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Abstract: A methodological approach is proposed that allows to analyse an impact of information security on the performance of standard agreement processes, organizational project-enabling processes, technical management processes and technical processes according to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288. Using the proposed probabilistic approach to risks prediction in a life cycle of systems helps to identify "bottlenecks" and define measures and actions for reducing risks when performing standard processes, considering threats to system information security. The usability of the approach is illustrated by examples.

1 INTRODUCTION

In conditions of multiple uncertainties for system life cycle, various risks arise, including risks connected with the violation of information security requirements. Despite a lot of researches devoted to risk management (Akimov, 2015, Artemyev, 2017, Kostogryzov, 2008-2020), the problems associated with the analysis of an impact of system information security on standard system processes performance in terms of predicted risks continue to be poorly studied. For this reason, the topic of research related to the probabilistic analysis of such impacts continues to be acutely relevant. At the same time, standard system processes according to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 “System and software engineering. Systems life cycle processes” cover the agreement processes (i.e. acquisition and supply processes), organizational project-enabling processes (i.e. life cycle model management, infrastructure management, portfolio management process, human resource management, quality management and knowledge management processes), technical management processes (i.e. project planning, project assessment and control, decision management process, risk management, configuration management, information management, measurement and quality assurance processes) and technical processes (i.e. business or mission analysis, stakeholder needs and requirements definition, system requirements definition, architecture definition, design definition, system analysis implementation, integration, verification, transition, validation, operation, maintenance and disposal processes). In general, these processes characterize the complete set of standard processes in system life cycle.

In this paper an universal methodological approach that allows to perform a probabilistic analysis of an impact of information security on performance of all above standard processes is proposed.

2 GENERAL PROPOSITIONS

The focus on standard processes is justified by the fact that on the one hand, the life cycle of any complex system is woven from a variety of standard processes deployed in time, and on the other hand, for each of these processes, ISO/IEC / IEEE 15288 defines its possible purposes, outcomes and typical actions.

For example the main purpose of the decision management process is to provide a structured, analytical framework for objectively identifying, characterizing and valuating a set of alternatives for a decision at any point in the life cycle and select the most beneficial course of action. And as typical

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results of the successful performance of this process are next outcomes: decisions requiring alternative analysis are identified; alternative courses of actions are identified and evaluated; a preferred course of actions is selected; the resolution, decision rationale and assumptions are recorded.

To obtain the identical results for every standard process, one or more typical actions should be performed using some assets for which information security must be provided. It means the standard processes are identical from the point of view of an impact of information security on processes performance.

In a life cycle of any system, both the reliable performance of each of the standard processes used and system information security, associated with this process must be ensured. The term “reliability of standard process performance” is defined as an ability of this process to perform its necessary actions under stated conditions for a specified period of time. The reliability of standard process performance is expressed in maintenance the values of corresponding measures within the established limits during given time.

To predict the risks for each of the standard processes for a given prognostic time T it is proposed to use the following quantitative probabilistic measures:

- \( R_{rel}(T) \) — probability of failure to reliably perform the necessary actions of the standard process without consideration of threats to system information security;
- \( R_{sec}(T) \) — probability of violating information security requirements;
- \( R_{int}(T) \) — integral probability of failure to reliably perform standard process considering system information security.

Corresponding risks are characterized by these probabilistic measures against possible damage.

Note. According to ISO Guide 73 risk is defined as effect of uncertainty on objectives considering consequences. An effect is a deviation from the expected — positive and/or negative.

3 THE PROPOSED APPROACH

There may be two cases for estimation the probabilistic measure \( R_{rel}(T) \): the case of observed repeatability and the case of assumed repeatability of random events influencing reliability of the standard process performance without consideration of threats to system information security. For estimation the probabilistic measure \( R_{sec}(T) \) repeatability of threats activation is assumed. For estimation the integral probabilistic measure \( R_{int}(T) \) and probabilistic analysis of an impact of information security on standard process performance the assumption of an independence of events connected with reliability of standard process performance and system information security is used.

3.1 The Case of the Observed Repeatability

The inputs for calculations use statistical data according to observed repeatability. For standard process the quality of process performance results and expected obtaining them in time are required. Failure to perform the necessary actions of the process is a threat of possible damage. From the point of view of the composition of actions and/or the severity of possible damage, all varieties of the standard process can be divided into K groups, \( K \geq 1 \) (if necessary).

