A Blockchain-based Architecture for Enterprise Ballot

Paulo Henrique Alves1, Isabella Frajhof1, Élisson Michael Araújo1, Yang Ricardo Miranda1, Rafael Nasser1, Gustavo Robichez1, Alessandro Garcia1, Cristiane Lodi2, Flavia Pacheco2 and Marcus Moreno2

1 Software Engineering Laboratory, Department of Informatics, Pontifical University Catholic of Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
2 Petrobras, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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Abstract: Enterprise ballots are usually applied to support the decision-making process in voting-related scenarios. They allow its members to manifest their opinion and settle their position in regards to a specific topic, such as the approval of budgets and the acquisition of goods and services. Even though we are living in a data-driven society, highly digitized, enterprise ballots still rely on a paper based process. Thus, migrating to an electronic voting system, in which all the resolution process happens online, triggers various issues on verifiability, correctness and secrecy. Blockchain plays a vital role in this environment, as it is able to provide a trustable and secure enterprise decision-making system. Therefore, we developed BallotBR, an enterprise ballot system under a permissioned blockchain platform, to address all the requirements based on a challenging enterprise consortium context. This consortium is representative of many consortia across the oil and gas industry and other domains. Furthermore, we contrasted the open-source proposals available in the literature with the BallotBR needs. Also, we discussed how our solution addresses security and trustworthiness requirements usually faced in e-voting systems.

1 INTRODUCTION

Despite the tradition of some countries in the use of e-voting systems for public and democratic elections, this culture has not yet reached the enterprise ambiance. Enterprise ballots (EB) are usually applied to support the decision-making process in many scenarios (Yan et al., 2019). They allow stakeholders to inform, discuss and settle their position on important topics related to their business operation. Thus, EBs can be understood to be a means by which an organization’s deliberative body discusses and deliberate issues related to its operations. Through the exercise of the stakeholders’ vote, such questions are decided and the decisions executed.

The migration from a paper based ballot process to an e-voting system requires the development of systems that provide verifiability, correctness and secrecy, common security requirements in cryptographic e-voting systems (Juels et al., 2010), (Clarkson et al., 2008), (Spector et al., 2020). The prevailing goals of such requirements are to: (i) guarantee the correct execution of the company rules regarding its resolutions, (ii) verify that the votes were counted as it were cast, and (iii) maintain the secrecy (iii.a) regarding the voter identity and how s/he voted, avoiding the coercion and influence on how one should vote, and/or (iii.b) restrict unauthorized access to the system, maintaining the confidentiality of deliberation to its participants. In a nutshell, electronic ballot systems must provide a secure resolution process in order to ensure the legitimacy and trust of the results.

Given the aforementioned goals, blockchain-based systems play a vital role in this environment (Pawlak et al., 2018). Blockchain is a novel technology with the potential for creating a new paradigm of trust and cooperation when involving multiple parties (Alves et al., 2020; Nasser et al., 2020; Paskin et al., 2020). Blockchain is a decentralized data structure responsible for storing data in a chronological, digital and immutable manner. The registration of such data depends on the network participants consensus, which
validates the transactions without the need of a central authority (Pilkington, 2016). When applied to an e-voting system, due to its properties, blockchain allows for the verification of the stored data. Thus, participants can verify the results and attest their correctness, without the need of third parties (Pawlak et al., 2018).

In this sense, we have listed the main requirements and features that an EB system must present. Our analysis was based on the context of an oil and gas consortium, the Libra consortium. This context is challenging for manifold reasons. First, this consortium is composed of five different organizations. Therefore, the consortium dynamics depend on the non-trivial coordination and discussion of these organizations, for which important decisions must be deliberated through ballots. Such process is well regulated by the Libra consortium agreement, which the ballot procedure must comply with.

Also, three open-source voting projects were evaluated to investigate the proposed features with the Libra ballot requirements. Such requirements were listed according to the Libra consortium Agreement, and validated and complemented by stakeholders during regular meetings. None of the open-source projects have presented a complete environment to manage enterprise ballots and satisfy the Libra consortium specifications.

