Canopy: A Learning-based Approach for Automatic Low-and-Slow DDoS Mitigation

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Abstract: In a low-and-slow distributed denial-of-service (LSDDoS) attack, an adversary attempts to degrade the server with low-bandwidth requests specially crafted to slowly transmit data, consuming an inordinate amount of the server’s resources. This paper proposes Canopy, a novel approach for detecting LSDDoS attacks by applying machine learning techniques to extract meaning from observed patterns of TCP state transitions. While existing works have presented techniques that successfully mitigate different examples of LSDDoS attacks, Canopy has uniquely shown the ability to mitigate a diverse set of LSDDoS attacks, including never-before-seen attacks, all while maintaining a low false positive rate. Canopy is able to detect and mitigate low-and-slow attacks accurately and quickly: our tests find that attacks are identified during 100% of test runs within 650 milliseconds. Server performance is restored quickly: in our experimental testbed, we find that clients’ experience is restored to normal within 7.5 seconds. During active attack mitigation, which only occurs during server performance degradation indicative of an attack, Canopy exhibits minimal erroneous mitigative action applied to benign clients as it achieves a precision of 99%. Finally, we show that Canopy’s capabilities generalize well to LSDDoS attacks not included in its training dataset, identifying never-before-seen attacks within 750 milliseconds.

1 INTRODUCTION

Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks remain a pervasive cybersecurity threat with impacts that vary from minor nuisances, e.g. knocking rivals offline in online competitive games (Plante, 2015), to national security, as when the nation-state of Georgia’s Internet was disrupted ahead of a Russian land invasion in 2008 (Markoff, 2008). DDoS attacks are a perennial and widespread problem: in a seminal paper (Moore et al., 2006) on the enumeration of DDoS attacks, Moore described the observation of 68,000 such attacks between 2001 and 2004. The NetScout Threat Intelligence Report for the second half of 2018 (Modi, 2018) estimated monthly DDoS attacks numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

Traditional DDoS attacks attempt to overwhelm a service by transmitting such a large volume of traffic that the server is unable to handle all of the requests it receives, including those of legitimate clients. If the attacker is able to generate more traffic than the service can handle, the service will be forced to drop requests.

Today, various commercial services such as Akamai and CloudFlare are effective in mitigating these kinds of attacks. In 2016, a world-record-setting, 620-Gbps DDoS attack was mounted against KrebsOnSecurity.com; however, this attack was unsuccessful, absorbed by Akamai’s DDoS mitigation service (Krebs, 2016). Volumetric attacks are also quite expensive to launch. A recent study found that a small, 1,000-machine DDoS attack costs on the order of $25 per hour (Makrushin, 2013), an attack that would be all-but-unnoticed by a service with DDoS protection.

In addition to their high cost, volumetric attacks are also relatively easy to detect due to the abnormal increase in traffic volume they entail. In comparison, low-volume attacks send smaller amounts of data and can more easily evade detection systems. Low-volume or low-rate attacks stealthily degrade server performance through cleverly crafted transmissions of data. While these terms encompass a wide body of DDoS approaches, our work focuses on a subset of this category called low-and-slow attacks. These attacks slowly send small streams of data that keep connections alive for long periods of time, tying up server resources throughout the process. There
are different ways in which attackers can utilize this kind of traffic to create a denial-of-service condition. At the application layer, they can exhaust web servers through specially crafted HTTP requests. At the transport layer, attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in the TCP stack. We will detail the scope of the low-and-slow attacks we employ in Section 3.1.2.

The relatively low resource requirement for mounting a low-and-slow attack has two important consequences. First, the potential for abuse is much higher as the barrier to launching an attack is reduced. Additionally, these attacks are more difficult to detect since they are not characterized by large bursts of traffic. LSDDoS attacks not only expose vulnerable Internet services to lower-resourced adversaries, but also present a distinct advantage for adversaries against whom defenders were previously on equal footing.

Canopy is designed to protect services from such attacks, both detecting and, importantly, mitigating LSDDoS adversaries in real-time. We present what we believe is the first application-agnostic defense for mitigating a diverse set of low-and-slow attacks, including attacks not represented in the defense’s training dataset, or signature database.

2 BACKGROUND

Denial-of-service attacks have been a persistent threat in the computer security space for decades; as such, a large volume of research toward mitigating their threat has developed. Denial-of-service attacks whose efficacy is based on raw volume of data have established effective methods of mitigation (Tripathi and Mehrete, 2013; Specht and Lee, 2003). The cost of these methods generally scales with the size of the attack, though research (Fayaz et al., 2015) into making these methods more efficient continues.

