Best Practice in Multi-organisation Sensitive Health Data Sharing: A Comparative Analysis of Ireland’s Data Governance Approach for the Covid–19 Data Research Hub

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Abstract: This paper examines, from a data governance perspective, the creation and operation of the Irish Covid–19 Data Research Hub, a secure multi-institution collation and access-controlled source of sensitive Covid–19 epidemiological data from diverse sources. The Hub is assessed alongside international comparators and with reference to a set of leading academic data governance models, including those developed by Khatri & Brown (2010), Winter & Davidson (2019), and Abraham et al (2019). The analysis explores the requirements for such data hubs balancing data protection, security, and health policy decision making. It examines the data hub design from architectural, data access policy, and data governance perspectives. Whilst recognising certain unique features of the Covid–19 Data Research Hub not replicated elsewhere, it highlights key data governance strengths and gaps in the model used which may inform future development of similar hubs supporting the exploitation of public sector data for health policy-related research. The interdisciplinary legal and technical data governance assessment methodology described here is applicable to the increasing number of data federation and aggregation projects increasingly being deployed in both public and private healthcare settings.

1 INTRODUCTION

Health research operates in one of the most sensitive of all data domains (General Data Protection Regulation, 2018) and requires exemplary standards of data stewardship and governance to comply with data protection laws and to maintain public confidence. The Data Administration Management Association (DAMA, 2017) defines data governance as “the exercise of authority, control, and shared-decision making (planning, monitoring, and enforcement) over the management of data assets”. In addition, ethical health data governance, as described by Hripcsak et al. 2014, must involve the structured management, secure storage and controlled disclosure of health data only to appropriate users, to ensure knowledgeable and proper use of the data.

This challenge of providing secure researcher access to sensitive health data is well recognised internationally and the last decade in particular has seen significant State led initiatives to develop structurally, legally and ethically robust systems to exploit the explosion of opportunities, including via Big Data, in this sphere of public health administrative data. Examples include initiatives in the UK, (Winter & Davidson, 2018), France (Goldberg & Zins, 2021) and Germany, (Cuggia & Combes, 2019). Ireland lags in the development of the infrastructure and services required to deliver such an environment. Hence it is relevant to evaluate

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the Irish Covid-19 Health Research Data Hub jointly developed by the Central Statistics Office, Department of Health and Heath Research Board against international best practice. Even defining the terms of this comparison is challenging, due to the diversity of national health data sharing projects.

Important related developments in academic research on models of Data Governance (Khatri & Brown, 2010; Winter and Davidson, Abrahams et al, 2019) have emerged which reflect best practice in the design, build and operation of any large scale data management system. Taken together, information from the foregoing practical and theoretical systems can be used to benchmark the Covid–19 Data Research Hub in terms of data governance and to identify strengths, gaps and opportunities for future such initiatives by the Irish public administration.

In this paper, we investigate the research question “to what extent can international health data sharing hubs and academic data governance frameworks be used to evaluate data governance in the Covid–19 Data Research Hub?” We use this question to conduct an analysis of data governance best practice in the sphere of public administrative health data access, analysis and exploitation and we show how to evaluate the Irish approach based on comparison with international approaches and academic models.

The contribution of this paper is by drawing on the learnings from these models, we propose a series of areas for focus both in the future development of the Covid–19 Data Research Hub and for other public administrative health data hubs and we discuss the applicability of academic data governance models to these. Using the Covid–19 Data Research Hub as its model, this case study aims to illustrate a method to critically assess the state of the art in the collation and dissemination for statistical purposes of public sector health research data, specifically focusing on data protection, data governance and access control. It will examine the requirement for this approach; the aims of the model; the involvement of inter-organisational collaboration and the legal and governance structures used in its construction. The key strengths and weaknesses of the Covid–19 Data Research Hub will be outlined and options for alternative approaches will be identified.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discussed related work, section 3 discusses our case study consisting of a description of the Covid–19 Data Research Hub, our evaluation methodology and the evaluation itself, section 4 discusses our findings and section provides our conclusions.

