Enhanced Local Gradient Smoothing: Approaches to Attacked-region Identification and Defense

Cheng You-Wei and Wang Sheng-De

Department of Electrical Engineering, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan

Keywords: Adversarial Attack, Adversarial Defense, Reactive Defense, Data Pre-processing, Deep Learning.

Abstract: Mainstream deep learning algorithms have been shown vulnerable to adversarial attacks - the deep models could be misled by adding small unnoticeable perturbations to the original input image. These attacks could pose security challenges in real-world applications. The paper focuses on how to defend against an adversarial patch attack that confines such noises within a small and localized patch area. We will discuss how an adversarial sample affects the classifier output from the perspective of a deep model by visualizing its saliency map. On the basis of our baseline method: Local Gradients Smoothing, we further design two methods called Saliency-map-based Local Gradients Smoothing and Weighted Local Gradients Smoothing, integrating saliency maps with local gradient maps to accurately locate a possible attacked region and perform smoothing accordingly. Experimental results show that our proposed method could reduce the probability of false smoothing and increase the overall accuracy significantly.

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, deep neural architectures have achieved significant success in most computer vision fields, including Image Classification, Object Detection, and face recognition. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) became prominent among different architectures due to their ability to extract image features. Those methods also had been widely applied to real-world systems like surveillance cameras and autonomous driving (Huval et al., 2015). The consistency of the learning-based algorithms is one of the biggest concerns before adopting deep neural networks in security-critical applications.

However, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) had been proven vulnerable to some well-designed attack methods. J. Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al., 2015) showed that by slightly modifying input data or, in other words, adding subtle noises onto the original input image(s), CNN models could wrongly classify the input with high confidence. These noises should be imperceptible to humans or should not affect human's recognition of the image. An adversarial attack could be roughly explained as finding the minimal perturbation which is strong enough to alternate the position of the input in space and cross the decision boundary.

Among all works, attacks can be divided into two categories: traditional attack and patch attack. Traditional attack FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015), PGD (Madry et al., 2018) and One Pixel Attack (Su et al., 2019) do not try to limit the size of the adversarial mask; hence the size of adversarial perturbations can be as large as the target image. However, even with remarkable success on benchmarks, in real-world scenarios, there might be some obstacles in applying those perturbations onto real objects. While patch attack confines the perturbations in a small area, those patches can be used as stickers in real-world scenarios. Image patches generated by Adversarial Patch (Brown et al., 2017) can cause a classifier to output any target class and can be printed and added to any scene. Afterward, LaVAN (Karmon et al., 2018) will successfully confine the patch to a small, localized patch of the image without covering any of the main objects and fool the state-of-the-art classifier Inceptionv3 (Szegedy et al., 2016).

Applications of the above methods vary in many parts of life. DPatch (Liu et al., 2019) can fool object detectors like YOLO and Faster-RCNN with a 40*40 patch. Based on DPatch (Liu et al., 2019), Physical Adversarial Patches (Lee and Kolter, 2019) fails human detectors by drawing all attention to the patch itself. Instead of failing the whole system, Simon Thys et al. innovated a method (Thys et al., 2019)
that only makes the person holding cardboard in front of the body undetectable by YOLOv2. In addition to malicious usage, Adversarial CAPTCHAs (Shi et al., 2021) and Robust Text CAPTCHAs (Shao et al., 2021) address a more secure CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) with adversarial examples.

Defense against adversarial samples has become an important security issue. Reactive methods typically remove adversarial noises by applying sets of transformations. Simple filters including median and Gaussian are cheap but perform poorly against strong attacks. Moreover, these simple filters can be detected by attackers and then used to optimize attack methods accordingly. Ensemble Defense with Data Diversity (Li et al., 2021) ensembles a set of filters with high diversity to satisfy randomness and representation and thus augment the performance. However, these methods against adversarial attacks do not fit well in defending adversarial patch attacks. Since the noise is concentrated on a small patch area, it is unnecessary and in conductive to apply a filter onto the whole image. On the contrary, we believe a defense mechanism consisting of detection and defense stage will be more effective against adversarial patch attacks. In this paper, we introduce an evolved defensive scheme based on a previous work called Local Gradient Smoothing (Naseer et al., 2019) to detect and remove adversarial noises according to the result of an attack-region proposing module. This method does not require changing either the architecture of the deep neural network or the parameters. Instead, it works in the preprocessing stage that modifies input data with some smoothing mechanisms. The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:

1) By investigating the adversarial phenomena, we visualize how the perception of the deep model changes while given an adversarial sample in contrast to a normal input, also showing how different CNN architectures and different experimental settings affect the influence of adversarial attack methods.

