Keywords: Digital Data Marketplaces (DDM), System Calls, N-gram, Profiling, Containers.

Abstract: A Digital Data Marketplace (DDM) facilitates secure and trustworthy data sharing among multiple parties. For instance, training a machine learning (ML) model using data from multiple parties normally contributes to higher prediction accuracy. It is crucial to enforce the data usage policies during the execution stage. In this paper, we propose a methodology to distinguish programs running inside containers by monitoring system calls sequence externally. To support container portability and the necessity of retraining ML models, we also investigate the stability of the proposed methodology in 7 typical containerized ML applications over different execution platform OSs and training data sets. The results show our proposed methodology can distinguish between applications over various configurations with an average classification accuracy of 93.85%, therefore it can be integrated as an enforcement component in DDM infrastructures.

1 INTRODUCTION

A Digital Data Marketplace (DDM) provides a digital infrastructure to facilitate data sharing in a secure and trustworthy manner. The collaborating parties, e.g. data providers and algorithm providers, normally come to a DDM with a pre-agreed policy describing which algorithm can work on which dataset. A DDM should include a component to enforce those policies (Zhang et al., 2019).

The compute algorithms in DDMs are normally encapsulated in containers to gain better portability (Canon and Younge, 2019). Multiple containers may run on the same platform with permissions to execute on different data sets. It is crucial to ensure each data set is accessed by the container running the authorized algorithm. To avoid information leakage, the DDM infrastructures are not allowed to access the containers or the algorithm source code directly. This raises a question: "How to distinguish containerized applications only depending on external monitoring?", which we answer in this paper.

System calls provide an interface to the services provided by an operating system. The behaviors of a computer program can be well modelled as system call sequences (Forrest et al., 1996). In this paper, we propose an architecture to distinguish running containers by establishing system call profiles. This can be implemented as an enforcement component in a DDM. An authorized party builds an authorized profile of a computing algorithm after verifying the source code. The program behavior is modelled with the occurrence of fixed length subsequence of system calls ($n$-grams). The execution platform monitors system calls in real time and can, at the end of execution, distinguish programs running inside containers based on system call profiles. The dissimilarity between profiles is computed with cross entropy. The system will trigger an alarm if there is a mismatch between the policy and classification results.

However, system calls are highly localized and the generated trace files depend on the configurations of the execution platforms (Forrest et al., 2008). Also, an authorized algorithm is retrained multiple times with different training data sets. To support portability of containers, an authorized profile may be reused over platforms with different OSs. To address these points, we investigate the suitability of our methodology over different Linux distributions and with different training sets with 7 typical applications in DDMs. Based on our experimental results, the proposed profiling and distance calculation methodology show stable results over different platform configurations, e.g. OSs and training data sets. Finally, we demonstrate that the proposed methodology can gain an average classification accuracy of 93.85%.
2 RELATED WORK

There are recent studies modelling program behaviour with system calls. The work in (Paek et al., 2006) proposed to use frequency of individual system calls to build the normal profiles of an application. Such profiles may lose some important information about the application behaviours because they do not capture the sequential relationships among system calls. In addition, this method is vulnerable to mimic attacks. Exploiting the profiles, the adversaries can mimic the benign program to perform malicious actions (Varghese and Jacob, 2007). (Forrest et al., 1996) proposed to profile normal behaviors of a running process as a set of short sequences of system calls. The profile is an enumeration of all fixed-length subsequence and an anomaly is flagged if a sufficient number of new short subsequences occur. (Hofmeyr et al., 1998) proposed a similar version of program profiling methodology, which is called STIDE. In this case the authors use Hamming distances to calculate the dissimilarities to detect anomalies. These works provide us with a good starting base for our research.

(Suratkar et al., 2019) proposed in their recent work to use Hidden Markov Chain to model normal behaviors of applications. The work in (Xiao et al., 2019) proposed to train an LSTM model with benign behaviors of a running program. However, those methods are very computationally expensive and require a large amount of data.

