The Role of Heuristics and Biases in Linux Server Administrators’ Information Security Policy Compliance at Healthcare Organizations

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Abstract: Information Security Policy (ISP) compliance is crucial to healthcare organizations due to the potential for data breaches. The healthcare industry relies heavily on Linux servers to house electronically Protected Health Information (ePHI) due to their inherited lower volume of known vulnerabilities. However, Linux Server Administrators appear to be more relaxed than other server administrators when it comes to ISP compliance. Prior research suggests that the use of cognitive heuristics and biases may negatively influence threat appraisal and coping appraisal, while ultimately impacting ISP compliance. Thus, the goal of our study was to empirically assess the effect of cognitive heuristics, biases, and knowledge-sharing level on actual ISP compliance measured based on actual security setting adjustments. Aside from the novel measure of actual ISP compliance, we developed a survey instrument based on prior validated instruments to measure cognitive heuristics and biases. A group of 42 Linux Server Administrators who oversee the servers at a major healthcare organization participated in our study. Additionally, an intervention in the form of hands-on cybersecurity training, periodic security update emails, and Linux-focused tabletop exercises was introduced. Our results indicated that information security knowledge-sharing significantly influenced both cognitive heuristics and biases. Conclusions and discussions are provided.

1 INTRODUCTION

With the massive avalanche of data breaches in recent years, information security is rising to the radar of organizational leaders (Levy & Gafni, 2021). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s Internet Crime Report estimated that in 2021, the cost of cybercrime reached $6.9 trillion (FBI, 2022, March 22). With the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the healthcare industry experienced a massive wave of cyber-attacks and, unfortunately, many successful data breaches (Gafni & Pavel, 2021). Prior reports by the FBI’s Internet Computer Complaint Center (IC3) from 2021 that included COVID-19 cyber-attacks statistics, documented over 230% increase in cyberattacks in 2020 from the prior year, many of these targeted the healthcare industry (FBI, 2021). The number of healthcare breaches that resulted in at least 500 records stolen increased from 220 in 2013 to 550 (250% increase) in 2020 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2023). From early 2012 to early 2023, a total of 301,013,431 patient records were breached in 50 states and the District of Columbia impacting physician practices, health plans, and hospitals (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2023). During the same period, server-related incidents resulted in the loss of 229,563,942 individual electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI) records (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, 2023). Healthcare-related server breaches represented...
79.6% of the total records breached. The healthcare industry is a complicated network of hospitals, providers, independent laboratories, pharmacies, imaging centers, insurance companies, and public health departments centered on patients’ health (Dixon, 2016). The ability to safeguard patients’ ePHI in all three data states (at rest, at processing, & at transit) is key to improving patient medical outcomes and lowering the cost of healthcare (Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, n.d.). Server administrators’ compliance with the Information Security Policy (ISP) of the organization is key to safeguarding patients’ ePHI and minimizing the risk of data breaches (Chen et al., 2018). While many organizations’ servers are Windows-based, a significant number of larger, back-end systems, especially at large-scale healthcare organizations, are Linux-based to capitalize on increased server processing power, reliability, assumed increased information security, and clustering technology (Beuchelt, 2017). As of October 2023, it was reported that Linux servers represent 82.0% of active Web servers worldwide (W3Techs, 2023). Globally, Linux variants represent 67.21% of the operating system market share (GlobalStats, 2023). Adequately managing servers’ security reduces the risk of systems disruption, loss of confidential ePHI, harm to organizational reputation, potential loss of revenue, and financial loss due to litigation or fines (Donaldson et al., 2015). Server administrators are humans, and like other individuals, they use judgment to make decisions daily. Cognitive heuristics are mental shortcuts that individuals use to quickly assess a situation and determine an adequate, though frequently flawed, conclusion (Kahneman, 2011). Cognitive biases describe how information framing and context influence decision-making, which departs from normal rational theory (Gilovich & Griffin, 2013). Prior research provided strong evidence that knowledge-sharing related to information security issues among users, especially Information Technology (IT) professionals, is critical for the mitigation of cybersecurity risks in organizations (Safa et al., 2016). A significant volume of prior research related to security compliance is based on self-reported compliance (Mandiant, 2013). Moreover, self-reported behavior has been documented in prior research to have a limited correlation with actual human behavior (Mahalingham et al., 2023). In the context of information security, Wash et al. (2017) indicated that “There are many user decisions that people do not self-report accurately. When studying these [information security] decisions, it is important to measure actual behaviors rather than relying on self-reports” (p. 2231). Additionally, self-reported behavior frequently measures intention rather than actual secure behaviors (Chen & Tyran, 2023). Thus, the goal of our study was to empirically assess the effect of cognitive heuristics, biases, and knowledge-sharing levels on actual ISP compliance by Linux Server Administrators. Moreover, we have intentionally elected to craft multi-point metrics to assess actual ISP compliance based on security setting adjustments that the Linux Server Administrators performed or not. Furthermore, we have developed an intervention in the form of a set of targeted Linux-focused tabletop exercises that included hands-on interactive information security challenges and provided the Linux Server Administrators a platform for knowledge-sharing when it comes to ISP compliance and cybersecurity issues. Our two main Research Questions (RQs) for this study were:

**RQ1:** What is the role of knowledge-sharing level, cognitive heuristics, and cognitive biases on the Linux Server Administrators’ actual ISP compliance level mediated by their perceptions of severity and vulnerabilities along with efficacy (self-efficacy & efficacy-response) in the healthcare industry?

**RQ2:** What is the role of an intervention in the form of updated cybersecurity training, periodic security update emails, and Linux-focused tabletop exercises on the Linux Server Administrators’ actual ISP compliance level in the healthcare industry?

## 2 BACKGROUND

### 2.1 Human Factor in ISP Compliance

The human aspects of information security must be understood to reduce the risk of data breaches (Antonucci et al., 2021). Users’ ignorance, apathy, errors, resistance, and mischievous nature can result in human-caused data breaches (Pollock et al., 2021). Recently, the 2022 Data Breach Investigation Report led by Verizon (2022) with contributions from 83 federal and state law enforcement agencies, noted that so far in the first half of 2022 alone, “82% of breaches involve the human element—something the silicon isn’t going to be mitigating” (p. 45). To strengthen the human aspect of information security, ISPs are developed, which enhance cybersecurity, and physical security, decrease vulnerability to data...
breaches, as well as ensure legal and regulatory compliance (Pollock et al., 2021). Unfortunately, employee noncompliance with ISP is the key threat to organizational information security (Pollock et al., 2021). Sadok et al. (2020) found that by connecting ISPs with subject matter experts, work processes improved overall ISP compliance. This was relevant to the current research as the Linux Server Administrators are the subject matter experts for the organizational servers that they manage, yet they are human too. Kahneman (2011) referred to the two cognitive systems of decision-making as 'System One' and 'System Two'. System One lies outside of individuals' awareness and is intuitive, implicit, and involuntary (Cooper et al., 2021). System Two, the reasoning and analytical system, is where deliberate thought occurs (Cooper et al., 2021; Kahneman, 2011). System Two is activated whenever a problem presents itself to which System One cannot provide a reasonable answer (Antonucci et al., 2021; Kahneman, 2011). Several heuristics and biases may negatively impact threat appraisal and coping appraisal including the cognitive heuristic, optimism bias, and confirmation bias (Kahneman, 2011). Use of these heuristics and biases can result in inappropriately low judgment of risk or an overinflated estimation of coping skills, or human error (Kahneman, 2011; Pollock et al., 2021). Optimism bias can result in dangerous neglect of risks (Rhee et al., 2012). This bias can enhance perceived invulnerability to negative events and lead to inappropriately high levels of risky behaviors (Pollock et al., 2021; Rhee et al., 2012). To judge the probability of an event, an individual may assess the availability of associations related to the event (Kahneman, 2011). It is cognitively easier to estimate a probability based on the ease with which one recalls occurrences of a similar event (Kahneman, 2011).

Pachur et al. (2012) found that the availability heuristic significantly influenced perceived risk. Confirmation bias and optimism bias are closely related and can significantly influence decision-making (Kahneman, 2011). With confirmation bias, one gives greater validity to information that supports one’s beliefs. Tsohou et al. (2015) found that confirmation bias led individuals to inappropriately assess information security threats. Kahneman (2011) identified confirmation bias as a System One heuristic, and it is, therefore, easily activated when making decisions. Building on Kahneman’s (2011) heuristics and biases work in assessing risk, this study investigated how the availability heuristic, confirmation bias, and optimism bias influenced Linux Server Administrators’ implementation of information security controls.

2.2 Knowledge-Sharing in Information Security

Flores et al. (2014) emphasized the importance of knowledge-sharing processes in organizations. The sharing of information security knowledge, experience, and insights can improve organizational performance and help enhance the overall organizational cybersecurity posture (Safa & Von Solms, 2016). Prior research provided ample evidence that information security knowledge is frequently scattered throughout organizations and many organizations have not developed an effective program to share critical knowledge within them (Safa & Von Solms, 2016). Furthermore, prior research indicated that one effective way of increasing information security knowledge-sharing, and cybersecurity skills is through effective SETA programs (Safa & Von Solms, 2016). It appears that the development of a formal means for information security knowledge-sharing may help to foster the sharing of ideas, experiences, tools, and processes to improve the information security of organizational information systems assets. Making users aware of the current and evolving cyber risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and their severities, the speed with which the threats propagate, as well as the potential impact on the organization is crucial to ISP compliance (Safa et al., 2016; Siponen et al., 2014). Safa and Van Solms (2016) found that information security knowledge-sharing benefited businesses, increased employee information security self-efficacy, and improved ISP compliance.