2) Motivated by our baseline method (Naseer et al., 2019), which proposes a strategy called Local Gradients Smoothing (LGS), LGS first estimates the region of interest in the input image of adversarial noise and then performs gradient smoothing against it. We raise its performance by incorporating the information of deep visual features, which is also called the saliency map.

3) We propose two different algorithms: Saliency-map-based Local Gradients Smoothing (SLSG) and Weighted Local Gradients Smoothing (WLGS). Both methods outperform the baseline method and other top methods such as image filtering mechanisms, JPEG compression, and digital watermarking (DW) (Hayes, 2018).

Figure 1: Example images with VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014) classification result and confidence score. (a) shows the original image sample from (Russakovsky et al., 2015), (b) is the adversarial sample generated by LaVAN (Karmon et al., 2018), (c) represents the result of Saliency-map-based Local Gradients Smoothing (SLGS), and (d) is the result of Weighted Local Gradients Smoothing (WLGS). As illustrated, both proposed methods successfully turned the classification result into the correct label.

2 RELATED WORKS

2.1 Attack Method

Traditional adversarial attack methods aim to find adversarial samples by adding some noise to original inputs. Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al., 2015) propose a fast and strong method to find adversarial examples. Papernot et al. (Papernot et al., 2016a) use the saliency map to explain how adversaries are generated and bring up an attack accordingly. The search for adversarial examples can be formulated as finding a solution $x'$ to the following equation:

$$ \mathcal{F}(y = \hat{y}|x') $$

subject to $||x - x'||_p \leq \epsilon$ (1)

where $x'$ is the image sample with adversarial noise added onto the original image $x$. Instead of limiting the size of the noise, it restrains the magnitude of the sum of the noise within a threshold $\epsilon$. The objective function of targeted attack is to make the prediction result of an image classifier $F$ fall into a specific target class $\hat{y}$, while the value of perturbation remains within a threshold. Non-targeted attack is formulated by making the output become any class other than the original label; hence it is considered easier to achieve than the targeted attack.

Researchers of Adversarial Patch (Brown et al., 2017) find adversarial examples created using the methodology presented in the above equation cannot be used in physical world attacks because adversarial noise loses its effect under different camera angles, rotations, and lighting conditions. Brown et al. use a
variant of the Expectation over Transformation (EoT) framework to create dependent robust noise patches confined to a small region that can be printed and placed in real-world scenarios to cause misclassifications. They design a patch operator $A(p, x, l, t)$ for a given image $x$, patch $p$, location $l$ and a set of transformations $t$. The adversarial patch is obtained by solving the following optimization problem:

$$p^t = \max_p E(F(\hat{y}|A(p, x, l, t)))$$

During optimization, patch operator $A$ applies a set of transformations to the patch $p$ and then projects it onto the image $x$. Finally, the patch $p^t$ has the greatest expectation over transformations.

Furthermore, LaVAN (Karmon et al., 2018) confines adversarial noise $\delta$ to a small region, usually away from the salient object in an image. Instead of training the noise to either maximize the probability of the target class or to minimize the probability of any other class, they use a loss function to achieve both:

$$x^t = (1 - m) \odot x + m \odot \delta$$

$$\text{argmax}_m [M(y = \hat{y}|x^t) - M(y = \tilde{y}|x^t)]$$

where $M$ represents the activations prior to the final softmax layer in the network, $\hat{y}$ is the target class, and $\tilde{y}$ is the source class. After training, it uses a spatial mask $m$ to replace the small area with noise, as opposed to noise addition performed in traditional attacks.