The work in (Das et al., 2017) aimed to analyze Android App behaviors using system calls. They built the App profile based on the frequency distribution of individual system calls. Their conclusion was that system calls are not sufficient to classify application behavior. In our work we will demonstrate that this possible as long as the profiling methodology is more refined than the one adopted by these authors.

3 ARCHITECTURE

We propose an architecture to enforce the data access and usage policy among collaborating parties during the execution phase of a data sharing application. The architecture can be implemented as one of the enforcement components for DDM infrastructures.

As shown in Figure 1, the data providers and algorithm providers first agree on a policy, which describes the purpose of the computing algorithm, e.g. the algorithm can perform on which specific data set. For portability, the computing algorithms in DDMs are containerized.

Figure 1: A DDM enforcement component to distinguish and verify running algorithms inside containers with system call profiles.

Secondly, the algorithm provider sends its compute algorithm, one or multiple images, and the policy to an authorized party for verification. It checks the source code and verifies whether the given algorithm complies to the policy. If so, the authority party generates profiles of the application images with system call traces and sends them to the execution platform. These profiles are digitally signed and encrypted with the public key of the execution platform. Thus the risk of mimic attacks for profiling is highly reduced (Varghese and Jacob, 2007).

Thirdly, both data objects and compute objects are sent to the execution platform. To keep confidentiality of the algorithm, the compute containers are normally executed by its owners remotely. The platform monitors system calls of running containers and feeds the information to a classifier. The classifier discriminates running programs inside each container and computes the dissimilarities between the observed tracefiles with all authorized profiles.

4 PROFILE GENERATION

It is important to consider the behavioural variance of system call traces when programs are running with different configurations. For instance, the traces of a specific ML algorithm may change with different training data sets or with multiple runs. This may cause false alarms when we use system call profiles to distinguish compute applications. Good profiling and similarity computation methodology will reduce the noise and only extract the information which actually represents the algorithm behaviours.
We define self-variance of a profiling methodology to be the dissimilarities among system call profiles of the same application. It represents how sensitive a profiling methodology is to the intrinsic variability of the running application. The quantitative definition of self-variance depends on dissimilarity measures in the classifier. Higher self-variance is likely to cause a higher false negative rate when making the decisions.

To investigate our proposed methodologies, we set up an experimental environment illustrated in Figure 2. We want to emulate the action of the authorized 3rd party in Figure 1 when it generates the profile as well as the actions of the execution platform when it is monitoring running applications.

![Figure 2: Profile generation setup](image)

We run containers within a physical node. We use Sysdig to monitor the generated system calls because it is specifically designed for containers. The probe is placed in the Linux kernel of the host machine and it traces all the system calls generated by the container. The input data is accessed as the volume of the Docker container. As shown in Figure 2, the result is the raw trace file which serves as the input of Filtering component. The Filtering component filters out all system calls generated by the container runtime. Finally, the Profile Generator will generate profiles with the proposed methodology, which will be introduced in Section 6.

5 CLASSIC N-GRAM PROFILES

Recently, there are plenty of work using fixed length subsequence to detect characterize behaviors of running processes (Khreich et al., 2017; Varghese and Jacob, 2007; Subba et al., 2017). They segment a system call trace into fixed length subsequence with a sliding window of length n (normally 3 - 6). The subsequences are called n-grams, with n being the length of the subsequence.

Suppose we have a sequence of system calls such as \( fstat, mmap, close, open, read, write \ldots \). This can be segmented into a list of n-grams with length 3: \( \{fstat, mmap, close \}, \{mmap, close, open \}, \{close, open, read \}, \{open, read, write \}, \{read, write \ldots \} \).

The traditional n-gram profiling methodology was proposed in (Forrest et al., 1996). It builds the profile as an enumeration of all occurring n-grams and the deviation between two distinct profiles is computed as the number of n-grams that are distinct in two profiles. With the setup illustrated in Figure 2, we aim to investigate the self-variance of traditional n-gram profiles. The application is to train a fraud detector. The operating system is Ubuntu 18.04. We first run a docker container with the same training data set for 10 times and investigate the self-variance of the generated n-gram profiles. As seen in Figure 2, Sysdig traces are generated by an entire container runtime. It is interesting to filter out the runtime generated system calls from the raw trace file. We filter out these calls with a text processing script we wrote for this purpose, as illustrated in the Filtering module in Figure 2.