2 RELATED WORK

Any attempt to examine the data analysis approach of public administrations in responding to the Covid–19 pandemic requires an understanding of both academic and deployed models addressing intra and inter-organisational data governance and exploitation of administrative and Big Data in the healthcare related sphere (Tse et al, 2018). This section examines the existing literature in large scale data governance generally across multiple organisations, particularly from the health data hub perspective, seeking out existing data hubs of similar nature, considering the impacts of Big Data on research, and finally, the evaluating impact of the use of such data sets on the organisation and exploitation of state data resources looking forward.

Due to the emergent nature of the data governance domain, research on data governance with a multi-organisational perspective in the area of health data is still very limited. There is a pattern of literature reviews considering the issue of data governance in relation with health data hubs, but few papers address it directly. One paper (Nielsen, 2017) directly notes that within data governance published between 2007 and 2017, there have been only 62 papers directly fitting under the description of ‘data governance’ i.e., not confusing data governance with data management. Within those papers, only 11% consider e-health, and only 3% consider e-government. This highlights a gap in literature, as academic surveys show that persons are generally positive about sharing their data for research purposes (Nielsen, 2017), with their top priorities revolving around secure databases, data stewardship, and anonymisation or pseudonymisation, as well as re-consent. Addressing these concerns requires strong data governance.

2.1 Healthcare Data and Data Governance

Only recently has the potential of Big Data in healthcare, particularly from a research perspective, begun to be systematically explored and exploited. In this regard, (Wang et al., 2018) identify five discrete areas in which Big Data analytics can enhance healthcare activities, these being analytical capability for patterns of care, unstructured data analytical capability, decision support capability, predictive capability, and traceability. Literature also points to the fact that there is increasing public and academic perceptions of Big Data being of substantial value for improving decision making processes, education, healthcare, law, social media and artificial
intelligence. Comparatively, there has not been as much focus on the governance of said data though, unless dealing with the risks of artificial intelligence (Ethics Guidelines on Trustworthy AI, 2019). Literature is also lacking in respect of data governance of Big Data for research purposes, particularly dealing with ‘sensitive’ data. It also often conflates data management and data governance, or in some cases calls for better techniques to handle data, while omitting, or perhaps ignoring, data governance. Yet this omission is problematic given the related significance of the legal, digital trust, and societal implications. Consideration is needed of data governance by design, data interoperability, data quality, data storage and operations, data security, and data architecture.

2.2 National Data Hub Initiatives

Few national administrations have utilised health data hubs within Healthcare (e-Estonia, 2021) and the area remains emergent. The nature of health research is such that in many instances the greatest value is to be exploited where multiple data flows are combined to bring new insights. As such, collaboration between these entities requires complex inter-organisational data governance (Lis & Otto, 2020).

Two interesting but different approaches are explored from France and Germany by Cuggia and Combes (2019), who examine the respective top-down and bottom-up approaches to developing publicly funded health data hubs in these countries. In France, the Health Data Hub was designed to operate on a hub and spoke model, with the central delivery of sophisticated data sharing infrastructure supported by highly expert staff in all relevant technical domains, including IT, engineering, medicine, law and governance. In this Top-Down model, projects were then selected to be incorporated into the data sharing infrastructure in two groups - one involving only public or academic collaborators, the other offering access also to industry partners. In Germany, the Medical Informatics Initiative was developed using a Bottom-Up methodology, reflecting the federal structure of that country’s public administration, with locally developed Data Integration Centres and locally promoted use cases, building on existing regional (Land) based e-health strategies. The most successful of these use cases were then selected to graduate to a subsequent phase of work, during which the respective projects are to be grown and networked. The German model focuses on the importance of encouraging stakeholder confidence in health data sharing, with strong electronic consent declarations, trusted third party technologies for identity management, clearly defined data rules and access structures, an emphasis on semantic interoperability, data sharing modalities and audit criteria. The paper does not reach a definitive conclusion as to which approach, Top Down or Bottom Up is the most appropriate, but gives a clear indication that in both respects the key criteria include the drive for interoperability, data quality and citizen involvement and trust dynamics.

Likewise within the framework of public administrative bodies collaborating to create data hubs also shows great discontinuity though, as there has been an increase of jointly created networks, and data collections, in which public administrative bodies collaborate to construct. However, the same literature generally does not consider the collaboration of administrative bodies for the purposes of research-based datasets, and particularly the impact that their collaboration may have in the creation of them.

