Storage Allocation for Camera Sensor Networks using Feedback-based Price Discrimination

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Abstract: Camera sensor networks, mainly with surveillance cameras, are growing in size and complexity. Storage space is the prime resource in such systems but current surveillance setups are still very much centralized and limited in resources due to cost and security constraints. Allocating the correct amount of storage to each camera sensor considering their large difference in characteristics and video content is challenging. In this paper we propose a framework using feedback-based price discrimination of storage resources in order to guarantee a uniform quality level of the videos in camera sensor networks, regardless of the specific camera sensor parameters. We designed a lightweight solution using simple video quality metrics, cascade control and PI (Proportional and Integral) controllers to define the optimal price of resources per camera.

1 INTRODUCTION

The number and size of camera sensor systems used, e.g., in different types of public spaces with surveillance cameras, are growing due to the Internet of Things (IoT) trend and they are currently one of the major storage and bandwidth consumers. With growing demands on high resolution, high frame rate and level of detail, the amount of storage needed to retain these videos is a growing problem. Surveillance installations are usually critical installations and are mostly running on dedicated infrastructures, storing video in trusted servers owned by systems administrators. Newer installations are usually large scale (commonly hundreds of cameras), heterogeneous and have large differences in resource requirement. (IPVM, 2021).

In this paper we propose a lightweight solution using the price discrimination principle from micro-economics, (Armstrong, 2008), to allocate storage resources while separating the resource providers (i.e., the storage units) from the resource buyers (i.e., the camera sensors). The buyers have private information on the amount of resources needed and act accordingly to maximize their utility (here the desire to minimize the compression of their own video stream). The utility represents the goal the buyers want to achieve. The storage units enforce the constraint on resource availability through the use of pricing.

The focus in this paper is H.264 video cameras, the dominating system on the market today. H.264 is a video compression standard based on block-oriented, motion-compensated coding (ITU-T, 2010). A model of the bandwidth needed/generated by a H.264 surveillance camera was presented in our earlier work (Edpalm et al., 2018a; Edpalm et al., 2018b). This model provides an estimate of the bandwidth needs for a H.264 video given current scene conditions and specific sensor parameters and allows to calculate the long term resource needs for the camera as long as it maintains the current parameters.

For a video surveillance system operator, the most important metric is the video quality. As such they want to have the best possible system-wide video quality given the current (mostly cost) constraints without knowledge of the prior or current characteristics of each camera sensor. The video compression level of H.264 videos, \(qp\), determines the quality of each frame. The lower the \(qp\) value, the less compression is applied to the frame, the better the quality but the higher the frame size. The \(qp\) value and its variation over time have a direct impact on the perceived video quality (using mean opinion score testing) according to (Xue et al., 2010; Xue et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2012), i.e., the lower and less vary-

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ing the compression parameter $qp$ is, the better the perceived quality will be. Our aim is thus to have all video cameras in the system to deliver videos with the same compression parameter values without having specific information about them.

The contributions of the paper are:

- The use of cascade control to decide the price of resource per camera (price discrimination) so that the storage usage is maximized.
- A proposed utility measure for camera sensor networks based on the compression value ($qp$) and its deviation from a nominal value.

2 RELATED WORK

Price discrimination is a known profit optimization method in economics, (Armstrong, 2008), but it has been mostly used for revenue maximization. A study of different pricing schemes for maximizing revenue from selling cloud resources can be found in (Xu and Li, 2013). (Li et al., 2009) studied the maximum revenue achievable by a monopolistic service provider under complete network information. Revenue maximization using price discrimination for communication network service providers was studied in (Shakkottai et al., 2008). Price discrimination was used in order to distribute energy between sensors in (Edalat et al., 2009). In (Tsakalozos et al., 2011) the same technique was used to optimally allocate virtual machines in a cloud service infrastructure. But, to the best of the authors knowledge, however, no prior work has used price discrimination in camera sensor networks for visual quality maximization.

