Improving Classification of Malware Families using Learning a Distance Metric

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Abstract: The objective of malware family classification is to assign a tested sample to the correct malware family. This paper concerns the application of selected state-of-the-art distance metric learning techniques to malware families classification. The goal of distance metric learning algorithms is to find the most appropriate distance metric parameters concerning some optimization criteria. The distance metric learning algorithms considered in our research learn from metadata, mostly contained in the headers of executable files in the PE file format. Several experiments have been conducted on the dataset with 14,000 samples consisting of six prevalent malware families and benign files. The experimental results showed that the average precision and recall of the $k$-Nearest Neighbors algorithm using the distance learned on training data were improved significantly comparing when the non-learned distance was used. The $k$-Nearest Neighbors classifier using the Mahalanobis distance metric learned by the Metric Learning for Kernel Regression method achieved average precision and recall, both of 97.04% compared to Random Forest with a 96.44% of average precision and 96.41% of average recall, which achieved the best classification results among the state-of-the-art ML algorithms considered in our experiments.

1 INTRODUCTION

A large number of new malicious samples are created every day, which makes manual analysis impractical. The majority of these samples are generated by malware generators, which need to input some parameters. These malware generators, together with their particular settings, define corresponding malware families. Samples generated from the same generator with a fixed setting (i.e., from the malware family) may be potentially similar to each other and different from samples belonging to other malware families or benign files. This work focuses on leveraging these differences to distinguish between malware families. Note that samples from the same malware family, however, generated in a different time period may be different from each other (Wadkar et al., 2020).

Since the samples are usually obfuscated, it is difficult to classify new (previously unseen) samples into the correct malware families. Moreover, there is no known general similarity measure suitable for a feature set extracted from the PE file format to correctly cluster all malware families. (Jureček and Lórencz, 2018) presented distance metric specially designed for the PE file format that can handle all data types of features.

Our work focuses on the multiclass classification problem where each malware family and benign files have their own class. This multiclass classification problem is more challenging than a binary classification problem where the goal is to distinguish between malicious and benign files. However, the results of (Basole et al., 2020) may indicate that an increasing number of families (from 2 to 20 families) drops an average balanced accuracy slightly.

The practical use of distinguishing between malware families lies in helping malware analysts to deal with a large number of samples. Due to a large number of malicious files that come to antivirus vendors, there is a need to automatically categorize malware into groups corresponding to malware families. Samples belonging to the same group are similar to each other with respect to some similarity measure (determined by distance metric). These groups are then distributed to malware analysts and assuming that files belonging to the same group have similar behavior, it may help speed up the further analysis.

Usually, malware analysts are specialists for some limited number of malware families. If we assume...
that samples were classified correctly and samples of the same family are similar to each other and dissimilar to the samples of other families, using our approach, the analysts can focus only on those samples which belong to the malware families for which the analysts are specialized.

Good similarity measure plays an important role in the performance of distance-based classifiers, such as k -Nearest Neighbors (KNN). The distance between two feature vectors having the same class label must be minimized while the distance between two feature vectors of different classes must be maximized. This is the goal of distance metric learning methods used to learn the parameters of distance metrics from training data. As a result, they can potentially improve the performance of the classifiers.

In our experiments, we consider six malware families, which is a relatively small number. Another limitation of our work lies in assuming that our dataset is large enough for training distance metric learning (DML) algorithms. However, in practice, new families or new malware variants are continuously emerging. Therefore the training set, at some moment, may not contain enough samples of the desired malware family to train some supervised learning classifier.

