

A Self-Configuration Controller To Detect, Identify, and Recover Misconfiguration at IoT Edge Devices and Containerized Cluster System

Areeg Samir^a and Håvard Dagenborg^b

Department of Computer Science, UIT The Arctic University of Norway, Norway

Keywords: Markov Decision Process, Hierarchical Hidden Markov Model, Self-Configuration, Detection, Recovery, Misconfiguration, Performance, Threat, Edge Computing, Cluster, Containers, and Medical Devices.

Abstract: Misconfiguration of IoT edge devices and containerized backend components can lead to various complications like performance degradation, non-compliant data flows, and external vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose a self-configurable cluster controller that uses the hierarchical hidden Markov model to detect, identify, and recover from misconfiguration at the container and network communication level. Our experimental evaluations show that our controller can reduce the effects of misconfiguration and improves system performance and reliability.

1 INTRODUCTION

Misconfiguration in edge devices and core backend components can impact the workload and how data flows within and across systems and services. This might lead to ineffective resource utilization and performance degradation or, more alarmingly, enable unauthorized access. For critical systems like the ones used in healthcare, avoiding misconfigurations is particularly important. For example, at the edge level, a misconfiguration in the Conexus telemetry protocol (e.g., CVE-2019-6538) could affect the scores of Medtronic and PolySomnoGraphy heart-rate monitors and allow unauthorized changes to a patient's device. At the cluster level, misconfiguration (e.g., CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2022-0811) might occur due to network rules, root/less privileged user access, wrong pod label specifications, or forgetting to enforce network policies after writing them. To address these challenges in a shared multi-clustered environment, like those often found in healthcare, systems need to manage the workload and the flow of information from edge devices to the system and within the system clusters.

Several recent works have looked at workload and information-flow management (Moothedath et al., 2020), (Kraus et al., 2021), (Sklavos et al., 2017), (Luo et al., 2020), (Mäkitalo et al., 2018), (Guo et al., 2019). However, more work is needed on correlating

the misconfiguration of medical edge devices and system clusters to its observed performance degradation and identifying its reasons for optimizing the system's information flow and performance.

In this paper, we propose a self-configurable controller that detects, identifies, and recovers from misconfigurations and limits their impact on the workload and faulty flow of information of edge devices and container-based clusters. The proposed controller is in accordance with the common misconfigurations of Azure, Docker, and Kubernetes security reported in 2022 by CVE, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) NIST SP 800-190, OWASP Container Security Verification Standards¹, OWASP Kubernetes Security Testing Guide², and OWASP A05:2021³ – Security Misconfiguration. Our proposed controller is based on Hierarchical Hidden Markov Models (HHMMs) (Fine, 1998) and Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) (Derman, 1970), which are useful for modeling a wide range of security and optimization problems. We used HHMMs to characterize the dependency of misconfiguration in a hierarchical structure by mapping the observed performance anomalies to hidden resources and identifying the root causes of the observed anomalies to improve reliability. We chose MDP to determine the optimal

¹<https://owasp.org/www-project-container-security-verification-standard/>

²<https://owasp.org/www-project-kubernetes-security-testing-guide/>

³https://owasp.org/Top10/A05_2021-Security_Misconfiguration/

^a <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4728-447X>

^b <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1637-7262>




Figure 1: An example of a multi-cluster architecture for edge-based fog/cloud computing typically found in the healthcare industry.

recovery policy as the performance of running medical edge devices and the system’s containers-based clusters at a particular time instant is uncertain, and the model is memoryless. The controller adapted the Monitor, Analysis, Plane, Execute, and Knowledge (MAPE-K) adaptive control to optimize the control over the system under observation.

2 MAPPING FAILURES TO FAULTS

To analyze and classify the various misconfiguration, failures, and faults, we use the ISO-27001 risk management framework. As a use case for our discussions, we consider the multi-cluster environment of modern medical organizations consisting of various IoT devices and containerized services organized in a fog-like architecture, as illustrated in Figure 1. We focused on the most common security issues and technical concerns for IoT edge devices, especially medical heart-rate devices and container-based clusters reported in literature studies and in the industry, like Azure, Kubernetes, and Docker. We targeted the data transmission and the configuration connectivity of IoT edge medical devices to/from the system. We consider a failure as the inability of any such system component to perform its functions in accordance with specified requirements, both functional and non-functional (e.g., performance). Faults are system properties that describe an exceptional condition occurring in the system operation that may cause one or more failures (IEEE Standard Classification, 2009). For instance, if the application gateway in Fig-

ure 1 has a fault, it may redirect edge-device traffic to the wrong healthcare system cluster node or be used to stage malicious activities (Jin et al., 2022).

