Verification of Scenario-based Behavioural Models using Capella and PyNuSMV

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Keywords: Model-driven Engineering, Model Transformation, Verification, Model Checking, Sequence Diagrams, Capella, Toolchain, Case Study.

Abstract: Scenarios are widely used to capture a set of key system behaviours. They are part of standardised modelling languages like UML and SysML. Precise semantics enable to analyse them at a formal level. In this paper, we show how scenarios can be used to perform early checks on behavioural models in an industrial context by providing a bridge between system modelling with Capella and the NuSMV model checker through the PyNuSMV integration library and using hMSC semantics. Both the modelling front-end and verification back-end are discussed and illustrated on a case study of unmanned aerial vehicles. Some interesting extensions to increase the value of the integration are also identified and discussed.

1 INTRODUCTION

Software and system models rely on a variety of languages captured by standards such as UML and SysML (OMG, 1997)(OMG, 2005). The dynamic behaviour of a system is often modelled using scenarios describing interactions among various types of system actors (human beings, software services, hardware devices...) in order to achieve functionalities or maintain key properties like safety. Sequence diagrams are a widely used scenario notations part of both UML and SysML. They offer a rich set of primitives enabling to build elaborated scenarios including alternatives, optional behaviours, loops... The reason of their success compared to other formalisms like state machines is that they are easy to use and understand. They can also be applied from an early stage to deal with high-level requirements by providing a set of intended behaviours. Hence, their use have been reported in a variety of industrial domains such as automotive (Sippl et al., 2019), railways (Tang et al., 2010) and cyber-physical systems (Hu et al., 2020).

However such notations have some drawbacks as they provide partial view on the system with no guarantee of completeness nor consistency in order to guarantee possibly critical requirements. Detecting such flaws early in the system design process is highly desirable because it is known that the cost to fix issues is raising exponentially as the development cycle is progressing (Haskins et al., 2004). In order to enable this kind of analysis, sequence diagrams must have clearly defined semantics which is not the case in the UML2 specification. However, several semantics have been proposed and surveyed (Micskei and Waeselynck, 2011). They differ in the way of representing the system events, the considered categories of traces, whether they represent complete or partial executions and the agent synchronisation mode between fragments. Based on this, fully automated formal verification like model checkers can be used to verify desired properties.

The purpose of this paper is to explore an early verification toolchain by considering two complementary points of view:

- the industrial perspective is anchored in the modelling notation without any knowledge of the underlying verification technology. Inputs and diagnostics should be provided in a system modelling editor through sequence diagrams. In our case, the Open Source Capella industrial tooling is considered (Polarsys Fundation, 2015).
- the verification perspective requires a formal verification language and tooling. In our case, we consider NuSMV model checker providing an open architecture which can be reliably used for the verification of industrial designs (Cimatti et al., 2002).
In order to reconcile both dimensions, it is necessary to provide a mapping and interfacing between both worlds. Our work adopts an approach based on hMSC semantics of sequence diagrams close to (Uchitel et al., 2004). We propose a model transformation using the convenient Python based PyNuSMV library (Busard and Pecheur, 2013) and provide a roundtrip integration with Capella. A validation is performed on a middle-sized case study in the domain of unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e. drones) composed of 14 main scenarios organised in a structured way and also covering 3 degraded scenarios.

This paper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 presents the general architecture of our tooling. Section 3 details the verification approach and the NuSMV back-end. Section 4 introduces our drone case study which is used in Section 5 to demonstrate our integration with Capella and presents some validation experiments. Section 6 discusses our results over related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes and presents some future work.

2 GENERAL ARCHITECTURE

Figure 1 presents the general architecture of our tooling which is composed of two distinct layers:

• the modelling front-end based on Capella supports system modelling diagrams including UML2 sequence diagrams. Such diagrams are used to capture behaviours and can provide feedback about counter-example scenarios.

• the verification back-end is based on the NuSMV engine accessed through the PyNuSMV library which provides Python integration primitives to perform the necessary forward translation of sequence diagrams and properties to NuSMV automata as well as the backward translation of possible counter-example traces back to Capella.