### 2.2 Defense Method

In the defensive phase, there are also two main categories: proactive and reactive defense. Proactive defense methods aim to make the model robust to adversarial samples by adjusting the training process. Adversarial Training (Shaham et al., 2015) includes adversarial samples as training data, which reduces the impact of adversarial perturbations. This data augmentation also leads to a more stable model. Defensive Distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b) applies the technique of knowledge distillation. The process starts by training a teacher network that will generate soft labels, then trains a student network to fit the soft label, which is also the teacher’s probability distribution. The student network is the network that will be used for inference. This method leads to a smoother decision boundary, making adversarial samples harder to be found by attackers. Carlini et al. (Carlini and Wagner, 2017) then propose a stronger attack against Defensive Distillation (Papernot et al., 2016b). Inspired by (Carlini and Wagner, 2017), Papernot et al. (Papernot and McDaniel, 2017) modify the original mechanism soon. The reactive defense method, also called transformation-based defense, focuses on detecting and removing adversarial noises on images before feeding them into convolution networks. This sort of method does not require changing any of the DNN architectures. For example, there are works studying reducing noise with JPEG and JPEG compression (Das et al., 2018) (Dziugaite et al., 2016). Feature Squeezing (Xu et al., 2017) applies image filtering techniques, including median filtering and Gaussian filtering to resist adversarial attacks. Digital Watermarking (DW) (Hayes, 2018) first introduces using the saliency map to detect and defend against attackers. Our baseline method lies under this category. In this paper, we improve one of the most successful methods: Local Gradients Smoothing (Naseer et al., 2019) by adding another noise detection mechanism in the preprocessing stage. LGS observes adversarial noise as high-frequency noise, which can be detected by calculating local gradients. Details are to be discussed in the next section.

### 2.3 Baseline Method: Local Gradients Smoothing: Defense against Localized Adversarial Attacks

Previous attacks (Brown et al., 2017) (Karmon et al., 2018) introduce high-frequency noise concentrated at a particular image location, and such noise becomes very prominent in the image gradient domain. It can be observed by the image characteristics of the patch. The effect of such adversarial noise can be reduced significantly by suppressing high-frequency regions without affecting the low-frequency image areas. LGS proposed a method by projecting a gradient magnitude map onto the image.

LGS obtains the gradient magnitude map by estimating the first-order local image gradient of each pixel, which is calculated by the first-order partial differential of others pixels along in $x$ and $y$ axis. The regions with stronger gradients have a higher likelihood of being the perturbed areas. The gradient is obtained by the image’s characteristics only. Hence, they do not provide significant information for the final classification result. Approaches to estimate the region’s contribution to the predicted result will be discussed in the later section. The local gradient of each pixel $x$ is computed as follows:

$$\nabla x(a, b) = \sqrt{\left(\frac{\partial x}{\partial a}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{\partial x}{\partial b}\right)^2}$$

where $a$ and $b$ denotes the horizontal and vertical di-
rections in the image plane.

They then divide the gradient magnitude map into $K$ blocks of the same sizes and apply a threshold to decide whether to keep or remove the block. If the total value of the local gradient within a block does not exceed the threshold, the block will be masked out to zero on the gradient magnitude map. After normalization, the gradient magnitude map $g(x)$ is then used to suppress the high-frequency parts by performing “smoothing” to input image:

$$T(x) = x \odot (1 - \lambda * g(x))$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where $T(x)$ is the result after LGS transformation, $\odot$ denote element-wise multiplication of two matrices, and $\lambda$ is the smooth factor.

3 APPROACH

According to Local Gradients Smoothing (LGS) (Naseer et al., 2019), one of the important control factors is $\lambda$, the smoothing factor for LGS. The smoothing factor decides how much information will be removed on those regions that are considered perturbed. Even though LGS masked out blocks with gradient magnitude below a particular threshold, it still becomes a trade-off between clean images and perturbed images in accuracy. If $\lambda$ is too small, the defense would fail to smooth out adversarial noises. In large $\lambda$ cases, LGS could remove noises but could also remove too much ground-truth information at the same time, which would lead to an unexpected result. The image classifier could classify the image into another class instead of the ground-truth or the attacking target.

We believe it is necessary to locate the adversarial noises with higher precision, not only from image-level information but also from what the classifier had perceived, to make the smoothing process more accurate.

A mathematically clean way of locating “important” pixels is to construct a sensitivity map—also called saliency map—obtained by differentiating class activation function $S$ with respect to input $x$. The saliency map $M$ represents how much difference a tiny change in each pixel of $x$ would make to the classification score for class $c$. The sensitivity map of a label will be highly correlated to regions where that label is present. In practice, the approach is widely used for the visualization of CNNs. Here we refer to the implementation of constructing Saliency Maps (Simonyan et al., 2013):

$$M_x = \frac{\partial c}{\partial x}$$ \hspace{1cm} (6)

where $M$ represents the saliency map with the same shape of the input image, and $S_c$ is the final class activation function of the image classifier.