The focus of this paper, however, is not on these "brute-force" denial-of-service attacks. We also seek to distinguish our work from research on low-volume attacks that induce congestion through periodic bursts or "pulses" of traffic (Kuzmanovic and Knightly, 2003; Zhang et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2017). Our work pertains specifically to low-and-slow attacks, whose efficacy stems from requests crafted to exhaust its target’s resources through low-bandwidth, slow transmissions of data. Despite progress made in the research community, defense against low-and-slow attacks remains an open problem. This section reviews LSDDoS research within the context of these key characteristics of an effective solution:

1. Operates in real-time
2. Is not tied to a specific application
3. Can detect a variety of low-and-slow attacks
4. Can detect low-and-slow attacks not included in signature database

Real-time Detection. Considering that the ultimate goal in DDoS detection is the mitigation of attacks, it is imperative that a viable detection system operates in real-time. Siracusano et al (Siracusano et al., 2018) extract TCP statistics for benign and malicious flows, including multiple low-and-slow attacks: slowread, slowheaders, and slowbody. The experiments reveal that, given this set of features, decision trees and KNN algorithms are able to achieve very high accuracy in detecting malicious flows. The fact that these attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities at the application layer, yield highly separable transport-layer features is a notable finding that is corroborated by our work. The real-world applicability of this approach is limited, however, by the fact that features are obtained through post-processing steps following the capture of network traffic, rather than in real-time.

Sharafaldin et al (Sharafaldin et al., 2018) introduced the CICIDS2017 dataset, a widely-used public source of LSDDoS traffic. The authors additionally trained various classifiers on features extracted from their experiments in a post-processing fashion. While the high accuracy of these models provides evidence as to possible features to include in a mitigative defense, the offline manner in which features were extracted limits the direct utility of such a solution. The dataset is also limited in the scope of LSDDoS attacks it contains, as well as by the fact that attackers and benign clients target different services.

Application Agnosticism. An additional consideration when assessing the utility of LSDDoS solutions is the degree of versatility with regard to the applications it protects. FINELAME (Demoulin et al., 2019) detects low-and-slow attacks, such as Slowloris, through the use of probes that identify anomalous resource utilization. This approach, however, requires host-based instrumentation of executable code upon installation, as well as componentization of the protected application. FINELAME’s performance is also dependent on the K-means algorithm parameter that needs to be altered depending on the number of request types in the application. We seek to design a system that is easily portable to new environments and not tied to any one application.

Robustness to Attack Diversity. An important attribute of any LSDDoS defense is the ability to detect a variety of low-and-slow attacks that differ in nature. Attacks can be conducted at both the transport layer
and, more commonly, the application layer. Within the scope of application layer LSDDoS, attackers can exploit the HTTP protocol through varying means including slowly reading server responses, slowly sending packets, opening many partial connections, and requesting large numbers of overlapping byte ranges.

Smart Detection (Lima Filho et al., 2019) presents a detection system that, from pcap files, extracts statistics on IP lengths, source and destination ports, as well as TCP flags. These features are then input into a random forest model. The model achieves high accuracy on a dataset that consists primarily of flooding attacks, but also includes HTTP-based LSDDoS attacks. It remains inconclusive, though, whether Smart Detection can defend against LSDDoS attacks that are not HTTP-based, such as Sockstress. Additionally, since the vast majority of instances in the dataset are from flooding attacks, its performance on LSDDoS is difficult to evaluate absent a breakdown of results by attack type.

**Detection of Unknown Attacks.** Methods for DDoS detection can broadly be grouped into two categories: anomaly-based and signature-based. Anomaly-based systems identify attacks by developing a profile of benign behavior and flagging traffic that deviates too significantly from this profile (Demoulin et al., 2019; Ranjan et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2017). While these systems identify attacks, they often suffer from high false positive rates.

Signature-based methods entail building a dataset of benign and malicious traffic. These systems can then identify attacks assuming the traffic exhibits similar characteristics as the previously collected malicious traffic. The downside of this approach is that this assumption may not hold true for attacks not included in the signature dataset (i.e. new or unknown attacks). Given the constantly-evolving nature of LSDDoS threats, it is important that a real-world defense can detect new or unknown attacks. Absent this capability, defenses would need to undergo expensive cycles of data collection and model retraining whenever new attacks surface.

