

Who Watches the Watchers: A Multi-Task Benchmark for Anomaly Detection*

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Keywords: Anomaly Detection, Benchmark, Performance Metrics, Datasets, Reproducibility.

Abstract: A driver in the rise of IoT systems has been the relative ease with which it is possible to create specialized-but-adaptable deployments from cost-effective components. Such components tend to be relatively unreliable and resource poor, but are increasingly widely connected. As a result, IoT systems are subject both to component failures and to the attacks that are an inevitable consequence of wide-area connectivity. Anomaly detection systems are therefore a cornerstone of effective operation; however, in the literature, there is no established common basis for the evaluation of anomaly detection systems for these environments. No common set of benchmarks or metrics exists and authors typically provide results for just one scenario. This is profoundly unhelpful to designers of IoT systems, who need to make a choice about anomaly detection that takes into account both ease of deployment and likely detection performance in their context.

To address this problem, we introduce Aftershock, a multi-task benchmark. We adapt and standardize an array of datasets from the public literature into anomaly detection-specific benchmarks. We then proceed to apply a diverse set of existing anomaly detection algorithms to our datasets, producing a set of performance baselines for future comparisons. Results are reported via a dedicated online platform located at <https://aftershock.dev>, allowing system designers to evaluate the general applicability and practical utility of various anomaly detection models. This approach of public evaluation against common criteria is inspired by the immensely useful community resources found in areas such as natural language processing, recommender systems, and reinforcement learning.

We collect, adapt, and make available 10 anomaly detection tasks which we use to evaluate 6 state-of-the-art solutions as well as common baselines. We offer researchers a submission system to evaluate future solutions in a transparent manner and we are actively engaging with academic and industry partners to expand the set of available tasks. Moreover, we are exploring options to add hardware-in-the-loop.

As a community contribution, we invite researchers to train their own models (or those reported by others) on the public development datasets available on the online platform, submitting them for independent evaluation and reporting results against others.

1 INTRODUCTION

Anomaly Detection, or the ability to recognize and distinguish deviations from expected behavior in data, is a last line of defense for the identification of intrusions, faults, and other undesirable events in deployed systems. Although widely applicable, this technology

is especially useful in the context of systems that are key targets but that lack comprehensive security design: for example, critical cyber-physical systems to which internet connectivity has later been added.

Cyber-physical systems are difficult to secure but nevertheless have strong availability requirements. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) who attack and compromise cyber-physical systems have become more common and more sophisticated. As a result, research in the applications of anomaly detection to cyber-physical systems is becoming both timely and necessary. However, anomaly detection is a challenging task in the absence of tailored information about the data in question and the mechanisms used

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*This project was funded by the UK EPSRC grant EP/S022503/1 that supports the Center for Doctoral Training in Cybersecurity delivered by the UCL Departments of Computer Science, Security and Crime Science, and Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy.

to produce it. Partly as a result, comparisons between anomaly detection systems across a broad range of deployment scenarios are almost entirely missing.

Aftershock reduces the difficulty of establishing like-for-like comparisons between methods in this space and ensures reproducible results. Simultaneously, Aftershock enforces practices that avert mistakes and errors that could yield inaccurate performance metrics (for example the unintended mixing of development and test data) through a strict separation between model authors and evaluators.

In Section 2 we discuss the task of Anomaly Detection, its various interpretations, and prior work in this space. We proceed to introduce Aftershock in Section 3, discussing its requirements, the current tasks, baseline models, and our submission model. We follow this with a discussion of the performance of the baselines (Section 4), and discuss the implications, opportunities for improvements, and future work in Section 5 prior to our concluding remarks (Section 6).

2 BACKGROUND

Taxonomies of anomaly detection techniques typically draw a distinction between knowledge-based and behavior-based systems. The former identify specific patterns of misbehavior while the latter identify out-of-the-ordinary runtime features (Mitchell and Chen, 2014).

While knowledge-based systems are commonplace in practice, such methods are tailored for specific tasks and domains. Given that one of the core goals of this project is to encourage the development of generalisable anomaly detection methods, we exclusively consider behavior-based approaches. Within this subgroup, we identify three prevalent formulations of anomaly detection, in which the primary difference is the quality and quantity of contextual information to which a model has access: unsupervised, supervised, and semi-supervised. We further distinguish between temporal and non-temporal anomaly detection. In the former, observations may be influenced by preceding observations whereas, in the latter, observations are independent of each other.

