Universal Safety Format: Automated Safety Software Generation

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Abstract: The development of safety-critical software requires a significant additional effort compared to standard software. Safety mechanisms, e.g., for mitigating hardware errors, have to be designed and integrated into the functional code. This results not only in substantial implementation overhead, but also reduces the overall maintainability of the software. In this paper, we present the Universal Safety Format (USF), which enables a model-driven approach that complies with the separation of concerns principle. Software safety mechanisms are specified as patterns via a domain-agnostic transformation language, separated from the functional software. Various domain-specific tools apply these safety patterns to domain-specific artifacts, such as code or software architecture models. This enables the reuse of safety patterns in multiple designs as well as in a single design to artifacts from different domains.

1 INTRODUCTION

Industrial safety standards such as (IEC 61508, 2010) or (ISO 26262, 2018) for automotive systems require additional development steps to ensure that a safety-critical system does not cause harm even in the presence of random hardware faults. Safety mechanisms are technical solutions to detect faults or control failures in order to maintain a safe system state. These mechanisms can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of both. Safety mechanisms implemented in software are becoming increasingly relevant for software-intensive systems, especially when used in combination with commercial off-the-shelf hardware. These software safety mechanisms can be integrated at different stages of the software development with different abstraction levels, for example, at software model (Ding et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2020), source code (Trindade et al., 2014), or binary level (Didehban and Shrivastava, 2016; Reis et al., 2005; Didehban et al., 2017; Vankeirsbilck et al., 2017). The appropriate selection of the level of abstraction and the modeling or programming language (from now on called \textit{domain}) for integrating suitable safety mechanisms depends on many aspects and is highly application-specific. Nonetheless, the implementation of safety mechanisms often follows common patterns which share a general structure, independent of the application and even across different domains (Armoush, 2010). While many methodologies exist to support a safety engineering process, integrating, and implementing application-specific software safety mechanisms remains a predominantly manual process which is error-prone and time-consuming. Furthermore, adding safety mechanisms inflates the software, which not only increases the maintenance effort, but often makes it more difficult to understand the functional software.

In this paper, we present a methodology to automate the labor-intensive realization of software safety mechanisms for different domains via the so-called Universal Safety Format (USF), newly introduced in this paper. This is achieved by describing safety mechanism patterns via a domain-agnostic transfor-
mation language and by extending domain-specific tools to implement the domain-agnostic transformation in a domain-specific context. Automating this process also enables the functional software to be kept separate from the safety mechanisms, as these can be adapted and integrated at any time. The main contributions of the paper are:

- The domain-agnostic USF metamodel which describes the structure as well as the data and control flow of the functional software.
- The USF transformation language (UTL) used to integrate safety mechanism patterns into a model.
- A methodology to map USF transformations to domain-specific contexts.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: A brief overview of the safety engineering process is given in Section 2 as well as the introduction of a running example. Section 3 illustrates how the USF process can be integrated into an existing development flow. The USF metamodel is described in Section 4, while Section 5 is dedicated to the UTL. The application of the USF methodology is demonstrated on the introduced running example at model and source code level in Section 6. The results are discussed in Section 7 and our approach is compared with related research in Section 8. Section 9 concludes and describes future work.

2 SAFETY ENGINEERING IN A NUTSHELL

Various safety standards exist to minimize the risk of system failures. They offer guidance on how to design, deploy and maintain a system for a safety-related application. One exemplary standard is the before-mentioned (IEC 61508, 2010), which is applicable to all industries, while (ISO 26262, 2018) is an industry-specific adaptation of the former. In order to get a better impression of the topic of safety engineering, the IEC 61508 standard will be examined in more detail in the following paragraphs.

The premise of this standard is that any safety-related system must work correctly or fail in a predictable and safe manner under all possible stated conditions. For this purpose, the standard provides a comprehensive and holistic engineering process called the safety life cycle. It comprises 16 phases, starting with analysis, continuing with principles for realization, and ending with phases on the operation of a system. All these phases evolve around the correct execution of safety-related functions. A fundamental part of this life cycle is a probabilistic failure approach that classifies the safety impact of a component’s failure. It is part of the hazard and risk analysis which consists of three stages: hazard identification, analysis, and risk assessment. For the risk assessment, risk is seen as a function of likelihood of a hazardous event and the severity of its consequence. Either qualitative or quantitative analysis techniques can be used to quantify the risk. This assessment indicates which risks have to be reduced and therefore allows for an appropriate design of the protective system. It renders under- or over-specifying less likely.