We design a slightly different version of the sensitivity map. Since the effect of attacks is not always guaranteed, the target class may not be predicted as the only possible class; thus it may not be the prominent part on the sensitivity map. Instead of using the whole class score, we thereby design a loss function calculating the cross entropy of the top 5 classes.

In most cases where adversarial samples successfully fooled the classifier, we will find out that the sensitivity map and the local gradient map highlights different areas but both cover areas where the adversarial sample is located. One of the naive thoughts is to find the overlapping areas of the two approaches mentioned above. We propose two ways of integrating the sensitivity map and the local gradient map to boost up the accuracy of the attacked-region proposal. In this paper, we apply the same local gradient map $g(x)$ presented in LGS (Naseer et al., 2019).

Saliency-map-based Local Gradients Smoothing (SLGS): we take the primary parts of the saliency map to perform gradient smoothing, the rest will be ignored. One possible problem of the saliency map is that even when there is apparent noise, the pixels are still scattered. To complete a mask, we take a threshold to binarize the saliency map:

$$M_{xy} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } M_{xy} \geq \text{threshold} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$ \hspace{1cm} (7)

where the threshold is designed as the mean value of the saliency map $M$ obtained by Eq. 6 in our experiments.

Then we use a combination of erosion and dilation to remove small empty “holes” and clear outliers. Finally, we multiply element-wise the local gradient map with the updated saliency mask. If a pixel has a negative value of the mask, the gradient will be zeroed as follows:

$$E(i, j) = M(i, j) \cap (M(i - 1, j - 1) \cup M(i - 1, j))$$
$$M(i - 1, j + 1) \cup M(i, j - 1) \cup M(i, j + 1)$$ \hspace{1cm} (8)

$$M(i + 1, j - 1) \cup M(i + 1, j) \cup M(i + 1, j + 1)$$

$$D(i, j) = E(i, j) \cup E(i - 1, j - 1) \cup E(i - 1, j)$$
$$E(i - 1, j + 1) \cup E(i, j - 1) \cup E(i, j + 1)$$ \hspace{1cm} (9)

$$E(i + 1, j - 1) \cup E(i + 1, j) \cup E(i + 1, j + 1)$$

$$E(i + 1, j) \cup E(i + 1, j + 1) \cup E(i + 1, j + 1)$$
where \( \cap \) denotes the logical and, i.e. intersection operation and \( \cup \) denotes the union. In our experiments, we apply two times of erosion followed by three times of dilation to form a mask. We then perform the smoothing operation based on the element-wise multiplication of the final dilated mask \( D(x) \) along with the local gradient map \( g(x) \) as Eq. 10:

\[
T(x) = x \circ (1 - \lambda \ast D(x) \circ g(x))
\]  

(10)

where \( \circ \) denotes the element-wise multiplication of two matrices, and \( \lambda \) is a scaling factor, which controls the intensity of eliminating noises.

**Weighted Local Gradients Smoothing (WLGS):** there are times when the local gradient map and sensitivity map do not reach an agreement on candidate regions. Hence, we simply use the saliency map as the weight matrix for local gradients. The saliency map varies within a large range, so we normalize it for consistency among all samples using the following equation:

\[
W(x) = \frac{M(x) - M(x)_{\text{min}}}{M(x)_{\text{max}} - M(x)_{\text{min}}}
\]  

(11)

where we take the normalized map \( W \) as the weight matrix, representing the possibility of containing adversarial noise in each pixel. The final gradient map is obtained by re-weighting the local gradient map with the weight matrix as Eq. 12:

\[
T(x) = x \circ (1 - \lambda \ast (M(x) \ast g(x)))
\]  

(12)

We set the local gradient map threshold = 0.2 and the saliency map threshold = mean value of the map and searched a wide range of smooth factors in our experiments. We further discuss and demonstrate the advantages of SLGS and WLGS in later sections.

**Figure 4:** Visualizing changes of the local gradient map and the saliency map. The first row shows the image in human perception, the second row is the local gradient map, and the third row illustrates the saliency map.
generation and Local Gradients Smoothing reproduction, we refer to the code source: https://github.com/metallurk/local_gradients_smoothing.