Threats are malicious actions or interactions with the system or its environment that can result in a fault and, thereby, possibly in a failure (ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026, 2019). Any abnormal flow of information occurring during an execution of a component is considered a fault or anomaly. Such faults can occur due to a misconfiguration. Such abnormal flows characterized stealthy threat strategies conditioned on the system model, while normal flows defined active defense strategies, which enabled misconfiguration detection.

Observed failures were analyzed along three dimensions: risk identification (observed behavior), risk assessment, risk treatment (recovery), and risk severity (in percentage) relating to the system performance in terms of the objectives that were not met by the observed metrics and benchmarks. We used Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to determine whether the motoring metrics met the maintenance goals and the system’s performance (e.g., resource utilization, latency, response time, network congestion, throughput). The higher the value, the more severe impact on the system’s performance will be.

Sudden Stop of Edge Device. *Risk Identification:* the edge device, after running successfully, stopped for a specific period (e.g., a minute). In such a case, the logs indicated that the device failed to connect to the IoT hub over AMQP and WebSocket, and the edge device existed. *Risk Assessment:* a host network misconfiguration prevented the IoT edge agent from reaching the network. The agent attempted to connect over AMQP (port 5671) and WebSockets (port

443) as the edge device runtime set up a network for each module to communicate, either using a bridge network or NAT. *Risk Treatment*: protect the IoT Hub resources against attack by reconfiguring network-related resources (e.g., firewall configuration). *Risk Severity*: 70%. *Risk Type*: Conf₁.

Spike Traffic Received by System. *Risk Identification*: system services are not working properly, its resources are excessively saturated *Risk Assessment*: a Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDOS) prevents access to the system's network. *Risk Treatment*: secure the routing protocol and enforce policy on the traffic entering or leaving the system's default network namespace. *Risk Severity*: 98%~99%. *Risk Type*: Conf₂.

Connectivity Error. *Risk Identification*: IoT Edge modules that connect to cloud services, including the runtime modules, stop working and return network failure. *Risk Assessment*: IP packet forwarding is disabled, and modules connected to cloud services aren't working. *Risk Treatment*: enable IP packet forwarding, specify multiple DNS servers and public DNS server in case the device cannot reach any of the IP addresses specified, and check port configuration rules. Restart the network service and docker service. *Risk Severity*: 99%. *Risk Type*: Conf₃.

Empty Configuration File. *Risk Identification*: the device has trouble starting modules defined in the deployment. Only the edge agent is running but continually reporting empty configuration files. *Risk Assessment*: the device may be having trouble with DNS server name resolution within the private network. *Risk Treatment*: specify the DNS server in container engine settings, and restart the container. *Risk Severity*: 20%~30%. *Risk Type*: Conf₄.

Edge Hub Failure. *Risk Identification*: the edge Hub module fails to start. *Risk Assessment*: some process on the host machine has bound a port that the edge Hub module is trying to bind. The IoT Edge hub maps ports 443, 5671, and 8883 for use in gateway scenarios. The module fails to start if another process has already bound one of those ports. *Risk Treatment*: stop the process using the impacted ports or change the create options in a deployment file. *Risk Severity*: 20%~30%. *Risk Type*: Conf₅.

Unable to Access Module Image. *Risk Identification*: the edge agent logs show a 403 error as a container fails to run. *Risk Assessment*: the IoT edge agent doesn't have permission to access a module's image as registry credentials are incorrectly specified. *Risk Treatment*: reconfigure the credentials of a container registry. *Risk Severity*: 20%~30%. *Risk Type*: Conf₆.