The integration between both layers is achieved though the Capella plugin extension mechanisms. The verification is performed locally on the same machine with adequate binaries for NuSMV but the same interface can easily be extended to invoke verification as a web-service on a dedicated server.

3 BUILDING AND VERIFYING BEHAVIOURAL MODEL FROM SCENARIOS

Our approach is based on the synthesis of state-based models from scenario-based models in order to perform verification tasks on the resulting model using model checking technology, in our case NuSMV. Several works have studied this kind of synthesis. A complete survey in (Liang et al., 2006) covers different source scenario-oriented models such as Message Sequence Charts, Live Sequence Charts or Sequence Diagrams, and different target state-based models such as Statecharts, Automata or Petri nets.

In our case, scenarios are expressed as SysML sequence diagrams. Such diagrams are composed of fragments used to provide structure based on operators like alternative, loop, parallelism, etc. The term scenario refers to a set or linked sequence diagrams. While the syntax of these diagrams is well defined, they lack a clear and precise formal semantics.

Our semantics will consider that execution traces of a scenario consist of labelled messages exchanged synchronously between a sender actor and a receiver actor. The considered traces may not contain other messages than those specified in the sequence diagrams. Additionally, fragments appearing in a scenario are sequenced in a weak way. This means that an actor who has received or sent his last message must not wait until the others have also finished sending all their messages to be able to move on to the next fragment.

Figure 2 presents a simple scenario between four actors A, B, C and D, containing two alternatives. It has four possible executions:

1. A sends m1 to B, then D sends m2 to C;
2. D sends m2 to C, then A sends m1 to B;
3. B sends m3 to A, then C sends m4 to D;
4. C sends m4 to D, then B sends m3 to A.
The main motivations for our semantics is that:

- it enables to mark behaviours as either valid or invalid and thus translate them into a finite state machine (FSM) encoding valid behaviours.
- the synchronicity assumption is a simplification, but does not in itself constitute a limitation because it is quite possible to introduce bounded communication channels to model asynchronous communication.
- the weak sequencing of fragment matches the (informal) reference semantics for UML sequence diagrams.

This semantics is also quite similar to the semantics of High-level Message Sequence Charts (hMSCs) (Mauw and Reniers, 1997). hMSCs are graphs where the nodes are basic scenarios, i.e. a sequence of messages exchanged between actors. This similarity allows us to translate a UML scenario into an hMSC. For example, the hMSC depicted in Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3. However, this translation requires restricting the UML language. More specifically, the UML language supports a large number of fragments and also assertions types. Some are excluded because not supported by hMSC: negative behaviours, "Break", "Ignore" and "Consider" assertions. Moreover, we will further limit the considered fragments to alternatives, optional behaviours, loops and parallel behaviors, because they are the fragments encountered in our industrial validation case.

The benefits of translating SysML scenarios into hMSCs are not only to rely on clear and well-documented formal semantics but also to reuse existing work on how to extract a state machine encoding the hMSC behaviours, e.g. (Uchitel et al., 2004)(Palshikar and Bhaduri, 2003). The considered approach produces an FSM encoding the hMSC behaviours through the parallel composition of the FSM of each actor with an additional controller FSM ensuring that all the actors are making the same choices during the system execution. Thus, it considers that the state of each actor evolves through the hMSC nodes and through the basic scenarios of these nodes. The controller will enforce that any required choice to transition to the next node will be applied in the same way by all actors resulting in a consistent behaviour with the initial hMSC.

More precisely, to build an actor FSM, the states of each actor are identified based on the nodes and basic scenarios of the hMSC. For example, Figure 4 shows the hMSC annotated with the possible states of actor A:

- A is at the start of the scenario (state A1);
- A has decided to run the basic scenario on the left (state A2);
- A has received message m1 from B (state A3);
- A has finished executing the scenario (state A6).
Once their states have been identified, the actor FSM can be built by introducing a transition between two states if the hMSC allows it. Figure 5 shows the FSM of the actors of the hMSC presented in Figure 3. Note the FSMs of actors A and B are identical because, since the messages are exchanged synchronously, there is no difference between sending and receiving a message. The same holds for FSMs of C and D.