The contributions of this paper are as follows:

- We determined and described the list of 25 features all extracted (except one, i.e., size of a file) from the PE file format. For each feature from a section header, we considered the order of the section rather than the type of the section (such as .text, .data, .rsrc, etc.). While the sections' order turns out to be important for malware detection, this kind of information is often not mentioned in research papers.
- Using three DML algorithms, LMNN, NCA, and MLKR, we achieved significantly better multi-class classification results than any state-of-the-art ML algorithms considered in our experiments. We provided practical information concerning performance, computational time, and resource usage.
- We showed that the DML-based methods might improve multi-class classification results even when standard methods such as feature selection or algorithm tuning were already applied. As a result, we suggest using DML algorithms as an important preprocessing step.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review recent malware detection methods based on machine learning focusing on the classification of malware families. In Section 3, we give some theoretical background and discuss three distance metric learning techniques used in our experiments. The experimental setup and results of feature selection algorithms are presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes DML-based experiments and results. We summarize our research work in Section 6.

2 RELATED WORK

This section briefly reviews the previous research papers on malware family classification related to our work.

In (Basole et al., 2020), the authors conducted experiments based on byte n-gram features, and they considered 20 malware families. A binary classification was performed on different levels. In the first level, for each of 20 families, they performed binary classification for 1,000 malware samples from one family and 1,000 benign samples. In the second level, the malware class consists of two malware families; in the third level, the malware class consists of three malware families, and so on up to level 20, where the malware class contains all of the 20 malware families. The authors applied four state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms: KNN, Support Vector Machines, Random Forest, and Multilayer Perceptron. The best classification results (balanced accuracy) was achieved using KNN and Random Forest, over 90% (at level 20), while KNN achieves the most consistent results.

A fully automated system for analysis, classification, and clustering of malware samples was introduced in (Mohaisen et al., 2015). This system is called AMAL and it collects behavior-based artifacts describing files, registry, and network communication, to create features that are then used for classification and clustering of malware samples into families. The authors achieved more than 99% of precision and recall in classification and more than 98% of precision and recall for unsupervised clustering.

In (Ahmadi et al., 2016), the authors proposed a malware classification system using different malware characteristics to assign malware samples to the most appropriate malware family. The system allows the classification of obfuscated and packed malware without doing any deobfuscation and unpacking processes. High classification accuracy of 99.77% was achieved on the publicly accessible Microsoft Malware Challenge dataset.

(Islam et al., 2013) presented a classification method based on static (function length frequency and printable sting) and dynamic (API function names with API parameters) features that were integrated
Improving Classification of Malware Families using Learning a Distance Metric

3 BACKGROUND

Performance of some ML classifiers, such as KNN, depends significantly on the distance metric used to compute similarity measure between two samples. These classifiers rely on the assumption that samples belonging to the same class are close to each other (with respect to the distance function), and they are far from samples belonging to the same malware family.

The DML algorithms were designed to improve the performance of distance-based classifiers via learning the distance metric. This section provides background and a brief description of three state-of-the-art distance metric learning algorithms, LMNN, NCA, and MLKR, used in our experiments.

Euclidean distance is by far the most commonly used distance metric. Let \( \mathbf{x} \) and \( \mathbf{y} \) be two \( n \)-dimensional feature vectors. The weighted Euclidean distance is defined as follows:

\[
d_w(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i (x_i - y_i)^2}
\]

where \( w_i \) is a weight (non-negative real number) associated with the \( i \)-th feature. The distance metric learning problem for weighted Euclidean distance is defined as finding (or learning) an appropriate weight vector \( w = (w_1, \ldots, w_n) \) using training data, with respect to some optimization criterion, usually minimizing error rate.

Several distance functions have been presented (Wilson and Martinez, 1997). To improve classification or clustering results, many weighting schemes were designed. A review of feature weighting methods for lazy learning algorithms was proposed in (Wettschereck et al., 1997).

Mahalanobis distance for two \( n \)-dimensional feature vectors \( \mathbf{x} \) and \( \mathbf{y} \) is defined as

\[
d_M(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \sqrt{(\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y})^\top M (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y})}
\]

where \( M \) is a positive semidefinite matrix. Mahalanobis distance can be considered as a generalization of Euclidean distance, since if \( M \) is the identity matrix, then \( d_M \) in Eq. (2) is reduced to Euclidean distance. If \( M \) is diagonal, this corresponds to learning the feature weights \( M_{ii} = w_i \) from Eq. (1) defined for weighted Euclidean distance.