Unable to Access Registry. *Risk Identification*: the edge device voltage increased and decreased, which generated errors as the attack gained root privileges. *Risk Assessment*: the IoT edge agent doesn't have permission to access a module's image, as registry credentials are incorrectly specified. *Risk Treatment*: reconfigure the credentials for accessing the registry. Specify the correct name of the registry. *Risk Severity*: 40%~70%. *Risk Type*: Conf₇.

Data Leakage. *Risk Identification*: sensitive medical data was leaked. *Risk Assessment*: deploying high-sophisticated malware leading to the theft of sensitive medical data involving compromising sensitive medical information. *Risk Treatment*: recover weak passwords and misconfigured endpoints. Enhance data encryption. *Risk Severity*: 40%~70%. *Risk Type*: Conf₈.

Privilege Escalation Flaw. *Risk Identification*: sensitive medical data was leaked. *Risk Assessment*: a docker Engine function option (e.g., users-remap) gives access to remapped root and allows privilege escalation to the root level. *Risk Treatment*: configure user namespace remapping. *Risk Severity*: 80%~90%. *Risk Type*: Conf₉.

Privilege Escalation Flaw and Redeployment Fail. *Risk Identification*: sensitive medical data were leaked. *Risk Assessment*: an Azure function (e.g., SCM_RUN_FROM_PACKAGE) gave access to remapped root and allowed privilege escalation to the root level. *Risk Treatment*: function configuration (e.g., SAS token) and redeployment. *Risk Severity*: 80%~90%. *Risk Type*: Conf₁₀.

3 SELF-CONFIGURATION CONTROLLER

In this section, we described our controller, which consists of (1) *Monitoring* that collected the performance data of such as CPU, memory, and network metrics; (2) *Detection and Identification* that detected misconfiguration and identifies its type; (3) *Recovery* that selected the optimal recovery policy.

3.1 Monitor System Under Observation

We checked the normality of flow and workload for the components under observation by utilizing spearman's rank correlation coefficient to estimate the dissociation between the emitted observations (failures) and the amount of flow. To achieve that, we wrote an

algorithm to be used as a general threshold to highlight the occurrence of abnormal flow in the managed components (more details, see (Samir and Pahl, 2019)). The controller checked the configuration settings against the benchmarks of Azure Security, CIS Docker, and Kubernetes. For any mismatch between the settings and the requirements of secure deployment in components, the controller reevaluates the deployment of the impacted component, applies the required configuration, and redeploys the component. Otherwise, the controller proceeds with the deployment.

3.2 Misconfiguration Detection and Identification

The Hierarchical Hidden Markov Model (HHMM) is a generalization of the Hidden Markov Model (HMM), where the states that are hidden from the observer might emit visible observation sequences that constitute observation space.

The system under observation has a hierarchical structure, and it consists of one or more clusters $Cl^{j=1}$ root state that has an internal state $N_i^{j=2}$ (node) with horizontal transition i (states at the same level), and vertical transition j (sub-state). The sub-state C_i^{j+1} represents containers (e.g., C_1^3 at vertical level 3 and horizontal level 1), and the production state S_i^j represents services that emit Observation Space $OS_n = \{L_{CPU}, L_{Memory}, \dots, L_{Responsetime}\}$ that is associated to the computing resources saturation L_{CPU} . The State Space SP is mapped to Cluster Space ClS , which consists of a set of Ns , containers C , and services S . The edge direction indicates the information flow between states.

The model vertically calls one of its sub-states $N_1^2 = \{C_1^3, C_2^3\}$, N_2^2 , $N_3^2 = \{C_3^3, C_4^3\}$ with “vertical transition χ ” and j index (superscript), where $j = \{1, 2, 3\}$. Since node N_1^2 is the abstract state, it enters its child HMM sub-states containers C_1^3 and C_2^3 . (C_1^3, C_2^3, C_3^3), and C_4^3 have deployed services $S_1^4, S_2^4, S_3^4, S_4^4$ respectively. Since (S_1^4, \dots, S_4^4) are production states, they emit observations and may make the horizontal transition with horizontal index i (subscript), where $i = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, from S_1^4 to S_4^4 . Once there is no other transition, S_4^4 transits to the end state S_{eCid}^4 , which ends the transition for this sub-state, to return the control to the calling state C_2^3 . Once the control returns to the state C_2^3 , it makes a horizontal transition (if it exists) to state C_1^3 . Once the horizontal transition finishes, the transition goes to the End state S_{eNid}^3 to make a vertical transition to State N_1^2 . Once all the transitions under this node are achieved,