Based on the use of statistical data, the probability of failure to perform the actions of the process for the k-th group for a given time is proposed to be calculated by the formula

\[
R_{act,k}(T_k) = \frac{G_{\text{failure},k}(T_k)}{G_{k}(T_k)},
\]

where \( G_{\text{failure},k}(T_k), G_k(T_k) \) are accordingly, the number of cases of failures when performing the necessary actions of the process and the total number of necessary actions from the k-th group to be performed in a given time \( T_k \).

The probability \( R_{rel}(T) \) of failure to reliably perform the necessary actions of standard process without consideration of threats to system information security is proposed to be estimated for the option when only those cases are taken into account for which the actions were not performed properly (they are the real cause of the damage)

\[
R_{rel}(T) = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{K} W_k \left( 1 - R_{act,k}(T_k) \right) I(\alpha_k) / \sum_{k=1}^{K} W_k,
\]

where \( T \) is the specified total time for a process performance for the entire set of actions from different groups, including all particular values \( T_k \), taking into account their overlaps;

\( W_k \) — is the number of actions taken into account from the k-th group for multiple performances of the process.

For the k-th group, the requirement to perform the process actions using the indicator function \( I(\alpha_k) \) is taken into account

\[
I(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if condition } \alpha \text{ is performed,} \\
0, & \text{if condition } \alpha \text{ isn't performed.}
\end{cases}
\]
The condition $\alpha$ used in the indicator function is formed by analysis of different specific conditions, proper to the process. It allows to take into account the consequences associated with the failure to perform the necessary actions of the process – see (1), (2). Condition $\alpha_k$ means a set of conditions for all process actions, subject to quality and time constraints within the given time $T_k$ for performing the necessary actions from the $k$-th group.

### 3.2 The Case of the Assumed Repeatability

For the case of the assumed repeatability the probabilistic modeling approach is proposed. The next interconnected ideas 1-7 are used.

#### Idea 1

Idea 1 is concerning the usual concept and properties of probability distribution function (PDF) (see for example Kostogryzov, 2020) for a continuous random variable of time. PDF for a time variable $\tau$ is nondecreasing function $P(t)$ whose value for a given point $t \geq 0$ can be interpreted as a probability that the value of the random variable $\tau$ is less or equal to the time value $t$, i.e. $P(t)=P(\tau \leq t)$. Additionally $P(t)=0$ for $t<0$, and $P(t)\to 1$ for $t\to \infty$. In general case the solutions for modeling problems in decision-making are based on using concept of the probabilities of "success" and/or "unsuccess" (risk of "failure" considering consequences) during the given prognostic time period $t_{req}$. This probability is a value for a point $t_{req}$ and is defined by created PDF in modeling.

#### Idea 2

Idea 2. An interested system or process modelled are in general case a complex system and may be a subsystem or element of comprehensive complex system. It means the used integrated PDF of time between losses of system integrity can’t be banal exponential PDF. It must consider complexity in modeling any process, predict of “success” or “failure” on time line and allow to define zone focused on limitations to admissible risks – see Figure 1 (fragment of exponential and an adequate PDF of time between losses of system integrity is illustrated in conditional units).

#### Idea 3

The proposed approach for modeling should allow a generation of probabilistic models for prediction of “success” or “failure” in uncertainty conditions. In general case an input for generated models should consider system complexity, periodical diagnostics, monitoring between diagnostics, recovery of the lost integrity for every element of system or processes modelled. As an output of such generated models adequate PDF of time $\tau$ between losses of integrity should be produced in analytical form.

#### Idea 4

Input for probabilistic modeling can be formed from gathered real data or from hypothetical data.

For the approach implementation the next probabilistic models are proposed.

#### 3.2.1 “Black box” Formalization

The models below implemented ideas 1 – 3 (see for example Akimov, 2015, Artemyev, 2017, Kostogryzov, 2008-2020).

As modelled system are considered:
- “Black box” with virtual random events influencing reliability of the standard process performance without consideration of threats to system information security – for estimating $R_{req}(T)$;
- “Black box” with virtual random events influencing system information security before or during the standard process performance (with threats activation) – for estimating $R_{sec}(T)$.

In general case successful modelled system operation is connected with counteraction against various dangerous influences on process performance integrity - these may be counteractions against

![Figure 1: Example when all requirements to admissible risk are met for an adequate PDF of time between losses of system integrity.](image)

Note. Integrity of system or process modelled is defined as such state when purposes (of system or process) are achieved with the required quality and in time.
failures, defects events, “human factors” or computer viruses events on time line, etc.