Researchers can assess the ability of signature-based methods to identify new or unknown attacks by omitting certain attacks from the signature database. Recent work follows this methodology and suggests that signature-based methods have the potential to detect DDoS attacks not included in the collected dataset (Demoulin et al., 2018; Saied et al., 2016). We seek to determine to what extent this holds true for LSDDoS attacks specifically, including cases where the omitted attack differs substantially in nature from those in the signature database.

### 3 CONTRIBUTION AND METHODOLOGY

This section describes our LSDDoS defense, Canopy, in detail. First, we introduce our custom testbed, including the myriad components and parameters that allow us to experiment with different test scenarios. We then detail our novel data featurization process that enables us to extract rich information from TCP state sensors in real-time. Next, we discuss how our detection and mitigation engines work to protect the system under test. In Section 3.4, we describe the machine learning techniques we employ to make predictions based on the data we generate. Finally, in Section 3.5, we discuss our experimental setup, detailing how test runs are configured, as well as how data is selected for training and validation.

#### 3.1 Architecture

To evaluate our defenses, we test attacks on a custom testbed with a virtual network connecting containerized instances of our server, clients, attackers, and other necessary utility applications. We refer to instances of a test as *test runs*, which are configured in *test plans* that include the following parameters: number and type of clients, type and severity of attack (e.g. number of threads, size of packets, requests per second), the event timing of the run, a victim system-under-test, and whether mitigation is enabled. Containers are provisioned by Mesosphere DC/OS\(^1\), through a custom test orchestration suite that provides scheduling of the various containers during each test run, job queue management, and experiment creation via our custom management UI. We use three machines for testing, each with a 28-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 v4 CPU @ 2.00GHz and 128GB of RAM.

The containers we use in experimental test runs are as described below. Test runs consist of three main entities: the system subjected to attack, the attackers, and legitimate clients attempting to obtain service from that system.

#### 3.1.1 System-Under-Test

For our work, we choose Apache HTTP Server with WordPress as our System-Under-Test (SUT). We choose this stack for two reasons: first, it is widely used on the web, ensuring our system has wide ap-
applicability even before considering the agnosticism of the techniques used. Second, there is a substantial set of known LSDDoS attack implementations for this stack. We specifically use Apache 2.2.11 for its vulnerability to the set of attacks we wish to test. SUTs are configured with 8 CPUs and 16GB of RAM. SUTs are based on stock Ubuntu 14.04 with minimal additions other than of the aforementioned server stack and a lightweight TCP state sensor, which uses the `conntrack` user space daemon to capture TCP connection state changes.

Note that while our evaluation focuses on a particular web server, no aspect of Canopy is tailored to this particular application. Furthermore, we emphasize that while the version of Apache we use has been superceded, and the attacks we test on largely mitigated, our techniques are not specific to this application, version, or these attacks. Rather, we show that Canopy is capable of detection and mitigation of a given attack despite not having seen it before.

### 3.1.2 Attack and Client Containers

During simulation, attacks are carried out by one of six types of test containers, each with eight predetermined levels of intensity. The set of implemented attack images consists of Slowloris (Valialkin, 2014), R U Dead Yet (Shekyan, 2011), Slow Read (Shekyan, 2011), Apache Killer (Stampar, 2011), Sockstress (Hornby, 2012), and a second implementation of Slowloris (Shekyan, 2011). The selection of attacks warrants careful consideration, as we seek to employ attacks that differ in the means by which they induce congestion. Sockstress attempts to exhaust the SUT’s resources by means of TCP protocol exploitation, while the other attacks accomplish this end by exploiting different aspects of the HTTP protocol. As we will show, TCP state transition patterns are affected even in the case of an attack executed at the application layer, for example, by a TCP connection being held longer in the ESTABLISHED state during a slow HTTP request. The differing targets of these attacks help us ensure that Canopy’s usefulness is not dependent on the protocol being exploited.

In our simulations, synthetic legitimate-user traffic is generated by HTTP request agents that mimic human behavior. These customized agents, based on Locust (Byström et al., 2019), continuously browse the SUT, traversing randomly from link to link within the hosted WordPress site. Locust allows us to easily scale the number of clients per container and their rate of activity. We also use Noisy (Hury, 2019), a website crawler whose intended purpose is to add “noise” to mask a user’s web browsing patterns. While these two methods of traffic generation are similar in intent, implementation details can cause differences in the TCP state transition patterns they exhibit, hence the inclusion of both.

### 3.2 TCP State Data Featurization

This section describes the steps we take to convert raw TCP sensor data into a form that can be input into a detection model. Figure 1 shows these steps in relation to the overall system. The key components of this featurization pipeline are our TCP state sensor, our data transformation process, and finally our imputation engine.