Table 1 shows the average number of n-gram in the 10 profiles. We distinguish between profiles generated by the entire container and profiles with container runtime calls filtered out. The similarity of two n-gram profiles is measured as the proportion of n-gram entries that are common in both files. We do a pair-wise comparison of the n-grams in the 10 traces and show the average number of pair-wise common n-grams in the middle column. Finally we present the average number of overall common n-grams in all 10 traces in the last column.

We first focus on unfiltered traces. We can see that the average number of unfiltered n-grams is 1520; this reduces to 1310 when we do the pair-wise comparison and finally only 1205 n-grams are common to all 10 tracefiles. There are only around 86% of the n-gram entries are common between arbitrary two profiles, as this is the ratio between 1205/1520. In addition, the overall similarity is only 79%. Looking at the filtered profiles we see that the pair-wise similarities are approximately 88% and the overall similarity is 82%. This is only slightly better than the unfiltered case and the likelihood of false negatives is still high.

From this we can conclude that the classic n-gram profiling and distance computation methodology are likely to generate false alarms if we adopt it for discriminating containerized applications. In the next sections we will propose a different profiling methodology that can solve this issue.
Table 1: Average number of n-grams for the fraud detection application, before and after filtering of runtime generated system calls in three categories: all n-grams, pair-wise common n-grams and overall common n-grams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. n-grams</th>
<th>No. pair-wise common n-grams</th>
<th>No. overall common n-grams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before Filtering</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Filtering</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 N-GRAM FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS

The traditional n-gram method presented in section 5 builds the profile with distinct n-grams without occurrence frequency, which conveys information for describing the behavior of a program. Using the same application (fraud detection) and using the 10 filtered profiles we have obtained in the previous experiment we produce the occurrence distribution.

Figure 3 shows the CDF of the occurrence distribution of each n-gram in one run of our application. The axis is the number of occurrence of each n-gram.

![Figure 3: CDF of occurrence distribution of n-grams in one filtered tracefile - a tracefile containing only the container runtime calls.]

There are in total 1350 distinct n-grams in this profile. The occurrence numbers of those n-grams range from 1 to as high as 10^5. As shown in the Figure, more than 50% of the n-grams occur very rarely with occurrence numbers of 1. We expect that those rarely occurred n-grams contain little or at least less important information about the actual program behaviors. On the other hand, n-grams which occur often provide a clear signature of the application.

This observation is in fact confirmed when we compare the n-gram entries that are different between two profiles of our application. We observe that almost all of those distinct n-gram entries occur only once in the profile. In this sense, we confirm that the traditional n-gram profiling methodology which treats all the distinct n-grams entries equally does not model the actual behaviour of an application well and may result in a lower classification rate.

Hence we propose to profile a containerized program with the frequency distribution of n-grams. We do expect that the distinctive signatures of the application’s profiles will result in lower variance. To confirm our assumption we need to identify a method to calculate the profile distances when they are expressed as frequency distributions of n-grams. The dissimilarity of two profiles will then be computed using the cross entropy. Suppose \( \text{OD}_p = \{n_1^{(p)}, n_2^{(p)}, \ldots, n_N^{(p)}\} \) denotes occurrence distribution in tracefile \( tr_p \), \( n_i^{(p)} \) indicates occurrence counts for the n-gram in the tracefile \( tr_p \) and \( N \) denotes the total number of distinct n-grams. Similarly, \( \text{OD}_q = \{n_1^{(q)}, n_2^{(q)}, \ldots, n_M^{(q)}\} \) denotes occurrence count of \( M \) n-gram entries in tracefile \( tr_q \). In most scenarios, we have two distributions with \( M \neq N \).