2.3 Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and ISP Compliance

Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was developed by Rogers (1975) to understand how fear appeals influenced behaviors. PMT is frequently used to understand compliance with ISPs, and as a result, is of great relevance to this study (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Jansen & van Schaik, 2018). Two key constructs in PMT are coping appraisal and threat appraisal (Rogers, 1975). Coping appraisal, which includes self-efficacy and response-efficacy, is an assessment of how the individual can cope with, adapt to, and change behavior to avoid harm (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Threat appraisal is an assessment of the perceived severity of a threatening event or attack vector, also noted as "perceived severity" in short,
and the perceived probability of the occurrence of such event that the individual attributes to the threatening event or attack vector, also noted as “perceived vulnerability” (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). Prior studies found threat appraisal to be positively correlated with ISP compliance intention (Chen & Tyran, 2023), yet we question the validity of such work, as noted previously when it comes to the relationship between self-reported intentions and actual behavior of individuals in the context of ISP compliance.

2.4 Security Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) and ISP Compliance

Security Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) programs are a means for organizations to increase awareness and minimize the risk of insider-caused information security failures or data breaches (Chen et al., 2018). Prior research indicated that engaging the users and ‘audience appropriate’ SETA programs, positively influences self-efficacy and ISP compliance (Chen et al., 2018; Pattinson et al., 2019). Focusing the SETA program on the responsibilities of the participants improved engagement, information retention, and compliance (Schroeder, 2017). Posey et al. (2015) found that SETA programs positively correlated with both perceived severity and response-efficacy.

2.5 Prior ISP Compliance Research Gaps

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) poses penalties and settlements levied on healthcare systems and insurance companies totaling millions of dollars yearly (HIPAA Journal, 2022). Given the potential financial liabilities associated with data breaches and privacy violations, it is imperative that healthcare organizations secure their computing resources by following the HIPAA and Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) guidelines. The HIPAA Security Rule provided specifications and standards that covered healthcare entities should implement to help ensure the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) of ePHI (Koch, 2017). These policies and guidelines, however, will not protect PII/ePHI data if they are not properly implemented within the technical infrastructure (Dixon, 2016). At the same time, HIPAA and other governmental regulations require healthcare organizations to develop well-articulated ISPs both for their general employees and their IT employees. As such, lack of ISP compliance appears to be a major threat vector. However, based on our review of the literature, there are several notable gaps that this study investigated. First, research on ISP compliance has focused primarily on end-users. While they are critical to organizational information security, server administrators have the highest privilege levels and access to the critical data stored in the organization (Beuchelt, 2017). Siponen et al. (2014) identified employee failure to follow ISPs as a key threat to the security of an organization. An additional risk is that employees can make errors due to cognitive limitations, task demands, as well as organizational, social, or environmental factors (Safa & Von Solms, 2016). Most of these studies have evaluated end-user ISP compliance intention (Chen & Tyran, 2023). Behavioral compliance of Linux Server Administrators, however, can be even more crucial as the data hosted on the back-end Linux servers frequently contain ePHI, PII, or financial data (Beuchelt, 2017). Additionally, server administrators are responsible for configuring security controls to protect organizational servers and data (Beuchelt, 2017). Information security threat vectors for servers include network-, security-, and operating systems misconfiguration, as well as unpatched systems or device firmware, and privileged account escalation (Caballero, 2013). Given these risks, it is important to understand how to improve server administrators’ actual ISP compliance. Second, it appears that research is scarce into the effectiveness of a SETA program that focuses on the job activities of server administrators, while they hold the most privileged access at most organizations. It appears that most SETA-related research studies have been focused on organizational employees (Sarabadani et al., 2022). As such, another innovation of our study is that it investigated how a specially designed SETA workshop affected heuristics and biases, as well as actual ISP compliance of Linux Server Administrators. Third, cognitive heuristics can lead to biased decision-making as well as biased evaluation of information security threats and risks (Pollock et al., 2021). The inappropriate use of heuristics and biases may prevent Linux Server Administrators from correctly assessing the information security risks to the organizational servers that they are overseeing, which may reduce actual ISP compliance. Participant-focused SETA programs can be an effective means of reducing the use of cognitive heuristics, biases, and improving actual ISP compliance (Sarabadani et al., 2022). Fourth, while Posey et al. (2015) integrated SETA and PMT, they
appear to omit in their assessment the influences of heuristics and biases on program effectiveness, which our study attempted to do. Finally, while behavioral intention is frequently taken as an indicator of behavior (Chen & Tyran, 2023), it was noted by several prior research (e.g., Mahalingham et al., 2023) that intention differed significantly from actual behavior in the context of implementation of security controls. Comparing baseline (pre) and post-intervention information security scans allowed the present research to analyze actual information security measures implemented by the server administrators. Additionally, the use of optimism bias, confirmation bias, or the availability heuristic can lead to a fundamental underestimation of risk and result in reduced ISP compliance (Tsouh et al., 2015). Thus, it appears that there is great value in further understanding how tailored SETA and knowledge management programs, developed to address the unique job functions of Linux Server Administrators, influence their use of cognitive heuristics, biases, information security knowledge-sharing, and ultimately test if it has any effect on their actual ISP compliance.