#### 3.2.1 TCP State Transition Sensor

As mentioned in Section 3.1.1 and depicted in Figure 1, data is captured from the TCP state sensor co-located with the SUT. This sensor utilizes `conntrack` which is a set of user space tools allowing interaction with the kernel connection tracking system.
on the host, identifying TCP state transitions in connections to the SUT. These transition messages are sent to an Apache Kafka cluster, leading to the next part of our pipeline: the data transformation step.

### 3.2.2 Transformation

At this step of the process, the various TCP state transition messages sent by the sensor are aggregated into summary statistics for 100 milliseconds time windows for each IP. This component of our system gathers all the messages for an IP in a time window, and then outputs a vector containing the percentage of the IP’s open connections in each TCP state. For each IP, we append 10 consecutive 100 milliseconds time window vectors to form an array that’s input into a classifier. Figure 2 provides an example of how this process works. While the window size and number of windows that form an array are tunable parameters, we selected these values based on the intuition that the malicious behavior of an LSDDoS attack will manifest itself in TCP states in less than a full second (ten 100 millisecond time windows). In the future we aim to empirically test the performance exhibited when varying these parameters, as discussed in Section 5.4 Limitations and Future Work.

### 3.2.3 Imputation

While we mentioned in the previous section that 10 consecutive time window vectors are appended for an IP to form an input array, it is often the case that the transformation engine does not receive data from the TCP state sensor for a given IP during a time window. This occurs whenever an IP does not experience any TCP state changes during a time window. In this event, the missing window of data is imputed by filling in the most recent TCP state vector outputted by the transformation engine for the IP. This “sample and hold” approach is depicted in Figure 3.

During experimental runs used to generate training data, the imputed arrays are serialized and stored in MinIO. These arrays can later be converted from serialized format into different forms necessary for training models.

### 3.3 Inference and Mitigation Engines

Once the data exists in a form suitable for input into a model, the next step is to classify examples as benign or malicious. These predictions are fed into our mitigation engine, which takes the steps necessary to protect the SUT. Figure 1 again shows how these processes relate to Canopy as a whole.

With mitigation enabled, imputed data is passed along in real-time to an inference engine that makes a prediction on each array by running the input through a loaded model. The first time an IP is seen by the inference engine, its predicted class (benign or attack) is sent to the mitigation engine. From that point forward, a prediction is sent to the mitigation engine only if the predicted class differs from the most recent prediction for that IP.

The mitigation engine is co-located with the SUT and is responsible for consuming prediction messages and mitigating attack IPs. When a new prediction is received, the mitigation engine adds or drops iptables filter rules to deny or allow traffic for the classified IP.

### 3.4 Learning Methods

Our work aims to differentiate between malicious and benign traffic using a supervised learning approach, using features extracted from the temporal patterns of TCP state transitions. Our experiments include three different methods of varying complexity for our classification model: temporal convolutional networks (TCNs), decision trees, and an ensemble approach. TCNs are a special case of convolutional neural networks designed to learn meaningful relationships between temporally-related features, and we include this algorithm due to its success on tasks featuring temporal data (Bai et al., 2018). We evaluate decision trees because they have proven effective in LSDDoS detection, and have even been shown to outperform neural networks (Siracusano et al., 2018; Lima Filho et al., 2019). The success of decision trees in our initial experiments prompted us to also build an ensemble of simpler classifiers (decision trees, random forests, and logistic regression) in an attempt to improve model robustness. To combine predictions from the components of the ensemble, we simply average the output probabilities.

### 3.5 Experimental Setup

In this section, we discuss the experimental conditions under which we train and test Canopy.

**Test Run Configuration.** As mentioned in Section 3.1, our experimental testbed suite allows for the specification of many different parameters of each test run, including attack type, intensity of attack, client type(s), and whether mitigation is enabled. For each
attack and attack level, we generate test runs including all Locust clients, all Noisy clients, and an even mix of both. Mitigation is disabled for the generation of training data and is activated only to evaluate how well models are protecting the SUT.

**Global vs. N-1 and N-2 Experiments.** In a global experiment, we include data from all test run configurations in the training set. This means, of course, that for any data the model is evaluated on, the model has been trained on data generated using the same test run configuration. This experiment tests how well a model detects known attacks.