Therefore, we developed BallotBR, an EB system, under a permissioned blockchain and evaluated the open-source voting projects (Section 4). This system addresses Libra consortium agreement needs, and its architecture was developed considering further adaptation to be reused in other enterprise contexts (Section 5). We also discuss how we addressed security requirements, which are often faced in electronic voting systems: correctness, verifiability and privacy (Section 6). Section 7 presents conclusions and future perspectives.

2 BACKGROUND

The migration to e-voting systems means that all the resolution process happens online (from participants authentication to ballot tallying). This migration can provide for a more efficient, easy, engaging, and sustainable process. However, this transformation can trigger security issues, especially regarding the system’s verifiability, correctness, and privacy. Even though paper based and electronic ballots (Silva, 2019) are not exempted from this criticism, researchers are constantly aware of those issues when developing e-voting systems (Juels et al., 2010; Clarkson et al., 2008; Specter et al., 2020). Thus, mapping and addressing such vulnerabilities become a fundamental step towards the development of a safe and reliable e-voting system.

Electronic voting systems raise many technical challenges that must be dealt within democratic elections, which are potentially exacerbated in an electronic voting system (Juels et al., 2010). The main security requirements that must be dealt are: verifiability, correctness and secrecy.

Attacker-aware Correctness and Verifiability. Juels et al. (Juels et al., 2010) identify, among others, two security requirements that an electronic voting scheme must deal with: correctness and verifiability. Correctness is defined with a twofold meaning. First, an attacker “cannot pre-empt, alter, or cancel” the vote of the participants. Second, the attacker must not be able to vote two times for the same person. Thus, it means that votes must be counted once, according to the intention of the voter. Verifiability is defined as the ability of the voters to confirm if the vote was correctly computed, in which the system must be able to detect voting misbehaviors. Clarkson et al. (2008) affirm that verifiability can also be considered an integrity property (Clarkson et al., 2008). The integrity of the election means that participants must be convinced that their votes were correctly counted.

Voting Security Requirements. Moreover, Specter et al. (Specter et al., 2020) organize the main security requirements and their definitions in the voting system literature, which are: (i) correctness and usability, (ii) secret ballot and (iii) end-to-end verifiability. According to the authors, correctness and usability are defined as the system’s capacity to demonstrate that “votes were cast as intended, collected as cast, and counted as collected”. End-to-end verifiability means that the participant must have proof that his vote was cast as intended and unmodified. This verification must be done “without the need to trust any separate authority to do so”.

Ballot Secrecy. The concept of ballot secrecy refers to the need to maintain the anonymity of the voter identity and to his/her vote to avoid voter coercion and vote buying. We questioned the Libra consortium if anonymity was an important element for the ballot context, which was not. The votes of each organization are kept open for all members of the consortium. Although we recognize that anonymous voting can be demanded in other EB contexts, we did not deal with such feature, since it was not a priority.

Nevertheless, in BallotBR secrecy can be defined as the need to avoid unauthorized access to the ballot and to the shared documents during resolutions. In this sense, there is the need to implement a robust user
authentication procedure. Overall, electronic voting systems must be developed taking in consideration such aforementioned security requirements. In section 6 we demonstrate how the BallotBR architecture attends to such specifications. Complying with such requirements is important to guarantee a secure voting procedure, hence, a legitimate and trustworthy result.

3 RELATED WORK

This section aims to describe the state of art of open-source electronic voting systems. Five selected projects also proposed the usage of blockchain technology. The goal is to understand the proposed solutions’ gaps to build a more accurate, verifiable and secure system in the enterprise scenario.

Hardwick et al. presented an e-voting system under the private Ethereum network destined for public elections1 (Hardwick et al., 2018). They defined six requirements that such system should satisfy and how their system dealt with them: (i) fairness, (ii) eligibility, (iii) privacy, (iv) verifiability, (v) coercion-resistance, and (vi) forgiveness. The use of a public blockchain does not allow for the creation of data sharing options and all network members have access to registered information. An EB needs to assure that shared information during a deliberation is kept private and restricted to its members. This can be implemented with the use of a permissioned blockchain, such as Hyperledger Fabric (HF).