3 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

As indicated above from prior research, the development of an information security knowledge-sharing culture is an important goal for any organization that has critical information systems assets (Safa & Van Solms, 2016). Flores et al. (2014) emphasized the importance of knowledge-sharing processes in organizations. SETA workshops and online training provide formal means of information security knowledge-sharing within organizations (Safa & Von Solms, 2016). These processes provided a starting point for the present research’s cognitive model of ISP compliance. Security knowledge-sharing processes are theorized to directly influence the three studied cognitive heuristics and biases used by Linux Server Administrators (Kahneman, 2003). Therefore, our first set of hypotheses noted in the null form were:

H1: Information security knowledge-sharing will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ use of the availability heuristic.

H2: Information security knowledge-sharing will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ use of optimism bias.

H3: Information security knowledge-sharing will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ use of confirmation bias.

While prior research indicated that knowledge-sharing has a significant influence on the three cognitive heuristics and biases (Kahneman, 2003), in this study we will assess if these also hold true in the context of information security, especially with Linux Server Administrators. Moreover, prior research indicated that heuristics and biases influence threat appraisal and coping appraisal from PMT (Kahneman, 2011; Pachur et al., 2012; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The key components of PMT, threat appraisal and coping appraisal, have been found in prior literature to be significantly influenced by SETA programs and are, therefore, critical to research into ISP compliance (Safa et al., 2016). Dang-Pham et al. (2017) found that information security awareness also improved the diffusion of knowledge-sharing, in the context of information systems, throughout the organization. Finally, threat appraisal and coping appraisal have been shown in the literature to influence compliance behavior (Safa et al., 2016). As such, our study proposed to assess such relationship in the contexts of ISP compliance of Linux Server Administrators to include the following four key areas; (1) SETA; (2) heuristics and biases; (3) PMT, i.e., perceived severity, and perceived vulnerability; as well as (4) actual ISP compliance. Therefore, we hypothesized that:

H4: Availability heuristic will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ (a) perceived severity, and (b) perceived vulnerability.

H5: Optimism bias will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ (a) perceived severity, (b) perceived vulnerability, (c) self-efficacy, and (d) response-efficacy.

H6: Confirmation bias will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ (a) perceived severity, (b) perceived vulnerability, (c) self-efficacy, and (d) response-efficacy.

H7a: Perceived severity will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ actual ISP compliance.

H7b: Perceived vulnerability will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ actual ISP compliance.

H8a: Self-efficacy will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ actual ISP compliance.

H8b: Response-efficacy will have no significant influence on Linux Server Administrators’ actual ISP compliance.
All hypotheses are noted in the null form for uniformity and testing purposes.

4 METHODOLOGY

The main aim and objective of our study was to formulate a cognitive processing model to test the two previously introduced research questions via a set of hypotheses outlined above. Additionally, we developed an integrated information security knowledge-sharing model following the Information Security Organizational Knowledge-sharing Framework proposed by Flores et al. (2014). We have also followed Kahneman, his colleagues, and other researchers who extended his work into the information security field on cognitive heuristics as well as bias measures (Antonucci et al., 2021; Cooper et al., 2021; Pollock et al., 2021), along with PMT constructs (Posey et al., 2015) as depicted in Figure 1. The proposed model addresses RQ1.

Figure 1: The Research Model on the Factors Impacting Actual Linux Server Administrators’ ISP Compliance.

