Combat Simulation to Support the Conceptual Design of Equipment

for the Soldier System

Vikram Mittal

, Graham Webb

, Jackson Steiner

, Luke Shriver

and Sierra Butcher

Department of Systems Engineering, United States Military Academy, West Point, U.S.A.

Army Cyber Institute, West Point, U.S.A.

Keywords: Combat Modelling, Cyber Capabilities, Soldier Systems.

Abstract: Simulation will play an increasingly important role in designing future equipment for soldiers. The complex

operational environment necessitates that the soldier be treated as a system. A soldier system can be defined

as a soldier using equipment to complete a mission. Though it is often difficult to capture the mission aspect

of the system, constructive combat simulation provides a technique for testing out new equipment on a soldier

early in the system design lifecycle. Though combat simulations have historically been used primarily for

training purposes, they can be readily modified for analysis of new military capabilities. Additionally, these

simulations can be modified to reflect the changes in physical and cognitive load associated with these new

capabilities. This paper outlines a methodology for using combat simulation to perform analysis of new

capabilities for the soldier system. A case study is then presented to perform a trade space analysis on different

tactical-cyber capabilities given to dismounted soldiers. Using the Infantry Warrior Simulation (IWARS), the

case study quantified changes in soldier survivability and lethality with the addition of new technologies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Ground combat will always play a decisive role in

future conflicts. And as mission sets continue to

become more complex, so must the soldier. The

soldier is no longer a person with a helmet and a gun

standing on a volley line, shooting at an enemy.

Rather, the soldier is part of a complex system, where

they use an array of cutting-edge technology to

maintain a tactical advantage in a combat scenario.

As new technology gets introduced into this

soldier system, systems level analysis is required to

ensure that the technology provides the soldier with

the required capabilities without producing negative

consequences. This analysis requires the ability to

assess the usage of the new equipment in a relevant

operational environment. Combat simulation

provides the ability to perform this analysis early in

the conceptual phase, allowing for the determination

of design requirements for new equipment. Several

challenges exist with this approach, especially that

these simulation packages are typically developed for

training purposes and do not readily allow for the

integration of new equipment.

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2485-2366

This paper presents a methodology to use combat

simulation to analyse changes to the soldier system.

It then presents a case study that evaluates different

tactical-cyber equipment. This analysis includes

accounting for change in physical and cognitive

overloading associated with these different

capabilities.

2 CHALLENGES OF DESIGNING

MILITARY EQUIPMENT

2.1 The Soldier System

In ancient armies, soldiers were given uniforms,

protective equipment, weapons, and sustenance. As

technologies advanced for one individual component,

it was simply swapped out, such as the iron age

resulting in the weapons changing from bronze.

However, the equipment set currently carried by

soldiers is significantly more advanced, creating a

complex system with numerous interrelationships. As

240

Mittal, V., Webb, G., Steiner, J., Shriver, L. and Butcher, S.

Combat Simulation to Support the Conceptual Design of Equipment for the Soldier System.

DOI: 10.5220/0009883602400247

In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2020), pages 240-247

ISBN: 978-989-758-444-2

such, the design of military equipment requires a

systems-level design approach.

The systems architecture for the soldier-system,

as shown in Figure 1, consists of three components:

the soldier, their equipment, and the mission to be

completed. This architecture leverages the Soldier

System Enterprise Architecture by the Natick Soldier

Research, Development, and Engineering Center

(McDonnell, 2015). The equipment alone is just a set

of inanimate objects; however, when coupled with a

soldier, the soldier and equipment form a relationship

that allows them to complete a mission. A systems

analysis requires understanding the internal

properties of each component and the interactions

between components. These interactions create

emergent effects that must be accounted for to fully

characterize soldier performance.

Figure 1: The soldier system defined as a soldier using their

equipment to perform a mission.