To understand how a model would respond to unknown attacks, we conduct two other types of experiments. In an N-1 experiment, we leave one attack type out of the training set. For example, in a Sockstress N-1 experiment, we train the model on data from all test run configurations except those that contain Sockstress attackers. This kind of experiment simulates an unknown attack by excluding an attack (in this case, Sockstress) from the training set, but testing against it in the validation set. The N-2 experiments follow the same logic, except we exclude two attack types from the train set, testing the models’ ability to generalize given an even further limited set of attacks to train on. These experiments demonstrate the generalizability of Canopy, which is critically important to its practical utility, given that new LSDDoS attack vectors will continue to be discovered and abused.

### 4 EVALUATION

In this section, we discuss our performance evaluation of Canopy. In Section 4.1, we cover the detection metrics used to evaluate our models and provide results for different experiments. Next, in Section 4.2, we define the mitigation metrics used to assess our system in a practical test setting, providing results for how well Canopy protects the SUT.

Before diving into the specifics of detection and mitigation metrics, we highlight two key distinctions when understanding our results:

**Per-example vs. Per-client.** First, the detection metrics we will discuss in Section 4.1 show AUC, precision, and recall computed on a per-example basis. If, for example, one of 50 examples from a benign client is classified as malicious, this constitutes a per-example false positive rate of 2%. On the contrary, the per-client false positive rate describes what percent of benign clients are classified as malicious *at least once* during the run. Using the previous example, if that benign client is the only benign client, we would have a per-client false positive rate of 100%.

**Disabling vs. Enabling the Mitigation Engine.** Second, detection metrics (unless explicitly stated otherwise) are computed from test runs where mitigation is disabled and the SUT is left unprotected. This process of evaluation is necessary to assess models before they are inserted into the mitigation engine. Important, this means that these metrics are a function of flagged-IP examples that reach the system before, during, and after the occurrence of an attack. On the contrary, mitigation metrics are of course computed with mitigation enabled. Thus, IPs flagged as malicious get blocked and no longer impact the metrics computed. To understand why this difference is important, consider a model that struggles to detect the onset of a attack, but correctly identifies attackers long after they’ve had their effect. Such a model would yield poor mitigation metrics, but its detection metrics would be inflated by parts of the run not containing the onset of the attack.

#### 4.1 Detection Results

**Global Results.** In Table 1, we observe the results of the global experiments. Each global model is evaluated on all attacks at varying levels, and the results are averaged over the different attacks. The results indicate that the ensemble and decision tree perform very similarly, both outperforming the TCN in AUC, precision, and recall.

**N-1 Results.** In these experiments (results illustrated in Table 2), we find that the ensemble classifier stands out as the best performing method with a precision of 0.99, compared to 0.92 and 0.89 for the TCN and decision tree classifiers, respectively. While TCN’s recall of 0.91 exceeds those of the ensemble and decision tree methods, both 0.89, this metric is less critical than precision in our context. The reasoning for this is that false positives cause benign clients to be blocked, and while false negatives may delay the mitigation of an attack, Canopy can flag the attacker at subsequent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>AUC</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Tree</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>AUC</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Tree</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
data examples it receives. Notably, the absolute percent decrease in AUC, precision, and recall for the decision trees in comparison to the global experiments is 0.07, 0.10, and 0.06 respectively.

**N-2 Results.** For the N-2 experiments, we sample five different subsets of attacks, each time omitting two attacks from the training set. We then evaluate each trained model on the two attacks omitted from its respective training set. The results are averaged over all five models for each method and can be found in Table 3. The ensemble method again finishes with the highest precision at 0.99. Its AUC of 0.96 also exceeds the TCN’s and decision tree’s AUC’s of 0.95 and 0.89 respectively.

**Effect of Attack Type on Performance.** We evaluate each global model, averaging over the three learning methods, on all attacks and observe how performance is dependent on the attack type. These results are depicted in Table 4. Notably, Canopy’s performance against Sockstress is on par with the HTTP-based attacks, exemplifying Canopy’s application-agnosticism.

The detection results indicate that Apache Killer is the most challenging attack for Canopy to detect. While the recall for all other attacks ranges between 0.95 and 0.98, Apache Killer is identified with a recall of 0.77. Though our detection metrics indicate weak performance against Apache Killer with mitigation disabled, in operation with mitigation active, recall rises from 0.77 to 0.98. This observation offers a key insight: Canopy is able to identify an attack like Apache Killer as it is ramping up and mitigates it before later stages of the attack cause confusion for the model. This also demonstrates that Canopy can perform significantly better during practical operation than what may be reflected in detection metrics absent mitigating action. This leads us to our mitigation metrics, which will be discussed in the following section.