Unsupervised anomaly detection involves a model that observes a stream of data and predicts the emergence of anomalies with no prior context; that is, without any knowledge of the underlying process or system prior to deployment. The model is expected to learn the characteristics of the underlying process dynamically, with the expectation that, with the passage of time, the model will become increasingly robust.

While this is the approach used in the only other known anomaly detection benchmark at the time of this writing, namely the Numenta Anomaly Benchmark (NAB) (Ahmad et al., 2017), the core limitation of unsupervised anomaly detection lies in the potential for model misprediction and corruption shortly after deployment when anomalous events may be ongoing. If an unsupervised model is initialized under anomalous conditions, it will interpret these conditions as its baseline of normality. This mode of operation may also be more limiting than necessary under real-world circumstances in which normal observations are abundant. Not leveraging this data renders the already complex training of models more difficult.

Supervised anomaly detection involves a model that is pre-trained on labeled (anomalous/non-anomalous) observations prior to deployment. In contrast to unsupervised anomaly detection, a supervised anomaly detection model is aware of the types of anomalies that may arise and trains a decision function to detect them. Notably, supervised anomaly detection techniques are trained only to detect types of anomalies observed during training and, therefore, will struggle to detect novel events that are unlike those captured within the provided training corpus.

Semi-supervised anomaly detection can be thought of as a compromise between unsupervised anomaly detection and supervised anomaly detection. A semi-supervised model is pre-trained on observations from the underlying system or process, but these observations need only be normal; there may be a total absence of anomalies. Semi-supervised models are thus expected to learn to distinguish between normal and abnormal observations on the basis of a notion of normality derived from the training data, without classifying discrete types of anomalies. Semi-supervised anomaly detection is vulnerable to corruption of its training dataset, which is expected to consist of only normal observations, akin to the issue identified in unsupervised anomaly detection.

3 AFTERSHOCK: A BENCHMARK FOR ANOMALY DETECTION MODELS

Given that there is usually an abundance of normal data, semi-supervised anomaly detection is a strong contender as the most realistic candidate for practical applications. While Aftershock is primarily tailored to this type of technique, it supports unsupervised algorithms without limitation since such models may be converted to semi-supervised models as

discussed later in this section. The purpose of Aftershock is to enable like-for-like comparisons between anomaly detection techniques and, in doing so, spur the development of new techniques that exhibit excellent cross-task generality and practical utility.

While we evaluate a number of “off-the-shelf” anomaly detection models to establish comparative baselines, academics and industry practitioners may themselves contribute anomaly detection models to Aftershock for evaluation against a representative set of challenges. To that end, we have established a process to facilitate the submission of models based on virtually any technology, using containerization.

Aftershock features a diverse array of datasets specifically adapted for anomaly detection tasks. Each dataset is divided into a publicly accessible development dataset and a privately accessible test dataset. By “privately accessible”, we mean that the test dataset is only accessible to models after submission to Aftershock. To that end, model execution occurs on dedicated air-gapped evaluation infrastructure, thereby avoiding mistakes such as the accidental mixture of development and test data.

The suggested workflow, as illustrated in Figure 1, is for contributors to use the publicly available development dataset to fit their model on a per-task basis, extract the requisite inference routines, and package them into standardized container images. On initialization, these containers are expected to read the test dataset from the local filesystem and produce an anomaly prediction in $[0, 1]$ for each observation, with 0/1 representing absolute confidence of normality/abnormality.

Once submitted, container images are transferred to the Aftershock evaluation infrastructure and are run until completion or exhaustion of the resources provisioned. When model predictions are finally produced, Aftershock will compare them to ground truth labels and produce a series of performance metrics that are published on the online platform.

Aftershock does not place any constraints on model architecture beyond the ability to process observations via standard file-based I/O and to make corresponding predictions as to their normality or abnormality. Unsupervised models can be adapted to semi-supervised models by ingesting the provided development datasets to inform their state prior to submission.

To ease the contribution of models encumbered by confidentiality or intellectual property concerns, we allow authors to keep the training mechanism of their contribution secret and absent from submitted container images. To the same end, we allow authors to request the deletion of all executable components as-




Figure 1: Model contribution process diagram. Green, yellow, and red items represent publicly accessible, privately accessible, and secret data respectively. Blue actions are taken by the contributor whereas purple actions are taken by the Aftershock maintainers.

sociated with their contribution immediately following evaluation.