Some centralized bandwidth allocation techniques optimizing the system’s compression level have been proposed in (Seetanadi et al., 2018) and (Silvestre-Blanes et al., 2011). Centralized task allocation for collaborative radar sensors based on resource availability and Quality of Service are proposed in (Yan et al., 2021) and (Giannecchini et al., 2004). An alternative but related distributed approach to assign resources are auctions, thus second price auctions have been applied to video surveillance systems to optimize specific applications such as area overage (Ding et al., 2012; Konda et al., 2016; Dieber et al., 2011), sensor placement (Elhamifar and Vidal, 2009; Ermis et al., 2010) and object tracking (Qureshi and Terzopoulos, ; Sankaranarayanan et al., ). Auction theory has also been used to minimize content delivery delay and caching cost for large mobile networks involving multiple stakeholders as reported in (Li et al., 2016) or (Ghosh et al., 2004) or to allocate tasks between radar sensors as in (Ostwald et al., 2005).

3 ARCHITECTURE, VALUATION & FRAMEWORK

We consider a simplified camera sensor network with one storage unit (Network Attached Storage, Cloud storage or other) and $I$ IP video cameras, each having a camera sensor, indexed with $i$: $\{C_i, C_2, ..., C_I\}$. An overview of the system with $I = 4$ is shown in Figure 1. Typically a video surveillance camera system is owned by a security department, which buys/rents storage from an IT department or cloud provider at a fixed rate. In our system, viewing quality is most important. The main system goal is to maximize the overall global video quality given the current system constraints: running cost and video storage size. The shared information between the devices and the system load should be as low as possible. We therefore use the video compression factor as a computation-free and simple way to measure the video quality. The direct correlation between the perceived video quality and the compression factor and its oscillation over time was studied in (Xue et al., 2013) and (Xue et al., 2010). In H.264 videos, the compression factor is defined by the quantization parameter, $qp \in \{0, 1, ..., 51\}$ with 0 being lossless and 51 being the highest compression level (ITU-T, 2010). The quantization controlled by the $qp$ value is the only non-reversible step in the H.264 compression/decompression process impacting the visual quality.

Every predefined period $k$, e.g., an hour, a day, or a week, the cameras need to buy storage from the seller to save the video they generate, using the money at their disposal. If the cameras run out of storage they need to wait until the next period to buy more. At the beginning of each period, $k$, the cameras obtain an amount of money, $m$, that they can use at their discretion to buy resources. The amount they receive depends on the cost of running the system. Each camera sensor has a virtual account holding the money it may use. Any remaining money can be saved for future periods. The amount of money available for camera $C_i$ to buy storage at the beginning of each period $k$ is: $m_i(k) = m_i(k-1) + m$. We do not enforce a limit to the amount of money a camera can retain if unused. How the money is distributed and enforced is not investigated in this paper.

It is assumed that all camera sensors in the net-
work can communicate with the seller and they could, e.g., be part of the same virtual network. The total quantity of storage available by the storage provider is \( s \) and the storage space allocated to camera \( C_i \) is \( s_i \). The corresponding expected quantities are annotated with a superscript, e.g. the expected allocated storage \( s_i \) to camera \( C_i \) is denoted \( s_i^e \). Only the storage unit has storage space, i.e., the cameras are not storage providers.

### 3.1 Price and Valuation of Resources

#### 3.1.1 Storage Providers

The running price of each storage unit (Tbyte, Gbyte, etc.) is determined by the storage provider. The most common approach is to use marginal pricing, i.e., the price is defined as the running cost plus a revenue margin. The storage provider will then charge \( p_0 = \min(p_0^{\text{run}}, p_0^{\text{min}} + \epsilon) \) where \( p_0^{\text{run}} \) is the running cost and \( \epsilon \) the revenue margin. If \( p_0 \leq p_0^{\text{min}} \) the storage provider would sell at a loss. We can calculate \( p_0^{\text{min}} \) from the physical cost of hard disks, e.g., a 8Tb hard disc costs around 400$S, thus \( p_0^{\text{min}} = 0.05 \$ \) per Gb of storage. By adding a 20% margin, we would have \( p_0 = 0.06\$ \).

In our approach, the seller will instead set different (or discriminate) prices per buyer based on the quality of the video stored by the buyer. We define the discriminate price of camera \( i \) at time \( k \) as \( p_i(k) \geq p_0^{\text{min}} \).