To further comply with the standard, safety requirements have to be made with a targeted safety integrity level (SIL). The safety integrity is described as ‘the probability that the safety-related system will satisfactorily perform the required safety functions under all stated conditions’. There are four discrete safety integrity levels which specify the safety integrity requirements for a function. The general reasoning behind SILs goes as follows: for a greater necessary risk reduction, the safety-related system needs to be more reliable, so the targeted SIL has to be higher.

(IEC 61508, 2010) and other related safety standards offer assistance on what safety mechanisms should be used in order to meet a targeted SIL. Thus, there is a recurrent set of utilized safety mechanisms in the development of safety-related systems, some examples are: error detection logic and codes, plausibility checks, range checks of input and output data, stack overflow/underflow detection, timing supervision with watchdogs, control flow monitoring and external monitoring facilities, static recovery mechanisms, hardware self-tests and majority voters. To foster the wide applicability and reuse of these safety mechanisms, this paper proposes a specification format that is not bound to one specific domain.

Running Example

The potential of the USF is illustrated in this paper on a simplified adaptive cruise control (ACC) system. Fig. 1 shows an overview of the functionality. The goal of an ACC is to control the speed of a vehicle such that it keeps a constant distance to a preceding vehicle. For this, the system reads its own speed and the distance to the preceding vehicle, executes a PI control algorithm, and adjusts its own speed by setting a new throttle value in the motor.

Running the ACC on an embedded hardware plat-
form which may be error-prone can cause safety hazards. Clearly, a major safety hazard may arise, if the distance to the preceding vehicle is not maintained. Typical errors in the integrated hardware platform are either permanent errors due to aging and wear-out effects or transient errors (so called soft-errors) which may arise, for example, from particle strikes in the integrated circuitry. A common method to mitigate the impact of soft-errors on a calculation is the application of a dual modular redundancy (DMR) pattern. Fig. 2 gives an example of an applied DMR pattern on the PI controller. The DMR pattern duplicates the function and compares the two results. If both calculations yield the same result, the motor throttle is set, if not, an error handler is triggered.

Fig. 2: ACC with dual modular redundancy (DMR).

3 WORKFLOW

The USF methodology enables the user to generate and integrate application-specific safety mechanisms into different domains using one pattern description per safety mechanism type and the approach can be integrated into existing functional development flows. Fig. 3 gives an overview of a typical design flow. Based on the functional requirements, a functional specification is created and subsequently implemented.

Fig. 3: Development flow with USF support.

The safety requirements are derived from a safety analysis of the system and its functional requirements. Analogous to the functional development, a separate safety specification is then created that contains the required software safety mechanism. For the USF approach, this objective is achieved by selecting and configuring suitable safety mechanisms from a predefined library of safety mechanism patterns. This selection represents the safety specification, and the patterns are stored in a formalized manner. Once the safety specification is complete, the specification can be used to implement safety mechanisms fully automatically, i.e., generate the safety software and then integrate the generated safety software into the functional software, resulting in the final safe software. To enable automatic safety software generation, the core of the USF consists of the following two parts:

1. USF metamodel: A domain-agnostic metamodel to describe the structure of functionality including the data and control flow.
2. UTL: A transformation language to specify safety mechanism patterns and how to integrate them into USF-based models. The safety pattern library consists of formal specifications of safety patterns and their corresponding transformation scripts. A predefined set of safety patterns is provided with the USF, but the library can and should be extended with each design. A safety pattern from the library can be easily applied to a USF model by specifying elements inside the model that should be protected by the given mechanism and executing the transformation. Fig. 4 shows the application of a DMR pattern on a USF component. A detailed description of the USF metamodel is given in Section 4.

Fig. 4: Application of a DMR pattern in USF.