To obtain the cross entropy, two input distributions need to have an equal number of entries. To accomplish this we define a procedure to adjust the sets. We need to have an equal number of entries. To accomplish this we define a procedure to adjust the sets. We do the same procedure to form \( \hat{\text{OD}}_q \) with \( L \) entries; we add \( \hat{\text{OD}}_q \) with \( L \) entries; we add

\[
\text{OD}_a = \text{OD}_p \cup \text{OD}_q = \{n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_L\}
\]

\( L \geq M, L \geq N \) \hspace{1cm} (1)

\( L \) denotes the cardinality of the union set \( \text{OD}_a \). We create two sets \( \text{OD}_p \) and \( \text{OD}_q \) with \( L \) entries; we add all the n-grams contained in \( \text{OD}_a \) but not in the original \( \text{OD}_p \) with an occurrence of zero to form the new set \( \hat{\text{OD}}_p \). We do the same procedure to form \( \hat{\text{OD}}_q \).

\[
\hat{\text{OD}}_p = \{n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_N, 0, 0\} \hspace{1cm} (3)
\]

\[
\hat{\text{OD}}_q = \{n_1, \ldots, n_N, 0, 0\} \hspace{1cm} (4)
\]

To avoid zero probability, we adopt Laplace smoothing, specifically add-one smoothing, to calculate the frequency distribution.

\[
\text{laplace smoothing} = \frac{nc_i + 1}{\sum L \cdot nc_i + L} \hspace{1cm} (5)
\]

\[
\text{laplace smoothing : \( \hat{\text{OD}}_p \rightarrow FD_p \)} \hspace{1cm} (6)
\]

\[
\text{laplace smoothing : \( \hat{\text{OD}}_q \rightarrow FD_q \)} \hspace{1cm} (7)
\]

\( FD_p = \{f_{d_1}^{(p)}, f_{d_2}^{(p)}, \ldots, f_{d_L}^{(p)}\} \) denotes the frequency distribution of each n-gram entry after applying laplace-smoothing for tracefile \( tr_p \). Similarly,
FD_q denotes the smoothed frequency distribution for tr_q.

After this procedure, we can compute the cross entropy of two tracefiles tr_p and tr_q as:

$$C(tr_p, tr_q) = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \left( f_d^{(p)} - f_d^{(q)} \right) \cdot \log \frac{f_d^{(p)}}{f_d^{(q)}}$$

where $f_d^{(p)}$ is the frequency of the $i$-th item in tracefile $tr_p$ and $f_d^{(q)}$ is the frequency of the $i$-th item in tracefile $tr_q$.

The value of cross entropy has a lower bound of 0 if two distributions are identical. A small value of cross entropy indicates a large similarity between two distributions.

7 SELF VARIANCE AND MUTUAL DISTANCE

In this section we validate our frequency distribution profile methodology by looking at the self-variance and the distance of profiles calculated with cross-entropy, which we define as follows.

Suppose $T_M = \{ t_1^{(M)}, t_2^{(M)}, \ldots, t_p^{(M)} \}$ represents the set of tracefiles for Application M. Suppose $T_N = \{ t_1^{(N)}, t_2^{(N)}, \ldots, t_q^{(N)} \}$ represents the set of tracefiles for Application N.

The self-variance of Application M with tracefile set $T_M$ is the average value of the cross entropy for any pair of tracefiles in set $T_M \times T_M$.

$$\text{self variance}(T_M) = \text{average}(C(t_i^{(M)}, t_j^{(M)}))$$

$$\forall (t_i^{(M)}, t_j^{(M)}) \in T_M \times T_M$$

Similarly, the average mutual distance between two applications M and N is calculated as:

$$\text{Mutual Distance}(T_M, T_N) = \text{average}(C(t_i^{(M)}, t_j^{(N)}))$$

$$\forall (t_i^{(M)}, t_j^{(N)}) \in T_M \times T_N$$

To validate our methodology we select 7 typical DDM applications in the related field of machine learning. Each application is encapsulated into a Docker container (Merkel, 2014). All the algorithms are written in Python and primarily rely on TensorFlow, an open source library that helps to develop and train ML models. The Docker images of all applications have a common underlying image of Python Stirech 3.6 and the algorithm script is running on top of it. We run containers of all 7 applications as the experimental setup depicted in Figure 2. The kernel operating system is Ubuntu 18.04 and we run 4 times for each application.