3.1 Datasets

Aftershock features ten anomaly detection tasks, which cover a broad range of feature counts, data quantities and difficulties, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. As Aftershock aims to reward cross-task generality, we designed the benchmark such that achieving good performance requires a model to perform well across as many tasks as possible. We describe these tasks below and discuss our evaluation mechanism in Section 4.

All tasks made initially available on the platform are derived from existing publicly accessible sources, namely simulators or raw data, that have undergone random but consistent geometric transformations to inhibit the use of models trained on the publicly available sources. To prevent side-channel attacks, Aftershock does not expose inter-networking facilities to the containers during evaluation. Nevertheless, as many of the evaluation datasets are ultimately directly derived from publicly available counterparts, there exists some risk of inference that cannot be eliminated. We hope to include additional proprietary tasks in the future to partially address this concern.

Where development and test datasets are indicated in the original source, these datasets are preserved. Where no such distinction is made, development datasets are produced by extracting a uniformly random 50% subset of normal observations without substitution. The remaining data, both normal and abnormal, represents the private test data.

3.1.1 Cyber-physical Systems

We include four datasets derived from raw data produced by cyber-physical systems or simulations.

Table 1: Task feature counts and quantities of normal and abnormal data.

Task	Features	Normal Samples	Abnormal Samples
Cyber-physical Systems			
TE Fortran	53	406,400	572,800
TE Matlab	42	878,195	136,769
TE Rieth	23	730,000	14,600,000
SWaT 2015	52	890,298	54,621
Computer Networks			
CIC-IDS-2017	78	2,273,097	557,646
KDD (HTTP)	38	309,523	313,568
KDD (SMTP)	38	47,685	48,869
Cross-domain			
Shuttle	9	68,216	5,288
CoverType	10	283,301	2,747
Mammography	6	10,923	260

Table 2: Task feature counts and quantities of development and testing data.

Task	Features	Dev Samples	Test Samples
Cyber-physical Systems			
TE Fortran	53	201,600	777,600
TE Matlab	42	434,750	580,214
TE Rieth	23	250,000	15,080,000
SWaT 2015	52	495,000	449,919
Computer Networks			
CIC-IDS-2017	78	529,918	2,300,825
KDD (HTTP)	38	309,523	313,568
KDD (SMTP)	38	47,685	48,869
Cross-domain			
Shuttle	9	34,108	39,396
CoverType	10	141,650	144,398
Mammography	6	5,461	5,722

These include three datasets derived from variants of the Tennessee-Eastman (TE) industrial process, namely its (original) Fortran (Downs and Vogel, 1993) implementation, revised Matlab (Bathelt et al., 2015) implementation and raw data published by Rieth et al. (Rieth et al., 2017). We also include a dataset derived from the SWaT project¹.

Tennessee-Eastman is a realistic process simulation of a chemical plant that has been widely used as a benchmark for control and monitoring research. The simulators found in the Tennessee-Eastman source code distributions can produce 20 or 28 types of dif-

¹The SWaT dataset is available at <https://itrust.sutd.edu.sg/testbeds/secure-water-treatment-swat/>.

ferent process faults under the Fortran and revised Matlab implementations respectively. These faults occur due to various disturbances; some faults almost instantaneously place the process in a critical state while others (notably disturbances 3, 9, and 15 in the Fortran implementation) produce statistically insignificant deviations (Lee et al., 2006; Detroja et al., 2006).

SWaT is a water treatment dataset that was designed to accelerate cybersecurity research in the context of cyber-physical systems. The process begins by taking in raw water, adding necessary chemicals to it, filtering it via an Ultrafiltration (UF) system, de-chlorinating it using UV lamps, and then feeding it to a Reverse Osmosis (RO) system. A backwash process cleans the membranes in UF using the water produced by RO. The cyber portion of SWaT consists of a layered communications network, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation, and a Historian. Data from sensors is available to the SCADA system and is recorded by the Historian for subsequent analysis.

3.1.2 Computer Networks

We include three datasets derived from network traffic analysis in networks exhibiting anomalous activity. Namely, we include the CIC-IDS-2017 dataset (Sharafaldin et al., 2018) and two instances of the legacy KDD Cup 1999 dataset² which is preserved to facilitate historical comparisons.