Dagher et al. proposed the BroncoVote, a verifiable e-voting system also designed under Ethereum blockchain (Dagher et al., 2018). The system tests were performed in the Ropsten public network (Kim et al., 2018). The authors mentioned that blockchain smart contracts (BSCs) could be deployed on an Ethereum private network. However, (Hardwick et al., 2018) identified limitations regarding such approach, for instance, the majority of encryption protocols require larger numbers than 256 bits available on solidity unsigned int. Thus, HF emerges as a secure option to overcome this.

Hjálmarsson et al. (Hjálmarsson et al., 2018) and Patil et al. (Patil et al., 2019) defended the usage of permissioned blockchains in the voting scenario as an alternative to public blockchains to provide secrecy. The argument concerns the BSC execution and transaction costs. They argue that this involves not only performance, i.e., permissioned blockchains perform better than the public blockchains in regards to transaction per second, but permissioned blockchains also deliver more data privacy. However, the authors only evaluated an election voting scenario instead of an EB.

Last but not least, the authors in (Specter et al., 2020) analyze and criticize the security of the Votaz blockchain-based system for Federal Elections in the U.S. under a permissioned blockchain. Even though Voatz developers affirm that a permissioned blockchain is used, they do not specify which platform. Furthermore, the authors address privacy concerns and discuss system vulnerabilities that would allow hacker attacks. However, the proposed solution does not comply with the enterprise requirements for balloting processes, as demonstrated by (Villalobos et al., 2019). Thus, the gap of the blockchain platforms for EBs is still an open discussion.

Regarding non-blockchain-based e-voting solutions, Helios and Civitas are open-source platforms proposed by (Alonso et al., 2018) and (Clarkson et al., 2008). Concerns regarding the coercion resistance in public and democratic elections scenario were presented. However, other useful features that we could approach were also presented, e.g., approval rates and abstention behavior configuration. Therefore, we have considered both platforms to develop our solution and the comparative analysis (Section 4.3).

Thus, as none of the previous work proposed a solution for the EB environment, neither the use of a permissioned blockchains in such domain, we developed BallotBR. Our proposal considered the gaps presented by previous works. Also, our system is based on the Libra consortium requirements, and must deal with security issues related to the correctness, verifiability and secrecy of the system (Section 2). The details of our study are described in the following sections.

4 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS

4.1 Application Scenario

Libra “was offered in the first bidding round executed by the Brazilian government under the new Production Sharing Contract for presalt areas, in 2013” (Carlotto et al., 2017). Currently, it is one of the seventeen contracts in force in Brazil2. Libra is explored by five companies that compose the consortium: Petro-

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bras (Operator, upholding 40%), Shell Brasil (20%), Total (20%), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (10%), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) (10%). The Production Sharing Contract establishes that PPSA (Pre-Sal Petroleo S.A.), a public company, must be part of the consortium to represent the Federal Government's interests. The company chairs the Operational Committee and is responsible for managing the sharing contracts. One of the company’s role is to ensure that the consortium complies with the agreement rules.

Hence, PPSA presents an essential role during the deliberation process of the Operational Committee. A ballot must take place whenever the consortium needs to acquire goods and services. When a ballot is proposed, such companies’ participation is proportionally distributed to allow the involvement of PPSA. Thus, in the deliberation process, which is called “resolution” in the consortium agreement, each company will have the following participation: Petrobras with 20%, Shell Brasil and Total with 10% each, CNPC and CNOOC with 5% each, and PPSA with 50%.

Moreover, other than the ballot, there is another communication mechanism called notification, which consists of a notification. Both ballot and notice are currently part of paper-based processes. These manual activities delay the decision-making process and require many manual interventions to initiate and end resolutions. Thus, in order to automate this procedure and provide more efficiency, we mapped ballot requirements of the Libra consortium to streamline the development of the BallotBR, an enterprise blockchain-based ballot system.

The BallotBR had to be strictly adherent to the Libra consortium Agreement. Such requirements were listed according to that legal document, and validated and complemented by stakeholders during regular meetings. The decision to develop such a system was motivated after the analysis of three open-source voting projects. Non of these open-source projects fully satisfied the requirements and features demanded by the Agreement and stakeholders. Some of these were: a flexible configuration of the resolutions, well-defined roles, system availability and full transparency. The use of a permissioned blockchain was essential to reinforce key aspects of electronic voting systems listed in Section 2, as well as to provide a transparent and legitimate ballot process.