### 4.2 Mitigation

To evaluate Canopy’s mitigation capability, we mount an Apache Killer attack campaign against a specified SUT and measure client experience throughout the test run. We focus on the Apache Killer attack as it represents a likely lower bound for Canopy’s mitigative performance, given the results in Table 4. We examine global and N-1 models in mitigation, for each learning method. In this section, we first define our mitigation policies. Next, we describe the metrics we use to evaluate mitigation, examine the results for our experiments, and visualize the impact Canopy has on a system.

#### 4.2.1 Mitigation Policies

A risk associated with Canopy and other defensive systems is the possibility of incorrectly identifying a client as an attack (false positive). A fundamental design principle in developing Canopy is to favor models and policies that would reduce false positives and impact to benign users. One measure we take to this end is the implementation of a classification strike policy; the inference engine will not take defensive action unless the active model classifies an IP as an attacker for multiple consecutive examples. Furthermore, Canopy forces increasing backoff on IP addresses classified as malicious. These IPs are blocked for an increasing amount of time for every such classification by the model. This ensures that attackers will continue to be mitigated for long periods of time, while client IPs that are misclassified as an attack will eventually return to normal response rates.

#### 4.2.2 Description of Mitigation Metrics Used

We have presented Canopy as a practical lightweight LSDDoS defense that is server application-agnostic and easily deployable. As such, we evaluate not only our models’ ability to classify IPs in mitigation-disabled runs, but also the practical measurable effects of Canopy’s ability to mitigate attacks in defense of a server. Specifically, we measure:

- the time to detect an attack campaign
- the time to mitigate the effects of an attack, with benign clients’ experience returning to normal
- the per-client false positive rate

**Time to Detect.** We measure this value as the time between the first TCP state transition reported from an attacker IP and the time the model identifies an attacker IP.

Table 4: Mean detection results for global models on each attack, averaged over each method.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>AUC</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goloris/Slowloris</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.U.D.Y.</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowread</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Killer</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sockstress</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Mean detection results on multiple never-before-seen attacks, averaged over all N-2 models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>AUC</th>
<th>Precision</th>
<th>Recall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Tree</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Time to Mitigate

We measure the impact of an attack by the time it takes for legitimate clients to interact with the server. As our server is running a WordPress website, we measure this interaction by the time it takes for the client to be served all content on a page from the time that page was requested. We refer to this measurement as *Round-Trip Time*, or *RTT*. When we refer to a percentile RTT, we are referring to the percentage of client requests in which the calculated RTT is below a specified value. We consider an attack to be *mitigated* when the RTT for client requests return to normal levels. For each test run, a baseline RTT is measured to determine the expected RTT that a client will encounter when using the SUT during non-attack conditions. A client’s experienced RTT is considered to have returned to normal levels when it is within one standard deviation of the baseline value.\(^5\)

#### 4.2.3 Mitigation Results

**Time to Detect.** In global experiments, Canopy detects the Apache Killer attack within 650 milliseconds. In N-1 experiments, the time to detect increases to 750 milliseconds. Table 5 shows the average time it takes for Canopy’s models to detect an attacker’s IP. These metrics show that the models are identifying patterns in how an attack communicates with a SUT early in the attack, which is critical for mitigating in a timely manner and reducing the impact on clients.

**Time to Mitigate.** After Canopy takes mitigating action, the SUT begins to quickly recover, with client request RTTs returning to pre-attack levels. In our experiments, within 7.5 seconds, 90% of new requests are served without impact. Table 6 shows the time it takes for the average client request RTT to return to pre-attack levels for different learning methods, attacks, and experiment types.

#### 4.2.4 Visualizing the Mitigative Effect of Canopy

To show the impact of Canopy on the benign clients of a SUT, we visualize the following two aspects of user experience: the distribution of TCP states, as well as client RTT. We will do so for the following three scenarios: no attack campaign present, attack campaign present with no defense, and attack campaign present with Canopy active.

**No Attack Campaign Present.** First, we observe a run of our experimental system without an active attack campaign to establish a baseline of performance characteristics under normal operation. As seen in Figure 4, our test run with only benign connections includes sessions that transition normally through TCP states and end in `TIME_WAIT`. This is expected, as old client connections are aged out after completed service requests (page-loads of the WordPress site). Figure 5 also shows that, after a short start-up, the RTT is steady for the duration of the run.

