 0.000$ , and degree of freedom of 20440 shows that there are meaningful relationships among the observed attacks. These results align with the findings of research by (Sufi, 2024) which state that there are dependencies between certain attack types as mentioned in our results, as well as there were some sequences of attacks that they detected using a different dataset.

### 5.5 Comparison with Previously Published Work

The F1- scores of our model was compared to the results of other published papers, which used the same data set. The comparison is based on different dimensions as shown in Table 5. From this table, it can be seen that our proposed model achieved the state-of-the-art F1 score, compared to other multiclass, time series studies. This is a significant contribution, given that we worked with unbalanced data sets. Furthermore, our proposed model is the only model that captures the relationship and the sequence of attacks within the time series. This provides a good base, where security experts can build on to protect their networks from cyber-attacks.

## 6 CONCLUSION AND INSIGHTS FROM THE RESULTS

This paper presents a novel approach for detecting cyber-attacks and the possibility of consecutive attacks, utilizing deep learning model for multi-class, multivariate time-series analysis. The model utilizes a transformer architecture to capture temporal relationships while dealing with class imbalances. The model has achieved state of the art results for detecting cyber-attacks, in multi-class classification tasks, and revealing complex relationships between different attacks, overcoming the shortcomings of the traditional methods. The model also demonstrated strong performance in classifying minority attack types, such as fuzzers and backdoor attacks, even when they occurred sporadically in the data.

The most important outcome of this paper is that there are methods that can model, analyse and detect possible sequences or dependencies between attacks. However, this might be different from one network to another, depending on their nature and the type of traffic and attacks they have. the model's learned awareness of diverse attack sequences enables it to capture transitions between attacks from reconnaissance or generic to more serious intrusions like dos or backdoors.

Future research can improve the model's performance by implementing feature augmentation, integrating Shapelet learning and discovery techniques to enhance the interpretability of the model, and exploring the model's scalability on different real-life datasets.

Table 5: Performance comparison between the proposed solution and the existing literature on the UNSW-NB15 dataset.

Method	Accuracy	F-score	Classification Type	Time series	Sequences of attacks detected	Data balanced
(Kasongo & Sun, 2020)	N/A	69%	Multi-class	No	N/A	No
(Jouhari et al., 2024)	N/A	97%	Multi-class	No	N/A	No
(Al-Obaidi et al., 2023)	N/A	68.8%	Multi-class	No	N/A	No
(Talukder et al., 2024)	N/A	99%	Multi-class	No	N/A	Yes
(Psychogyios et al., 2023).	N/A	80%	Binary	Yes	No	No
(Alsharaiah et al., 2024)	92%	N/A	Binary	Yes	No	No
<b>(Proposed Method)</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>82%</b>	<b>Multi-class</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>

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