The goal of learning the Mahalanobis distance is to find an appropriate matrix \( M \) with respect to some optimization criterion. In the context of the KNN classifier, the goal is to find a matrix \( M \), which is estimated from the training set, which leads to the lowest error rate of the KNN classifier. Since a positive semidefinite matrix \( M \) can always be decomposed as \( M = \mathbf{L}^\top \mathbf{L} \), distance metric learning problem can be viewed as finding either \( M \) or \( \mathbf{L} = \mathbf{M}^{1/2} \). Mahalanobis distance defined in Eq. (2) expressed in terms of the matrix \( \mathbf{L} \) is defined as

\[
d_M(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = d_L(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \| \mathbf{L}^\top (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}) \|_2
\]

The matrix \( \mathbf{L} \) can be used to projects the original feature space into a new embedding feature space. This projection is a linear transformation defined for feature vector \( \mathbf{x} \) as

\[
\mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{Lx}
\]

Note that the Mahalanobis distance \( d_L(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \) for two samples from the original feature space equals the Euclidean distance

\[
d(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}') = \sqrt{(\mathbf{x}' - \mathbf{y}')^\top (\mathbf{x}' - \mathbf{y}')}
\]
in the space transformed by Eq. (4). This transformation is useful since computation of Euclidean distance has lower time complexity than computation of Mahalanobis distance.

In the rest of this paper, we will consider the feature space as a real $n$-dimensional space $\mathbb{R}^n$. The following subsections briefly describe three distance metric learning methods that we used in our experiments.

### 3.1 Large Margin Nearest Neighbor

Large Margin Nearest Neighbor (LMNN) (Weinberger et al., 2006) is one of the state-of-the-art distance metric learning algorithms used to learn a Mahalanobis distance metric for KNN classification. LMNN consists of two steps. In the first step, for each instance, $x$, a set of $k$ nearest instances belonging to the same class as $x$ (referred to as target neighbors) is identified. In the second step, we adapt the Mahalanobis distance with the goal that the target neighbors are closer to $x$ than instances from different classes that are separated by a large margin.

The Mahalanobis distance metric is estimated by solving a semidefinite programming problem defined as:

$$
\min_{L} \sum_{i,j \neq i} \left( d_L(x_i, x_j)^2 + \mu \sum_{k: y_l \neq y_l} \max \left( 0, 1 - d_L(x_i, x_j)^2 - d_L(x_i, x_k)^2 \right) \right)
$$

The notation $j \rightarrow i$ refers that the sample $x_j$ is a target neighbor of the sample $x_i$, and $y_i$ denotes the class of $x_i$. The parameter $\mu$ defines a trade-off between the two objectives.

### 3.2 Neighborhood Component Analysis

(Goldberger et al., 2005) proposed the Neighborhood Component Analysis (NCA), a distance metric learning algorithm specially designed to improve KNN classification.

Let $p_{ij}$ be the probability that the sample $x_i$ is the neighbor of the sample $x_j$ belonging to the same class as $x_i$. This probability is defined as:

$$
p_{ij} = \frac{\exp(-\|Lx_i - Lx_j\|_2^2)}{\sum_{k \neq i} \exp(-\|Lx_i - Lx_k\|_2^2)}, \quad p_{ii} = 0 \quad (6)
$$

The goal of NCA is to find the matrix $L$ that maximizes the sum of probabilities $p_i$:

$$
\arg \max_{L} \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \sum_{j: y_j = y_i} p_{ij} \quad (7)
$$

The well-known gradient ascent algorithm is used to solve this optimization problem. Note that both LMNN and NCA algorithms do not make any assumptions on the class distributions.