To analyse an impact of information security on the performance of standard processes there are proposed the formalization for the general technology used in process performance. The technology is based on periodical diagnostics of modelled system integrity, that is carried out to detect danger sources penetration into a modelled system or consequences of negative influences (see Figure 2). The lost modelled system integrity can be detect only as a result of diagnostics, after which the system recovery is started. Dangerous influence on modelled system is acted step-by-step: at first a danger source penetrates into the system and then after its activation begins to influence. The system integrity can’t be lost before penetrated danger source is activated. A danger is considered to be realized only after a danger source has influenced on the modelled system.

Figure 2: Some accident events in modelled system.

(left – correct operation, right – a lose of integrity during prognostic period Treq)

There are recommended some “Black box” models for which probabilistic space \( \sigma \)-algebra; \( P \) – is a probability measure on a space of elementary events; \( \Omega \) - is a limited space of elementary events, satisfied to the properties of \( \sigma \)-algebra; \( P \) – is a probability measure on a space of elementary events \( \Omega \). Because, \( \Omega = \{ \omega \} \) is limited, there is enough to establish a reflection \( \omega_k \rightarrow p_k = P(\omega_k) \) like that \( p_k \geq 0 \) and \( \sum_k p_k = 1 \).

It is supposed that used diagnostic tools allow to provide necessary integrity recovery after revealing danger sources penetration into modelled system or the consequences of influences. Using the probabilistic models (described in details in Kostogryzov, 2008, 2012 etc.) the measures \( R_{rec}(T) \) and \( R_{sec}(T) \) can be estimated in terms “success” or “failure” considering uncertainty conditions, periodical diagnostics, monitoring between diagnostics, recovery of the lost integrity for “Black box”. There are the next input for probabilistic modeling (Kostogryzov, 2008-2020):

\[
\sigma - \text{ frequency of the occurrences of potential threats (or mean time between the moments of the occurrences of potential threats which equals to } 1/\text{frequency});
\]

\[
\beta - \text{ mean activation time of threats};
\]

\[
T_{betw} - \text{ time between the end of diagnostics and the beginning of the next diagnostics};
\]

\[
T_{diag} - \text{ diagnostics time};
\]

\[
T_{recov} - \text{ recovery time}
\]

\[ T - \text{ given prognostic period.} \]

3.2.2 About Modeling for Complex System

For a complex systems with parallel or serial structure there are proposed the next method to generate adequate probabilistic models (Kostogryzov, 2008-2020 etc.). This method uses the usual way of probability theory for independent random variables, it is described below.

Let’s consider the elementary structure from two independent parallel or series elements. Let’s PDF of time between losses of i-th element integrity is \( B_i(t) = P(\tau_i \leq t) \), then:

1) time between losses of integrity for modelled system combined from series connected independent elements is equal to a minimum from two times \( \tau_i \): failure of 1st or 2nd elements (i.e. the modelled system goes into a state of lost integrity when either 1st, or 2nd element integrity is lost). For this case the PDF of time between losses of modelled system integrity is defined by expression

\[
B(t) = P[\min(\tau_1, \tau_2) \leq t] = 1 - P[\min(\tau_1, \tau_2) > t] = 1 - [1 - B_1(t)] [1 - B_2(t)], \tag{3}
\]

2) time between losses of integrity for modelled system combined from parallel connected independent elements (hot reservation) is equal to a maximum from two times \( \tau_i \): failure of 1st and 2nd elements (i.e. the modelled system goes into a state of lost integrity when both 1st and 2nd elements have lost integrity). For this case the PDF of time between losses of modelled system integrity is defined by expression

\[
B(t) = P[\max(\tau_1, \tau_2) \leq t] = P(\tau_1 \leq t) P(\tau_2 \leq t) = B_1(t) B_2(t) \tag{4}
\]

Applying recurrently expressions (3) – (4), it is possible to build PDF of time between losses of integrity for any complex system with parallel and/or series structure and theirs combinations.

Using these probabilistic models and methods (described in details in […]) the measures \( R_{rec}(T) \) and \( R_{sec}(T) \) can be estimated in terms “success” or “failure” considering uncertainty conditions, system
3.3 Estimation of Integral Measure

The integral probability of failure to reliably perform standard process considering system information security $R_{int}(T)$ for the period $T$ is proposed to be calculated by the formula:

$$R_{int}(T) = 1 - [1 - R_{rel}(T)] \cdot [1 - R_{sec}(T)].$$

Here the probabilistic measure $R_{rel}(T)$ and $R_{sec}(T)$ are estimated according to proposition of 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 considering the possible damage.