Estonia (McBride et al., 2018) is widely recognised as leader as regards the overall digitisation of the delivery of government services and its approach to digital state service delivery, including in the healthcare sphere, although it does not specifically inform the instant issue of public health research responses in a time of pandemic. Therefore while the technological design and data governance protections inherent in its model were groundbreaking and radical in the 1990s when their project commenced, their application to the present problem turns less on specific issues of access to health research data and more on the Estonian State’s approach to designing digital government on the basis of a common national commitment to the use of Base Registries for the collection, use and re-use of citizen data; a very robust identity verification and management infrastructure, underpinned by (Public Key Infrastructure) PKI based authentication and digital signatures and a transparent “service layer” via which all Estonians can both access all State services and view who in the State sector has accessed their personal data; a very robust identity verification and management infrastructure, underpinned by (Public Key Infrastructure) PKI based authentication and digital signatures and a transparent “service layer” via which all Estonians can both access all State services and view who in the State sector has accessed their personal data, for what purpose with a full access audit trail. This model offers possible indicators of a route map to sustaining public trust in the use and re-use of personal health information in Ireland, post pandemic.

2.3 Data Governance Models

Managing the inter-organisational dynamics of data governance in Big Data research is also a theme in research by (Lis & Otto, 2020), who define the
characteristics of interorganisational data governance around the themes of scope, purpose, goals, roles and organisation, modes and governance and distinguish between the more traditional intra-organisational data governance tasks of assigning decision rights and accountabilities and the more complex challenges of inter-organisational data governance, which frequently involves platform based technical infrastructures.

An interesting model for approaching data governance in the specific case of personal health information is set out by (Winter and Davidson, 2019), who explore Helen Nissenbaum’s approach to privacy (2009). She describes privacy not as a right to secrecy or control but as an appropriate flow of personal information within particular social contexts. In the Winter and Davidson model (2018), Data Governance in the area of Personal Health Information (PHI) should be governed based around five analytical dimensions – the data domain; the stakeholders, the value or the application of the PHI, the governance goal and the governance forum. This paper explores the particular use case of the Royal Free Trust and Alphabet’s DeepMind Health initiative and highlights conflicts between the partners in respect of key aspects in particular of the governance goals, governance forms and the value achieved through the initiative.

Khatri and Brown (2010) is considered the foundational model of modern data governance and iterates 5 key data decision domains: Data principles, Data Quality, Meta Data, Data Access, and Data Lifecycle. Winter and Davidson (2018) further develop this model in their 2019 paper also documenting 5 “dimensions” of governance for Public Health Data, focusing in inter alia on the role of Stakeholders (incorporating Direct, Indirect and Public Health System related) and more specifically calling out the Value or Application of the work, generally encompassed Khatri and Brown’s Data Principles (2013), while a composite synthesis of research papers published by Abrahams et al. in (2019) reviews 145 research and practitioner papers in the sphere of data governance generally published between 2001 and 2019. The latter define a pyramidal governance structure, in which data, domain and organisational scope are counterbalanced by Governance Mechanisms, all framed by organisational legal and technical “antecedents” pre data ingestion and influenced by risk management and performance related “consequences” post hoc. Taken together, these three studies provide a comprehensive governance framework via which to evaluate research data hubs (see Table 1 below).

Based on the foregoing analysis, our study can seek to fill gaps in the current literature, in particular as regards connecting Big Data, the State sector, personal freedoms, research ethics and data governance. The lack of extensive published information on multi-organisation health data hubs suggests a gap where our comparative analysis could add value. Additionally, the review uncovered that while there are live medically oriented hubs internationally which bear some similarities to the Irish data hub, none of these systems could be said to identically match the comprehensively centrally driven model for Health Data Hub. While the German Medical Informatics Initiative, through its focus on clearly defined data rules and access structures, semantic interoperability, data sharing modalities and audit criteria appears to share the most similarities to the Irish hub it still does not share the same function as the Irish hub which is to ultimately provide a statistically robust, secure and controlled environment for the statistical analysis of relevant data sources to inform the Government’s Covid–19 response.