We denote with \( R(k) \) the revenue of the camera at time \( k \):

\[
R(k) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i(k) \cdot p_i(k) \tag{1}
\]

where \( p_i(k) \) is the price set by the seller and \( s_i(k) \) is the amount of storage bought by camera \( i \) at time \( k \).

The seller wants to maximize the camera’s video quality given the current system constraints and to adjust the price to reflect the storage limitations without sacrificing the revenue.

The compression level, i.e., \( qp \), of H.264 videos is part of the headers of the received videos. Hence, in each transaction period the storage provider has access to the \( qp \) of the received videos.

The discriminate prices are set with the help of PI controllers (one per camera) which compute the offset \( \Delta p_i(k) \) to the running price \( p_0 \), i.e., the discriminate price is \( p_i(k) = p_0 + \Delta p_i(k) \). Proportional and Integral (PI) control is the most widely used control scheme in industry (Wittenmark et al., 2003). The equation for a continuous-time PI controller is given by

\[
 u(t) = K \left( e(t) + \frac{1}{T_i} \int_{0}^{t} e(s) \, ds \right), \tag{2}
\]

where \( u(t) \) is the control signal, \( e(t) \) the error between the desired value (or setpoint) of the measured signal and the actual value of the measured signal, and \( K \) and \( T_i \) are constant parameters. The storage provider has one controller per camera. It uses the current compression level, \( qp \), of the video as the measured signal. The setpoint is determined by a single outer-loop probing controller which monitors the amount of storage allocated. The goal of the probing controller is to compute the desired compression level for all the cameras so that the storage usage is maximized. Probing control is a simple version of extremum-seeking control that is commonly used in process control, e.g., (Akesson and Hagander, 2000) and (Dochain et al., 2011). The probing controller adjusts its output signal gradually until it reaches a good enough value, probing a new value at regular intervals to check if the new optimal value has changed.

Here the output of the probing controller is the desired system compression level which is used as the setpoint of the inner-loop PI controllers. The output of the PI controllers, i.e., the control signal, is the discriminate price offset \( \Delta p_i(k) \). In order to maximize the used storage the compression level should be as small as possible. Hence, the probing controller will decrease the desired compression level until the requested storage is at or above the maximum storage available. Then it will increase the desired compression level until the requested storage is within a safety margin and then keep it constant. It is kept constant until either (1) the requested storage is again at or above the maximum storage available, in which case it will start to increase the desired compression level again, or (2) a time-out event occurs, in which case it will again start to gradually decrease the desired compression level.

The cascade architecture with \( n \) cameras is shown in Figure 2 and the state machine of the probing controller is shown in Figure 3. The sampling period of the controllers is the transaction period and they are executed at the beginning of each period.

The effect of the feedback-based price discrimination is that the compression levels, \( qp \), of the cameras will converge to the setpoint value of the PI con-
trollers, i.e., the value set by the outer probing controller.

If the total amount of storage requested by the cameras exceeds the total amount of available storage for sale, the storage provider will provide each camera $C_i$ with an amount of storage $s_i$ proportional to its demand compared to that of the other cameras.

3.1.2 Cameras

In order to decide how much storage a camera $C_i$ wants to buy it needs to know how much storage it needs to store a video of a certain quality. An estimate of the storage needed for each $qp$ is obtained using the frame size estimation model provided in (Edpalm et al., 2018b). This model is based on empirical values from multiple real surveillance videos. We denote the estimated storage at the period $k$ for camera $i$, $s_{i,k}(qp)$, it provides for each $qp$ the expected amount of storage necessary for a video with the current parameters (e.g., motion in the scene, light level, amount of nature) and settings of the specific camera sensor (e.g., frame rate, group of picture length). An example of $s_{i,k}(qp)$ is shown in Figure 4. The higher the $qp$ is, the smaller the amount of storage needed and the lower the visual quality of the video.

At the beginning of each transaction period $k$, each camera $C_i$ calculates $s_{i,k}(qp)$, i.e., an estimate of the storage need for each $qp \in \{0, 1, \ldots, 51\}$ given the actual scene and camera sensor parameters which are assumed to be measured or estimated by the camera. The $s_{i,k}(qp)$ functions differ from camera to camera and over time because each camera sensor which equips camera $C_i$ has different settings and overlooks

a different non-constant scene.