**Training:** This part aims to reproduce the results of Adversarial Patch and LaVAN attacks, creating robust targeted adversarial patches in the white box setting. Both were trained and validated with the ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 training set with 1000 classes and more than 1281k images in our experiments on a single GeForce RTX-2080-ti GPU. Two pre-trained models, VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014) and InceptionV3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) were utilized respectively to experiment on the attack mechanisms. We use Pytorch (Paszke et al., 2019) framework and load the pre-trained architecture and weights from Torchvision. Instead of changing the model weights, we fix the weights and optimize the patch in input images by stochastic gradient descent with momentum. We use the same hyperparameters for both attacks: Due to the limitation of memory, we set the batch size to 20 and train size to 50, which means for each epoch, we sample a new collection of 20*50=1000 images from the dataset. The learning rate is 1 for the first 160 epochs and then decay to 0.1 for 20 epochs, lastly 0.01 for the last 20 epochs, with a total of 200 epochs. Before feeding images into networks, we normalize and resize input images to 400x400 size. Three LaVAN masks with size 42x42 (≈1% of the image), 52x52 (≈1.7% of the image), and 60x60 (≈2.2% of the image) were applied. For Adversarial Patch, the patch size is 90x90(≈5% of the image).

**Testing:** To show the improvement of our methods, we apply the same patch attacks as stated above onto a subset consisting of 5000 samples from ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 validation set, which originally has 50000 images in total, and then exploit our proposed methods and the baseline method to defend against the attack. For deducing the inconsistency and avoiding the patch covering the salient objects, we always place the patch on the top-right corner with 10 pixels away from the corner. Lastly, we simply use top-1 accuracy as the evaluation matrix.

### 4.2 Experiment Results

For the smoothing factor $\lambda$, we found that it is not easy to give the most suitable value, as different attackers lead to different results, so we searched through a wide range of lambdas. Table 1 demonstrates the effect of our proposed method defending against LaVAN attacks on VGG16, comparing them to the baseline method with various lambdas. As shown in Fig. 5, Saliency-map-based Local Gradients Smoothing (SLGS) has significant improvements from Local Gradients smoothing (LGS), while Weighted Local Gradients Smoothing (WLGS) is comparable to LGS. This is due to the addition of an attacked-region proposing mechanism to the initial algorithm that reduces the probability of false smoothing without sacrificing its capability to smooth out most attacks. As in Fig. 5, we measure the results for both scenarios, with and without attackers, and for readability, we only take into account the average result for each scheme.

![Figure 5: Visualizing average top-1 accuracy defending LaVAN attack on VGG16 with different lambda values among LGS, SLGS, and WLGS. Patch Size = 52x52. In WLGS clamp, we clip the value of normalized saliency in (0,1).](image)

As demonstrated in Table 2, which shows the effect of our proposed method defending against LaVAN attack on InceptionV3, our proposed methods do not show any notable improvement as on VGG16, yet still comparable. The primary reason for the difference is the dependency on the precision of the

Table 1: Summary of VGG16 performance against LaVAN attack with and without defenses including Local Gradients smoothing (LGS), Saliency-map-based Local Gradients Smoothing (SLGS), and Weighted Local Gradients Smoothing (WLGS). Bold numbers represent the best accuracy of a certain defense against LaVAN attack. Underlined numbers represent the best accuracy of a method among all smooth factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>VGG16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patch Size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Defense</td>
<td>72.24 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS($\lambda=3.5$)</td>
<td>64.28 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS($\lambda=2.7$)</td>
<td>67.74 (1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS($\lambda=2.3$)</td>
<td>68.64 (2% )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLGS($\lambda=3.5$)</td>
<td>65.42 (1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLGS($\lambda=2.7$)</td>
<td>67.38 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLGS($\lambda=2.3$)</td>
<td>68.64 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGS($\lambda=3.5$)</td>
<td>68.20 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGS($\lambda=2.7$)</td>
<td>69.64 (2% )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGS($\lambda=2.3$)</td>
<td>70.48 (2.3% )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Visualizing average top-1 accuracy defending LaVAN attack on VGG16 with different lambda values among LGS, SLGS, and WLGS. Patch Size = 52x52. In WLGS clamp, we clip the value of normalized saliency in (0,1). Patch Size = 52x52. **Left:** accuracy with and without attack. **Right:** average accuracy with and without attack.