**Attack Campaign Present, No Defense.** Let us next observe the effect of Apache Killer on the SUT without Canopy active. In this scenario, the attack begins 50 seconds into the test run with a duration of 70 seconds. Without mitigation enabled, the attack impacts service availability dramatically. The TCP state transition (Figure 6) and RTT graphs (Figure 7) show a taxed server with behavior that diverges significantly.

---

\(^5\)The idea that we expect most or all clients to return to within one standard deviation of a mean RTT may raise a red flag for some readers. However, this assumption is reasonable due to the way we evaluate client RTT. The standard deviation cutoff that creates the bounds for a “normal” RTT is calculated based on individual RTTs measured before the attack. A client’s experienced RTT, used to determine whether that client is back to experiencing normal RTTs, is calculated as the mean of a window of RTTs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>Time Since Attack Campaign Start (ms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global DT</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Ensemble</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global TCN</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1 DT</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1 Ensemble</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1 TCN</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Time to detect Apache Killer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment</th>
<th>X% of Clients’ RTT Restored</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global DT</td>
<td>5.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Ensemble</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global TCN</td>
<td>6.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1 DT</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1 Ensemble</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1 TCN</td>
<td>6.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Time to mitigate Apache Killer (seconds).
from our expectations under non-attack conditions. In Figure 6, we see the manifestation of Apache Killer clearly in the TCP state data; as expected, there is a saturation of TCP states like ESTABLISHED during the attack. Figure 7 shows that the average RTT increases from an approximate 250 millisecond baseline to about five seconds during the lifetime of the attack.

**Attack Campaign Present, Canopy Active.** Now, we demonstrate how Canopy affects benign clients when mitigation is enabled. We insert the global ensemble model into our mitigation engine since Table 5 indicates that this model achieves the fastest time to detect.

Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate the TCP states of open connections and RTTs during an attack campaign with mitigation enabled, respectively. The TCP and RTT trends for the run leading up to the start of the attack campaign mirror that of a scenario with Canopy disabled until the attack campaign is mitigated by the Canopy (at approximately t=57 in our example). At this time, attack connections are filtered out by the mitigation engine, allowing service availability to return to pre-attack levels. From this point forward, the TCP state transitions and RTTs resemble a scenario with no attack present.

It is critical to note that only a small percentage of connections are affected by the attack when Canopy is active. This can be observed in Figure 9: the 90th and 75th percentiles of average client RTTs spike while the lower percentiles remain consistent near baseline RTT for the duration of the experiment. The models and attacks tested all exhibit similar TCP and RTT trends; the critical difference is that faster attack detection and mitigation lead to quicker recoveries for benign client performance.

Our mitigation results also show that Canopy is effective at generalizing to new or unknown attacks; Canopy detects attack campaigns even when not trained on the particular type of attack. Though the detection (and the subsequent mitigation) of an attack when utilizing N-1 models is slightly delayed, the SUT still recovers in a timely fashion. Detection time increases to 750 milliseconds when Apache Killer is held out from the training data, versus 650 milliseconds with a model trained with Apache Killer. Recovery times for N-1 also increase by around one second in comparison to global models.

## 5 DISCUSSION

In the previous section, we looked at the concrete results from our experimentation with Canopy. In this section, we discuss these results in context, noting some perhaps unexpected results, and examining the potential impactfulness and practicality of Canopy in the real world.

### 5.1 Comparing Performance of Learning Methods

The detection and mitigation results presented in Section 4 indicate that, overall, the ensemble method achieves the best performance. In spite of their potential to capture rich complexities and their specific applicability to temporal data, TCNs are consistently outperformed by ensemble and decision tree models when inserted into our mitigation engine and evaluated for practical performance (i.e., our mitigation metrics), as they can be susceptible to false positives and take significantly longer to mitigate attacks. The efficacy of simpler machine learning methods is a testament to the richness of the features extracted through the TCP state data featurization process discussed in Section 3.2.

### 5.2 Generalizing to Never-Before-Seen Attacks

The N-1 and N-2 results shown in Tables 2 and 3 respectively indicate that Canopy is able to generalize to never-before-seen attacks with minimal dropoff in performance. This observation is further supported by the minimal increase in the time to detect and mitigate Apache Killer when using an N-1 model for mitigation, shown in Tables 5 and 6 respectively.

While the recall in the N-2 experiments decreases to 0.86, the ensemble model maintains a precision of 0.99. This drop in recall doesn’t necessarily have an adverse effect on practical performance, given that Canopy need not correctly identify all examples from an attacker to trigger mitigative action.

