

Efficient Modelling with Logic-Labelled Finite-State Machines of IEC 61499 Function Blocks: Simulation, Execution and Verification

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Abstract: As automation grows, so does the complexity of software systems. Hence, the urgent and pressing need for software verification, particularly for distributed systems, as they are notoriously difficult to verify. The widespread of verification techniques, such as model checking, however, have been hindered by requiring a significant level of expertise. In the realm of industrial automation, on the other hand, the IEC 61499 function block architecture has gained prominence for modelling intricate distributed automation systems, especially in demanding scenarios such as process control. However, it suffers from being event-driven, forcing semantic interpretations and the use of timed events by a central clock, to produce input for model checkers. We argue that this situation can be remedied by logic-labelled finite-state machines and control-status messages. This is the first time that these concepts have been used for producing executable and verifiable models of distributed systems for industrial automation with communication delays as is the current environment of application of the IEC 61499.

1 INTRODUCTION


“Formal methods are critical to the development of autonomous systems. Moreover, verification of the behaviour of autonomous systems is especially important when they are embedded in safety-critical systems, which are increasingly being introduced into everyday settings.” (Provan, 2024). For effective application (Sinha et al., 2019), formal verification necessitates the development of tools and methods seamlessly integrating design models with their simulation, execution, and formal verification of models without semantic discrepancies. We introduce logic-labelled finite-state machines (LLFSMs) for modelling distributed systems described with the IEC 61499 standard and show that this enables the simulation, execution, and formal verification of design. We illustrate our approach with a three-level elevator.


In the realm of industrial automation, the IEC 61499 standard’s function block architecture (Vyatkin, 2011) is gaining prominence for modelling intricate distributed automation systems, par-


ticularly in demanding scenarios such as process control. A factor fuelling this explosion of the IEC 61499 standard is the integration of operational technology (OT) with information technology (IT), resulting in a critical shift in the industrial sector (Bencherki et al., 2024). (Bencherki et al., 2024) believes that Information Technology’s rapid advancements have outpaced those in OT. As a result, the IEC 61499 standard has been postulated as the most suitable tool for the integration of IT and OT in industrial automation (Bencherki et al., 2024).

Like Ptolemy II, IEC 61499 uses event-driven block diagrams for modelling cyber-physical systems (CPSs), integrating physical processes with control and communication mechanisms. While simulation is the most commonly used validation method, it has limitations in identifying potential faults. Model checking provides exhaustive testing but faces risks, such as combinatorial explosion, particularly with complex data types and computations.

(Sinha et al., 2019) reviewed the application of formal methods in the context of industrial automation. Over the past 15 years of research, some advancements have been made in formal modelling within the IEC 61499 framework, though early efforts

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were limited by support for only basic data types, non-timed semantics, and small-scale systems.

One of the most serious limitations was the definition of a semantics for the IEC 61499. In 2010, (Cengic and Akesson, 2010) highlighted that “*IEC 61499 is based on function blocks for developing distributed control applications. However, the standard has no formal semantics, and different interpretations of it have emerged.*” Since then, many efforts have been dedicated to providing such semantics (Vyatkin, 2009; Lindgren et al., 2015; Pang et al., 2014; Dubinin and Vyatkin, 2012).

We use LLFSMs (Carrillo et al., 2020) and control-status messages (Kopetz, 2011) to demonstrate that we can efficiently and effectively produce models for industrial automation analogous to those of the function blocks of the IEC 61499 architecture. In Section 2, we review related work. In Section 3, we show the modelling of a canonical example of the IEC 61499 architecture. Subsection 3.1 describes the case study appears repeatedly in the literature (Drozdov et al., 2021; Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2021; Drozdov et al., 2017) of formal verification of a complex distributed system of function blocks with communication delays on messages. Subsection 3.2 presents the model when there are no delays in the communication channels. In this case, a simple controller results in an executable and verifiable model that satisfies safety properties and liveness properties. However, in Subsection 3.3, we do model the delays in the communication channel and show that the simple controller is insufficient. All safety properties and liveness properties become false. Thus, in Subsection 3.4 we introduce the corrected controller that accounts for message delays, and all properties become valid again. Section 3.6 shows that our modelling enables more efficient formal verification than an earlier version available in GitHub (Shatrov, 2021). Section 4 provides conclusions.