Camera $C_i$ uses the actual curve to decide how much storage it should buy with its available money $m_i(k)$, see Section 3.1.3. We do not impose any limitation on the saved funds of cameras and unused money could be saved indefinitely.

3.1.3 Camera Utility

The more storage the camera has, the lower $qp$ it can use to compress its video and therefore the better the video quality (Xue et al., 2010) will be. Oscillations between $qp$ values have a large impact on the visual quality of the video because of the visible jumps in visual quality (Xue et al., 2013).

The valuation function $\theta_i$ of buyer $C_i$ designed to embody the system objective, i.e., to retain videos of the highest possible quality in the system, where quality is measured by the video compression level, $qp_i$, and how much it varies. It is defined by the ellipse equation

$$\theta_i(qp_i, m_i) = m_i \cdot \sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{qp_i + \sigma_i(qp_i)}{2 \cdot 51}\right)^2}, \quad (3)$$

where $m_i$ is the money available for the camera $C_i$, $qp_i$ the compression value corresponding to the received amount $s_i$, and $\sigma_i(x)$ is the standard deviation of $x$ over the $n$ last periods.

The equation of an ellipse has an interesting characteristic around its vertexes. The derivative of the ellipse is low when approaching the co-vertex (low $qp$ and low $\sigma(qp)$), while it is high when close to the vertex (high $qp$ and high $\sigma(qp)$). It is valued more (high derivative) to move away from the high $qp$ and high $\sigma(qp)$ values (vertex) than it is to get closer to the low $qp$ and low $\sigma(qp)$ values (co-vertex).

The utility $u_i$ of buyer $C_i$ is then given by

$$u_i(qp_i, m_i, p_i) = \theta_i(qp_i, m_i) - p_i \quad (4)$$

where $p_i$ is the price paid to obtain the amount of storage $s_i$. The smaller the compression level and the variation of the compression level the higher the camera utility will be. An example of the utility is shown in Fig 5. We use the last 10 $qp$ values from previous
transactions to calculate the standard deviation. The longer this history, the longer a deviation in $qp$ will affect the utility.

At the beginning of each transaction period $k$, after calculating the expected storage amount of storage $s^*_i(k)$ (see Section 3.1.2), the camera calculates the expected utility $u^*_i(k)$ assuming that it gets the associated storage $s^*_i(k)$ given the available money $m_i(k)$ and the announced unit price $p_i(k)$.

Different cameras can have different strategies for buying storage. Here we consider two possible strategies:

1. At each period $k$, the camera buys the amount of storage $s^*_i(k)$ which maximizes the expected utility $u^*_i(k)$ given the money $m_i(k)$ available.
2. The camera keeps all the money until an event occurs. When the event occurs it acts according to Strategy 1 (above).

### 3.2 Transaction Steps

We use a transaction mechanism inspired by the closed bid transaction mechanism used in auctions (Reck, 1997). A transaction is defined by the steps described below. At the beginning of each transaction period $k$:

1. Camera $C_i$ gets an amount of money, $m$, for the new period $k$. The money available to the camera is $m_i(k) = m_i(k - 1) + m$.
2. The storage provider, $n$, announces the total amount of storage for sale, $s(k)$, and the unit price of camera $C_i$: $p_i(k)$.
3. Camera $C_i$ decides how much it buys based on the expected storage usage $s^*_i(k)(qp)$, $p_i(k)$ and $m_i(k)$. It sends to $n$ the amount from $s^*_i(k)(qp)$ maximizing its expected utility $u^*_i(k)$ (see Section 3.1.3).
4. Storage provider $n$ decides the storage allocation and sends to $C_i$ the amount of storage it is allowed to buy, $s_i$.

5. Camera $C_i$ pays the storage provider $n$ the price $s_i \cdot p_i$, deduces this amount from the money it has, i.e., $m_i(k) = m_i(k) - s_i \cdot p_i$, and starts streaming video data up to the provided amount $s_i$ allocated.