4.2 BallotBR Requirements

Enterprise ballots require the creation of voting groups to deliberate on different topics. Hence, such systems must provide the creation of a committee, group companies and voting sections. In Libra consortium, the deliberation process is named resolution.

Additionally, a specific feature of Libra consortium is the use of the notice instrument. The notice is used on behalf of the operator of the consortium for the acquisition of goods or services. Due to its value, the operator only informs the other members, not requiring a resolution. Situations where a notice is necessary, and not a ballot, are listed in the Consortium Agreement.

In decision-making processes with multiple agents, an interaction guideline is important. In the Libra consortium, members can require more details or information when the resolution (or a notice) is opened. Such resource decreases bureaucracy and friction between members, as concerns are transparently addressed. This question and answer tool act as a private forum, restricted to consortium members.

Moreover, EBs require different forms and weights of participation. They demand more roles than required by general election systems. Hence, we incorporated six main user roles with different permission rights:

- **Staff.** This role provides committee members (CMs) permission to: (i) create, edit, and delete resolutions; (ii) create, answer, and resolve questions; (iii) create notices; and (iv) remove companies from resolutions and withdraw resolutions.

- **Representative.** This role allows CMs to vote in resolutions and answer questions from the committee s/he is part.

- **Alternative.** This role enables CMs to substitute a Representative when necessary. The Alternative has the same permissions as the Representative role.

- **Assistant.** This role enables CMs to view resolutions only. People with this role are restricted only to visualize a resolution status.

- **Viewer.** As the name suggests, this role allows the CM-only to view resolutions and notices from the committee s/he is part.

- **Partner Staff.** This role allows the CM to create notices, as well as create and answer questions.

The Libra consortium agreement sets different participation percentages for each company, reflecting percentage rates of the result. Hence, the system should set distinct participation weights. Thus, EB system must allow the configuration of approval rates and abstention behaviors.

The approval rates calculate the required percentage to approve or disapprove a resolution, and defines how absentee votes will be tallied. Therefore, the EB system should allow the setup of percentages of acceptance at the committee level and abstention behavior at the resolution level. To do so, we present
Table 1: Voting Systems Evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>BallotBR</th>
<th>Helios</th>
<th>Civitas</th>
<th>BroncoVote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Account management</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee management</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution management</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail notification</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dashboard of on-going resolutions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution due date extension</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspension of resolution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw resolution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of participant in-progress Resolution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval rate configuration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention Vote Behavior Configuration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Voting Options Configuration</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send notice</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution questions and answers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice questions and answers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search questions and answers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real time visualization of partial and final result</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export resolution result to PDF</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search attachments</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implemented in blockchain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

two approval rates: majority and unanimity. However, other acceptance percentages can also be set.

In regards to abstention behavior, the resolution creator can set different behaviors. The absentee vote can: (i) be proportionally distributed to the remaining companies, (ii) follow the majority option, (iii) follow the minority option, or (iv) not be tallied. Furthermore, the resolution creator can also require the justification for a vote option. For instance, the consortium may always require a vote justification when a participant intentionally votes for abstention or when s/he disagrees.

The voting options in EB systems are different from public and democratic e-voting systems. In enterprise systems, the possibilities are usually "agree" or "disagree". However, such systems should also allow other voting options. Therefore, we have enabled such configuration (i.e., organization of an election). Also, it is possible to link resolutions, e.g., a budget resolution of 2019 may be related to the budget resolution of 2020.

The Libra consortium also requires a transparent business process to avoid friction. As partners have to present evidence of expenses to share operational costs, decisions must be securely stored and available for auditing.

4.3 Systems Comparison

To position the BallotBR over the already proposed e-voting solutions, Table 1 presents the main system’s requirements and a comparative analysis between the proposed solution and three open-source platforms: (i) Helios (Alonso et al., 2018), (ii) Civitas (Clarkson et al., 2008), and (iii) BroncoVote (Dagher et al., 2018). Those requirements were listed with the stakeholders before deciding to develop a system from the very beginning.