the control returns to N_3^2 . The observation O_n refers to the failures observations sequence (high CPU utilization, slow network traffic, and slow response time), which might reflect workload fluctuation. This fluctuation is associated with a probability that reflects the state transition status from AF (Abnormal Flow) to NL (Normal Flow) at a failure rate \mathfrak{R} , which indicates the number of failures for a S , C , N , or Cl over a period of time. We used the Baum-Welch algorithm to train the model by calculating the probabilities of the model parameters. The algorithm’s output is used to train the Viterbi algorithm to find the abnormal information flow path of the detected states under misconfiguration. Once all the recursive transitions are finished, we obtained a hierarchy of abnormal flow path $AF_{seq} = \{Cl, N_2^2, N_3^2, C_3^3, S_3^4\}$ that is affected by the component under misconfiguration (N_2^2).

The model’s output is used to identify the type of misconfiguration (hidden states) given the observation (observed failures) emitted from the system components. The observations are compared with the risk severity to infer the misconfiguration type. For each misconfiguration, we initialized the model states $Conf_{ij}$ and observations $F_{\{1, \dots, T\}}$ parameters through a misconfiguration state graph length $ConfLeng$ and observations of length T . The probability of occurrence $Conf_{ij}$ was calculated assuming that the misconfiguration started at the initial state $Conf_1$. The probabilities of $Conf_{ij}$ and observations $F_{\{1, \dots, T\}}$ were stored in matrix $ConfMat[ConfLeng, T]$. We computed the F probability by summing the previous forward path probability from the previous time step $t - 1$ weighted by their transition probabilities $Confprob_{Conf', Conf}$, and multiplied by the observation probability $Fprob_{Conf}(F_t)$. We sum over the probabilities of all possible hidden misconfiguration ($Conf_{ij}, \dots, Conf_{Nj}$) that could generate the observation sequence $F_{\{1, t+1, \dots, T\}}$. Each $Conf$ represented the probability of being in $Conf_j$ after seeing the first F_t observations. In case of a misconfiguration, we checked its type ($Conf_1, Conf_2, Conf_3, Conf_n$) considering the Risk Type for that state; otherwise, the model returns to check the next state. The model results were stored in Knowledge storage to enhance the future of detection.

We focused on the most common misconfiguration types reported about the edge cluster and cloud layer according to National Vulnerability Database, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification, OWASP Top 10 Security Risks, ENISA Top 15 Threats, and AT&T Cybersecurity. To enhance the identification process, we created pre-defined misconfiguration description profiles with common mis-

configuration types and stored them in the knowledge storage.

We extended HHMM with controlling labels made up of tags, each of which stands for a certain integrity issue (such as private data) and outlines the information flow permitted. Thus, a tag model is defined to deliver a policy formulation.

We further created an information access control list to control the access to the system components. The list identified a set of access variables for each participant, such as roles, actions, access to the API, authorizations they hold, permissions, permission boundaries, and conditions.

The permission boundary defines the maximum permissions granted to participants and roles by utilizing an enumeration-type action with two values (true and false). If the action of permission is true, then the permission is allowed; otherwise, it is rejected. Moreover, we assumed that if no information flow policy is specified in the domain, the inbound and the outbound flow will be set if the policy has any outbound rules. The policies in the observed system do not conflict as they are additive.

3.3 Misconfiguration Recovery

We used the MDP to model the recovery as a set of states (identified misconfiguration type) and actions that can be performed to control the system's behavior through an agent. The agent interacted with the environment by choosing the optimal actions to maximize a long-term measure of total reward without knowing about past situations.