The additional controller ensures that all actors make the same choices. In Figure 3, it must ensure that if A and B are exchanging message \( m_1 \), then C and D will exchange message \( m_2 \) and not message \( m_4 \). The number of states of such a controller grows quickly because it must keep track of the path taken by each actor in the hMSC, in order to force all actors through the choices of the actor leading the execution. In our simple case, the controller has 100 states.

Finally, the FSM encoding all the possible behaviours of the given hMSC, the trace model, results from the parallel composition of the controller FSM and the actors FSMs. The FSM encoding the behaviours of the scenario of Figure 2 and therefore of the hMSC of Figure 3 has 118 states. However, it can be reduced by hiding the transitions related to the controller, resulting in the FSM shown in Figure 6.

4 DRONE CASE STUDY

An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drone is an aircraft without a human pilot on board. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is composed of an UAV, a ground-based controller, and a communications system. UAV may operate under various degrees of autonomy: either under remote control by a human operator or autonomously, under the control of an autopilot. The unmanned aircraft system traffic management (UTM) is in charge of autonomously controlled operations of an UAS. It implements operational concepts, data exchange requirements, and a framework enabling multiple UAS operations beyond visual line-of-sight (Airbus, 2019). For this purpose, it relies on a specific component that we named Autonomous Operation System (AOS).

Our case study is based on scenarios from a requirements analysis of drone information management (Mennella et al., 2018) and a set of scenarios gathered in our local Belgian ecosystem through two emergence workshops[reference removed]. This resulted in the identification and specification of 14 scenarios. Those are organised under two main scenarios covering a large part of the system and 3 additional
degraded scenarios as shown in Figure 7. The next section illustrates the processing of a specific scenario related to the drone capture and also gives some statistics on the full set of scenarios (Nihoul et al., 2019).

5 INTEGRATION AND VALIDATION IN CAPELLA

Figure 8 shows a standard sequence diagram of Capella specifying the UAV Traffic Management (UTM) capture scenario. It is composed of 4 lifelines involving respectively the UTM, the Human Controller (Ctrl), the UAV and the AOS.

Figure 8: UTM capture scenario.

A verification dialog depicted in Figure 9 can be triggered from a sequence diagram in order to capture a property for model checking and different technical parameters related to the FSM generation process described in Section 2.

In order to ease the capture of the property, a wizard supporting different classical LTL specification patterns can be triggered from the verification window. Figure 10 shows the wizard for a Respond pattern stating that each occurrence of a request should be followed by a notification response.

The verification process then goes through model transformation chain detailed in Section 2 including the NuSMV-based verification engine described in Section 3 to yield a result which is valid in this case as the Ctrl notification always responds to a Ctrl request. In case the request is dropped, the result will yield a counter-example scenario as depicted in Figure 11. Note that in the current version this counter-example is only presented in textual form and not yet as a sequence diagram.

Figure 11: Counter-Example scenario for invalid property.

Table 1 shows global summary of the test performed on our 14 validation cases. For each scenario, it details the number of agents, the fact it is bounded, the number of hMSC nodes and the size of the resulting trace model.

First, the two main scenarios about Over the Air (OTA) commands and piloting advice cannot be checked because they are not bounded and so their behaviours cannot be encoded within an FSM. Such information is already useful and a separate boundedness check of the scenario is provided as support for this. Two other scenarios (flying and data reporting) revealed too complex to be managed within reasonable time (the generation was limited to 1 hour on a standard laptop). Other scenarios could be processed with success with a model complexity varying from very few states up to about 65000 states.
Table 1: Validation summary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Agents</th>
<th>Bounded nodes</th>
<th>hMSC Trace model size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OTA commands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>41 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV init</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take off</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>17 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual control</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control pt mgnt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing control</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data reporting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTM capture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerg. landing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piloting advice</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>25 N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEG: UAV failure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEG: mis-routing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEG: missed g-way</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 DISCUSSION OVER RELATED WORK

Scenario-based modelling and verification has been applied in the railway domain to help transitioning from a strong document-based system development culture to a more model-based approach (Tang et al., 2010). In this work, relevant operational scenarios are extracted from the specification to construct UML sequence diagrams which are verified by a formal analysis tool. As in our work, NuSMV was used and the output analysis helping in producing the document quality. A notable difference is that in our work, a model-based approach is already partly in place and that specification documents are being generated through model to text generation and update mechanisms (Michot et al., 2018). We could also successfully apply our tooling to ATO over ETCS industrial problem.