3 CASE STUDY

This case study to critically assess the Covid–19 Data Research Hub, compares it with similar administrative data hubs in order to identify any key strengths and weaknesses. In order to provide a proper evaluation, given we could not rely solely on a comparison of international prototypes we had to look to models such as the five key decision domains for effective data use proposed by Khatri and Brown (2010), the conceptual framework proposed by Winter and Davidson (2018) as well reaching out to industry professionals who could provide us with greater insight into the nuances of how the Covid–19 Data Research Hub was developed.

The steps which were necessary to achieve our research objectives for this case study included the following:

- Speaking with members of the public administrative bodies involved in the Covid–19 Data Research Hub so as to validate or invalidate some of our own assumptions.
- Establishing the existence of clear data governance structures specifically regarding data access.
- Establishing whether international models such as those outlined above were examined during the course of the development of the
Covid–19 Data Research Hub. Identifying whether the Covid–19 Data Research Hub may be able to incorporate features of models abroad
• Identifying whether the Covid–19 Data Research Hub diverges significantly from international standards.

3.1 Covid–19 Data Research Hub

The development of the Covid–19 Data Research Hub has been a novel undertaking in an Irish context, precipitated by necessity. The Covid–19 Data Research Hub is defined here as a technical architecture which enables secure health data sharing between Irish public administrative bodies and approved users in a format that is controlled, accessible and usable. The infrastructure and underpinning governance approach were modelled on best international practice, with a particular emphasis on data confidentiality and strong governance. It represents a federated governance and data sharing initiative as following a decision by the Minister for Health to authorise it, the Central Statistics Office was given legal authority to process special category health data under the control of the Department of Health and the HSE. This was to facilitate secure, reliable data access to approved researchers and thereby to facilitate Covid–19 related analysis. Looking beyond the current emergency period, population-level data similar to that stored in the Covid–19 Data Research Hub may also be a valuable tool, for example, for designing medical management algorithms and guidelines (Sharma, Borah and Moses, 2021).

In response to the Covid–19 pandemic the CSO began receiving research and analysis relevant data flows from the HSE (Health Service Executive) and other public bodies. Consequently, the Covid–19 Data Research Hub was created to make Covid–19 relevant datasets compiled by the CSO from diverse administrative data sources securely available to researchers via the CSO Researcher Microdata Files (RMF) process under Section 20(c) of The Statistics Act, 1993. The use of a RMF process was designed to implement the possibility for statistical analysis in a manner that protects the confidentiality of the data and ensures that such data is only made available for use for statistical purposes and to a restricted number of specifically approved researchers. It was developed after extensive consultation between the CSO, the Health Research Board (HRB), the Department of Health (DoH) and the HSE.

From a technical perspective, the process which transforms data received by the CSO to data available to the researchers is shown in Figure 1. HSE and DoH data is transferred by Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) to a CSO remote server with the use of encryption and secure transmission mechanisms from the HSE. Each data flow is dealt with individually and is stored safely in its original format in what is called the “Migration Tier” of the Administrative Data Centre (ADC) of the CSO. Access to such raw data in the Migration Tier is confined to a small number of ADC staff for processing purposes only.

Each entire dataset is then converted from its original format to a format compatible with the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) and stored in what is called the “Source Tier” of the ADC. SAS is the primary statistical software used by the CSO to analyse data. Access to such second Tier is limited to ADC staff for processing and a limited number of CSO staff with fully documented and approved reasons which justifies the use of such confidential data for limited internal or analysis purposes.

Afterwards, a pseudonymised version of each data flow is also created in SAS and stored in what is called the Analysis Tier. All access requests for analysis purposes are with respect to pseudonymised data only, therefore to this third Tier.
All data flows and datasets involved in the Migration, Source and Analysis Tiers of ADC are registered on the internal ADC Data Portal. This online portal, which uses the CSO intranet, includes a register of all available data stored, including metadata and a list of registered users for each data flow.

Once the data has undergone all the above-explained processing and is stored in a pseudonymised form in the Analysis Tier, researchers may access the RDP via a Citrix connection using unique credentials. The microdata, at all times, remains on a CSO server as the RDP is a secure, locked-down environment from which no data can be extracted without permission. There is also no internet/email access and nothing can be copied to the local PC.

When a researcher has completed work on a file that they wish to have exported as an output, they may contact the data custodian in the CSO. Only such nominated custodians have permissions set to allow access to the researchers’ inputs and outputs folders after checking for compliance with statistical disclosure control.