The agent at state S_t chose an action A_t from the action space AS , ($A_t \in A(S_t)$), where $A(S_t)$ was the set of actions (a_1, \dots, a_n) (Risk Treatment) available in state S_t at time t . Here, the a_1 denoted that the system's component (containers deployed services) is terminated when a container escapes vulnerability and allows an attacker to obtain host root access. The a_2 denoted that the system's component is reconfigured and redeployed. Here, the affected configuration is updated and redeployed. The a_3 denoted that the system's component was reconfigured and the whole cluster was restarted. The a_4 denoted that no action was applied because the status of the component couldn't be obtained. Depending on the action taken, the starting state, and the subsequent state P_S^A , the agent receives a numerical reward $R_{t+1} \in \mathfrak{R} \subset \mathcal{R}$ to maximize the reward (performance). Then, the system returns a new state S_{t+1} from the state space SP at time t .

The state space includes three possible situations, 1) the state is at the initial status (misconfigured) S_{Int} ,

2) successful recovery S_{SR} , 3) the recovery fail S_{RF} , and 4) recovered state S_R . Hence, if the state is S_{Int} , then one recovery action from the actions in AS is applied. If the action is applied successfully, the state transits to S_{SR} , which indicates the success of recovery. Here, the state is marked as recovered S_R otherwise, the state turns to S_{RF} , and another action is applied to recover the state $P : S \times S \times A \mapsto [0, 1]$ until the state is recovered with the probability of transition $P(S_t1, S_t2, A1) = 1$ from state S_t1 to state S_t2 upon using action $A1$. If the recovery isn't applied successfully, the state is marked as non-recovered with a probability of failure $P(S_t1, S_t2, A1) = F$, and a constant failure rate FR , which results in an exponential failure distribution as shown in (1).

The reward could be a set of possible rewards with a reward probability R_S^A : (1) positive value, which refers to a successfully applied recovery action that enhanced the observed metrics. (2) negative value refers to non-successful applied recovery action that declined the observed metrics. The reward function R represents the gain for using action $A1$ in state S as $R : S \times A \mapsto \mathcal{R}$. The gain of the reward is determined by defining the performance function based on the action chosen at each time slot t , denoted by $PerSC_t = Q_{SC}$. The Q_{SC} denoted the system's component performance at t , and Q_{ED} denoted the edge device's performance at t . The greater the value of Q , the better a chosen action for a state with a policy π . To control the importance of immediate and future rewards for each state, we used a discount factor of D to maximize the cumulative reward we got from each state.

$$F_{(t)} = FR \times \exp^{-FR(t+t')} \quad (1)$$

The controller stops the iteration as soon as there is no more policy enhancement. We enhanced the controller performance during the selection process of the optimal policy as shown in (2) by taking the best action over all actions considering the converge of the expected return sequence $upsilon_w$ and the optimal returned policy $upsilon_{optimal}, \forall s \in S$.

$$v_{w+1}(s) = \max_a \sum_{s', r} p(s', r|s, a) \times [\epsilon v_w(s') + r] \quad (2)$$

4 EVALUATION

To evaluate the controller, we ran several experiments. Our setup consisted of three VM instances (2 VM for the heart rate monitor application and 1 VM for the controller). Each VM is equipped with 3 VCPUs and 2 GB VRAM; and runs Ubuntu 22.10 and Xen 4.11.

Agents are installed on each VM to collect and transfer monitoring data for external storage and processing. The VMs are connected through a 100 Mbps network. For each VM, we deployed three containers. A K8s cluster, consisting of one master node and three worker nodes, was deployed using Kubeadm, running K8s version 1.19.2. All nodes have 4 VCPUs and 8GB RAM, and all were deployed on the same machine to eliminate variations in network delay. We created 30 namespaces, each with 4 microservices (pods) used for performance measurements, and assigned the same number of network policies. The number of created policies was 900, which were ordered, managed, and evaluated.

4.1 Data Collection and System Monitoring

The installed agents collect data about CPU, Memory, Network, filesystem changes, information flow (i.e., no. of flows issued to component), patient health information, device operation status, the device id, and service status from the system components. The agents exposed log files of system components to the storage to be used in the analysis. Edge devices with similar functionality are grouped and allocated to a respective group (pool of heart monitor edge devices). We used the Datadog tool to obtain a live data stream for the running components and to capture the request-response tuples and associated metadata. The collected data are grouped and stored in a time series database. We used the "Logman" command in Kubernetes and Docker to trace remote procedure call (RPC) events to forward container logs as event tracing in the window. The gathered data are stored in real-time/historical storage to enhance future detection.