There are three pillars that the system should provide to perform EBs: (i) account management, (ii) committee management, and (iii) resolution management. First, as information is not public in enterprise solutions, they often require a restricted area for authenticated users. So, the first step into the analysis is the existence of user credential management. Second, EBs usually require multiple and often related resolutions during the corporation life cycle; hence, the system should support the grouping of different ballots from the same committee, or committee management. Finally, the system should also allow resolution management, i.e., a configuration of voting options, approval rates, different ways for tallying votes, relating different resolutions, and definition of abstention behavior.

We have based our evaluation on related works that provide the code repository. Some of the listed
requirements Section 4.2 could not be evaluated because there is no information reported about them. Such requirements were classified as N/A (not available). Furthermore, if a system addressed or not a certain requirement, we gave three different values for the response: (i) Yes, meet the requirement, (ii) Partially meet the requirement, and (iii) No, it does not meet the requirement.

Moreover, the system shall offer a dashboard to evaluate the on-going resolutions and provide a space for users to send questions to other enterprise members while the resolution is open. Also, the system needed to support default participants, i.e., non-compliant financial status. Also, the system should not allow the company participation during a resolution if it presents any financial issue. In this case, the entity must not have a vote until the situation is fixed.

The Libra consortium presents two additional requirements that the system should provide. First, the notice event described above, when the operator announces a decision to the other consortium members that does not demand a ballot. Second, the system should also allow the visualization of partial and final results.

Table 1 shows that the Helios platform fully attends to the requirements [F03], [F04], [F06], [F07], and [F12]. Also, Helios partially attends to the following requirements: accounting management, approval rate and abstention vote behavior configuration. As for Civitas, it fully attends to BallotBR requirements [F01], [F03], [F08], and [F12]. However, Civitas does not partially attend to other requirements. Finally BrancoVote, meets BallotBR requirements [F01], [F12], and [F20]. On its turn, the platform only partially attends to the resolution management requirement.

Thus, Table 1 shows that no evaluated platform adequately complies with the consortium agreement requirements. The Helios platform (Alonso et al., 2018) offered more features. However, even though this platform provides an open-source project, we decided not to use the Helios source-code given the lack of documentation and the mismatch features regarding our requirements.

5 BALLOTBR: AN ENTERPRISE Ballot SYSTEM

In order to meet the identified requirements, we designed the BallotBR architecture and fully developed the system. Figure 1 depicts BallotBR software architecture, which has two main layers: the BallotBR interface, and the HF permissioned blockchain. The former is responsible for providing most of the features listed above as EB requirements. The architecture persists data regarding the committee, resolution, and notice in the Postgres database. This guarantees that data will not be lost if any problem occurs while it is not stored in the blockchain. The latter is responsible for guaranteeing the ballot rules providing the correctness, verifiability, and privacy required in EB.

The use of a permissioned blockchain in the BallotBR solution was motivated by the technology’s intrinsic characteristics and the Libra consortium’s needs. In this sense, the integration of the BallotBR to a permissioned blockchain can ensure important properties to the ballot process.

The technology is able to reduce errors when examining ballot results, since the resolution rules are hard-coded into immutable BSCs. This allows participants to confirm that their votes were tallied accordingly. Furthermore, the distributed consensus guarantees that all members accept the ballot rules and transactions before they are registered in the blockchain. Also, data access can be restricted to specific members of the network. Organizations can access the results and verify their correctness depending on the Certificate Authority’s previous authentication.

Hyperledger Fabric. The developed solution was based on the HF framework (version 1.4). A strong motivation for this decision was the offered possibilities. Hyperledger allows creating different data access and writing policies associated with the Channels and Chaincodes. This means that data flow and access are governed by immutable and self-enforcing rules previously defined.

Channel and Peers. The Channel is the layer that allows data isolation and confidentiality. Each Channel has a specific ledger that is shared between thePeers (the nodes in HF) of each organization, which are part of the network. These nodes are associated with the permission policies that rule each Channel.

For BallotBR, the Libra channel was created. Access to this Channel is restricted to the Libra consortium organizations (Petrobras, Shell Brasil, Total CNPC, CNOOC and PPSA). Each organization has its own Peer, Orderer, Fabric CA and API.