### 3.3 Metric Learning for Kernel Regression

(Weinberger and Tesauro, 2007) proposed Metric Learning for Kernel Regression (MLKR), which aims at training a Mahalanobis matrix by minimizing the error loss over the training samples:

$$
\mathcal{L} = \sum_i (y_i - \hat{y}_i)^2 
$$

where the prediction class $\hat{y}_i$ is derived from kernel regression by calculating a weighted average of the training samples:

$$
\hat{y}_i = \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} y_j K(x_i, x_j)}{\sum_{j \neq i} K(x_i, x_j)} \quad (9)
$$

MLKR can be applied to many types of kernel functions $K(x_i, x_j)$ and distance metrics $d(x_i, y)$. Note that the mentioned distance metric learning algorithms can be used as supervised dimensionality reduction algorithms. Considering the matrix $L \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times n}$ with $d < n$ then the dimension of transformed sample $x' = Lx$ is reduced to $d$.

### 4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

In this section, we present our dataset, describe evaluation measures and feature selection results.

### 4.1 Dataset

Our experiments are based on the dataset containing 14,000 samples consisting of 6 malware families and benign files. The dataset is well-balanced since each of the 6 malware families is of equal size, i.e., 2,000 samples, and the number of benign files is also 2,000. The malicious programs were obtained from (VirusShare, 2020), an online repository containing various malware families. Benign files were gathered from university computers. We confirm that all malicious samples considered in our experiments match
known signatures from antivirus companies. Also, none of our benign programs was detected as malware.

In our experiments, we used the following six prevalent malware families:

**Allaple** – a polymorphic network worm that spreads to other computers and performs denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.

**Skeeeyah** – a Trojan horse that infiltrates systems and steals various personal information and adds the computer to a botnet.

**Virlock** – ransomware that locks victims’ computer and demands a payment to unlock it.

**Vundo** – a Trojan horse that displays pop-up advertisements and also injects JavaScript into HTML pages.

**Zbot** – also known as Zeus, is a Trojan horse that steals configuration files, credentials, and banking details.

### 4.2 Evaluation Measures

In this section, we present the metrics we used to measure the performance of the classification models. In a binary classification problem, the following classical quantities are employed:

- **True Positive (TP)** represents the number of malicious samples classified as malware
- **True Negative (TN)** represents the number of benign samples classified as benign
- **False Positive (FP)** represents the number of benign samples classified as malware
- **False Negative (FN)** represents the number of malicious samples classified as benign

The performance of binary classifiers considered in our experiments is measured using three standard metrics. The most intuitive and commonly used evaluation metric is the error rate:

\[
ERR = \frac{FP + FN}{TP + TN + FP + FN} \tag{10}
\]

It is defined on a given test set as the percentage of incorrectly classified samples. Alternative for error rate is accuracy defined as \( ACC = 1 - ERR \). The second metric is precision, and it is defined as follows:

\[
precision = \frac{TP}{TP + FP} \tag{11}
\]

Precision is the percentage of samples classified as malware that are truly malware. The third parameter, recall (or true positive rate), is defined as:

\[
recall = \frac{TP}{TP + FN} \tag{12}
\]

Recall is the percentage of truly malicious samples that were classified as malware.

In the multiclass evaluation, since all the classes have the same number of samples, we use averaged versions of error rate, precision and recall. Average error rate is defined as follows:

\[
(average) \ ERR = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \text{class}_{predicted} \neq \text{class}_{true} \tag{13}
\]

where \( N \) is the size of our dataset, and \( 1 \) is the indicator function. Average precision and average recall is defined as an average resulting precisions and recalls, respectively, across all classes.

### 4.3 Feature Selection

The features used in our experiments are extracted from the portable executable (PE) file format (Microsoft, 2019), which is the file format for executables, DLLs, object code, and others used in 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the Windows operating system. The PE file format is the most widely used file format for malware samples run on desktop platforms.