The dataset is divided into a 50% training set and 50% testing set. We used NNM iSPI Performance to collect data about the information flow from the system under observation (e.g., device id, device type, max/mean/min size of the packet sent, total packets, max/mean/min amount of time of active flow, duration of flow). We stored the configuration files of the components in the GitOps version control to simplify the rollback of configuration change. We wrote our configuration files using YAML. We managed the configurations, deployments, and dependencies using kubectl and Skaffold.

After training the models on the gathered data, we noticed at the cluster level a sudden increase in request latency and the request rate falling, which caused excessive consumption of resource usage (CPU, memory, network). This occurred because of

Table 1: Detection Evaluation.

Metrics	HHMM	CRFs	DBMs
RMSE	0.2003	0.4860	0.2600
PFD	0.3065	0.3976	0.3948
Recall	94.49%	91.69%	93.62%
Accuracy	93%	92%	92%

the deployment of the incorrectly configured version (pod replacement) that allows root access to the host as the *privileged* and *hostPID* were true. Moreover, a critical improper access control occurred at the edge level due to no encryption to secure the communication protocol, and the protocol lacks authentication for legitimate devices.

4.2 The Detection Assessment

The performance of the detection model is evaluated by Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Probability of False Detection (PFD), which are the commonly used metrics for evaluating detection accuracy. The RMSE measures the differences between the detected value and the observed one by the model. A smaller RMSE value indicates a more effective detection scheme. The PFD measures the number of the normally detected component which has been misdetected as anomalous by the model. A smaller PFD value indicates a more effective detection scheme. The efficiency of the model is compared with Conditional Random Fields (CRFs) and Deep Boltzmann Machines (DBMs); see Table 1. We noticed that the computation of CRFs is harder than the HHMM. The results show that the performance of the proposed detection is better than the CRF, as it correctly identified true positives (TP) of abnormal flow and misconfiguration with 94% recall and 93% accuracy. The DBMs achieved promising results; however, the learning procedure was too slow.

4.3 The Recovery Assessment

This section evaluates the controller by measuring the reliability of recovery, deployment, and performance of the controller. We used Mean Time to Recovery (MTTR) to measure the average time the recovery process takes to recover a component after observing a failure on the monitored metrics. The failures refer to a component that cannot meet its expected performance metrics. A higher MTTR indicates the existence of inefficiencies within the recovery process or the component itself. We conducted two scenarios. The first one corresponds to the selection of the optimal policy. The second relates to selecting a random policy, where the agent randomly selects one or more

actions with uniform distribution. For each scenario, we aimed to assess the average time the recovery process took to recover a container and an edge device. In the first scenario, the MTTR for the edge device was 20 s, and the MTTR to recover the container was approximately 43 s with a grace period of 80 s (default 30 s in Kubernetes) for service image size (110 MB) with service image number 30. For the second scenario, the MTTR for the edge device was 53 s, and the MTTR to recover the container was roughly 71 seconds under the same settings. We noticed that the container and the edge device function normally after that interval in both scenarios regarding the assigned rewards. The result of the first scenario led to a significantly short recovery time as the average achieved rewards through the optimal policy were remarkably higher than the random policy. Moreover, we found that for some actions, such as function configuration and configuring user namespace remapping, the more rewards are assigned during the recovery process, the average time decreases as the detection time is short, demonstrating a significant difference in the controller performance. However, to recover from failure efficiently, the average recovery time increased when the failure rate increased.

We measured the Overall Accuracy of Recovery (OAR). The OAR measures the average rate of successfully recovered components to the total number of failures emitted by all components. When computed over multiple runs, the OAR was around 97.66%, which means that the trained recovery policy could not handle a small number of failures. The accuracy was still more than 96%, though the unhandled failures decreased dramatically with more training data.