In order to use USF safety mechanisms in a specific domain, the transformation steps have to be interpreted for this domain’s context. This can be automated by integrating USF support in a domain-specific tool. There are many implementation options to achieve this and they depend on the specific domain and existing tool infrastructure. One option to realize the USF support in a tool is to implement the following four steps:

1. Mapping between the domain and USF elements.
2. Interface to use the safety patterns from the USF library and to annotate them directly to domain elements using the mapping.
3. Create a domain-specific USF transformation interpreter using the mapping.
4. Interface for domain-specific implementations of the newly introduced components (e.g., comparator functions, specific error handlers)

Fig. 5 shows an example for the application of a DMR mechanism on a section of C code. The C code can be transformed by interpreting all transformation steps from the USF transformation script in the C domain (dark gray), analogous to the transformation in the
4 USF METAMODEL

The metamodel is the foundation for a comprehensive tool support and makes sure that all tools are based on the same concepts. The USF model targets simplicity, which is often a requirement in the safety domain, and takes inspiration from SysML to enable low-threshold entry for model experts. This section gives a brief overview of the main concepts of the USF metamodel. The full USF metamodel is available at (USF, 2021).

4.1 Block, Port and Connection Concepts

The USF metamodel provides the concepts of blocks, ports, and connections. They are used to represent the system structure and the data flow of the functional model. The application of the USF has shown that some patterns have to take the control flow into account as well. Therefore, the metamodel was enhanced by dedicated ports and connections to specify both data flow and control flow in one model. Fig. 6 shows the part of the metamodel to describe both flows. A functional element of a system is modeled as a Block and is characterized by a BlockType. An interface to a block is defined by DataFlowPorts, which can be typed by the USF type concept. Information flow between blocks is described by a DataFlowConnection connecting two DataFlowPorts.

4.2 Safety Pattern Concepts

Safety mechanisms are technical solutions to protect a functional system. Safety patterns are formalized specifications for a safety mechanism, which are specified first and then are assigned to elements in the functional model. Both the pattern specification as well as its assignment provide the input for the transformation. With this transformation the functional model will be converted into an enriched model where all assigned safety patterns are applied. In Fig. 7 the main USF concepts for safety patterns are shown.

4.3 Pattern Application

As an example, on how to use USF the ACC system is modeled and a DMR pattern is applied for the con-
controller task. Fig. 8 shows the definition of the DMR in a safety pattern diagram.

A SafetyPattern specifies all required parameters of a safety mechanism. Required model parameters are shown in the blue box on the left, additional primitive parameters are listed in the yellow box on the right. The SafetyPattern can then be assigned to the functional model in the block diagram by adding a SafetyPatternApplication and setting up the assignment links. In Fig. 9 the USF model of the ACC example is shown and the DMR safety pattern is assigned to the functional block of the controller task.

5 TRANSFORMATION LANGUAGE

In this section, we describe the transformation language which operates on instances of the USF metamodel, and how transformations can be executed. Following the terminology of aspect-oriented programming (AOP (Kiczales et al., 1997)) we use the term weaving for the automatic integration of safety mechanisms.

5.1 Weaving as Model Transformation

The foundation for weaving functional safety mechanisms into models and code is a mapping between these target domains and the USF metamodel. Based on this mapping, any weaving mechanism can be defined as a model transformation applied to USF models. We define the USF-specific transformation language UTL, which provides a convenient way to specify mechanisms in terms of the domain of USF models. UTL is an imperative-style language, its basic entity being a transformation. The language concepts can roughly be divided into the following parts:

- transformation signatures
- general features (variable definitions, control structures, function calls)
- operations on concepts from the USF metamodel
- special concepts, esp. the block type constructor

By design, UTL can be expressed using a convenient textual concrete syntax, but can be enriched with more elaborate notational elements if the tool platform allows it (e.g., when using a projectional editor like JetBrains MPS (MPS, 2021)).

In order to allow a concise way of specifying transformations and at the same time provide the target users (i.e., mostly safety engineers) with a language which is easy to use also for non-developers, UTL is not a general-purpose transformation language (compared to e.g., ATL (Jouault et al., 2008)). The available concepts are restricted to what is required for specifying safety mechanisms. Moreover, the restrictions allow easier implementations for various target domains.

5.2 Overview of UTL Concepts

5.2.1 Expression Language with Types

UTL features an expression language with the usual primitive types (e.g., boolean, integer, string) and operations on these types. In addition, a subset of the block metamodel concepts are available as types in UTL, e.g., Block, DataPort and ControlPort.

5.2.2 Transformation Signatures

Calling a transformation resembles a function call. I.e., the transformation signature consists of a name, a set of named parameters with types and a return type (see item 1 in Fig. 10). This signature serves as the transformation’s interface to the annotations in the domain model or in the USF model. Signatures might also include block type definitions (according to the block metamodel). E.g., the transformation depicted at item 2 in Fig. 10 uses the block type Comparator<T>.