For extracting features from PE files, we used Python module pefile (Carrera, 2017). This module extracts all PE file attributes into an object from which they can be easily accessed. We extracted 358 numeric features that are based on static information only, i.e., without running the program. The dimensionality is high since for each section, and for each kind of characteristics (array of flags), we consider each flag as a single feature.

Before applying feature selection methods, all features were normalized using procedure preprocessing.normalize from the Scikit-learn library (Scikit-learn, 2020). We then employed the six feature selection methods also imported from the Scikit-learn library.

Table 1 shows error rates of the KNN \((k = 1)\) classifier applied to the feature set reduced using the corresponding feature selection algorithms. The lowest error rate of 4.13% was achieved for 25 selected features by RFE Logistic Regression. The KNN for the original feature set (i.e., 358 features) achieved an error rate of 4.31%. All feature selection algorithms were evaluated by 5-fold cross-validation on the randomly chosen training data containing 80% of the whole dataset. The remaining 20% of the dataset was
Table 1: Evaluation of the feature selection algorithms in terms of error rates of the KNN ($k = 1$) classifier. The abbreviation SFM refers to Scikit-learn procedure `feature_selection.SelectFromModel`. The abbreviation RFE refers to Recursive Feature Elimination implemented in `feature_selection.RFE` from the Scikit-learn library as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature selection method</th>
<th>Error rates [%] for specific number of features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal component analysis</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFM Logistic Regression</td>
<td>13.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFM Decision Tree</td>
<td>26.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Gain</td>
<td>15.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFE Logistic Regression</td>
<td>17.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFE Decision Tree</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following Fig. 1 illustrates the performance of RFE Logistic regression for a various number of features. For 50 and more features, the corresponding error rates are approximately the same as the error rate achieved from the original feature set (i.e., 358 features).

![Figure 1: Relation between dimensionality and error rate of KNN classifier ($k = 1$).](image)

Notice that for each feature selection algorithm under consideration, except SFM Decision Tree, we achieved a surprisingly low error rate with only two features, as shown in Table 1. We will provide more experiments for this extremely low dimensionality in Section 5.2.

We also performed all six feature selection algorithms to explore an even higher number of features: 100, 125, and 150. However, the corresponding error rates achieved from all the feature selection algorithms were higher than 4.13%. As a result, in all experiments (except those in Section 5.2), we will consider 25 features selected by RFE Logistic regression algorithm. To make our results reproducible, Table 2 summarizes all features used in our experiments. We keep the name of the fields in the same form as in the documentation (Microsoft, 2015), in order that the reader can easily find the detailed description.

The field `file_size` (size of the file on disk) is not contained within the PE structure, and note that it differs from the field `SizeOfImage`, which is the size of the image loaded in memory.

PE files are divided into one or more sections. The sections contain code, data, imports, and various characteristics. PE section features are considered separately for each section. The order of the sections is not the same for each PE file. Moreover, malware authors can change the order of the sections. Therefore, we prefer to consider only the order of sections (rather than their names). The special importance among all sections of a PE file has the last one since it may contain useful information, especially for some types of malware, such as file infector, which typically attaches malicious code at the end of the file. To deal with a various number of sections across the samples, we have decided to consider only the first four sections and the last section.

5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

This section presents multiclassification results based on six base ML classifiers: $k$-Nearest Neighbor ($k = 1$), Logistic Regression, (Gaussian) Naive Bayes, Random Forest (number of trees in the forest = 100), and Multilayer Perceptron (hidden layer sizes=(200,100), maximum number of iterations = 300, activation function = ‘relu’, solver for weight optimization = ‘adam’, random number generation for weights and bias initialization = 1). Implementations of the DML algorithms, the ML classifiers, and the classification metrics, are based on the Scikit-learn library (Scikit-learn, 2020). If not mentioned, the hyperparameters of the ML classifiers and the DML methods were set to their default values as set in the Scikit-learn library.