Scenario-based approaches are also being considered in the systems engineering for automated driving functions (Sippl et al., 2019). The aim is to propose a method for continuous usage of scenarios embedded in the systems engineering process which could help to divide complex and intangible development goals in smaller solvable tasks. The proposed approach is more general and not anchored in sequence diagrams but advocating for a standard called OpenSCENARIO. The incremental aspect of the approach is interesting and we believe using sequence diagrams at some point to provide semantics and checking capabilities can help avoiding regression in evolving set of scenarios or dealing with product families.

Another variant of scenario relies on Life Sequence Charts (LSC) rather than (h)MSC (Damm and Harel, 2001). It allows the distinction between possible and necessary behaviours both globally, on the level of an entire chart and locally, when specifying events, conditions and progress over time within a chart. A methodology called Play-In Play-Out supports the capture and animation-based validation through LSCs (Harel and Marelly, 2003) and also the verification through smart play-out which relies on model checking and planning algorithms. It has been used for the verification of a telecommunication system (Combes et al., 2005). However, the focus is more to run scenarios and to avoid some of the violations related to naive execution.

In addition to the verification of domain specific properties, more general checks can also be considered. Among them the detection of implied scenarios is interesting in the context of scenario-based design. Such scenarios are defined as an execution which is not authorized by the scenario, but which is possible if we consider that the different actors of the scenario do not consult each other but only rely on the exchanged messages to infer the choices made by other actors (Uchitel et al., 2004). In short, it means we consider the system without any controller enforcing the same choice. This check is justified as such a controller is usually hard or even impossible to implement given it must discuss will all actors. In addition, it would be very inefficient. Technically, this can be implemented by removing the controller from the trace model to produce an architectural model that represents the behaviours of the system composed of separated actors not worrying about synchronizing their choices. The verification could be done by performing an exhaustive search of the synchronised models until a trace is found in the more permissive architectural model which is not part of the trace model. If the search fails, the hMSC does not have any implied scenarios. The absence of implied scenarios also eases further verification activities since model checking can just focus on the equivalent architectural model which is simpler to encode and to verify than the full trace model. Such an extension is easy to implement through our flexible PyNuSMV framework and is being considered.

Another interesting verification approach involving sequence diagrams is to perform containment checking, i.e. check that low-level sequence diagrams produced in design steps are enforcing the behaviours stated through higher-level sequence diagrams from the requirements phase (Muram et al., 2016). This approach makes a lot of sense as system development usually proceeds through functional refinement from system to subsystems with the production of scenarios at different levels of details. In the proposed approach, high-level properties are translated into LTL formulas and lower level properties into automata as
in our approach. Our tooling could evolve to support such an approach, however low-level scenarios being more operational, they must support strict sequencing which is not the case of our current approach.

7 CONCLUSION & NEXT STEPS

In this paper, we proposed an integration of automated verification of sequence diagrams inside the Capella Open Source industrial platform used as modelling front-end. For the verification back-end, we used the reliable NuSMV model checker and the PyNuSMV library as flexible development and integration library to produce a precise mapping based on hMSC semantics. Our work could be validated on a drone case study. It confirmed the tool capabilities although with some limitations when dealing with bigger or unbounded models.

The comparative discussion with the literature highlights interesting ways to extend our work while keeping the same approach: supporting the verification of implied scenarios and of containment relationships. On the implementation side, in order to make our work easier to deploy and reduce the need to support different target platform, we also plan to implement the verification as a web service. We also plan to further validate the performance and usability of our improved tooling in other domains such as automotive and railways.

REFERENCES