As declared in the relevant DPIAs by the CSO, the data will then be retained for as long as necessary to respond to the pandemic.

Figure 2: Data Access Process Map.
3.2 Methodology

The Irish model will be evaluated by comparison with similar administrative data hubs in operation. The background literature was highly informative in the describing international comparator data hubs and four were selected: Health Data Hub (HDH) in France and the German Medical Informatics Initiative (MII), the UK’s partnership between the Royal Free Trust and Alphabet’s DeepMind Health (DMH) AI led medical data collaboration and the design and delivery of Estonia’s Digital Government model. This was complemented by access to the underpinning DPIA (Data Protection Impact Assessment) documentation for the Irish Data Research Hub, which provided a detailed insight into the design and execution of that model and its associated governance. This was complimented by an interview with a key stakeholder (discussed below). Each of these data hubs have been evaluated in accordance with their adherence to the data governance principles and domains laid out in Khatri and Brown and refined by the 2019 review by Abrahams et al. This gives a common basis rooted in best practice to evaluate the current solutions and the Irish Covid-19 Data Research Hub.

The opportunity of access to a key stakeholder in the Irish Data Research Hub permitted a more detailed and nuanced examination of the dynamics and structures underpinning this initiative. A senior manager with responsibility for Statistical System Co-Ordination in the CSO, was interviewed using the following as a discussion guide. The interview was semi-structured, intended to provide reliable and comparable data. Open-ended questions were used to obtain answers which were not focused on what the interviewee feels should be utilized within their organisation, but what is. The interview lasted for an hour and was transcribed verbatim.

The topics discussed were as follows:
1. Description of objectives of the development of the Covid–19 Data Research Hub and the interviewee’s role.
2. Options for project design considered by the interviewee.
3. Whether or not international exemplars were examined by the interviewee, and whether any conclusions were reached if affirmatively answered.
4. The key factors which influenced the final approach and model for the finalised approach to the Covid–19 Data Research Hub.
5. Based on international comparators or learnings since the Covid–19 Data Research Hub has gone live, the assessment the interviewee would give of the relative strengths/weaknesses in each model and in the final Irish model.
6. A description of any roadblocks or inhibitors which forced compromises in design and delivery choices which were ultimately taken.
7. The steps the interviewee would address in respect of the aforementioned roadblocks for future initiatives or learnings which would influence alternative decision making.
8. General remarks the interviewee would wish to add in regard to the mechanisms available in Ireland to leverage administrative data in support of public policy development.

Together the interview and data governance evaluation enabled a structured, comparative analysis of the Covid-19 Data Hub in terms of international best practice and theoretical soundness.

3.3 Evaluation

The findings of the evaluation are synthesised in Table 1 which provides a column for each data hub assessed and a row for each data governance dimension following to Khatri and Brown. First we examine the Irish Covid-19 Data Research Hub in isolation according to the academic principles of data governance and then a comparative analysis is provided with respect to the international models examined.

The academic Data Governance models evaluated indicate key strengths in the Irish model (see Table 1), in particular in the data governance areas of Data Access and Data Principles, however the real value and application of public health information depends on the engagement, trust and sustained cooperation of all stakeholders and there appear to be vulnerabilities here, especially as regard metadata standards, data lifecycle management and individual level data transparency.

The main objective of the Covid–19 Data Research Hub is to inform decision-making during the national emergency based on research undertaken by approved individuals. Pseudonymisation of the data held on the system protects the privacy of individuals and international comparison indicates this to be a standard. However, weak or absent meta data standardisation is a vulnerability from a Data Quality and Access perspective and in a longer-term perspective, in particular for more ordinary-time purposes, may hinder the value of the data from a researcher’s perspective.

Governance goals illustrate the objectives targeted by implementing a governance method. By robustly governing the data contained in the Covid–
19 Data Research Hub it is hoped to provide a secure source for researchers to access pseudonymised data relating to the Covid–19 pandemic and its effects and, by extension, to demonstrate the opportunities for further public sector policy to be informed by parallel type research.

Governance forms indicate externalities that impact on achieving the goals set out. These include organisational units, practices, policies and regulations and technologies involved in the management of the data. The CSO ensured that all necessary protocols under the Statistics Act, the Data Protection Act/Health Research Regulations were employed in the collaborative process. The establishment of the Research Data Governance Board (RDGB) acts as an added safeguard in supporting governance and transparency of the application process for approved researcher status.