We compute self variance and average mutual distances among all 7 containerized applications. The application names and computation results are shown in Table 2.

The self variance of each application is shown as the value on the diagonal line. The self variance is small compared to the mutual distances. This implies our proposed classification methodology can provide a lower false negative rate than the classic n-gram method.

When we look at the mutual distances between application we observe a number of interesting features. First we see that distances range from a value of 0.38 (App3-App5 pair) to 23 (App4-App6 pair). This large variation can be explained by observing that a number of our applications use the same libraries; we therefore expect that those applications are more difficult to distinguish. This is in fact the case for App4 which has a very unique set of libraries and therefore gives larger distances.

8 STABILITY

The system call trace files of a running program depend on configurations of the execution environment. In this section, we will investigate the stability, quantified as self-variance, of generated profiles over different OSs and training sets. We mainly focus on 3 of them: App 1 - Unbalanced classifier, App2 Text classification and App3 - Collaboration filtering as they are widely used ML algorithms in DDMs.

8.1 Stability over Different Platform OSs

One benefit of containerization is the portability over different platforms. In DDMs the same application will run at different times on different platforms, and that the OS of the execution platforms chosen to run may vary. It would be obviously very convenient if we could determine that a baseline profile generated by an application in a certain OS can be used for classification in another OS. To assess this we need to determine what is the stability of generated profiles over different platforms as this influences the classifier accuracy. In our experiment we ran the three applications on 3 host machines, each one configured with the following OS: Ubuntu 18.04, CentOS 7 and Debian GNU Linux 9. For each application, the container is running 5 times with the same training data set. We then calculated the cross entropy for all application profiles produced in one OS and the cross
Table 2: Self variance and mutual distances among all 7 containerized applications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application name</th>
<th>No. n-grams</th>
<th>APP 1</th>
<th>APP 2</th>
<th>APP 3</th>
<th>APP 4</th>
<th>APP 5</th>
<th>APP 6</th>
<th>APP 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced classifier</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text classification</td>
<td>5491</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>9.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative filtering</td>
<td>1394</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated learning</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2S learning</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train a LSTM</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train a quasi-svm</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we compare the variances for runs in the same OSs, with values ranging from 0 to 0.27, to the runs with different OSs pairs, with values ranging from 0 to 0.34, the cross-platform variance is only slightly larger. In addition, as shown in Table 2, the mutual distances among the 3 applications are 5.21 (APP1-APP2), 1.42 (APP1-APP3) and 4.81 (APP2-APP3). The absolute values of the variance cross-platforms are smaller than the mutual distances. This indicates the variance of profiles over different platform os is unlikely to cause false negatives. The results strongly suggest that our proposed methodology will support container portability with quite stable performance, at least for typical DDM ML algorithms.

8.2 Stability over Different Training Data Sets

Not only it is important to determine the stability of profiles across OS-es, it is likewise essential to investigate the stability over different training data sets. There are two reasons for this. First, to reduce the risk of data leakage in a DDM, the authorized party is not allowed to access the data objects directly and to execute the compute algorithm on them. This means that the data used to generate the profile in the authorized party is normally different from the one used for classification in the execution platform. Secondly, a DDM customer may retrain a machine learning model multiple times with different training data sets for higher accuracy. To determine the stability of each application in this case we trained the ML model with the data sets. For each application there are 5 training data sets of various sizes.

Figure 5 shows the stability of the application profiles expressed as cross entropy values for all pairs in the Cartesian product of the tracefile set. The cross entropy between profiles of the same application is small, in the large majority of cases with values lower 0.1. In particular, the profiles of App1 are the most stable across the 5 training data sets, and the cross entropy has values ranging from 0 to 0.15 including outliers. App2 and 3 have a few outliers with cross entropy higher than 0.1. App 2 has outliers with higher entropy values, ranging from 0.17 to 0.7. As explained in Section 8.1 this is because more device management system calls are generated in this case and inserted into the program behavioral traces.