We verified the ability of the controller using a long time-span dataset (from 1 July 2021 to 1 November 2022). For some misconfiguration types (e.g., CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2022-0811, CVE-2019-6538, CVE-2021-21284, CVE-2019-9946, and CVE-2020-10749), the trained recovery policy enhanced the performance of the system resources. The results show that the average amount of resource consumption (CPU, memory, network), with no misconfiguration, was approximately the same, with respective values varying around 30%~60% (normal behavior). Resource consumption due to misconfiguration increased and was over 98% (overloaded resources), demonstrating the impact of improper configuration on the system resources. The recovered misconfiguration impacted the saturated resource as the values of the monitored resources varied around 38.4%~64.6% (normal behavior). The controller performance was almost the same, with a minor recovery time deviation of around 100 seconds for some failure types,

like container privileged access and wrong pod label. The deviation returned to the correlation with the failure in the system. Hence, we used the sequence of failures occurring during the recovery process to reflect the type of failure, which represents the failures that share the same observations corresponding to a unique fault. If the container privileged access and wrong pod label sequence of failures occurred, we focus on the container privileged access failure to represent its failure type and relate it to its fault, which is Privilege Access Escalation Management. We choose the initial failure that occurred as it is representative enough of the observations to which it belongs, which allows us to save the recovery time without trying many recovery actions. We found that some failures in the test set, such as CVE-2022-0811, are not covered by the training set, which might impact accuracy. The result stated that the controller performed better with the increase in the training dataset size.

5 RELATED WORK

Several studies have addressed workload and information flow management in dynamic environments. Sorkunlu (2017) identified system performance anomalies by analyzing the correlations in the resource usage data. Wang (2018) proposed a model-based approach to correlate the workload and the resource utilization of applications to characterize the system status. In the work of Moothedath et al. (2020), an information-flow tracking model was developed for detecting suspicious flows in the system and performing security analysis for unauthorized use of data. A formal model that optimizes the runtime performance of data-flow applications focusing on detecting the latency variation in IoT is developed by Luo et al. (2020).

Many literature studies have used Markov models and their derivations to detect anomalous behavior. For instance, Sohal (2018) used Markov models to categorize and identify malicious edge devices, and Sukhwani (2014) implemented various techniques to detect network anomalies and intrusions. Faults can also be detected in real-time embedded systems by describing the healthy and faulty states of a system's hardware components (Ge, 2015). In contrast, Borgi (2018) proposed an intrusion-detection solution that collects data at the system level. This solution track information flows to find links between related and unrelated attacks at the network level and to recognize the reconstructed attack campaigns using HMM.

However, the previously mentioned literature studies provided limited scope for dynamically in-

tegrating different policies to manage medical edge devices' and clusters' configurations. In particular, existing frameworks have paid limited attention to the critical role of efficient recovery management (Alessandro, 2022), (CISKubernetes, 2022), (Darryl, 2022), (Fairwinds, 2023), (Joe, 2022), (Kyle, 2020). Hence, this paper: (1) mapped the observed performance degradation (failure) to its hidden abnormal flow of information (fault) and misconfiguration type (error) and (2) selected the optimal recovery policy with optimum actions to optimize the performance of the system under observation.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Securing workloads and information flow against misconfiguration in container-based clusters and edge medical devices is an important part of overall system security. This paper presented a controller that analyzes the misconfiguration, maps the observation to its hidden misconfiguration type, and selects the optimal recovery policy to maximize the performance of defined metrics. In the future, we will integrate streaming from different edge devices, expand the recovery mechanism, and conduct more experiments.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research was funded in part by The Research Council of Norway under grant numbers 274451 and 263248.

