An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage

Yan Yan, Elisabeth Oswald, Srinivas Vivek

Abstract

In the last few years a new design paradigm, the so-called ARX (modular addition, rotation, exclusive-or) ciphers, have gained popularity in part because of their non-linear operation’s seemingly ‘inherent resilience’ against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attacks: the non-linear modular addition is not only known to be a poor target for DPA attacks, but also the computational complexity of DPA-style attacks grows exponentially with the operand size and thus DPA-style attacks quickly become practically infeasible. We however propose a novel DPA-style attack strategy that scales linearly with respect to the operand size in the chosen-message attack setting.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Yan Y., Oswald E. and Vivek S. (2021). An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage.In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP, ISBN 978-989-758-491-6, pages 89-97. DOI: 10.5220/0010223600890097


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icissp21,
author={Yan Yan and Elisabeth Oswald and Srinivas Vivek},
title={An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,},
year={2021},
pages={89-97},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0010223600890097},
isbn={978-989-758-491-6},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,
TI - An Analytic Attack against ARX Addition Exploiting Standard Side-channel Leakage
SN - 978-989-758-491-6
AU - Yan Y.
AU - Oswald E.
AU - Vivek S.
PY - 2021
SP - 89
EP - 97
DO - 10.5220/0010223600890097