2.2 System Level Analysis

Although the soldier system, as depicted in Figure 1,

appears somewhat straightforward, it is difficult to

actually understand all the different interactions and

relationships related to the addition of a new piece of

equipment. The interaction between the new piece of

equipment and the user, indicated by the overlap in

the Venn Diagram in Figure 1, can be understood

through a standard usability assessment. However,

the interaction between the soldier using the

equipment to perform the mission, indicated by the

plus sign in Figure 1, is difficult to analyze. This

analysis becomes exceedingly difficult when the new

equipment is still in the conceptual phase.

For example, suppose that the Army is

considering replacing their existing body armor with

a slightly heavier armor material that provides

substantially more protection. However, in an urban

environment, even a small increase in weight will

result in the soldier moving significantly slower. In

turn, the enemy soldiers can more accurately shoot

the slower moving soldier, allowing them to shoot the

soldier in an unarmored location, resulting in an

overall decrease in survivability. This analysis would

be difficult to perform without actually developing

the body armor and testing it in an operational

environment. Even if the armor is developed, no

commander would agree to having their soldiers

carrying unproven equipment in combat.

2.3 Physical and Cognitive Loading

The largest negative emergent property from the

addition of new equipment is related to physical and

cognitive loading. Ideally, soldiers would be given

every possible capability to aid in destroying their

enemy. However, soldiers are already carrying over

100 lb of equipment consisting of weapons, armor,

ammunition, food, water, and electronics (Mittal,

2019). Since soldiers are already carrying close to

their maximum load, any additional equipment will

displace equipment currently carried. If this

displacement comes from batteries, water, or food,

the maximum duration of the mission must decrease.

In addition to carrying a large amount of

equipment, the soldiers must be able to operate it. The

new electronics on a soldier includes radios,

navigation tools, computers, minesweepers, and

robots. Soldiers are expected to operate all of this

equipment while “keeping their head on a swivel” and

“scanning their sector.” Modern combat in urban

environments, where soldiers must detect and identify

enemies in a crowd, imposes a significant cognitive

load on soldiers. As such, any new equipment must

not significantly increase the cognitive loading on the

soldier (Shanker & Richtel, 2011).

3 COMBAT MODELING

3.1 Overview of Combat Models

Combat simulation provides the capacity to test new

equipment in an operational setting, albeit, both the

equipment and operational setting are simulated

(Washburn & Kress, 2009). The military divides

combat simulation into three categories—live,

virtual, and constructive. Live simulations use real

soldiers with real equipment in a simulated

environment, such as a training site. Virtual

simulations involve real soldiers using virtual

equipment in a virtual environment, similar to a video

game. Constructive simulations employ virtual

soldiers using virtual equipment in a virtual

environment (Hodson, 2017).

Each type of simulation can play a role in

developing, evaluating, and testing requirements at

various stages in the system lifecycle. Live and virtual

Combat Simulation to Support the Conceptual Design of Equipment for the Soldier System

241

simulations require that the system already be

prototyped. As such, these simulations aid in system

validation and assessing the overall system usability.

Meanwhile, constructive simulations allow for

modelling a virtual soldier using virtual equipment in

a simulated environment. Since the soldiers are

virtual, their capabilities can be readily augmented to

reflect the addition of new equipment even if the

equipment has not been designed or built. Therefore,

constructive simulations are inherently useful for

systems still in their conceptual phase, such as those

used in this analysis.

Indeed, constructive simulation is used for

equipment design in a number of industries to include

medical devices, automotive, and consumer products

(INCOSE, 2015). Additionally, constructive

simulation is used for larger defense applications.

However, its usage has been fairly limited for analysis

of the soldier system (Hill & Miller, 2017).

3.2 Limits of Modelling New

Technologies

Though a range of constructive combat modeling

programs are available, most of them are not intended

for analysis; rather they are developed for training

(Tolk, 2012). In particular, these software packages

are used as part of larger live training events to

simulate events occurring elsewhere in the battlefield.

For example, a brigade will be performing a mission

at the National Training Center as part of a larger

overall division-level mission. The other brigades on

the battlefield are simulated with the results of the

simulation influencing the mission of the real unit.

Since these simulation packages are not designed

for analysis, they do not readily allow for the addition

of new equipment (Tolk, 2012). For example, many

of these simulation packages would not readily have

the capacity to model novel technologies such as an

exoskeleton or adaptive camouflage patterns.