Overall, from the perspective of formal or academic governance, the Irish model presents opportunities for improvement, on a solid and verifiable governance base.

From the perspective of practical implementation of other data hub models, Estonia (see Table 1) has stolen a march in the digitisation of their public administrative systems generally. Designed for broader purposes than the Irish Covid–19 Data Research Hub, their system allows residents to access personal health data amongst a range of all the data they share with the public administrative system, sharing this data with doctors and healthcare professionals whilst having full visibility of its use. This creates ease of engagement for both parties and removes the need for manual file transfer as it can be carried out online. Regarding the Irish data hub, this system operates in a more detached manner, ingesting information specifically related to instances of Covid–19, processing it for governance and onward access purposes, with no option for dynamic sharing of datasets. Only approved researchers will have access to the data hub, following an extensive process involving the HRB, the CSO and the RDGB.

The French Health Data Hub operates on the principle of encouraging research, much like the Irish data hub. A key feature of the French HDH is Artificial Intelligence (AI), which is not yet included in any aspect of the Irish Covid–19 data hub, although there are clear opportunities for the deployment of Machine Learning techniques. The HDH aims to expand the area of digital health by including multiple parties in the data sharing system. Similarly, the Irish Covid–19 Data Research Hub developed with involvement from a number of public administrative bodies, collaborating to ensure all bases were covered regarding the data transfer by the HSE to the CSO, the application process managed by the HRB and the system for approvals.

Germany has developed a Medical Informatics Initiative focusing on the promotion of training and educating among selected healthcare actors but relies heavily on local cooperation and as is yet unproven at a national level. The bottom-up nature of its operation offers assurance at a governance level whilst risking constraints in terms of broader utility, across its audience of data scientists, data stewards, doctors, patients, research and universities. It is hoped that this data hub will provide insights into medical research and improve treatment decisions. Access to the Irish Covid–19 Data Research Hub is limited to approved researchers, as mentioned above, in a bid to inform public bodies of evidence to support policy decisions.

3.3.1 Data Hub Stakeholder Interview Summary

The interviewee noted the objectives were to encourage research on Covid–19 across a broad group of researchers, consistent with the Statistics Act 1993 and health research obligations. He noted that a safe haven for research has been a necessity, which complied with all law and recognized the status of health data as ‘special category data’.

Regarding the “state of the art” in data hub design and execution, it was noted that the Health Research Board (HRB) is internationally connected and well aware of international trends in areas relating to process maps, research ethics, and public interest, while the CSO is a globally active National Statistical Institute, operating to transnational standards. Accordingly, Irish Health Research Regulations and CSO Statistical Data Governance Standards are considered state of the art and heavily influenced the governance model followed by the CSO and the HRB in developing the data hub.