5.2.3 Operations

The largest part of UTL is the set of operations on USF model elements. These can be divided into two groups. The first group of operations are implicitly defined by the USF metamodel (e.g., getters and setters for attributes). The second group
can be used to inject domain-specific behavior as implementation of the created block type. E.g., for the C domain this can be a C code snippet which adheres to the interface defined by the block type’s ports. The specific value of the BlockImpl<T> parameter will be initialized as part of the annotation in the domain and is “tunneled” through the transformation script until the constructor executes.

5.3 Transformation Engine for UTL

UTL allows to model safety mechanisms as domain-agnostic transformation scripts. The following section describes how these scripts can be executed.

5.3.1 Executing Transformations

In an environment for applying USF transformations to domain-specific models, the following building blocks are needed: transformation script defined in UTL, input model (in domain-specific and USF model representations), library with domain-specific implementation details (e.g., glue code). This is depicted in Fig. 11 using C code as example domain.

![Figure 11: Applying transformations (example: C domain).](image)

For execution of transformation scripts, there are different options:

- using an interpreter with a domain-specific backend
- translating the input domain-model into a USF model and executing the transformation generically
- translating the transformation script into code (e.g., Java) which can be executed on a representation of the domain-specific model

The best option for the implementation of a UTL transformation engine depends on the tool environment where it has to integrate as well as on the target domain. Esp. for program code domains (e.g., C code) the mapping to USF concepts can be complex.
5.3.2 Support for Structural Models

The mapping from USF models to target domains which represent hierarchically structured architectures with components and ports is quite straightforward. USF block types and blocks will represent domain components, and port concepts can often be mapped 1:1. Hierarchies are natively supported by USF as well. Therefore, the execution of UTL transformation scripts on these structures is easily possible. Typical industry-relevant domains from this category are SysML (and SysML-like proprietary models), AUTOSAR, and Simulink. E.g., using the Eclipse platform Artop (an EMF-based AUTOSAR implementation (Knüchel et al., 2010)) could be integrated with the USF reference implementation (EMF-based implementation of metamodel and transformation language) and a transformation engine (e.g., using Xtend (Xtend, 2021)) for executing the actual weaving.

5.3.3 Support for Program Code, Esp. C

In compilers and other code-related tools, program code (e.g., C) is represented as abstract syntax tree (AST). In order to map this domain to USF, elements of the AST have to be represented by USF blocks and other elements. USF has been designed to cover this, esp. by supporting data flow and control flow concepts. Despite this support the mapping between a C AST and USF block models is not straightforward. In our reference implementation, a UTL interpreter with a domain-specific plug-in has been implemented. The C domain plug-in creates the USF model from the input C code on the fly, starting from the annotated code elements (e.g., C functions or C blocks). The UTL interpreter will create new blocks and connections depending on the actual transformation scripts. In a post-processing step the resulting USF model is converted into C AST elements and manifested as code. The control flow connections on USF block level determine the order of the newly created C code blocks.

6 EVALUATION

The presented approach is demonstrated by applying safety patterns at different levels of abstraction to the development of the ACC software for an embedded system. To show that the USF approach can be integrated into an existing tool infrastructure, two tools are presented first. Then these tools are used to illustrate the application of safety patterns.

6.1 Tool Support

In order to validate the concepts of USF, the approach was successfully applied to several demonstrators. The functional software of the demonstrators was provided as C source code, Simulink, or SysML models. Safety patterns are described and woven into the functional software by different tools supporting USF. Safety patterns are provided in a library and can be readily applied to introduce safety mechanisms in any functional model. Table 1 shows selected safety patterns that can be used out-of-the-box.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMR</td>
<td>Dual modular redundancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMR</td>
<td>Triple modular redundancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>CRC generation and checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESM-ICU</td>
<td>External safety mechanism: interrupt controller unit test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watchdog</td>
<td>Hardware watchdog</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.1.1 SafetyModeler

SafetyModeler is a graphical editor to view and create USF models. It is provided as an Eclipse plugin and can be easily installed in an Eclipse Modeling environment. To instantiate the USF metamodel in a graphical way was also very useful during the definition phase of the metamodel and helped to validate it. The main purposes of SafetyModeler are the

- visualization of functional software in USF
- specification of safety patterns
- definition of safety pattern application
- definition and execution of transformations for safety patterns

To visualize the functional model the user interface of SafetyModeler provides several views like model trees, a drawing canvas with symbol palettes and property sheets to edit the details of a selected element. Functional block models with data and control flows, definition of data types as well as safety patterns to secure the functional model can be modeled. Models can also be imported via the XMI interface. Layout algorithms support the creation of diagrams in a semi-automated way.