The input feature vectors used in the following experiments are described in Section 4.3, and its dimensionality is 25, except in the experiment described in Section 5.2 where we consider only two-dimensional
Table 2: List of 25 features selected by the RFE Logistic Regression algorithm sorted by importance. All except one (file size) are extracted from the PE file format.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Feature name</th>
<th>Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>PointerToRawData</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Characteristics, flag IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_DSECT</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Characteristics, flag IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_COPY</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Characteristics, flag IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NOLOAD</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>RVA of Exception Table</td>
<td>Optional Header Data Directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>PointerToRawData</td>
<td>Section Header (the third section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Characteristics, flag IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_GROUP</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>RVA of Certificate Table</td>
<td>Optional Header Data Directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>RVA of Base RelocationTable</td>
<td>Optional Header Data Directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>RVA of Bound Import</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>VirtualSize</td>
<td>Section Header (the fourth section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>SizeOfRawData</td>
<td>Section Header (the second section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Size of file</td>
<td>not part of PE format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>VirtualAddress</td>
<td>Section Header (the fourth section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>VirtualSize</td>
<td>Section Header (the second section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>RVA of Import Table</td>
<td>Optional Header Data Directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Characteristics, flag IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_REG</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>AddressOfEntryPoint</td>
<td>Optional Header Standard Fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>RVA of Export Table</td>
<td>Optional Header Data Directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>VirtualAddress</td>
<td>Section Header (the first section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>RVA of TLS Table</td>
<td>Optional Header Data Directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>PointerToRawData</td>
<td>Section Header (the second section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>VirtualAddress</td>
<td>Section Header (the last section)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Size of Import Table</td>
<td>Optional Header Data Directories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>VirtualAddress</td>
<td>Section Header (the second section)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

feature vector.

All the following experiments were executed on a single computer platform having two processors (Intel Xeon Gold 6136, 3.0GHz, 12 cores each), with 32 GB of RAM running the Ubuntu server 18.04 LTS operating system.

5.1 Application of Distance Metric Learning Algorithms

In the first set of experiments, we applied the KNN classifier using the following four distances: Euclidean (non-learned) distance, and three Mahalanobis distances learned by three DML algorithms (separately) LMNN, NCA, and MLKR. We used 5-fold cross-validation as follows. The training dataset (80 % of the whole dataset) was randomly divided into five subsets of equal size, where four subsets were used for training the DML algorithms, and one subset was used for testing. First, the DML algorithm was trained on the four subsets, and then KNN with learned Mahalanobis distance metric was employed using training and testing sets. This procedure was run five times with different subset reserved for testing. Classification results obtained for each fold are then averaged to produce a single cross-validation estimate.

The first experiment focuses on the hyperparameter $k$ that expresses the number of nearest neighbors considered in the KNN classifier and LMNN (the learning rate of the optimization procedure = $10^{-6}$) algorithm. Note that both MLKR nor NCA do not depend on $k$. Fig. 2 shows the effect of $k$ on the error rate of the KNN using all four distances.

![Figure 2: The relation between the number of nearest neighbors ($k$) and error rate (ERR) compared for four distances.](image-url)
The KNN classifier for \( k = 1 \) with Euclidean distance achieved the ERR of 3.70%. Error rates of the KNN using Mahalanobis distance learned by DML algorithms are equal to: 3.23% for LMNN, 3.51% for NCA, and 3.57% for MLKR.

The result of distance metric learning algorithms is \( n \times n \) matrix, where \( n \) is the dimension of the feature vector. Since the number of components of the matrix to be learned grows at a quadratic rate and the size of the training data is fixed, we can expect that the size of training data stops being sufficient for high values of \( n \). In the next experiment, we used the Principal component analysis to reduce the data’s dimension and examine the learning ability of distance metric learning algorithms. We applied 5-fold cross-validation technique described above. For our fixed-size training dataset, the highest performance improvement gained by using DML algorithms was achieved for the following dimensions: \( n = 3 \) for LMNN, \( n = 4 \) for NCA, and \( n = 6 \) for MLKR. These results may indicate that considering 25-dimensional feature vectors used in our experiments, our dataset’s size is insufficient for learning as many as 625 parameters (i.e., the number of components of the matrix \( M \)).