2 RELATED WORK

A *function block* is the modelling unit of the IEC 61499 standard (International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 2012). A function block is an abstraction of a composable entity that has input and output communication channels to connect to other function blocks. Both input and output channels can be (input/output) variables and (reception/generation of) events. A function block encapsulates local variables, the event handling of the input events, and, if it is a basic block, a behaviour defined by a state machine. Function blocks are grouped into composite

function blocks.

Formal verification of systems defined by function blocks uses a particular semantics, where blocks at the same level of composition receive a turn each and no two blocks execute concurrently (Drozdov et al., 2021). A distributed model partitions a set of composite blocks into parts with access to a central clock. The parts can execute concurrently corresponding to the placement of composite function blocks on distributed hardware where connections are either wired (no delays) or wireless. Wireless links exhibit random jitter, ranging from no delay to a maximum value.

By adding time stamps to events, time-aware computation (TAC) (Drozdov et al., 2021) provides a formal semantics to a function-block architecture and translate an IEC 61499 standard (International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 2012) models to SMV for formal verification (Drozdov et al., 2021; Xavier et al., 2021; Drozdov et al., 2016; Patil et al., 2015; Drozdov et al., 2017). TAC is an extension of the use of event-timestamping (Vyatkin et al., 2015; Dai et al., 2020; Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2020) where all events across function blocks receive a double-valued integer timestamp. The first value is the system clock when the event is generated. The second value is the system clock at consumption by a function block or processing at an interface.

Thus, as far as we are aware, formal verification (of a system represented by function blocks of the IEC 61499 standard) only exists by translation to SMV, under TAC, and with a queue of events that considers a first-in-first-out queue for event handling. In the case of two events with the same timestamp, a system of priorities breaks ties in the scheduler (Drozdov et al., 2021, Page 174).

(Carrillo et al., 2020) provide a formal sequential semantics for an arrangement of LLFSMs, where each machine executes in a round-robin fashion on a single CPU, implying concurrency but not distribution. This formal semantics was used to transform LLFSMs to SMV (NuSMV’s input language), providing practical semantics as a Kripke structure. Later, (McColl et al., 2022) showed that LLFSMs could be partitioned into groups with no communication, allowing parallel execution across different processors. Although this suggests potential distribution, our interest here is when the groups are distributed because of local functionality, and there is communication.

3 LLFSMs FOR THE IEC 61499

In contrast to TAC, LLFSMs are time-triggered, and in the case of distributed systems, we propose they

offer the following advantages.

1. LLFSMs can model (define) a scheduler for sub-groups of LLFSMs, which can be either round-robin, non-deterministic or some other predefined one, allocating the turn of the LLFSMs in the sub-group. These schedulers enable the modelling of different concurrency types, progress rates, and can specify which parts of the system are distributed.
2. LLFSMs model communication with shared variables; these variables are called whiteboard variables.
3. The modelling can utilise the mechanisms of a “*time-triggered communication system and control/status messages*” (Kopetz, 2011) instead of event channels (also known as an event-triggered communication system (Kopetz, 2011); which avoids the use of time-stamping.

We now exhibit visual, graphical, executable and formal modelling with LLFSMs of distributed systems with communication delays. For this, we use a well-studied case of distributed systems within the IEC 61499 standard (International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 2012). The effectiveness of arrangements of LLFSMs for modelling cyber-physical distributed systems will be even more representative because we will show we can model the message delays in communications channels from one section of the system to another.

The modelling of an elevator has been a classical case study for model checking (Merz, 2008). Moreover, the elevator case study appears in the literature of *MDS* and translation for formal verification (Meyers et al., 2020). It is the canonical example for the IEC 61499 standard (Drozdov et al., 2021; Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2021; Drozdov et al., 2017). Moreover, we could retrieve the function-block model and its translation to SMV (Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2021; Shatrov, 2021) in the case of delays in communication between components. We describe now how we reproduced particularly closely the modelling of this system, but with an arrangement of LLFSMs.