### 5.3 Comparison with Other Work

The comparison between Canopy and related work is largely complicated by differences in datasets and ex-
As can be seen, all the examples in this comparison report metrics (accuracy, precision, recall) between 95% and 100%. In multiple cases (Lima Filho et al., 2019; Sharafaldin et al., 2018), the results pertaining specifically to LSDDoS are inconclusive because the datasets used predominantly comprise high-volume traffic. The lone real-time solution, FINELAME, reports 100% accuracy in detecting Slowloris, although this is the only LSDDoS attack employed in the study. It is also worth noting that the supervized approaches, all except FINELAME which performs anomaly detection, do not mention evaluating on never-before-seen attacks.

In an attempt to further validate our approach, we investigated evaluating our model on the LSDDoS traffic in the publicly available CICIDS2017 dataset employed by Sharafaldin et al. However, the absence of distinct external client IPs prevents the use of our IP-based data featurization process.\(^6\)

\(^6\)The CICIDS2017 test network includes a NAT on the border router that obscures source IP addresses of traffic to the victim server. Since the packet capture appears to have been recorded from a network interface internal to the victim’s network, all external traffic appears to be coming from the router itself.
Table 8: Comparison of results to related work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Lima Filho et al., 2019)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>mostly flood attacks; &lt;1% slow HTTP</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINELAME (Demoulin et al., 2019)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Slowloris</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Siracusano et al., 2018)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Slowloris, Slowread, Slowpost</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sharafaldin et al., 2018)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>mostly high-volume; Slowloris</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canopy (global experiments)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Slowloris, R.U.D.Y., ApacheKiller, Slowread, Sockstress</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canopy (N-1 experiments)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While related work in the field of DDoS prevention has sought to use aspects of TCP state data to detect attacks, our work presents a new approach for encapsulating TCP state data in a form that lends itself well towards accurate, rapid prediction of malicious behavior.

5.4 Limitations and Future Work

We have shown Canopy to be highly effective in detecting and mitigating LSDDoS attacks. However, during attack mitigation, Canopy erroneously blocks roughly 5% of benign clients for 4 seconds each, on average. Here, we discuss potential avenues to improve Canopy’s performance.

**Windowing Parameters.** As described in Section 3.2, TCP state data is aggregated in 100 millisecond time windows for each IP. Given that TCP state changes often occur far more quickly, it may be useful to shrink the size of this window. This increased granularity could improve detection performance.

**Input Resolution.** Also mentioned in Section 3.2 is the fact that each data example is composed of 10 time windows. While this number needs to be kept reasonably small in order to maintain adequately fast mitigation metrics as described in Section 4.2, shortening the duration of each window would enable the resolution (or number of windows that make up an example) to be increased without increasing the amount of real time that an example spans. For example, 40 time windows of 25 milliseconds span the same duration of time as 10 windows of 100 milliseconds.

**Increased Client Activity and Attack Variety.** The presented results are based on LSDDoS attacks and clients listed in the paper. While we strive to choose attackers and clients that were representative of what Canopy would see in the wild, these sets can always be improved. To increase the viability of the system, more complex client user patterns, new LSDDoS attacks, and a larger variety of SUTs could be added to the training datasets.

5.5 Performance

While Canopy has a relatively small footprint, resource efficiency is not the primary goal for this paper. We find that the overhead of running our sensor on the SUT is minimal during periods without attack. During such periods, CPU usage hovers around 5% of a single core to track TCP states. During periods of attack, resource usage increases: Canopy will utilize an entire CPU core until the attack is mitigated. The inference engine uses about half a core to make classification decisions, regardless of the presence or intensity of an attack. We also reserve four CPU cores for Kafka. While four cores is significant with respect to the resources of our small experimental testbed, this aspect of the infrastructure scales well and would remain this size for a large real-world deployment.

6 CONCLUSION

With this paper, we proposed Canopy, a novel approach for identifying LSDDoS attacks by applying machine learning techniques to extract meaning from observed patterns of TCP state transitions. Our tests showed that Canopy was able to detect and mitigate these low-and-slow attacks accurately and quickly: attacks were detected during 100% of test runs within 650 milliseconds, with clients’ experience restored to normal within 7.5 seconds. Our tests also showed that

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Future work may include replacing the inefficient conntrack userspace application with a custom TCP monitoring kernel module of our own.
Canopy exhibits minimal erroneous mitigation of benign clients, achieving a precision of 99%. Finally, we showed that Canopy’s capabilities generalize well to LSDDoS attacks not included in its training dataset, identifying never-before-seen attacks within 750 milliseconds.

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REFERENCES