The CIC-IDS-2017 dataset is a recent dataset derived from real-world network traffic that includes normal traffic and traffic from periods when the network was under various forms of attack. Over a five-day capture period, the network simulated had undergone brute force FTP, brute force SSH, denial of service (DoS), heartbleed, web, and other attacks.

The KDD Cup 1999 dataset is a popular intrusion detection dataset that includes traffic metrics arising from a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network environment. Two derivatives of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset are constructed from http and SMTP observations independently. While the original dataset contains 41 input features, the tasks herein group observations by layer 7 protocol and strip three related features: “protocol_type”, “service” and “flag” to produce http and SMTP tasks with 38 features.

²The KDD Cup 1999 dataset is available at <http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html>.

3.1.3 Cross-domain

We include three unrelated anomaly detection datasets that were selected to provide indications of cross-task generality.

The Mammography dataset available from openML³ is a medical anomaly detection dataset, originally published by Aleksandar Lazarevic (Woods et al., 1994), that consists of 11,183 observations with 6 input features, including 260 anomalies representing mammary calcifications that may be indicators of invasive cancer. Mammography is an example of a highly unbalanced dataset, that made it an appropriate, but intentionally different Aftershock task. All of the features included in the original dataset are carried forward into Aftershock.

The Shuttle (also known as Statlog) dataset⁴ from the UCI machine learning repository (Dua and Graff, 2017) was originally intended as a multi-class classification dataset consisting of 58,000 observations with 9 input features. Shuttle has been adapted to an anomaly detection task for Aftershock by designating one class as the normal class, stripping observations from a certain other class, and treating the remaining classes as anomalies, as described by the Outlier Detection Datasets project⁵.

The CoverType⁶ (also known as ForestCover) dataset from UCI machine learning repository (Dua and Graff, 2017) was intended to be a multi-class classification dataset used for predicting forest cover type from cartographic variables. The relevant study area includes four wilderness areas located in the Roosevelt National Forest of northern Colorado in the United States. These areas represent forests with minimal human-caused disturbances, so that existing forest cover types are a result of ecological processes rather than forest management practices. CoverType consists of 581,012 observations with 54 input features (10 quantitative features, 4 binary wilderness area features, and 40 binary soil type features) whereas the derivative anomaly detection task available on Aftershock only includes the 10 quantitative features. For the purposes of anomaly detection, observations from one class represent normal data and those from another represent anomalies; observations not associated with the foregoing two classes are ig-

nored, as described by the Outlier Detection Datasets project⁵.

3.2 Baseline Models

To set an initial comparative menu for this project, we have chosen a variety of anomaly detection models from the Scikit-learn project (Pedregosa et al., 2011) to act as baselines in our initial experiments. These algorithms are a representative sample of anomaly detection algorithms that are currently available “off-the-shelf”.

Due to the popularity of the Scikit-learn project, we anticipate that these algorithms are key tools for data science practitioners more broadly. The implementations of these algorithms together with training and submission scripts for Aftershock can be found on the project website and should serve as a starting point for future submission.

Isolation Forest: (Liu et al., 2012) is an ensemble method that performs semi-supervised anomaly detection by isolating observations from each other such that anomalies are isolated more quickly than normal observations. Unlike previous methods, Isolation Forest has linear training and inference complexity relative to the size of the respective datasets, and can operate in high-dimensional settings with or without redundant features.

One-Class Support Vector Machines: (Schölkopf et al., 2001) represent a class of algorithms that perform semi-supervised anomaly detection by mapping training data onto a feature space by means of a kernel function that maximizes the margin of the mapped data to the origin. Anomalies can then be distinguished by their embedded distance from the origin. Although one-class support vector machines have demonstrated superior performance at the time of their discovery, their runtime complexity scales quadratically with the size of the training data, rendering them of limited practical usefulness.

Minimum Covariance Determinant: is an algorithm that performs semi-supervised anomaly detection by leveraging FAST-MCD (Rousseeuw and Driessen, 1999) to identify a subset of the training data whose covariance matrix has the lowest discriminant. Once this subset has been identified, its covariance matrix can be used to derive an elliptic envelope of the region of normality and identify any outliers as anomalies.

Local Outlier Factor: (Breunig et al., 2000) is an algorithm for semi-supervised anomaly detection that is closely related to the K-nearest neighbors algorithm (Cover and Hart, 1967) and leverages the difference in density between neighboring observations

³The Mammography dataset is available at <https://www.openml.org/d/310>.