4.1 Measures and the Research Model

This quantitative research was conducted in a pretest and posttest design. The assessment included two parts: Part 1 – Survey instrument, and Part 2 – Actual ISP Compliance metrics, both were collected before and 90 days following the intervention – the Linux-focused SETA workshop. In Part 1, participants completed a survey instrument that included questions for Optimism Bias (OB), Self-Efficacy (SE), Response-Efficacy (RE), Perceived Vulnerability (PV), Perceived Severity (PS), and Information Security Knowledge-sharing (ISKS), which were adapted from previously validated instruments used by Safa and Von Solms (2016), Moqbel and Bartelt (2015), Tinedo (2012), Hanus and Wu (2016), Rhee et al. (2012), Siponen et al. (2014), as well as Safa et al. (2016). Questions were modified to reflect the focus on servers rather than personal computers. The questions used to assess a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree. We developed the questions for the Cognitive Heuristic (CH) and Confirmation Bias (CB) following prior work by Kahneman, his colleagues, Fischer et al. (2011), and other researchers noted above. Confirmatory Bias was measured using a fictional scenario, similar to the technique of Fischer et al. (2011) where participants are presented with a scenario, asked to make an initial decision, and then provided six confirming and six disconfirming bits of additional information they can choose to review, and then asked to choose again on the initial fictional scenario. The level of Confirmatory Bias was determined by subtracting the number of disconfirming choices (Cons) selected from the confirming choices (Pros) selected (Fischer et al., 2011; Gertner et al., 2016). The survey was pilot-tested with 17 individuals who evaluated the flow of the survey, the wording of the questions, as well as the reliability and validity of the instrument. Additionally, the participants took part in our developed Linux-focused SETA workshop and an online hands-on cybersecurity lab. The Linux-focused SETA workshop and cyber lab were designed with the following goals: (1) help increase cybersecurity awareness among Linux Server Administrators; (2) help Linux Server Administrators mitigate information security risk for the organizational servers that they manage; (3) Teach Linux Server Administrators on how to perform basic penetration testing and server ISP analysis using common tools; (4) Provide Linux Server Administrators hands-on cloud-based cyber lab to teach them the fundamentals of network security tools (WireShark, NMAP, Metasploit, etc.); (5) Provide environment for Linux Server Administrators to connect with other administrators to increase knowledge-sharing and collaboration.

In Part 2 when assessing for the actual ISP compliance, we used five information data points that were extracted directly from the Linux servers. Specifically, we wanted these data points to provide an accurate assessment of the actual security controls implemented on each server that is managed by the Linux Server Administrators. All five data points are requirements in the organization’s ISP for Linux servers. As such, security scans, reports, and scripts were run on all Linux servers associated with each participant before, and 90 days following the intervention – the Linux-focused SETA workshop. Following that, the five security data points metrics we used to assess actual ISP compliance (our dependent variable) by the Linux Server Administrators included:

1. Percentage of Linux servers using centralized log management, measured by a single data point
extracted from the Security Incident and Event Management (SIEM) tool.
2. Percentage of Linux servers with recorded software updates, measured by a single data point extracted from the organization’s SIEM Tenable dashboard.
3. Percentage of Linux servers blocking telnet, FTP, and remote services ports, measured by a single data point extracted from NMAP scan report.
4. Percentage of Linux servers using Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), measured by a single data point extracted from the organization’s centralized Single-Sign-On (SSO) system.
5. Percentage of Linux servers that have had recent software updates, measured by a single data point extracted from the organization’s SIEM Linux inventory dashboard.

4.2 Study Participants

All Linux servers and Server Administrators were identified from a single healthcare organization’s configuration management database. The organization is a multi-hospital health system and teaching university in the mid-Atlantic U.S. region. Invitations to participate emails were sent to all server administrators and their direct managers. The invitation described our study, the Linux-focused SETA workshop content, and the hands-on cyber lab. Invitation responses included 53 potential participants, where 30 of them were identified as primarily Linux Server Administrators. Some individuals (12) were identified as split responsibility for both Linux and Windows servers. Four individuals identified themselves as Windows-only server administrators; seven individuals did not have any responsibility for servers. A total of 42 who identified both as the primary as well as the split (Linux & Windows) participated in the study and completed all the study protocols. The Linux-focused SETA workshop had significant support from the organizational leadership, including the Chief Information Officer (CIO), Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), the IT security team, as well as directors and managers at the organization. We believe that this organizational leadership support led to such a high response rate. Unfortunately, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Linux-focused SETA workshop was conducted online via Zoom. The cyber lab followed the workshop and provided hands-on experience using information security tools in a controlled environment. The module utilized two Linux Virtual Machines (VMs) and consisted of challenges associated with locating, enumerating, and exploiting a Linux server. EDURange (2019) provides cloud-based resources for security education of students and researchers. A new EDURange Metasploit scenario was developed as part of this study and allowed participants to perform penetration testing using NMAP and the Metasploit Framework.