Chaincodes. The Chaincodes are the BSCs in HF. They are instantiated and operated by the Peers. Their role is to implement business rules that will validate and modify the Channels’s states. These business rules are part of the established consensus between the organizations, which are represented by Chaincodes’s methods. Each executed Chaincode method represents a transaction that will be: evaluated, when intended to validate or to consult the blockchain, and submitted, when it wishes to change the state of the
ledger related to the Channel (i.e., to share data with other organizations).

Thus, BallotBR business rules are implemented in the Chaincodes to create resolutions, notices and exercise the right to vote. This is important for two reasons: it means that the EB rules are hardcoded in BSCs and that participants can confirm that their vote was registered as intended, and counted correctly.

**Endorsement Policies, Ordering Service and Orders Node.** Each submitted transaction called by the Chaincode method should satisfy an endorsement policy. It shall present a minimum quantity of specific signatures based on the standard configuration of the Channel. If a transaction attends the endorsement policy, it will be submitted to the Ordering Service, responsible for ordering the block transactions by the Orders nodes. Finally, these blocks are transmitted to the Leading Peers of each organization, which will replicate the transaction blocks between the associated Followers Peers, according to the HF Raft consensus. In the end, the current states of the ledgers of each associated Peer to a Channel are updated.

The endorsement policy is related to the distributed consensus of HF. For instance, when a vote is cast, all Libra consortium organizations are communicated. Before registering the vote in the blockchain, they must all validate such activity, and collectively verify the vote before registering it.

**Private Data.** These transactions can also contain a collection of private data that will be kept secret. Only a subset of the Channel organizations can access it, according to previous definition, which is similar to the endorsement policy definitions. Non-authorized organizations will only access the document hash of the private data, not the data per se. The hash, thus, is evidence of the transaction of the data and of its ordering by the Order node.

This configuration of the architecture allows for data governance, i.e., only specific organizations can access certain data, and secrecy of shared information. Also, the hash verifies the validity that a certain transaction happened, without disclosing information.

**Fabric CA.** These mentioned functions are only executed if the organization uses the HF Certificate Authority (“Fabric CA”). The latter is responsible for creating the digital identity (credentials) of each member of an organization network, such as the nodes types Peer and Orderer, and the clients of the application. The credentials are issued by the Membership Service Provider (MSP), which is an authorized user responsible for issuing credentials to the network members and creating affiliations and identities. The use of these affiliations and the Organization Unity (OU) of the digital certificate can create broad endorsement policies and access to data.

Each organization in the Libra channel has its own Fabric CA. This means that each company has autonomy and independence to issue its members’ digital identity. Each digital identity has certain attributes that follow the standard X.509 (Kinkelin et al., 2020), such as: Common Name, which uses the corporate e-mail; Organization, related to the companies that are part of the Libra consortium (Petrobras, PPSA, Total, Shell Brasil, CNPC or CNOOC), and Country.

**Chaincode Server.** The Chaincode Server is an API that implements the integration between these two applications: Client (i.e., BallotBR) and HF. Moreover, another component, named Chaincode Server, manages the user keys and issue the transactions proposals or the submission of states to the network to which the node is connected.

Furthermore, such server is agnostic to the Chaincode. Its role is to abstract the transaction execution and facilitate interaction with the Peer nodes. This is made possible by the configuration archive, that connects the different Channels which the Peers are associated. This simplifies IT activities and allows the integration with different systems, being necessary (i) the connection archive indicating the Peer nodes and the Fabric CA; (ii) the user ID and password, issued by the Fabric CA, necessary to obtain the keys; (iii) the indication to the API of the transaction body,
including the names of the Channel, Chaincode, its function and arguments, and/or private data (if any).

The API is responsible for validating digital identities and submissions of the transactions to the Libra channel. Thus, the API plays an important role in the authentication procedure and in confirming the eligibility of the users that can participate of the BallotBR.