Transformations for safety patterns can be developed and executed within SafetyModeler as well. Starting from a safety pattern definition the skeleton of a transformation is created. The development of transformation scripts is supported by a language sensitive editor. Finally, the transformation can be executed to generate the functional model including the
applied safety patterns. This model can be visualized in SafetyModeler again to prove the proper application of safety patterns.

6.1.2 SafetyWeaver

The main focus of the SafetyWeaver tool is to allow automatic weaving for different target domains, esp. for programming languages like C. SafetyWeaver is using the JetBrains MPS platform (MPS, 2021) which provides great flexibility in terms of notation and modular combination of languages (Voelter, 2014). This results in a consistent and intuitive user experience:

- safety engineers can edit annotations directly in the C code and still get context-specific proposals (e.g., for selecting the proper transformation script and its parameters, see green elements in Fig. 14)
- transformation authors can provide online documentation (e.g., for each transformation and its parameters) which is presented to transformation users as type system checks and tooltips
- platform architects who implement the C glue code can use a code block editor which enforces the constraints defined by the transformation definition (e.g., data flow input ports represented as read-only C variables)
- the resulting C code is automatically annotated with projected trace information, providing trace links leading back to the applied UTL-scripts, additional glue code blocks (traceability, see Fig. 15)

For each transformation script, SafetyWeaver maintains a mapping from the feature-rich UTL-language to a core language using the Shadow Model engine (Voelter et al., 2019a). This allows to simplify the actual model transformation process, as all syntactic sugar is removed and only the core language features have to be supported. This is especially valuable because the transformations have to be applied on several different target domains.

SafetyWeaver uses the mbeddr platform (Voelter et al., 2013) for representing the C code as AST. The weaving of USF mechanisms is executed by direct interpretation of the UTL transformation scripts. The C AST is transformed to in-memory USF models dynamically; the UTL works on the resulting representation. Only those parts of the C AST are transformed which are required for the weaving. As part of the transformation postprocessing, the output USF model is optimized (e.g., control flow clean-up), transformed back to C AST subtrees and integrated into the original C AST. This approach allows efficient transformation even of big C codebases, as only the parts relevant for safety weaving have to be transformed.

6.2 Domain Use-case

In this section, we demonstrate how the previously introduced tools can be used to realize domain-specific safety mechanisms.

6.2.1 Simulink

As indicated in Section 2, the core functionality of the ACC is implemented by a PI controller that adapts the throttle depending on the distance of the preceding vehicle and the speed of the own vehicle to keep a fixed distance between them. Fig. 12 shows the implementation of the PI controller inside a subsystem of a MATLAB/Simulink® block diagram and can be directly translated into the C code for the embedded target via the Simulink Embedded Coder. Same as in the introductory example, we want to mitigate soft errors in the calculation of the PI controller by applying the DMR pattern to the Simulink subsystem. To make use of the USF inside of Simulink models a mapping had to be created once. This was achieved by directly mapping the appropriate concepts, e.g., Simulink blocks to USF blocks, Simulink signals to USF data flow, etc. The model-to-model transformation was then realized by using SafetyModeler and the Simulink support of Eclipse Epsilon (Sanchez et al., 2019), which supplies an interface to query and modify Simulink models in Eclipse through the MATLAB API. By supplying an appropriate Simulink block implementation for the comparator once, we could then fully automate the application of any DMR pattern on Simulink blocks. Fig. 13 shows the result of the model transformation. The resulting Simulink subsystem was then translated with the Simulink Embedded Coder to C.

6.2.2 Safety-mechanism for C

Additional code is required to execute the C code generated by Simulink on an embedded system. This includes code that interacts with the hardware and code
that invokes the generated function from Simulink (PIControlTask). Fig. 14 illustrates a very simple implementation of this software.

The main function activates a tick timer. Every time the timer tick triggers its timer interrupt service routine (ISR), a counter glbl_doPI is incremented. The main function is kept in an endless while loop until the counter reaches 10 and then triggers once the control task and resets the timer counter again to zero, hence, every ten ticks the control task is executed.