Following the Linux-focused SETA workshop, every three weeks, information security update emails were sent to participants. A total of six emails were sent which provided updates regarding recently identified vulnerabilities, relevant information security alerts, breach announcements, FBI InfraGard (https://www.infragard.org/) updates, ransomware events, as well as information about Tripwire and Rootkit Hunter applications. The goals of the information security update emails were to see if the current information security awareness, information security knowledge-sharing, and information security recommendations made during the workshop were being neglected, retained, or enhanced. Finally, 90 days after the workshop, an email was sent to all Linux Server Administrators who participated in the study to complete the online post-intervention survey. Also, information security scans and report extractions were used to quantify the changes made by the administrators before and again 90 days after the workshop, as the metrics for the actual ISP compliance. The measures comparisons of before and after the above-mentioned intervention were set to address RQ2.

5 RESULTS

5.1 Results of the PLS-SEM Analysis

Partial Least Squares - Structural-SEM (PLS-SEM) has been used extensively in prior research to test complex models in information security (Hanus & Wu, 2016; Ifinedo, 2012; Rhee et al., 2012). PLS-SEM has characteristics relevant to the present research including acceptance of small sample sizes, no assumption of data normality, variety of scales of measurement, and ability to handle complex models (Hair et al., 2017). Hair et al. (2017) indicated that for a significance level of 5% with a maximum of three arrows pointing toward a construct (threat appraisal), a minimum R2 of 0.25 requires a 33-participant sample size and a minimum R2 of 0.50 requires 14 participants. SmartPLS 3.3.2 was used to perform analyses of our collected data. The data analysis was completed in two phases. First the pre-workshop and post-workshop data were
collected and analyzed using PLS-SEM. The data from the surveys were exported from Qualtrics to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The actual ISP compliance metrics were collected, aggregated, and merged with the survey data to provide a single comma-delimited file for input into SmartPLS. The pre-workshop (a) and post-workshop (b) PLS-SEM analysis results are displayed in Figure 2.

5.2 Results of the PLS-MGA Analysis

The next step in the analysis of the data was to perform SmartPLS Multigroup Analysis (PLS-MGA). Both pre-workshop and post-workshop datasets were merged into a single data set, and a group identifier column was added to differentiate before-workshop and after-workshop data, which was then used for the MGA. The measurement model was assessed for internal consistency reliability, indicator reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2017). The structural model was assessed for collinearity among the constructs, as well as the relevance and significance of the path coefficients (Hair et al., 2017). The combined groups model with $R^2$ and path coefficients can be found in Figure 3.

Key paths in the MGA included Perceived Vulnerability $\rightarrow$ Actual ISP Compliance (-0.864), Confirmation Bias $\rightarrow$ Perceived Vulnerability (0.628), Optimism Bias $\rightarrow$ Response-Efficacy (0.539), and Information Security Knowledge-sharing $\rightarrow$ Optimism Bias (0.499). Bootstrapping was performed for path significance and in the analysis seven paths were significant: Confirmation Bias $\rightarrow$ Perceived Vulnerability ($p < 0.001$), Information Security Knowledge-sharing $\rightarrow$ Optimism Bias ($p < 0.001$), Optimism Bias $\rightarrow$ Response Efficacy ($p < 0.001$), Optimism Bias $\rightarrow$ Self-Efficacy ($p < 0.001$), Optimism Bias $\rightarrow$ Perceived Severity ($P < 0.047$), Optimism Bias $\rightarrow$ Perceived Vulnerability ($p = 0.022$), and Perceived Vulnerability $\rightarrow$ Actual ISP Compliance ($p < 0.001$). The effect size ($F^2$) was used to assess how constructs contribute to the explaining power of other constructs. In the analysis, strong positive effects: Confirmation Bias $\rightarrow$ Perceived Vulnerability (0.602), Perceived Vulnerability $\rightarrow$ Actual ISP Compliance (3.142), and moderate positive effects for Optimism Bias $\rightarrow$ Response-Efficacy (0.423), Optimism Bias $\rightarrow$ Self-Efficacy (0.334), and Information Security Knowledge-sharing $\rightarrow$ Optimism Bias (0.331). Finally, blindfolding was used to assess predictive power using the Stone-Geisser values (Hair et al., 2017). In the MGA, strong predictive power was found for actual compliance (0.352), moderate predictive power for Self-Efficacy (0.185), weak predictive power for Optimism Bias (0.146), and Perceived Vulnerability (0.086).