⁴The Shuttle dataset is available at [https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+\(Shuttle\)](https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Statlog+(Shuttle)).

⁵The Outlier Detection Datasets are available at <http://odds.cs.stonybrook.edu/>.

⁶The ForestCover dataset available is at <https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/covertime>.

as a proxy for abnormality; that is, observations with substantially lower density than their nearest neighbors are seen as anomalous.

Beyond these baselines, we include two additional anomaly detection algorithms.

MStream: (Bhatia et al., 2021) is a recent technique that performs multivariate streaming anomaly detection in constant time and memory by combining locality-sensitive hashing with a Count-Min-Sketch construction.

Bionic: (Demetriou et al., 2022) is an anomaly detection method developed by the authors. Bionic is a semi-supervised anomaly detection system that combines Neural Networks with robust gradient-free optimization techniques to produce novel, task-specific model architectures for anomaly detection tasks.

3.3 Submission and Model Evaluation

Aftershock allows researchers to contribute anomaly detection models for inclusion in the project’s model directory and task-specific and global leaderboards. We have developed a Contributor License Agreement that allows the contributor to retain their ownership in the work submitted while granting Aftershock the necessary legal rights to use that contribution to perform model evaluation and publish the resulting metrics on the foregoing leaderboards.

To facilitate the consistent and reliable evaluation of potentially very different models operating under potentially vastly different execution environments, Aftershock leverages containerization to operate contributed models, which must take the form of Open Container Images⁷ and include at least inference sub-routines, compiled or otherwise.

Container images must satisfy a data interchange contract, described on a per-task basis on the Aftershock website. For all existing tasks, this interchange involves the reading of observations and writing of predictions to and from CSV or HDF5 files found under file-system paths known a priori, as per the specifications of various tasks. Where deviations from this pattern are necessary, these will be noted under the specification of the relevant task. Upon completion, several indicative performance metrics are computed per completed task:

Area Under Curve: The area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is an indicator of the performance of a binary classification model com-

puted via the aggregation of performance metrics under various discrimination thresholds.

Inference Runtime: The amount of time required to compute model predictions as to the normality or abnormality of observations in the test datasets of various tasks is an indication of the practical usefulness of a model and of the computational considerations involved in a hypothetical deployment. The change in runtime with a varying number of features (i.e. across task) yields a measure of performance scaling with respect to task dimensionality.

Further to the per-task metrics described, the per-model geometric mean of each of the foregoing metrics is computed across all attempted tasks, yielding an approximate measure of general performance. As contributors may choose to have their models evaluated in only a subset of tasks, we also note the percentage of tasks attempted relative to the total number of tasks available.

To prevent service degradation arising from faults or abuse, we apply a number of restrictions and resource constraints when executing submitted container images, which contain arbitrary code. Namely, containers are limited to 4 CPU cores and 4GB of system memory, with some more intricate but reasonable I/O and syscall restrictions. Containers are also limited to a runtime of 24 aggregate core hours. In the event that a container exceeds these limitations, execution ceases and the submission will remain unranked. We ensure consistency in these limits and the general availability of resources by executing submissions serially on dedicated infrastructure.

4 EXPERIMENTS

To better understand the challenge posed by the included tasks, we conduct experiments with “off-the-shelf” anomaly detection models from the Scikit-learn project to establish global and task-specific baselines. For the purpose of these experiments, the relevant models are fitted using the publicly available development dataset for each task and, thereafter, evaluated using the standard containerized mechanism previously discussed. All model parameters are fixed to their default values as of Scikit-learn version 0.23.0, which were deemed to be reasonable for general applications.

In Table 3, we summarize the AUC scores achieved by the tested models in every attempted and fully completed task. The MStream algorithm has only been evaluated on temporal tasks that can support streaming anomaly detection; the remaining tasks are incompatible with this algorithm. The miss-

⁷The Open Container Image format was developed as part of The Open Container Initiative: a Linux Foundation project to design open standards for operating-system-level virtualization.

ing values for One-class SVM are due to runtimes exceeding 24 core hours, at which point the evaluation process times out. In Table 4 we similarly summarize the inference runtime for each model-task pair in milliseconds per record.

Table 3: AUC Scores of Model Baselines.