6. Storage $n$ extracts the compression level from the received videos, $qp_i(k)$, and uses it to decide the price for the next transaction $p_i(k + 1)$ using the PI controllers. It also calculates the total amount of storage allocated, $\sum s_i(k)$, and uses it to adjust the desired compression level using the probing controller so that the storage usage is maximized, see 3.1.1.

### 4 RESULTS

To validate the price discrimination approach we run multiple simulations using a python framework with independent players (seller and buyers) communicating via queues as well as simulations using the CORE real time network emulator (Ahrenholz et al., 2008). Each simulation uses random unit prices, $p_0$, and random camera parameters (resolution and motion level). The storage needs of the cameras are determined using the model described in (Edpalm et al., 2018b). The cameras will have a computation horizon of 10 periods to calculate their utility.

In the simulations we compare three different cases:

1. The storage uses marginal pricing, i.e., it defines the running cost and adds a margin to it (see Section 3.1.1).
2. The storage uses the price discrimination scheme described in Section 3 with a fixed system quality setpoint, i.e., without any probing controller.
3. The storage uses the price discrimination scheme described in Section 3 with the probing controller selecting the system quality setpoint.

The camera utility is given by Equation (4). We also define a seller utility $U(k)$ to visualise how efficiently the proposed approach reduces the standard
deviation of the sum of the compression levels. It is given by
\[ U(k) = \frac{1}{\sigma_n} \left( \sum_{i} q_{pi}(k) \right) \] (5)
The simulations use four cameras in Fig 7 and Figure 9 and ten cameras in Figure 8. The storage price \( p_0 \) is set randomly at simulation start. In the simulations in Figure 7 and Figure 9, \( C_1 \) is a 4K camera and as such requires the largest storage amount, \( C_2 \) and \( C_3 \) are 1080p cameras with different scene characteristics (\( C_2 \)'s video is more noisy and has more motion) and \( C_4 \) is a 720p camera. In Figure 8, camera parameters are randomly selected at simulation start. During the simulations the camera parameters are constant (resolution and motion levels are fixed) but uniform noise of amplitude up to 25% of the frame sizes was added to reflect a real scenario where noise from the sensor and small changes in the scene would create changing frame sizes. All cameras receive the same amount of money \( m \) at each period \( k \). Figure 7 shows the simulation results of case 1 and case 2. The left column contains the results using marginal pricing scenario (case 1) and the right column contain the results using price discrimination with PI control but without probing controller, i.e., with a fixed setpoint (case 2).

The uppermost plots contain the \( qp \) values of the cameras (remember that a higher \( qp \) means a lower video quality), the ones below are the prices set by the storage provider (gray for the base price, colored for discriminate prices). The third row is the camera utility and the final two rows show the seller utility (defined in 1) and the revenue from selling storage to the cameras (see 3.1.1). Note that in the utility plots the maximum utility has been limited to 5 for easier plotting and calculations (as the utility of an infinitesimal standard deviation tends to infinity).

In the right column of Figure 7, we can see that the PI controllers change the unit prices \( p_i \) to allow the video compression \( qp_i \) to converge towards a common \( qp \) value (first row). The seller utility \( U \) (fourth row) in the price discrimination case (case 2, right column) is clearly higher than in the fixed price case (case 1, left column) while the seller revenues \( R \) are very close to each other (fifth row), i.e., the price discrimination policy allows the total system to run in a better state than using marginal price policy. Because of the seller utility definition, the utility value will tend to infinity when the standard deviation of the camera \( qp \) is zero, leading to the jumps we can see in Figure 7.

In the simulations in Figure 9 price discrimination with probing controller (case 3) is used in both columns. The camera parameters (apart for the video resolution) are selected randomly at simulation start. The results in the left and right column are from two different runs. In the left column, cameras are buying storage at each period \( k \), the simulation being run for 400 periods. In the right column the simulation is done with 4 cameras over 100 periods, cameras \( C_5 \) and \( C_6 \) are buying at each time period but \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \) only buy every 5 and 12 periods respectively. The simulations were done using the same code and models as the python framework but the seller and buyers were running in virtual machines communicating through sockets in the CORE real time network emulator (Ahrenholz et al., 2008). A screenshot of the used system can be seen in Figure 6. With the CORE simulator we can simulate multiple machines communicating over different network architectures and simulate different network conditions. We used the CORE simulator to ensure communication was not sequential and reflected a real-world setup without having to deploy such a setup. The focus of the python framework is to simulate the system sequentially with a focus on the global system behavior.