Additionally, the methodologies that underly the

simulations are based on fundamental military

doctrine where soldiers and units shoot, move, and

communicate. The addition of new technology can

substantially change these methodologies. For

example, shooting algorithms rely on detecting a

target, identifying that the target is an enemy,

orienting towards the target, shooting the target,

determining where the bullet strikes the target, and

then determining the damage done from the hit. The

addition of a threat recognition system would change

this process because the soldier would no longer need

to identify the target as an enemy; rather, the new

system would automate that process for the soldier.

4 METHODOLOGY

Figure 2 displays a methodology for using combat

simulation to analyse different performance metrics

related to future military technology. This process is

applicable to all military technology; however, it is

tailored to those technologies that are still in the

conceptual phase that will result in substantial

changes in how soldiers operate.

Similar to any type of systems analysis, the first

phase is to define the problem. This phase starts by

defining a set of relevant missions for a given soldier.

These mission sets can be found in military doctrine.

These missions are then modelled in a simulation

package to provide a baseline set of performance

metrics for this analysis. These simulations can

achieve some level of validation through comparison

to performance data from training sites.

The performance metrics from the systems-level

analysis provide insight into problems that need to be

solved. Typically, these metrics are survivability and

lethality, with the goal that a new technology

increases the ability of a soldier to kill their enemy

and/or decrease their likelihood of being killed by the

enemy (Washburn & Kress, 2009). Another common

metric is mission success rates, which is the

percentage of time that the soldiers can complete their

mission.

The second step of the process is to identify a

technology that will solve the problem identified in

the first step by improving the relevant performance

metric. The researcher then needs to understand how

the new technology will be implemented into the

combat scenario. They also need to determine how it

will change the individual soldier’s physical and

cognitive loading, since any new equipment will

result in changes in these parameters. Finally, it is

necessary to identify how the technology will change

a soldier’s skills. For example, the new technology

could reduce target acquisition time, make them shoot

more accurately, move faster, or have an increased

knowledge state about the battlefield.

The third step in the process is to perform the

operational analysis. The operational analysis

requires modifying the combat simulation to reflect

the new technology. For example, the soldier may

change their actions based on the information

provided by a new piece of equipment. In another

case, the soldier may simply execute their mission

faster because they are carrying a lighter load.

SIMULTECH 2020 - 10th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications

242

Figure 2: Methodology for performing a soldier system

analysis using combat simulation.

5 CASE STUDY: TACTICAL

CYBER CAPABILITIES

The methodology presented in Section 4 was

specifically designed to support a study on tactical

cyber capabilities for the United States Army. These

capabilities are expected to play a key role in future

small unit operations.

5.1 Define Problem

5.1.1 Base Scenario

Though the full span of Army mission sets is vast, this

analysis is limited to those performed by small

infantry units at the squad or platoon level. FM 3-

21.8: The Rifle Infantry Platoon and Squad gives four

common mission types performed by such a unit

(Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2016).

These mission types include:

 Raid: fast kinetic movement into an area to

engage a known enemy.

 Ambush: setting a stationary trap for an enemy,

then engaging when they are vulnerable.

 Combat patrol: movement through an area to find

and engage enemy targets.

 Destroy bunker: engaging a fortified enemy

position.

These four missions become more complex if they

are performed in an urban environment. First, enemy

targets are harder to detect and identify because they

are blended in with civilian non-combatants.

Additionally, urban combat involves multiple levels

(i.e., underground sewage systems, ground level,

multiple story buildings). Moreover, the buildings in

urban environments provide opportunities for cover

and concealment for both forces; meanwhile, the

buildings limit movement down canalized pathways.

5.1.2 Infantry Warrior Simulation

The Infantry Warrior Simulation (IWARS) is a

constructive, force-on-force, combat simulation that

focuses on small-unit operations. The primary

IWARS simulation objects are intelligent agents that

are semi-autonomous, which allows for realistic

modeling of soldier and unit behaviors. The

methodologies that underly IWARS are stochastic,

such that the simulation must be run numerous times

to get a range of output parameters to include

measures of survivability and lethality (Samaloty,

Schleper, Fawkes, & Muscietta, 2007).