This case study involves three sub-cases. The first demonstrates system correctness when distributed and without message delays or losses. Formal verification ensures the system meets safety and liveness properties. A *safety property* (Bérard et al., 2001) guarantees that an undesirable state never occurs — for the elevator example, the doors never open unless the elevator is correctly stationed at the floor (*Absence Property Pattern* (Dwyer et al., 1998)). A *liveness property* ensures that certain actions will eventually happen, such as the elevator reaching a requested floor

(*Response Property Pattern* (Dwyer et al., 1998)).

Secondly, we demonstrate the failure of the properties when the same controller is used, but the system may suffer message delays between sections. Thirdly, we demonstrate correctness (the properties are valid again) when the controller is extended to consider such message delays. We conclude with a demonstration of the efficiency of our translated models by comparing the execution times of verification with publicly available ones.

3.1 The Three-Level Elevator Case Study

The three-level elevator system involves a controller (software) and physical components (sensors, buttons, elevator, motor) that are distributed and connected through a network with potential delays. Each level has a sensor to detect when the elevator reaches that floor, sending a signal to the controller. If the floor matches the destination, the controller stops the elevator and opens the door. However, network delays may cause the elevator to miss the floor, stop beyond it, and open the door, posing safety risks for users.

In this case, the system implements a correction, reversing the direction of the elevator for a period corresponding to the detectable delay in the message from the sensor. The three-level elevator models must satisfy the safety property and the liveness property mentioned before for each level, in total six properties (Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2021; Drozdov et al., 2017). Recall that the safety properties are that this automation cyber-physical distributed system with the correction never opens a door without the elevator properly placed at the corresponding door. We write this property in LTL for level 0, as follows.

```
G(door_0.At_CLOSED_0 ->
  X(G(elevator.At_POSITION_FLOOR_0 | door_0.At_CLOSED_0))
)
```

Replacing 0 by 1 or 2 results in the other two properties for this safety property. The other property verified in the literature (Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2021) is a liveness property and requires that a request at a floor be eventually fulfilled by the elevator getting there. For floor 2, the LTL formulation in SMV is as follows

```
G(button_floor_2.At_REQUESTED_2
  -> F elevator.At_POSITION_FLOOR_2)
```

while for *TLA+* we have

```
[] (button_floor_2State="REQUESTED_2"
  > elevatorState="POSITION_FLOOR_2")
```

The controller must initialise the elevator by commanding it to go to level 0. The existing versions of the SMV model (Shatrov, 2021) assume that when the




Figure 1: A drawing of the LLFSM for the call button at level 1.

system starts, all doors are closed. For formal verification of the sanity and liveness properties, the literature (Drozdov et al., 2017; Shatrov, 2021) proposes a *closed-loop* model that we also replicate. Thus, once initialisation is complete, users request the elevator first in level 1, then in level 2, and finally in level 0. This proposed test case (Drozdov et al., 2017) does not stop at level 1 when going to level 2. By contrast, we do not assume the doors are initially closed. Our controller not only posts commands for the elevator to reach level 0, but closes all potentially open doors during initialisation. This explains our use of the \times operator in the first safety property.

3.2 Messages Without Delays

The first model does not have messaging delays, and the controller does not consider this; thus, it has no corrections. Nevertheless, all six properties are valid.

Fig. 1 shows the LLFSM for the call button at level 1. There will be three analogous LLFSM in the arrangement corresponding to the call buttons of the three floors. A call button in floor i is typically in the state $IDLE_i$ unless it receives a control message that a




Figure 2: A drawing of the LLFSM for the door at level 1.

request by a user has been made on that floor. If such a message is received, this LLFSM will move to the state $REQUESTED_i$. When the user releases the button (no longer a control message that it is pressed, this LLFSM moves to the state $WAITING_i$, until it notices the status message of the door at level i indicating the door is open (thus, the request is served). Note that such call button LLFSM creates a status message, as the variable $i_pressed_status$ in the whiteboard.