The interviewee’s principal governance and risk factors in the Data Research Hub design & architecture included ethics, consent, public interest, legislation, metadata and data availability, lack of persistent identifiers, and consideration of international trends in data hub creation and management. The interviewee expressed the view that the data hub was strong in the area of research ethics and consent, with both heavily reflected in the model, while noting that the absence of advance data subject consent could be discounted to some extent by the public interest imperative of Covid–19 related responses. Nonetheless, approval to access such data is given from an independent source, Health Research Consent Declaration Committee.
Table 1: Data Hub Evaluation based on Data Governance Domains and Antecedents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Governance</th>
<th>Decision Domain</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>French HDH</th>
<th>German MII</th>
<th>Covid–19 Research Data Hub</th>
<th>DeepMind Health (UK)</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Antecedents</td>
<td>External (legal, regulatory, market envt...)/Internal (Business Strategy; IT architecture; Culture envt)</td>
<td>Central rule setting. Strict national regulatory framework, Hub and Spoke architecture</td>
<td>Bottom-Up approach</td>
<td>Urgent national response</td>
<td>Local (Health Trust to private contractor) contracting arrangement with weekly specified contracting parameters</td>
<td>Clean Sheet – common baseline – Register based approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Principles</td>
<td>Acceptable uses? Desirable behaviours? Use &amp; re-use protocols? Regulatory Engagement</td>
<td>18 projects sanctioned, subject to independent oversight. Complex access/matching processes slowing progress. Moving to harmonise</td>
<td>Strong commitment to interoperability and data sharing</td>
<td>Tightly defined, purpose dependent access. No open sharing protocols. Rigorous output checking. Close DPC engagement</td>
<td>Weakly defined. Large data dumps with poorly specified outputs. Data principles severely criticised according to an Independent Review Panel in 2017</td>
<td>Collect once, use often is the guiding principle with strict national governance re access and use. Maximum transparency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Quality/Domain Scope</td>
<td>Accuracy, Timeliness, Completeness, Credibility</td>
<td>No evidence of validation</td>
<td>No evidence of validation</td>
<td>Acknowledge unvalidated</td>
<td>No evidence of validation</td>
<td>100% transparent, data viewable by data subject, editable/verifiable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metadata/Domain Scope</td>
<td>Semantic Dictionary Metadata Maintenance</td>
<td>Implied strong governance, given Hub &amp; Spoke Design</td>
<td>Due to Bottom-Up design, presumed lagging if present at all. Poorly documented in research papers</td>
<td>Confirmed as a gap. Purpose specific approach to individual data flows. Urgently requires attention</td>
<td>No evidence. AI data mining/processing techniques deployed on a “black box” basis</td>
<td>Register based, legislatively driven approach ensures commonality and consistent with external parties (banks for eID infrastructure)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Access/Governance Form/Governance Mechanism</td>
<td>Access Risk Assessment Access Protocols Access Logging/Control Compliance &amp; Security</td>
<td>Varied, complex and diverse rules</td>
<td>Stringent governance, centrally overseen</td>
<td>Stringent data provenance, sharing, processing and access controls; Ethical, Research and governance sign off required</td>
<td>No central oversight but confirmed patient opt-out</td>
<td>Strict legislatively defined governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Lifecycle/Domain Scope</td>
<td>Data definition, production, retention, retirement</td>
<td>Unspecified in literature</td>
<td>Unspecified in literature</td>
<td>Unspecified in literature</td>
<td>Unspecified in literature</td>
<td>Unspecified in literature</td>
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</table>
He further noted the architecture of the Data Research Hub establishes a foundation for potential future expansion to the education and labour market, for which there is demand for research purposes.

The interviewee identified that a lack of metadata for data sets is an issue, as the CSO receives data from the HSE directly from diverse systems, each of which was designed independently, for diverse purposes. Researchers rely on data sets that display consistency, are complete and ready for research purposes. Bridging this gap is a considerable challenge. In particular, data access, metadata availability, and the lack of a persistent identifier created issues. It was also identified that reluctance to embrace standard identifiers across the public sector is problematic. In noting that the resistance existed even prior to GDPR and the DPC, he also noted that ‘bravery’ is now necessary, to galvanise the effort to mobilise administrative data for public policy development.

As a general remark, it was noted that investment in data which is based on sensors and IoT must be considered. However, this area raises the challenge of the sheer size of the data flows implying a need to engage with partners, including potential outsourced providers, which may imply cloud solutions for data that is not sensitive. This would represent a considerable departure for the public sector.