A hardware fault could lead to an error in the interrupt control unit (ICU) such that the ISR is not triggered on a timer tick. In this case, the control would never become active after the software started execution because the ticks are lost. Therefore, an ICU self-test should be inserted as a safety mechanism, which tests once at the start of the system software that the timer ISR is triggered correctly.

This can be done via the SafetyWeaver tool as shown in Fig. 14. The code positions marked in green are selected by the user. They mark the position where the test is set up after the start of the main function (ICU_Testsetup) as well as two positions in the ISR (ISRsetup, ISRskip), needed to mark the ISR start and end.

The safety transformation inserts two new code blocks into the C source code for both functions (main and timer ISR). This is shown in Fig. 15. The code blocks implement the inserted safety mechanism. In a nutshell, the main function sets a flag IRQxfc and triggers the timer ISR once via a special function. The timer ISR unsets the flag. The main function checks that the ISR was executed and the flag is unset. If it detects that the flag is still set, then the ISR did not execute correctly due to a hardware error. In this case, the safety mechanism calls an error handler to report the hardware problem.

7 DISCUSSION

The evaluation illustrated how the USF approach can be applied to generate and integrate software safety mechanisms. Naturally, this approach requires an initial development effort to enable the generation. As mentioned earlier, tool implementations can be complex, but only need to be carried out once per domain. Adding new patterns via the UTL, on the other hand is fairly easy, especially with the tool support. However, to enable the generation of the software, implementations for certain pattern parts, such as the comparator, must be supplied or generated once per domain. Since these parts usually represent a simple functionality, most of them are fairly easy to implement and the effort can be reduced by reusing the parts in several patterns. However, in certain cases, such as a timer for
bare metal software without a hardware abstraction layer, multiple implementations can be required depending on the hardware timer used. However, with this initial setup the reuse of safety patterns in different stages of the design as well as across different designs is enabled.

For the sake of brevity, we only described the generation of two mechanisms in detail in this paper. In our evaluation of the approach, we analyzed further software safety mechanism used in industry to create the initial safety pattern library. These patterns can be divided into application-specific and non-application-specific patterns. The application-specific patterns, such as the DMR, have to be adapted to the functionality and interwoven into the functionality often deep inside the software. Because of this, the reuse of application-specific patterns in conventional development is very limited and instead resulted in a manual re-implementation of the safety mechanism. With the USF approach, these steps can now be automated. The non-application-specific patterns, such as the ICU test, don’t have to be adapted to the functionality, but still have to be interwoven into the software. Examples for these patterns are the recommendations in safety manuals often provided from hardware manufacturers for their platforms. Similar to the conventional development, some effort is required to adapt to a new hardware platform, but the mechanisms can be shared between projects using the same hardware. While the benefit of using the USF approach for some of these mechanisms is reduced to only an automatic integration of existing implementations or may only be useful in certain domains, it can still be very beneficial to express these via pattern. Following the principle of separation of concerns, the USF keeps the functional and safety software separate, but can combine them at any time by using tools such as Safety-Weaver, making the code easier to maintain, as seen in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15, easier to maintain. Furthermore, describing all mechanism via USF pattern enables the creation of a formalized safety specification.

As described in Section 2, the realization of software safety mechanism is one part of the bigger safety engineering process and must be viewed in this context. This implies that the safety mechanisms have to be developed according to the strict rules of the safety standards and appropriate patterns have to be selected. The safety engineer is responsible for this selection and it not only includes that certain errors are detected and handled, but also that timing and memory constraints can be met. This can be a complicated trade-off, as some safety mechanisms may create enormous overhead that can conflict with the hard deadlines of the application. Automating the realization of safety mechanisms can also improve this process by enabling the safety engineer to evaluate different design alternatives faster.

8 RELATED WORK

8.1 System Modeling and Model Transformations

SysML (Mann, 2009) is a standardized language for modeling systems. Its profile mechanism has been used to specialize its generic metamodel and diagrams in order to support functional safety aspects of systems, e.g., for model-based dependability analysis in the aerospace domain (Steurer et al., 2018). The USF metamodel as a domain-specific language (DSL), on the other hand, allows the streamlined combination of structural aspects as well as control/data flow in the same model. Using a DSL avoids the artificial complexity of a generic, stereotype-based modeling approach, providing benefits both for manual editing and automated model transformations to/from USF.