IWARS was selected for this analysis because it

models individual soldiers conducting squad to

platoon size operations. Tactical cyber capabilities

are focused on units at this echelon. Other more

common simulation platforms aggregate individual

soldiers into units, not allowing for an accurate

modeling of soldiers with augmented capabilities

(Page, 2016).

An IWARS model is developed by placing blue

(friendly), red (enemy), and green (civilian) forces

onto a map. Each agent is assigned movement paths,

behaviors, and equipment, which then allows them to

perform a set of tasks that constitute their mission.

The behaviors can get very complex and are often

based on the actions of other agents in the scenario.

The performance of the soldier and their equipment is

captured through a parameterized database that can be

edited to reflect new capabilities. Screenshots of

IWARS is shown in Figure 3. The top image shows

the top-down view of a blue unit moving into a town

to clear the town of red forces. The bottom image

displays the 3D image for the agents shooting at the

intersection in the center of the right image.

The four missions were modeled in an urban

environment using IWARS. In all four cases, a small

unit of blue soldiers is conducting an operation

against ten red soldiers. The raid mission has a

platoon of blue forces sweeping into the town from

the north to find and kill the red forces that are

entrenched in the buildings. The ambush mission has

a blue force establishing an L-shaped ambush at a

crossroad in the center of the town. The combat patrol

has a blue force being ambushed by red forces and

then counter-attacking the red forces. The bunker

mission has the blue forces moving into the town, get

pinned down by a bunker, and then executing the

battle drill to destroy the bunker.

Define

Problem

• Determine mission set

• Build base model

• Evaluate current performance metrics

Solution

Design

• Identify method to improve performance metrics

• Determine change in physical and cognitive load

• Determine change in soldier skills

Operational

Analysis

• Modify scenario to reflect new technology

• Estimate the probability of technology working

• Evaluate change in performance metrics

Combat Simulation to Support the Conceptual Design of Equipment for the Soldier System

243

Figure 3: Screenshots of IWARS. Top-down view of raid

scenario showing blue forces moving south into a town

(top). Three-dimensional view of friendly and enemy

soldiers at the intersection in center of town (bottom).

5.1.3 Current Performance Metrics

The metrics of concern for this analysis are

survivability and lethality. These two metrics are

typically used qualitatively to describe the effect of

adding new equipment into the soldier system;

however, with combat modelling, these metrics can

be defined quantitatively. The survivability metric is

defined to be the percentage of blue forces (i.e.,

friendly soldiers) that survive a mission, and the

lethality metric is set as the percentage of red forces

(i.e., enemy soldiers) killed during a mission.

Table 1 displays the survivability and lethality

metrics for the four mission sets. Each scenario was

run 100 times to provide a desired relative precision

of 5 percent. Table 1 indicates the following:

 Raid: The blue forces outnumber the red forces

by a factor of 3 allowing them to overwhelm the

red forces. However, the blue forces incur a high

death toll because the red force is in a defensive,

fortified position.

 Ambush: The red forces have the element of

surprise, resulting in low survivability and

lethality metrics for the blue forces.

 Combat patrol: The combat patrol has equal

numbers of red and blue forces on the move, with

neither side having a solid defensive posture; as

such, both groups impose similar casualties.

 Destroy bunker: The destroy bunker mission has

a fairly high blue casualty rate, though the red

casualty rate is higher.

For all four scenarios, the survivability metric can

be significantly increased with the overall goal of

achieving a score of 100, which indicates that no

soldiers were killed during the mission. The results

indicate that across the scenarios, approximately half

of the blue forces die in each scenario. One method of

increasing the blue survivability is to increase their

lethality. If the blue forces can kill the red forces

faster, the red forces will impose less damage on the

blue forces. The outputs from the models indicate that

there is an opportunity to increase blue force lethality.

Table 1: Survivability and lethality metric scores for each

of the four baseline combat scenarios.