As demonstrated in Table 2, which shows the effect of our proposed method defending against LaVAN attack on InceptionV3, our proposed methods do not show any notable improvement as on VGG16, yet still comparable. The primary reason for the difference is the dependency on the precision of the
attacked-region proposal. As InceptionV3 originally shows more robustness against adversarial samples without any defenses, the success rate of the targeted attack drops significantly. Table 3 and 4 shows the result of our proposed method defending against Adversarial attack on VGG16 and InceptionV3 respectively. The enhancement of SLGS is still over 1.5 percent in both scenarios, while WLGS drops a lot. We will illustrate some outcomes to show the effect and related explanations in the subsequent experimental discussion.

Table 2: Summary of InceptionV3 performance against LaVAN attack with and without defenses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>InceptionV3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patch Size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Defense</td>
<td>78.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1%)</td>
<td>12.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.7%)</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.2%)</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS(λ=2.3)</td>
<td>77.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS(λ=1.9)</td>
<td>77.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGS(λ=1.5)</td>
<td>78.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLGS(λ=2.3)</td>
<td>77.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLGS(λ=1.9)</td>
<td>78.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLGS(λ=1.5)</td>
<td>78.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGS(λ=2.3)</td>
<td>77.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGS(λ=1.9)</td>
<td>78.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGS(λ=1.5)</td>
<td>78.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Summary of VGG16 performance against Adversarial Patch attack with and without defenses. λ=3.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Name</th>
<th>VGG16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Attack</td>
<td>71.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Attack</td>
<td>70.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary of InceptionV3 performance against Adversarial Patch attack with and without defenses. λ=3.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Name</th>
<th>InceptionV3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Attack</td>
<td>79.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Attack</td>
<td>79.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Summary of InceptionV3 performance against Adversarial Patch attack with and without defenses. λ=3.5

To emphasize the improvement of our proposed methods compared to the baseline method under the situation where we successfully decrease the extent of smoothing out the ground-truth object, we measured the difference between the input image and the result after image-preprocessing using structural_similarity from scikit-image. We conduct experiments on a set of 1000 images computing the average similarity index between the original input and the output of each method. As a result, the average similarity index of LGS is 0.971, SLGS is 0.987, and WLGS is 0.981. Fig. 6 visualizes the structural difference of cases in that LGS will wrongly classify the image. At the same time, SLGS and WLGS give the correct result, showing our methods can obtain the same or higher performance when making fewer changes to the input data.

We examine hundreds of failed cases with our defense methods in the experiments and thus find out those failed cases mostly fall into two scenarios: the image classifier having low confidence with its output or the image classifier already wrongly classified the original input image. Even though our methods work on reducing the possibility of removing ground-truth information with an attacked-region proposal, it is still inevitable to wrongly remove some parts from the image. In the cases shown in Fig. 7, after losing some saliency, the probability of distribution of the final softmax layer could be smoothed, which indicates that other classes would have higher chances to overtake the ground-truth label. Adversarial Defense by Restricting the Hidden Space of Deep Neural Networks (Mustafa et al., 2019) provides an intriguing solution to this problem.

4.3 Experiment Discussion

Performance Dependency. As LGS depends on the significant parts of the local gradient map, our method strongly depends on the perception of the classification model, e.g., saliency map. As long as the attack succeeds, we can assume the interest of the classifier will focus around at the patch itself. Based on our experiments, the strongest patch (baseball) reaches over
99 percent of the success rate on VGG16. In contrast, if the attack is not as successful, or if the model is robust to such attack methods, the effect of our proposed method could be deduced. Our research shows that Inception-v3 has stronger robustness than other models, including VGG16, ResNet101 (He et al., 2016), and GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al., 2015) under the same attacks. Patch size also affects the performance greatly. As we take the “primary” part of the saliency map in both SLGS and WLGS, we do not specify how large the proposed region should cover. Since Adversarial Patch (≈5%) attack covers more size than LaVAN (up to 2.2%), WLGS has relatively bad performance with a smaller smooth factor, compared to other methods. This phenomenon leads to another question: how to choose a suitable smooth factor? In regards to this, we propose a possible solution to the problem: estimate the patch size using the local gradient map. Since LGS discussed the correlations between patch attacks and high-frequency noises, we can calculate the area occupied by the high-frequency noises and thus adjust the smooth factor automatically.