In the next phase of the analysis, the heuristics and biases scores were evaluated for changes. Indicator scores for each construct were compared before and after the intervention using paired t-tests to assess if significant changes occurred for each administrator. The results indicate that the availability heuristic ($p < 0.001$, $t = 3.914$) and confirmation bias ($p < 0.001$, $t = 7.723$) had significant changes, but optimism bias did not meet the t critical requirement ($p = 0.01$, $t = -2.353$). Next, actual ISP compliance metrics scores were compared before and after the intervention using paired t-tests to assess if significant changes occurred for each administrator. The results indicated that all compliance metrics showed significant changes. A total of 17 hypotheses were evaluated based on the
research model indicated in Figure 1. T-statistics were used for H1-3 and PLS-MGA bootstrapping for path significance analysis for H4a-H8b. The results indicated that eight hypotheses were rejected (H1: ISKS → AH; H3: ISKS → CB; H5a: OB → PS; H5b: OB → PV; H5c: OB → SE; H5d: OB → RE; H6b: CB → PV; H7b: PV → AC) and nine were accepted (H2: ISKS → OB; H4a: AH → PS; H4b: AH → PV; H6a: CB → PS; H6c: CB → SE; H6d: CB → RE; H7a: PS → AC; H8a: RE → AC; H8b: SE → AC).

![Figure 3: Combined Groups PLS-SEM Multigroup Analysis Results.](image)

5.3 Model Evaluation, Validity, and Reliability Measures

For the measurement model evaluation, internal consistency reliability, composite reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity were assessed. Internal consistency reliability was evaluated with Cronbach’s α. For established constructs results α > 0.7 indicated internal consistency reliability and for new constructs results α > 0.6 indicated internal consistency reliability (Hair et al., 2017; Henseler et al., 2016). The results indicated that perceived vulnerability was below the threshold, aside from Confirmation Bias (CB) which was measured by a scenario following Fischer et al. (2011). All other constructs met internal consistency reliability requirements. Composite reliability was assessed with ρ. For established constructs results ρ > 0.7 indicated composite reliability and for new constructs, the cutoff was ρ > 0.6 (Hair et al., 2017; Henseler et al., 2016). The results indicated that perceived vulnerability was below the threshold. All other constructs met composite reliability requirements. Convergent validity was assessed using the Average Variance Extracted (AVE). Results > 0.5 indicate convergent reliability (Ifinedo, 2012). Our results indicated that perceived vulnerability was below the threshold. All other constructs met convergent vulnerability requirements. Finally, discriminant validity was evaluated using the Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT). HTMT values < 0.85 indicated discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2017; Kline, 2011).

6 DISCUSSIONS

Based on the analysis, the use of the availability heuristic and confirmation bias were significantly influenced by the Linux-focused SETA workshop and the information security update emails (H1, H3). Optimism bias did not meet the statistical cutoff for significance (H3). It did, however, have a statistically significant influence on all PMT constructs (H5a, H5b, H5c, H5d). Also, the multigroup analysis showed information security knowledge-sharing optimism bias path was significant (H2). We believe that these results point to the need for further investigation into optimism bias. Confirmation bias had a significant influence on perceived vulnerability (H6b). Lastly, perceived vulnerability significantly influenced actual ISP compliance (H8a). Both results were expected. The failure of the availability heuristic to significantly influence perceived severity (H4a) and perceived vulnerability (H4b) was unexpected. We have adjusted these survey questions for the construct of perceived vulnerability based on prior literature in the context of information security, however, we believe that additional testing and adjustments to the survey questions are needed. Confirmation bias did not have the expected impact on perceived severity (H6a), self-efficacy (H6c), or response-efficacy (H6d). Confirmatory bias was tested using a fictional scenario, similar to the technique of Fischer et al. (2011) where participants are presented with a scenario, asked to make an initial decision, and then provided six confirming and six disconfirming bits of additional information they can choose to review, followed by asking them to choose again. This may have resulted in historical bias due to having completed the survey before and after the intervention. Actual ISP compliance was not influenced by perceived severity (H7a), response-efficacy (H8a), or self-efficacy (H8b). This was not consistent with prior research that studied ISP compliance intention and may be due to evaluating actual ISP compliance instead. All the actual ISP compliance metrics we used were novel and demonstrated a significant increase between pre-workshop and post-workshop analysis. In our findings, port blocking and recent patching had the highest
degree of change and resulted from the intervention and following knowledge-sharing emails. Interestingly, these two measures were changes that the Linux Server Administrators could make with no interaction with the IT security team. Vulnerability scanning and MFA require Linux Server Administrators to request the organizational servers they manage to be registered. After setup, no interaction with the IT security team is usually necessary and information security scans could be run and viewed by the administrators on demand. Centralized log management demonstrated the lowest change between pre- and post-workshop. This metric required sending server log data to the IT security team via syslog forwarding. That means that the interaction level, effort required, and data exposure were significantly higher than the other metrics. It was noted in the data analysis that the four perceived vulnerability survey items did not reach significance levels for Cronbach’s α, ρ, and AVE. One question was used from the work by Hanus and Wu (2016), one question was from the work of Siponen et al. (2014), one question was from the work of Ifinedo (2012), and a final question was developed based on the recommendation of a pilot-tester. While these survey items were deemed sufficient by pilot testers, it appears that the four questions did not combine into concise indicators for the perceived vulnerability construct. We recommend future research to evaluate these survey items and come up with a more coherent measure for the perceived vulnerability construct.