Task	Bionic	MS	IF	SVM	MCD	LOF
Cyber-physical Systems						
TE Fortran	0.759	0.520	0.637	0.615	0.752	0.664
TE Matlab	0.829	0.676	0.704	0.675	0.665	0.772
TE Rieth	0.898	0.898	0.740	0.668	0.855	0.702
SWaT 2015	0.854	0.708	0.834	0.510	0.784	0.510
Computer Networks						
CIC-IDS-2017	0.802	0.291	0.717	0.702	0.595	0.797
KDD (HTTP)	0.999	–	0.939	0.752	0.950	0.940
KDD (SMTP)	1.000	–	0.999	0.780	0.949	0.963
Cross-domain						
Shuttle	0.996	–	0.997	0.778	0.953	0.999
CoverType	0.994	–	0.898	0.732	0.701	0.999
Mammography	0.890	–	0.883	0.794	0.726	0.868
Geometric Mean	0.898	0.579	0.826	0.695	0.784	0.805
Attempted Tasks	100%	50%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4: Inference Runtimes of Model Baselines (ms/record).

Task	Bionic	MS	IF	SVM	MCD	LOF
Cyber-physical Systems						
TE Fortran	0.155	0.000	0.088	5.285	0.002	0.171
TE Matlab	0.128	0.000	0.079	8.256	0.001	0.214
TE Rieth	0.133	0.000	0.086	9.083	0.002	0.263
SWaT 2015	0.140	0.000	0.085	11.014	0.002	0.020
Computer Networks						
CIC-IDS-2017	0.160	0.000	0.113	33.657	0.004	0.256
KDD (HTTP)	0.094	–	0.078	6.863	0.001	0.085
KDD (SMTP)	0.092	–	0.069	0.767	0.001	0.087
Cross-domain						
Shuttle	0.061	–	0.038	0.225	0.000	0.032
CoverType	0.073	–	0.047	1.011	0.000	0.012
Mammography	0.054	–	0.020	0.034	0.000	0.008
Geometric Mean	0.102	0.000	0.064	2.386	0.001	0.064
Attempted Tasks	100%	50%	100%	100%	100%	100%

5 DISCUSSION

We have chosen a set of “off-the-shelf” anomaly detection models from the Scikit-learn project to establish task-specific and global baselines in a series of experiments. The results of these experiments suggest that some anomaly detection tasks are consistently easier than others, regardless of the applied model. Performance on temporal tasks is generally lower than for non-temporal tasks, which suggests a need for more sophisticated temporal anomaly detection techniques.

Our results suggest that inference runtimes are not necessarily associated with better or worse perfor-

mance and, with the exception of One-class SVMs, display low variance across tasks which is correlated with task dimensionality. The existing implementation of One-class SVMs in Scikit-learn appears to exhibit both asymptotically quadratic fitting and inference runtimes relative to the number of samples processed.

We observe that all models demonstrate better than random performance on all tasks, but that MStream exhibits a higher variance in AUC score across tasks. We note that some Tennessee-Eastman disturbances under all variants are not accurately detected by any existing algorithm. Thus, even in the context of this benchmark, anomaly detection cannot be said to be a sufficiently solved problem, implying a need for more powerful models. It is unclear whether this reflects a limitation in the existing algorithms’ ability to capture temporal characteristics in general, or a result of the fact that some disturbances cause only subtle effects that can be masked by noise. We anticipate that the future integration of other large-scale temporal tasks may clarify this.

6 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have presented Aftershock, a challenging, diverse, and scalable platform that rewards the accurate detection of anomalies across a set of diverse tasks. Our objective in creating Aftershock is to encourage the development of new general-purpose, practically useful anomaly detection models and to allow the principal comparison of their performance.

In the course of developing Aftershock, we discovered the general lack of datasets and simulations designed specifically to assess the performance and robustness of anomaly detection algorithms. Datasets and tasks that are specifically crafted to challenge anomaly detection models could be the basis of more accurate comparisons between methods.

For the datasets that we could reasonably adapt to an anomaly detection modality, non-temporal tasks are effectively solved by some methods whereas temporal tasks remain relatively challenging. This observation calls for a stronger research focus on temporal anomaly detection methods.

We are actively engaging with academic and industry partners to expand the available tasks and are exploring options to add hardware-in-the-loop with real testbeds and to support fully private datasets where models are both trained and evaluated on Aftershock infrastructure. This will allow us to offer testing on commercially sensitive datasets that may be difficult to anonymize.

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