**Challenges of the Architecture.** HF has an inherent complexity related to its configuration. Before implementing the network, it is necessary to define what will be the network governance, such as: which organizations will be part of the Channel; Certificate Authorities creation (if each organization will have a Fabric CA, or if only one Fabric CA will be constituted for the whole Channel); if an organization will participate of the Channel of an Orderer; and which Endorsement Policies will be implemented.

Moreover, creating a Channel can be done with little complexity once the governance is defined. However, once it is implemented, adding new participants and updating the Endorsement Policies of a Channel is still an operational challenge. Also, managing different services that need to be integrated raises traditional challenges of distributed networks (i.e., communication, orchestrating containers, etc).

Finally, the deployment of this application allows for the development of the Chaincode and how a client application will interact with it, since all the infrastructure details related to such application are standardized by different applications. This allows the allocation of time and effort to structure the consortium organizations and how its applications will interoperate with HF. Therefore, the blockchain layer was essential to develop a verifiable, correct and secure electronic voting system.

6 DISCUSSION

Generally, blockchain technology provides data integrity as, by definition, stored data are immutable. Such technology supports append-only transactions and creates a linked list of blocks identified by the hash of such block. All blocks have the hashed information of the previous block. Hence, it enables data integrity. Once the data is changed, its hash will also be changed, which will generate an inconsistency in the chain. This is a standard characteristic of all blockchain solutions, either permissioned or not.

The permissioned blockchain allows the creation of smaller networks and subgroups to share data. Even though this approach is more susceptible to availability issues, as it presents a smaller number of nodes, other features are worth its usage. As a side effect of this smaller network, the consensus mechanism performs better than the presented by public blockchains. Moreover, the HF enables data governance, providing privacy management and creating channels to share information between a specific subset of participants.

Blockchain technology provides data availability. As a subset of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) (Ølnes et al., 2017), all the information is distributed among the participant nodes. Also, the possibility of establishing data governance related to data access and writing in the blockchain provides the necessary secrecy in an enterprise consortium.

As an immutable distributed database, blockchain technology also supports verifiability, which is necessary to e-voting systems. Users can verify the transactions in the blockchain without the need for a third party. Moreover, such technology is a timekeeping mechanism for the data structure, so the proof of data history is easily reportable. Thus, the system correctness and verifiability requirements were mitigated by using permissioned blockchain and the system’s requirements.

The blockchain layer, especially the Fabric CA, plays an important role in authenticating user’s identity. This avoids the participation of an unauthorized party in the resolution and offers a secure manner in certifying who is eligible to participate. Also, the system’s roles and their permission to interact in the BallotBR according to their responsibilities restrict undesired and unauthorized behavior.

Blockchain immutability does not allow further alterations of a registered transaction. Thus, the vote can not be modified after it was cast. Even though the system allows the participant to change its vote throughout the resolution, once it is resolved, and all votes are cast, the result is registered indefinitely and irrevocably in the blockchain.

The technology also allows tracking users’ behavior and actions in the BallotBR, i.e., creation of resolution and notice, voting, etc, in a transparent and distributed manner. Additionally, the blockchain’s cryptographic feature also allows participants to verify the results and integrity of the votes individually.

7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This paper proposes BallotBR, an enterprise ballot system implemented in a permissioned blockchain, Hyperledger Fabric, applied to a company consortium. The main contributions of this research are:

(i) the development of a permissioned blockchain-
based architecture to enterprise ballot systems; (ii) it is flexible enough to be applied to other contexts; and (iii) it deals with the main security and trustworthiness requirements of e-voting systems, due to its architecture with the implementation of a blockchain layer. Furthermore, we compared our enterprise solution with related work approaches and revealed the newly-developed features.

The developed architecture is modular and the developed API allows the BallotBR application layer to be changed for other scenarios. Some limitations include: (i) the chosen scope, i.e., the Libra consortium scenario; (ii) challenges related to vote anonymization, as the consortium did not present any concern on this issue; (iii) coercion issues were not expressly dealt, (iv) interoperability issues may arise in the future through the use of different blockchain platforms (e.g., Corda, Ethereum), and (v) performance tests were not available yet. Addressing these limitations is the target of our future work. We also aim to develop digital identity management applied to HF permissioned blockchain systems as a complementary module of BallotBR.

REFERENCES