In the right part of Figure 9 the seller revenues oscillate because of the less frequent storage buy from cameras \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \), but the average revenue is comparable and the different strategies does not prevent the system from converging to a common compression level. In the left part of Figure 9, we can observe the effect of the probing controller adjusting gradually the setpoint compression level down in order to maximize the storage usage, leading to a stable system value with \( qp = 20 \). We can also see that the prices set follows the same trend in order to converge to the system setpoint set by the probing controller but also each discriminate prices converge in order for the compression of each camera to converge to a common value thanks to the price discrimination PI controllers.

Figure 8 shows simulations with 10 cameras and same selected parameters (randomly chosen once for both simulations) and we visualize the most interesting 250 periods. In this figure, the left side has only the price discrimination PI controllers (case 2) running with a manually fixed global quality setpoint of \( qp = 25 \) (which is the optimal setpoint for this specific system). The right side of the figure shows the same parameters with the setpoint controller (case 3) converging autonomously to the optimal value of \( qp = 25 \). In the left column (case 2) we can see that all cameras converge slowly to the defined setpoint while on the right (case 3) they converge faster and autonomously to the desired quality levels.

Finally, to test the robustness of the proposed approach, we run 100 simulations of 500 transactions period \( k \) each with price discrimination (case 3) and 100 others with marginal pricing (case 1) where all
Table 1: Multiple simulations results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discriminate</th>
<th>Discriminate+rnd</th>
<th>Margin</th>
<th>Margin+rnd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seller utilities mean</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seller revenue mean</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer 1 utility mean</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer 2 utility mean</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer 3 utility mean</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer 4 utility mean</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Fixed price (left) and discriminate price (right) with fixed system setpoint (no probing controller) for 4 cameras.

Cameras were buying at each period $k$. We also run simulations with random uniform distributed video parameters changing from frame to frame. In reality this is highly unlikely to happen, but demonstrate a hypothetical worst case scenario. This is denoted with "+rnd" in Table 1.

A global summary of the simulation runs can be found in Table 1. The seller utilities $U$ are on average
Figure 8: Discriminate price with fixed setpoint (left) and with probing controller (right) for 10 cameras.

(mean) higher in the discriminate pricing (1.68 and 0.56) than for the marginal pricing (0.33 and 0.27). Note that the utility difference between the random and non-random case in Table. 1 comes from the utility being based on $\sigma_n(qp)$. With randomly changing video parameters, the optimal $qp$ value will rarely stay equal to the system setpoint $qp$ value, thus leading to a lower utility value for the storage than in a more stable environment. The revenue $R$ remains very close at 19.8 and 20 for the discriminate pricing versus 20 for the marginal pricing indicating no noticeable loss in revenue for the seller. The buyer utilities $u_i$ have higher values with price discrimination than with the marginal pricing because of the visual quality uniformity enforced by the storage provider.

5 CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK

In this work we proposed a method based on price discrimination of storage costs for system-level op-
Figure 9: Discriminate price with setpoint probing controller for continuous buyers only (left) or continuous and event buyers (right) for 4 cameras.

A logical extension of this paper would be to handle multiple storage providers and develop more complex utility functions for both cameras and storage sellers which would take into account different constraints such as network latency and bandwidth. We could also use a different convergence method which would optimize the storage usage more by allowing the compression levels to slightly deviate for some cameras. Instead of having the probing controller increasing or decreasing the compression level for all the cameras it could increase/decrease the compression level of the cameras one at a time, ensuring that
at all times the cameras have setpoints that maximally differ with one compression level value. This would increase the storage utilization.

A limitation of this work is that we expect the storage provider to be able to access the received videos in order to get access to the \(qp\) values in order to decide on a discriminate price. If the video is stored in an encrypted format this technique could not be used. Video quality is here considered as correlated to the video compression. An alternative approach would be to use an application specific metric or a recognized quality metric such as the structural similarity index measure (SSIM), peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) or other metrics enumerated in (Yang, 2007), but at the expense of additional computation costs.

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