3.4 Discussion

From the above, we can draw a number of conclusions: the stakeholder confirmed the growing trend in Europe to make data available for research purposes has reached Ireland, but noted the difficulties that come alongside this in respect of legislation that limits the use of health data for research purposes. While these difficulties have been discussed within scholarship and in papers outlining other European health hub systems, (Winter and Davidson, 2018) the author made it clear that these were not considered for direct implementation. Nonetheless, international trends were observed, as noted in topic 2. Some of the international trends observed, such as metadata (which also implies data quality), data availability, legislation and consent have been parts of data governance state-of-the-art scholarship (K. C. O’Doherty et al, 2021), (Prainsack & Buyx, 2013) (McMahon, Buyx & Prainsack, 2020), (Cuggia & Combes, 2019). Despite the fact the interviewee has not mentioned data governance specifically as an influencing factor, this does not imply that it cannot exist de facto. It should be further noted that while data governance has been confirmed to be an influencing success factor in prior scholarship, (Panian, 2010) it is nonetheless not in the mainstream yet. This is further exacerbated by the fact that scholarship is only recently treading the waters of data governance in international health hubs. The interviewee, in topic 5, discussed the lack of explicit consent for data as research assets. Nonetheless, the interviewee interestingly mentions the overriding public interest. Article 6(e) of the GDPR does allow processing for the purposes of performance of a task carried out in the public interest (GDPR, 2018). The German Data Protection Commission has recently approved a set of (updated) forms used to ensure a provision for patient data for medical research purposes (Virtuelles Datenschutzbüro, 2021). They will be approved for use by the Medical Informatics Initiative, which is essentially, a data hub much like the Covid–19 Data Research Hub developed by the HSE and CSO, with the two diverging factors being that the German data hub encompasses all medical data, as opposed to Covid–19 related data, (MII Germany, 2021) and the ‘bottom-up’ approach taken by Germany, wherein a consortia of hospitals, universities, and private partners exists (Cuggia & Combes, 2019). The French Health Data Hub, known as the ‘Plateforme nationale des données de santé’, or HDI, is more similar to the Irish hub, with the objective of promoting research. Much like the Irish system, the French system was also tested via pilot projects (“Plateforme des données de santé, Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques”, 2021). Furthermore, the Irish system also features the employment of data producers, as a joint venture by the HSE and CSO. While the full comparisons between the data governance of the French, Estonian, German, and Irish data hubs would be extensive, our initial research has nonetheless shown that the hubs differ greatly. International comparisons do not play a role in de facto application of development of health data hubs, and this is mostly arising out of the factors which necessitate the hub in the first place. Conclusively, there seems to be general international practice that simply occurs on the basis of best practice reasoning. While international hubs were not considered in respect of applicable features, nonetheless, there is general international practice used that can be found across all hubs.

4 CONCLUSION

While international Health Data Hubs exist or are in development, they diverge as much as they intersect as regards purpose, governance, and implementation.
Key areas of data governance development focus should be made a priority, in particular in order to preserve public confidence and to support future interoperability and long-term utility from data sources. In particular, attention should be paid to consent and metadata management and to data subject transparency.

The Covid–19 Data Research Hub is distinguished in particular by the fact that it focuses exclusively on public sector data being made available to academic researchers for emergency response purposes. International standard ethics approval is required for research projects, consistent with comparator models in the UK, France and Germany. Due to the retrofitting of the data access model to diverse available sources, preliminary consent has had to be dispensed with, although a robust retrospective process for consent management is in place. Rigorous researcher access protocols are applied, and the purpose of the research is firmly focused on public good outcomes, thus in this respect it appears to offer a particularly high level of assurance to data subjects individually and collectively.

All evidence suggests the CSO’s ingestion, collation and preparation of data for research access, via Research Micro-Data File access, complies with rigorous data governance standards, protecting the privacy of data subjects and limiting access strictly to that which is necessary. There are no “black box” processes and Data Subjects can access full transparency details in respect of the processing principles applied to their data. Outputs are rigorously checked for Statistical Disclosure. No cloud technology is used, and data is securely held on premise at all times.

While transparency is well documented in general, however, the Data Subject enjoys very limited transparency at the individual level. This aspect cannot easily be retrofitted to a system developed reactively and drawing on disparate sources, not designed for this purpose. This stands in stark contrast, for example, to the Estonian Digital Government model where a discrete Service Layer (Winter and Davidson (2019)) ensures Data Subjects have real time visibility on the use of their data and the X-Road based Data Registers model ensures that any given variable has a single consistent, auditable source. In order to preserve public confidence, progress in this area is desirable.

At the statistical level, the absence of strong semantic compatibility and inter-operability/ metadata standardisation hampers data processing, making the role of the CSO particularly challenging. Unique identifiers would assist considerably, as would common meta-data standards.

This research did not reveal ideal international comparators against which to benchmark the Covid–19 Data Research Hub, but general learnings were nonetheless instructive in particular as regards general pitfalls for large scale data sharing and analysis. The lessons learned from Estonia offer a particularly illuminating view of the possibility for the safe, trusted and transparent use of public administrative data “as a public asset” and these should be studied in particular detail in the perspective of future investment in Irish public sector research capability. Benchmarking against academic data governance models reveals key weaknesses, in particular in respect of meta data and data lifecycle management, while issues of Data Quality validations are also ripe for further examination.

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