4 EXAMPLES

Without violating the general understanding of the proposed approach, the examples are given with reference to the standard decision management process.

Let some enterprise organize production management, focusing on the requirements of IEC 62264-1 “Enterprise-control system integration - Part 1: Models and terminology” for the integration of enterprise management systems.

Without going into the details of integrated management systems in terms of the production process, maintenance process, quality control process and inventory process, the example demonstrates the proposed approach to analysing the impact of information security on the implementation of the decision management process. Consider performing the following actions: action 1 - planning decision management; action 2-gathering, processing, and analysing information for decision making; action 3 - decision making and decision management.

To estimate the probabilistic measures on examples the following actions and assets are selected – see verbal description on Figure 3.

Example 1 is devoted to estimate predicting the risk of a violation of the reliability of the implementation of the decision management process without taking into account the quality of the information used (based on the results of collecting, processing and analysing information for decision-making) and information security requirements. Example 2 is devoted to predicting the risk of violating information security requirements. Example 3 illustrates the analysis of an impact of information security on the performance of the standard decision management process at the integral risk level.

4.1 Example 1

Verbal description on Figure 4 allows to form a structure of modelled system in the form of a structure of the following consecutive elements associated with actions – see Figure 4. By definition, the reliability of the decision management process is considered to be ensured during a given period, if during this period "And" for the production process, "And" for the maintenance process, "And" for the quality control process "And" for the inventory process, the actions "And" for planning decision management (by elements 1, 2, 3, 4), "And" on decision-making and decision management (for elements 5, 6, 7, 8).

The input for estimations by the model (Kostogryzov, 2008, 2012) using the methods of 3.2.2 is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Input for example 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input for each element 1-8</th>
<th>Value of element 1-8 in production, maintenance, quality control and inventory processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **σ** - frequency of the occurrences of potential threats | Threats for elements 1)-4) are the threats of hard-software, technology and human errors made during planning:  
1) - 5 times in a year (due to insufficient qualifications or knowledge);  
2, 3, 4) - 1 time in a year (because of staff).  
Threats for elements 5)-8) are the threats of damage from making unreasonable decisions:  
5) - 2 times in a year (due to insufficient qualifications or knowledge);  
6, 7, 8) - 1 time in a year (because of staff). |
| **β** - mean activation time of threats | For elements 1)-4) these are the mean time to possible damage after critical hard-software, technology, or human errors made during planning:  
1) - 2 weeks (this is commensurate with the modeling time for the justification of the production plans);  
2, 3, 4) - 1 year (this is commensurate with the time between critical errors in planning of maintenance, quality control and inventory process).  
For elements 5)-8) it is the mean time to possible damage after critical hard-software, technological, or human errors made in decision-making:  
5) – 6 months (this is commensurate with the time of gradual failure of production equipment);  
6) – 6 months (this is explained by the preservation of the minimum system capabilities to function in an outdated environment);  
7) – 2 months (this is explained by the average time to complaints due to quality control errors);  
8) – 6 months (this is explained by the average time to production downtime due to critical errors) |
| **T_{beau}** - time between the end of diagnostics and the beginning of the next diagnostics | For elements 1)-4) it is equal to 8 hours, this time is determined by the regulations for monitoring the readiness of personnel for work – 1 time per shift with an 8-hour working day;  
5) – 1 hour, it is determined by the equipment control regulations;  
6, 7, 8) – 1 week, it is determined by the regulations for maintenance, quality control and inventory processes |
| **T_{diag}** - diagnostics time | For elements 1)-4) it is equal to 10 minutes, it is determined by the time of the medical examination before work.  
5, 7, 8) – 30 seconds, indicates the duration of automatic diagnostics in monitoring equipment and assets integrity.  
6) – 1 hour, it is duration of the diagnostics of equipment condition during maintenance process |
| **T_{recov}** - recovery time | For elements 1)-4) – 30 minutes, this is time to replace the person who has been suspended from performing the duties, and to assign the necessary functional responsibilities to the replacement person to perform the planning functions;  
5) – mean recovery time for equipment;  
6, 8) – 8 hours, this is recovery time for maintenance and inventory processes;  
7) – 30 minutes, this is time to re-install the software of quality control system |
| **T** - given prognostic period | From 1 month to 1 year  
(to estimate guarantees period to maintain admissible risks) |