Fig. 2 shows the LLFSM corresponding to the door at level 1. A door at level i can either be $CLOSED$ or $OPEN$, and this is communicated in a status message by updating the whiteboard variable $status_door_i_open$ (notice that this is the status that the call button consults). The doors are subject to the controller that sends them a control message to close or open them. For the i -th door, this is the control message in the whiteboard variable $[open_door_i_control]$.

The LLFSMs for the sensors that detect whether the elevator is on their floor are also machines with two states. Fig. 3 shows the LLFSM corresponding to the touch-sensor at level 1. There are three machines modelling each sensor at each level.

The i -sensor has two states. When it is being pressed by the elevator, it is in the state $TOUCHED_i$, and when it is not being pressed, it is in the state $ENABLED_i$. The touch sensor communicates its state with a status message in the whiteboard variable $sensor_i_touching$. The elevator controls the state of the touch sensor with a control message on the variable $touch_sensor_floor_i_control$.

The elevator is a more complicated LLFSM, as shown by Fig. 4.

As per the descriptions of this case study, the elevator takes four units of time to travel be-




Figure 3: A drawing of the LLFSM for the touch sensor at level 1.

tween two consecutive floors. It reacts to the controller’s control messages on its motor. The elevator moves up when the whiteboard variable `turn_motor_up_control` is true, and it moves down when the variable `turn_motor_down_control` is true. The elevator is (a) at one of the three levels, (b) in between levels lower than the bottom, or (c) higher than the top level. So as not to use even more states, three local variables are used to indicate how far it is when in between levels. For instance, when between levels one and two, the local variable `distance_to_floor_1` can have values in $\{1, 2, 3\}$.

The simple controller (Fig. 5) does not consider the possibility of the elevator bypassing a floor since there are no delays. The elevator’s arrival on a floor causes sensor detection, and the controller reads the sensor’s status immediately after.

To complete the arrangement as a closed model, we have an LLFSM (Fig. 6) that models interaction with the user and sends the control messages to the call buttons, waiting for the elevator to arrive before issuing the following control message.

3.3 Messages with Delays and Controller Without Corrections

The second model introduces delays parameterised by a maximum delay of 0, 1, or 2 units (in the literature (Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2021) the maximum delay is set to 2 units). The delays in the communication channels are placed as in the literature (Shatrov and Vyatkin, 2021) between the touch sensors and the controller. The signal that the elevator is at a particular floor can be delayed as much as 2 time units. Fig. 7 shows the LLFSM that introduces a delay between the touch sensor at level 1 and the controller. The system now has three of these delaying machines, one

for each touch sensor.

The LLFSM is analogous to a `E_DELAY` function block presented in Fig. 2 by (Drozdov et al., 2016) or in Fig. 6 by (Drozdov et al., 2017). The delay is non-deterministic, meaning it can take any of the values 0, 1, or 2 units and the system shall be correct for all these possibilities for every message.

Naturally, when the maximum delay is 0, this model reduces to the earlier model of the previous section (the delaying LLFSMs participate but have no effect). But, since the controller assumes no delays, it is enough for the maximum delay to be 1 for all properties to be false; thus, with maximum delay 2, all properties are also false (the trace that makes them false with maximum delay 1 is a trace for the case when the maximum delay is 2).

3.4 Messages with Delays and Controller With Corrections

Our third model incorporates the correction in the controller into the second model and now, no matter how we set the maximum delay, all properties are satisfied. Fig. 8 shows a fraction of the new controller. This fraction shows when the elevator departs from floor 0 to floor 1 or to floor 2. The controller closes the door at level 0, and then, according to the target floor, calculates the expected time for the displacement. The status of the calling button gives the target floor. A signal from a touch sensor at floor 1 or floor 2 (which may be delayed) is sufficient for the controller to stop the motor. Analogously to the correction in the literature, a difference between the expected travel time and the counting of time defines how many steps to run the motor in the opposite direction. Once the elevator arrives at a floor, the corresponding door is opened, and the elevator becomes available again. Naturally, the three possible departures imply a larger controller, that for space reasons is omitted, but available with our released examples.