There are several useful ways of applying DSLs and model-to-model transformations for safety-critical system development. Aside from weaving safety mechanisms into functional code as described here, the language workbench MPS has been used for complete generation of safety-critical code and tests from DSL-based models (Voelter et al., 2019b). Yet another aspect is the generation of fault-trees from SysML-like component models using JetBrains MPS (Munk and Nordmann, 2020).

In this paper, automatic weaving is implemented as model-to-model transformations supported by the UTL-language. The general approach is inspired by the aspect-oriented programming (AOP (Kiczales et al., 1997)) methodology. However, USF safety weaving is not AOP in the strict sense, as USF patterns might be applied to different target domains (not only to source code of a single programming language). Moreover, the languages, metamodels and annotations for USF are specialized for the functional-safety domain.

For the definition of transformations on generic metamodels, a variety of languages and corresponding implementations has been developed. QVT (Bast et al., 2005) is a standardized transformation/query language operating on models which conform to MOF 2.0. ATL (Jouault et al., 2008) is a QVT-like language for EMF models. Viatra2 (Bergmann et al., 2011) is also a query/transformation language operating on EMF models, but with a high-performance incremental implementation. Xtend (Xtend, 2021) is a general-purpose programming language with spe-
sional focus on model-to-model transformations. While all these approaches could be used to specify safety mechanisms for the EMF-based USF-models, UTL has been designed to meet the specific needs of safety engineers. It uses script-like, imperative control constructs instead of generic declarative, graph-based abstractions. It provides special features (e.g., constructor syntax) to create parts of the output by-example and allows transformation execution on different target domains (e.g., models or C code).

8.2 Safety Mechanism Generation for Model-driven Development

The model-driven application of safety mechanisms has only been sparsely addressed in research. Nonetheless, some approaches exist to integrate safety mechanisms via transformations on a given model (Trindade et al., 2014; Ding et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2020). The authors of (Trindade et al., 2014) present a method to generate boundary checks from semi-formal requirements for AUTOSAR software components. In (Ding et al., 2018) a flow is presented to integrate different computational redundancy mechanism, e.g., DMR, into Simulink models and the authors of (Hu et al., 2020) describe an approach to apply N-version programming in the Cyber-Physical Action Language (CPAL). These model-driven approaches share many advantages, as even complex safety mechanisms can be introduced early into the design and are often platform independent. Furthermore, as the model-based design is usually easier to understand, than for example only the source code, this also eases the validation effort of the safety engineer. While these approaches offer good result, they are limited to one type of safety mechanism and only support one domain.

8.3 Code Transformation Methods

When applying the presented model-based flow at code level, the code modifications defined in the transformation language are a source-to-source (S2S) code transformation. They were implemented in an industrial S2S tool SafetyWeaver, but can be equally implemented in other C/C++ frameworks such as LLVM (Lattner and Adve, 2004) or the Rose Compiler (Quinlan and Liao, 2011).

Another important class of code transformations are so-called SW-implemented HW fault tolerance (SIHFT). These methods do not add additional safety code but add instruction redundancy to detect transient hardware errors in the processor similar to the shown DMR patterns. Different variants exist to protect load and stores (Didehban and Shrivastava, 2016; Reis et al., 2005) as well as branches (Didehban et al., 2017). Other methods add signatures to code basic blocks to detect illegal jumps (Vankeirsbilck et al., 2017). SIHFT methods work at the immediate code or assembly code level and are usually integrated into backend of the compiler. For the presented model-based flow, these methods can be integrated. For this, USF transformations add additional code to indicate to the compiler, which SIHFT methods to apply to which function of the SW.

9 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we presented a model-driven approach to automatically adapt, generate, and integrate domain-specific software safety mechanisms via the newly introduced Universal Safety Format. Safety mechanisms are generalized by patterns described via the domain-agnostic transformation language UTL, which operates on USF models. The safety patterns form a library and can be reused in different designs and different design stages. We have shown how to integrate USF support into domain-specific tools, which then can apply USF safety patterns in a domain context to generate and integrate the software safety mechanisms. Our evaluations show how this can be realized for very different domain contexts such as Simulink models or C code using the same pattern library. Further information and open-source implementations are available at (USF, 2021).

In future work, we are planning to extend the library of safety patterns to support a broader range of mechanisms as well as integrating the USF into more domain-specific tools to further facilitate an easy automatic integration of safety mechanisms in different domains for the end-user. Furthermore, we are investigating how this approach can be extended to include the generation of security mechanisms.

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