The analysis of calculation results showed that for production, maintenance, quality control and inventory process the probability of failure to reliably perform the necessary actions of the standard process without consideration of threats to system information security during the year will be about 0.142 - see Figure 5. This means that actions for planning decision management in the production process (element 1) and actions for decision making and decision management in the quality control process (element 7) are the most significant in the generalized risk in probabilistic terms (see Table 1. Note: according to methods 3.2.2 this generalized risk isn’t equal to the arithmetical sum of risks for elements 1-8). For elements 2-6, 8, the values of the estimated risk do not exceed 0.019. When the prognostic period changes from 1 month to 1 year, the risk for all actions increases from 0.012 to 0.142. For an admissible risk at the level of 0.05, a period of up
to 117 days is justified, for which guarantees to maintain admissible risks are valid (see Figure 6).

Figure 5: Risks without taking into account information security requirements (prognostic period = 1 year).

Figure 6: Dependence of generalized risk on the prognostic period lasting from 1 month to 1 year.

4.2 Example 2

Continuing with example 1, the focus to analyse is on the structure of actions and protected assets defined in Figures 3 and 4. The input for each of the 8 elements, taking into account possible vulnerabilities in asset protection technologies, for estimations by the same model (Kostogryzov, 2008, 2012): using the methods of 3.2.2 is presented in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input for each element 1-8</th>
<th>Value of element 1-8 in production, maintenance, quality control and inventory processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>σ - frequency of the occurrences of potential threats</td>
<td>The threats for all elements 1-8 are the threats to information security: 1, 5) - 1 time in a year (it is commensurate with the frequency of technical failure of the equipment); 2) - 1 time in a year (it is commensurate with the error rate on the part of a specialist - planner of average qualification); 3, 4) – 2 times in a year (commensurate with the frequency of errors on the part of the man-controller and specialist – inventory planner of average qualification); 6) – 1 time in 5 years (it is explained by the threats masking of failures in the process of system maintenance by highly qualified specialists); 7, 8) - 1 time in a year (it is commensurate with the frequency of errors on the part of the man-controller and specialist – inventory planner of average qualification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β - mean activation time of threats</td>
<td>For all elements 1-8) – 1 day (it is assumed that because of masking, the threat sources are not activated immediately, but with a delay of at least a day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tbetween - time between the end of diagnostics and the beginning of the next diagnostics</td>
<td>For all elements 1-8) – 1 hour (it is determined by the rules for controlling the integrity of the software and assets used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tdiag - diagnostics time</td>
<td>For all elements 1-8) – 30 seconds (it is diagnostics time during automatic software and asset integrity monitoring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trecover - recovery time</td>
<td>For elements 1-8) – 5 minutes, including software reinstallation and data recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - given prognostic period</td>
<td>From 1 to 4 months (to estimate guarantees period to maintain admissible risks)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of calculation results showed that for the probability of violating information security requirements during the month will be about 0.016 - see Figure 7, and for elements 1-5, 7-8 - about 0.002, for 6th element - 0.0003, i.e. all assets are protected to a relatively equal degree. When the prognostic period increases from one to four months, the risk increases from 0.016 to 0.062. For an acceptable risk at the level of 0.05, a period of up to 96 days is
justified, for which guarantees to maintain admissible risks are valid (see Figure 8).

Figure 7: Risks of violating information security requirements (prognostic period = 1 month).

Figure 8: Dependence of generalized risk on the prognostic period lasting from 1 to 4 months.

4.3 Example 3

Considering prognostic period \( T = 1 \) month and the calculating results \( R_{rel}(T) = 0.012 \) and \( R_{sec}(T) = 0.0160 \), than according to (5) integral probability of failure to reliably perform standard process considering system information security

\[
R_{\text{int}}(T) = 1 - (1-0.012)(1-0.016) = 0.028
\]

This is less than the established acceptable level of 0.05, and with similar damages and reasonable costs, the reliability of the decision management process is commensurate with the effectiveness level of information security. It confirms for enterprise that the planned or applied system engineering solutions are balanced and allow to maintain admissible risks during justified period.

5 CONCLUSIONS

A methodological approach allows to analyse an impact of information security on the performance of standard processes in system life cycle according to ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288. It uses the integral measure for uncertainty conditions – the integral probability of failure to reliable perform standard process considering system information security. Using the proposed probabilistic measures the approach application helps to confirm that the planned or applied system engineering solutions are balanced, to calculate justified period for maintaining admissible risks, to identify "bottlenecks" and define measures and actions that help reduce risks when performing standard processes, considering threats to system information security.

REFERENCES