From our two experiments, stability over different...
OSs and different data sets, we can conclude that profiles are fairly closely clustered together, as seen by the low value of cross entropy. This means that we expect that our methodology can deliver good results independently from the OSs and training data set the reference profiles has been generated with.

9 CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY

In this section, we will investigate how well our proposed classifier works for distinguishing containerized applications. For each round, we randomly choose one profile per application to be the reference profile and measure how accurate our classifier can determine the remaining application profiles correctly. Table 3 shows the accuracy confusion matrix of the classifier for 6 containerized ML algorithms. In each row we report the classification result of the specific application. The last column shows the mean value and standard variation of classification accuracy rates for each application among 40 rounds.

We can observe that the classifier can always achieve an accuracy rate of 100% for App2, App6 and App7 no matter how we built the authorized profiles. The prediction accuracy is only 86.7% for App1, with 209 samples classified as App3 and 22 samples classified as App6. False classifications mainly occur between App3 and App5, App5 and App6. This is because of their mutual distance, as shown in Table 2, are only 0.38 and 0.58. For those applications with lower average classification accuracy, App1, App3 and App5, the std is also higher. This indicates that the selection of authorized profiles plays an important role in the performance of the classifier. The classifier can predict profiles with 100% accuracy for some applications sharing the same libraries and overall accuracy for all applications is as high as 93.85%.

10 DISCUSSION

The work presented so far mainly focuses on distinguishing applications running inside the containers based on system call monitoring. We must stress our methodology is not concerned with the maliciousness of the code. The focus is on whether the code is authorized to run. Detecting malicious code and intrusions in real time is out of the scope for the current paper, but we will extend our architecture in Fig. 1 to include this as a separate component.

The performance of our proposed methodology is lower for applications that are pretty similar to each other. It will be a focus of our future work to determine if more fine-grained classifiers, namely Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree, KNN (K-nearest neighbour), can improve the current classification accuracy. These more refined methods require many more tracefiles than the ones we currently. Still, in many DDMs this larger data set tracefiles is difficult to collect, hence our methods will still be the one adopted, and we believe deliver more than sufficient discrimination power, as seen by its overall accuracy of 93.85%.

Another interesting aspect to consider is the effect of the tracefile size, i.e. the number of distinct n-grams contained in it. As we can see from Table 2 the six applications we chose produce tracefiles which contain between 1140 and 5941 distinct n-grams. When we look at Table 3 we can see that there is no obvious correlation between number of n-grams and accuracy, which is also a good performance indicator for the suitability of our method as it is application size agnostic.

11 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper we propose an architecture to distinguish programs running inside containers by monitoring system calls. We propose to profile an algorithm container with n-gram occurrence distribution and compute dissimilarity with cross entropy. The methodology allows profile reuse across execution platforms with different OSs and different training data sets. We showed that we can gain high classification accuracy with typical ML applications. Our method can be easily incorporated in DDMs currently under development.

In the future we want to profile a compute container with multi-dimensional metrics, e.g. in and outgoing network traffic and the CPU usage. This will
Table 3: The confusion matrix of the classifier for 6 applications running with various platform OSs and training data sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APP 1</th>
<th>APP 2</th>
<th>APP 3</th>
<th>APP 5</th>
<th>APP 6</th>
<th>APP 7</th>
<th>mean (%) ± std</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APP 1</td>
<td>1529</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>86.7 ± 0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100 ± 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92.2 ± 0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP 5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1483</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>84.2 ± 0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP 6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>100 ± 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP 7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100 ± 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

allow us to build richer signatures and reduce inaccuracy of classification. Additionally we want to extend our architecture to include intrusion detection modules, which will not simply classify an application as being authorized or not, but also try to determine its behaviour at runtime.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper builds upon the work done within the Dutch NWO Research project ‘Data Logistics for Logistics Data’ (DL4LD, www.dl4ld.net), supported by the Dutch Top consortia for Knowledge and Innovation ‘Institute for Advanced Logistics’ (TKI Dinalog, www.dinalog.nl) of the Ministry of Economy and Environment in The Netherlands and the Dutch Commit-to-Data initiative (https://commit2data.nl/).

REFERENCES