REFERENCES

- Moothedath, S., Sahabandu, D., Allen, J., Clark, A., Bushnell, L., Lee, W., and Poovendran, R. (2020). Dynamic Information Flow Tracking for Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats: A Stochastic Game Approach. In *arXiv:2006.12327*.
- Kraus, S., Schiavone, F., Pluzhnikova, A., and Invernizzi, A. C. (2021). Digital Transformation in Healthcare: Analyzing The Current State-of-Research. *Journal of Business Research*, 123:557–567.
- Sklavos, N., Zaharakis, I. D., Kameas, A., and Kalapodi, A. (2017). Security & Trusted Devices in the Context of Internet of Things (IoT). In *The proceedings of 20th EUROMICRO Conference on Digital System Design, Architectures, Methods, Tools (DSD'17)*, pages 502–509.
- Luo, Y., Li, W., and Qiu, S. (2020). Anomaly Detection Based Latency-Aware Energy Consumption Optimization For IoT Data-Flow Services. *Sensors*, 20:1–20.
- Mäkitalo, N., Ometov, A., Kannisto, J., Andreev, S., Koucheryavy, Y., and Mikkonen, T. (2018). Safe and Secure Execution at the Network Edge: A Framework for Coordinating Cloud, Fog, and Edge. *IEEE Software*, 35:30–37.
- Guo, M., Li, L., and Guan, Q. (2019). Energy-Efficient and Delay-Guaranteed Workload Allocation in IoT-Edge-Cloud. *IEEE Access*, 7:78685–78697.
- Fine, S., Singer, Y., and Tishby, N. (1998). The Hierarchical Hidden Markov Model: Analysis and Applications. *Machine Learning*, 32:41–62.
- Derman, C. (1970). Finite State Markovian Decision Processes. Academic Press, New York
- Sorkunlu, N., Chandola, V., and Patra, A. (2017). Tracking System Behavior from Resource Usage Data. In *The proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing (ICCC)*, pages 410–418.
- Wang, T., Xu, J., Zhang, W., Gu, Z., and Zhong, H. (2018). Self-Adaptive Cloud Monitoring with Online Anomaly Detection. *Future Generation Computer Systems*, 80:89–101.
- Sohal, A.S., Sandhu, R., Sood, S.K., and Chang, V. A. (2018). Cybersecurity Framework to Identify Malicious Edge Device in Fog Computing and Cloud-of-Things Environments. *Computer Security*, 74:340–354.
- Sukhwani, H., Sharma, V., and Sharma, S. (2014). A Survey of Anomaly Detection Techniques and Hidden Markov Model. *International Journal of Computer Applications*, 93:975–8887.
- Ge, N., Nakajima, S., and Pantel, M. (2015). Online Diagnosis of Accidental Faults for Real-Time Embedded Systems Using a Hidden Markov Model. *Simulation*, 91:851–868.
- Borgi, G. (2018). Real-Time Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats Using Information Flow Tracking and Hidden Markov. Doctoral Dissertation.
- Alessandro, M. (2022). Nearly One Million Exposed Misconfigured Kubernetes Instances Could Cause Breaches. <https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/misconfigured-kubernetes-exposed/>
- CIS Kubernetes Benchmarks. (2022). Securing Kubernetes An Objective, Consensus-Driven Security Guideline For The Kubernetes Server Software. <https://www.cisecurity.org/benchmark/kubernetes>
- Darryl, T. (2022). ARMO: Misconfiguration Is Number 1 Kubernetes Security Risk. <https://thenewstack.io/armo-misconfiguration-is-number-1-kubernetes-security-risk/>
- Fairwinds. (2023). Kubernetes Configuration Benchmark Report. <https://www.fairwinds.com/kubernetes-config-benchmark-report>
- Joe, P. (2020). Common Kubernetes Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities. <https://www.fairwinds.com/blog/kubernetes-misconfigurations>
- Kyle, A. (2020). Major Vulnerability Found in Open Source Dev Tool For Kubernetes. <https://venturebeat.com/security/major-vulnerability-found-in-open-source-dev-tool-for-kubernetes/>

- Jin, X., Katsis, C., Sang, F., Sun, J., Kundu, A., and Kompella, R. (2022). Edge Security: Challenges and Issues. In *arXiv:2206.07164*.
- IEEE. (2009). IEEE Standard Classification for Software Anomalies (IEEE 1044–2009). In *IEEE Std 1044-2009 (Revision of IEEE Std 1044-1993)*, 2010:1–23.
- ISO. (2019). Systems and Software Engineering — Systems and Software Assurance — Part 1: Concepts and Vocabulary (ISO/IEC/IEEE 15026-1:2019).
- Samir, A. and Pahl, C. (2019). A Controller Architecture For Anomaly Detection, Root Cause Analysis and Self-Adaptation for Cluster Architectures. In *The Eleventh International Conference on Adaptive and Self-Adaptive Systems and Applications (ADAPTIVE)*, pages 75–83.