Initialization of Patch. The success of Local Gradients Smoothing (LGS) scheme is based on the observation that attacks introduce concentrated high-frequency changes at a particular image location. However, we have found that there is a significant reduction of the high-frequency changes as we initialize the patch with an image similar to the target class instead of random noise before starting training. Our image-initialized version of patches also achieves a smaller loss than the random-initialized ones under the same experimental settings. Fig. 8 illustrates baseball patches with and without initialization.

Computational Cost. The computational burden for our methods is that we pass the input data into the deep model two times. At the first pass, we feed input into the classifier and calculate the partial derivative through backward propagation. After the smoothing process, we then pass the preprocessed image into the network for inference. Fig. 9 shows the runtime of defense methods to process 5000 samples. Following the baseline, we use JPEG compression from Pillow, Gaussian Filter (GF) and Median Filter (MF), Bilateral Filter (BF), and Total Variance Minimization (TVM) from scikit-learn under python3.6 environment.

White-box Attack. Our empirical results show that even when the attacker is aware of our defense mechanism, our proposed methods remain robust. We revise the optimization problem of LaVAN attack and train it again, where all the experimental settings remain:

$$x_t = (1 - m) \odot x + m \odot \delta$$

$$\arg\max_{\delta} [M(y = \bar{y} | T(x_t)) - M(y = \hat{y} | T(x_t))]$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)$$

where $M$ represents the activations prior to the final softmax layer in the network, $\bar{y}$ is the target class and $\hat{y}$ is the source class, and $T$ is a reactive defense transformation between LGS, SLGS, and WLGS. As a result, LaVAN attack can not produce an effective adversarial patch, as shown in Fig. 10. Instead of applying a filter to the whole (input) image, LGS/SLGS/WLGS methods would eliminate the salient area beforehand. The area that will be affected
might change due to the different input data or the random position of the patch. This will produce multiple patterns instead of just one specific pattern that the model can easily learn from. The objective function for LaVAN’s training is formulated as minimizing the distance between the output and the target class and also maximizing the distance between the output class and the source class at the same time. Since it can not minimize the value of the former unit, it turns out to maximize the value of the latter and set the patch to zero.

Figure 10: The success rate of white-box attacks.

5 CONCLUSION REMARKS

5.1 Conclusion

In this work, we propose two revisions of Local Gradients Smoothing (LGS) methods, Saliency-map-based Local Gradients Smoothing (SLGS) and Weighted Local Gradients Smoothing (WLGS), to detect possible adversarial patches and to remove such noises accordingly. We attempt to interpret how an adversarial attack affects from the perspective of the deep model, i.e., the saliency map, thereby proposing an algorithm integrating the saliency map with original methods. By locating the adversarial noises with higher precision, SLGS surpasses the baseline method by over 1.5% on both clean and attacked data on VGG16, and WLGS is a more stable solution for addressing adversarial defense in a wider range of smooth factors. Since our proposed methods require two stages, the performance is positively correlated to the success rate of attacks. As the success of our method is based on the accurate attacked region detection, it requires the noise to have an impact that is strong enough for the classification model. Hence, in the cases of stronger attackers (or less robust models), our proposed algorithms can show more improvements. Lastly, we experiment with our proposed methods on the ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 dataset. The advantages of this work have been seen by experiments with LaVAN and Adversarial Patch attacks on both VGG16 and InceptionV3 models.

5.2 Future Work

In this work, we apply the saliency map due to its simple implementation. Apart from the saliency map, there are some other works trying to explain or interpret CNN models, including Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) (Ribeiro et al., 2016), SmoothGrad (Smilkov et al., 2017) and Integrated Gradients (Sundararajan et al., 2017). We expect the techniques of understanding deep models can contribute to detection and defense against adversarial attacks.

In the future, we hope that the proposed methods can be applied with existing applications in computer vision fields as a mask before inputs are fed into deep models. By adding another detecting module that will give an adversarial score to decide whether there is an attacker and how powerful it could possibly be, we expect the system to adjust the smooth factor $\lambda$ based on the information automatically. In conclusion, we hope to achieve a real-scene, real-time, and parameter-free improved resolution.

REFERENCES


Huval, B., Wang, T., Tandon, S., Kiske, J., Song, W., Pazhayampallil, J., Andriluka, M., Rajpurkar, P.,