3.5 Real-Time Properties

We reproduced the verification of all the safety properties and liveness properties we found in the literature. We now show that, with our translation to SMV, we can verify real-time properties. There are two types of real-time properties (Lampert, 2002) (or *Bounded Existence* (Dwyer et al., 1998)). First, there are properties that ensure an upper bound on the length of time for the system to respond. Second, there are those that ensure a lower bound on the length of time that an aspect of the state is present. For the first type of property, we verify that the waiting time




Figure 4: A drawing of the LLFSM for the elevator.




Figure 5: A drawing of the LLFSM for the controller that does not handle communication delays.




Figure 6: A drawing of the LLFSM for the user interaction.




Figure 7: A drawing of the LLFSM that delays the signal of the touch sensor at level 1.

once the elevator is called at a floor is bounded by a constant.

```

LTLSPEC
G( button_floor_0.At_REQUESTED_0
  -> F[0,147] elevator.At_POSITION_FLOOR_0
)
    
```

This illustrates that a request for the elevator at level 0 is serviced by the close model in no more than

147 Kripke states.

For the second type, we verify that once a door is open, it remains open for at least a certain period.

```

LTLSPEC
G
( (door_1.At_OPEN_1 & X !door_1.At_OPEN_1)
  -> H[0,44] door_1.At_OPEN_1
)
    
```

This property indicates that door 1 remains open for at least 44 Kripke states.

3.6 Comparison

Using the Eclipse Modelling Framework, we developed tools to translate LLFSMs models into SMV and TLA+ through model-to-text transformations. Our tools and examples are released as a Docker container for ease of installation. The model checker NuSMV completes the verification of the six properties for all three models in a matter of minutes. We replicated this in a machine running Linux with a CPU i7-10850H,0 and 16GB of RAM and a machine tuning macOS Sonoma 14.5 with an Apple Arm M1 and 16GB of RAM. In contrast, the SMV model with time-stamped events in the public domain (Shatrov, 2021) includes a script for verification. Our attempts to run the verification failed to terminate in machines with less than 16GB of RAM and required 2 hours and 20 minutes to verify only one property on both systems mentioned earlier. Moreover, for this model, NuSMV raises a warning “Fair states set of the finite state machine is empty” and the SMV formulation includes FAIRNESS directives, which raises issues about the apparent verification of a property because the property may be true by vacuity.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Whether a language is a domain-specific modelling language or a general modelling language is in the eye of the beholder (Wasowski and Berger, 2023). Although Turing complete, LLFSMs can be considered a domain specific language tailored to describe CPSs’ behaviour. LLFSMs are short of describing data structures or object-oriented mechanisms although there is no reason why LLFSMs can be organised in inheritance hierarchies and also contain methods using statements as per the code associated with states (LLFSMs already contain local variables).

The unambiguous semantics of LLFSMs, combined with control-status messages, improve the reliability of industrial automation and software systems by eliminating semantic discrepancies. This ensures




Figure 8: Fraction of the controller LLFSM that detects when the elevator bypasses a target floor and redirects it back.

consistency across different model checkers. Our tools can translate LLFSM models into multiple programming languages, with equivalent traces. While translations to C and assembly may run at different speeds, the execution times are proportional, allowing for real-time property verification. Although not shown here, the action language used in LLFSMs also supports timed transitions, which allow system calls to the system clock. Therefore, this introduction of the LLFSMs approach and its tools for incorporating them into the IEC 61499 standard is a step towards even more trustworthy and certifiable distributed systems.

Software language engineering (SLE) is the application of systematic, disciplined, and measurable approaches to the development, deployment, use, and maintenance of software (domain-specific) languages. The technology for this is now heavily reliant of language workbenches. Language workbenches are tools for reducing the gap between the design and implementation of (external) domain-specific languages. Our tools are currently based on the Eclipse-Modelling Framework. To modernise them for language workbenches, in the future, we plan to shift them to the GSLP (Metin and Bork, 2023).

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