We also explored the variation of classification results based on DML algorithms across six malware families and benign class. Precisions and recalls of the KNN classifier using the hyperparameter \( k = 1 \) are summarize in Table 3. The results indicate that the precisions and recalls corresponding to malware families depend significantly on the DML algorithms.

Regarding resource usage of DML algorithms, 32GB of RAM was sufficiently enough (i.e., without a need to use the disk as swap memory) for all conducted experiments. The average computational times of the DML algorithms applied on 8,960 samples are as follows: LMNN took 550 seconds, NCA took 960 seconds, and MLKR took 4,800 seconds.

### 5.2 Representation of Malware Families in Two Dimensions

In this section, we examine the classification results based on two-dimensional feature vectors. Two of the most important features, PointerToRawData and flag IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_DSECT (see Table 2), were selected by the RFE Logistic Regression and used for multiclass classification.

Fig. 3 presents the effectiveness of the KNN \( (k = 1) \) classification of malware families and benign files represented by only two-dimensional feature vectors. While we achieved 99% accuracy for the malware families Skeeyah and Virlock, benign files’ accuracy was 58%.

![Figure 3: Normalized confusion matrix comparing the accuracy of KNN \( (k = 1) \) using Euclidean distance for six malware families and benign samples.](image)

Two-dimensional representation of feature vectors allows us to show malware families as points in the plane. Three malware families, Allaple, Virut, and Vudo, are illustrated in Fig. 4. One hundred samples were chosen randomly from each of these classes, and we achieved the average classification accuracy of 92.00%.

![Figure 4: Three malware families: Allaple, Virut, and Vudo represented in two dimensions.](image)

### 5.3 Comparison with the State-of-the-Art ML Algorithms

In the last experiment, LMNN, NCA, and MLKR methods (each separately) were used to transform the data, as it is shown in Eq. (4) in Section 3. We compared the performance of the state-of-the-art ML algorithms for original (non-transformed) data and for the transformed data. Table 4 shows that the high-
state-of-the-art ML algorithms considered in our experiment that DML-based methods outperform any of the Euclidean distance. The classification results demonstrated that classification results achieved significantly better results than using common (non-learned) Euclidean distance. Regarding the original (non-transformed) data, the highest average precision of 97.05% was achieved using Random Forest on the data transformed by LMNN or MLKR. The KNN classifier achieved the highest average recall of 97.04% on the data transformed by MLKR.

Regarding original (non-transformed) data, the KNN classifier using common (non-learned) Euclidean distance. Regarding the Naive Bayes classifier, we achieved a very low precision of 54.53% for Vundo and a very low recall of 47.02% for Zbot compared to other ML classifiers. These two results cause that average precision and recall for Naive Bayes are significantly lower compared to other ML algorithms.

6 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we employed three distance metric learning algorithms to learn the Mahalanobis distance metric to improve multiclass classification performance for our dataset containing six prevalent malware families and benign files. We classified the previously unseen samples using the KNN classifier with the learned distance and achieved significantly better results than using common (non-learned) Euclidean distance. The classification results demonstrate that DML-based methods outperform any of the state-of-the-art ML algorithms considered in our experiments. Our results indicate that the classification performance based on DML methods could be further improved if we use a larger dataset for training the distance metric. Another experiment was concerned with low-dimensional representations of the input feature space. We achieved surprisingly good classification results even for two-dimensional feature vectors. In future work, other types of features, such as byte sequences, opcodes, API and system calls, and others, could be used and possibly improve the classification results. It would also be interesting to explore the application of distance metric learning algorithms to clustering into malware families.

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