This study demonstrated the influence of security training and knowledge-sharing on the use of cognitive heuristics, confirmation, and optimism biases of a unique group of systems administrators. In the institution where the study was performed, the Linux administrators were spread out geographically and organizationally. Many participants managed a handful of servers with minimal interaction with other administrators. The security workshop brought together many of these individuals from across the institution to help them become aware of the vulnerabilities facing Linux servers and the risks associated with not implementing security. Additionally, the workshop introduced participants to the key actions they can implement and the tools they can use to protect their Linux servers. The post-workshop security updates provided news about newly identified vulnerabilities, recent breaches, and more guidance on how to implement security tools discussed in the workshop. The goal of the post-workshop security updates was to maintain security awareness and encourage the implementation of security controls. The feedback from participants regarding the content of the workshop and security updates was consistently positive. The interaction of the participants in the new Microsoft Teams channel was also encouraging. Clearly, from an organizational perspective, institutions that have Linux administrators need to provide security awareness training that is relevant and provides them with the knowledge and tools they need to improve the security of Linux servers. Additionally, there seems to be a desire for a sense of community even among the distributed Linux administrators in the organization. Last, the security team needs to try to approach Linux administrators to help them integrate the organization’s overall security strategy. At the organization studied, the security team is largely focused on the threats and vulnerabilities facing Windows servers. This lack of Linux focus by the security team leaves some Linux administrators feeling overlooked and underappreciated and could lead to dangerous levels of non-compliance. The workshop and increased communications demonstrated the value for Linux administrators to connect with the security team. Additionally, it helped show the importance of embracing security tools that protect the organization.

After the workshop, the cyber lab was instantiated and made available to participants for four hours to allow them to use Metasploit to breach a vulnerable Linux VM. Unfortunately, only 42% of the participants completed the server breaching exercise following the workshop. If the lab could have remained running 24/7 for the weeks following the workshop, we believe that the Linux Server Administrators would have had significantly more opportunities to use the Metasploit cyber lab. Unfortunately, due to the cost of running the scenario in the cloud, it was not deemed possible to run it continuously. Finally, had the workshop been in-person as initially planned before the COVID-19 pandemic, it would have been easier to encourage participation in the cyber lab. The original intention was to run the workshop and cyber lab as a half-day event where lunch could also be offered after completing both. Unfortunately, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the work sites have been closed and remote training was required.

7 CONCLUSIONS

This study demonstrated the influence of a focused SETA workshop on Linux Server Administrators’ use of cognitive heuristics and biases. Prior to the workshop, many participants had minimal interaction with the IT security team. The Linux-focused SETA workshop brought together server administrators to help them become aware of the vulnerabilities facing Linux servers and the risks associated with not
implementing proper security controls. Additionally, the workshop introduced participants to the key actions they can implement and the tools they can use to protect the organizational Linux servers they manage. The post-workshop information security updates provided news about newly identified vulnerabilities, recent data breaches, and more guidance on how to implement information security tools discussed in the workshop. The feedback from participants was consistently positive. The interaction of the participants in the new Microsoft Teams channel was also encouraging. From an organizational perspective, institutions that have Linux Server Administrators need to provide SETA that is relevant to Linux as well as provides the knowledge and tools they need to improve the information security of the organizational servers they manage. Additionally, there seems to be a desire for a sense of community even among the distributed administrators in the organization. The questions and advice offered in the Microsoft Teams channel demonstrated that shared knowledge helped everyone increase the information security level to the organizational servers they manage. Anecdotally, we found that the Linux-focused SETA workshop, and information security update emails demonstrated the value for Linux Server Administrators to connect with the IT security team. Additionally, it helped show the importance of embracing information security tools that protect the organization as a whole.

REFERENCES


The Role of Heuristics and Biases in Linux Server Administrators’ Information Security Policy Compliance at Healthcare Organizations