Survivability Lethality

Mission Type Average St. Dev Average St. Dev

Raid 56.6 8.0 88.3 8.0

Ambush 34.4 13.9 52.2 14.9

Combat Patrol 45.0 13.2 56.7 20.9

Destroy Bunker 44.2 11.6 76.8 14.0

5.2 Solution Design

5.2.1 Tactical Cyber Capabilities

The rapid growth of the consumer electronics market

provides numerous opportunities for technologies

that can increase a soldier’s lethality, and hence

survivability. Advances in fields such as artificial

intelligence, augmented reality, cloud-computing,

and micro-electronics can translate into game-

changing military technology (Wilson, 2016).

Meanwhile, enemy soldiers are carrying more

electronics that are vulnerable to a cyber-attack

(Almohammad & Speckhard, 2017). This

combination of events creates the potential for a new

set of cyber weaponry that will provide soldiers a

tactical edge, potentially increasing their survivability

and lethality (Porche, et al., 2018).

Though cyber weaponry is typically considered a

strategic level asset, many offensive cyber

capabilities have trickled down to the tactical, small-

unit level (Brantly & Collins, 2018). Similar to

strategic cyber weaponry, tactical cyber weaponry

allows dismounted soldiers to detect and exploit an

enemy’s communication channels. Since the full

range of possible tactical-cyber-attacks is very broad,

this study limits itself to looking at four types of

tactical cyber-attacks. These four tactical cyber-

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244

attacks were selected because they encompass a broad

range of different capabilities. Additionally, they

represent capabilities that are already fielded or under

development.

The first tactical cyber-attack is a localized attack

on the electric grid. Individual buildings are

connected to the larger electric grid with numerous

communication pathways (Congressional Research

Service, 2018). These communication channels can

be exploited to deny electric services to a building.

This would disrupt the enemy by throwing them into

a set of disarray. Additionally, if the attack is at night,

the enemy would lose the ability to use lights.

Another tactical cyber-attack involves the use of

radio frequency (RF) triangulation. If friendly forces

know the radio frequencies associated with an enemy

combatant, they can triangulate and track its position

(Liu, Zhang, Su, Li, & Xu, 2013). This type of

exploitation allows the soldier to observe the enemy

beyond line of sight while also getting positive

identification through their radio signals.

A third tactical cyber-attack is communication

denial, also known as jamming. Since communication

is done simply through sending radio signals through

the air, the signal can be lost if the noise thresholds

are increased. This can be achieved by simply

pushing a large amount of radio frequency noise into

the environment. This type of tactical cyber-attack

does not allow the enemy to synchronize efforts.

The fourth tactical cyber-attack is communication

intercepting. If the enemy forces are communicating

over an unencrypted network or if the encryption key

is known, friendly forces can intercept the enemy’s

communication, hence gaining new intelligence. This

information allows friendly forces to observe enemy

forces from a further range.

5.2.2 Physical and Cognitive Load

The different tactical cyber capabilities will impose a

different amount of physical and cognitive loading on

soldiers. To analyze the different physical loadings, it

is useful to break the capabilities into two categories:

active and passive (Shirey, 2000). Active implies that

signals are being transmitted to disrupt the enemy’s

communication channels. Passive implies that the

system is simply ingesting the enemy’s

communication channels and processing the results.

The localized grid attack and communication

denial capabilities require active devices. These

devices would impose a higher physical load on the

soldier since the system must transmit signals, which

is power intensive. A simple radio requires 10 W of

power, associated to 1 lb of batteries for 10 hours of

operation. Jamming devices can require 100 W of

power, requiring 1 lb of batteries for each hour of

operation (Leemans & Mittal, 2018).

Passive devices would be required for RF

localization and communication intercept. These

devices require significantly less power since they are

simply collecting radio signals. However, upon

collecting the signals, the results must be analyzed

which does require power. A normal computer for

analyzing these results would require approximately

10 W of power, although triangulating a position

would require significantly less power than

decrypting and analyzing communication data

(Leemans & Mittal, 2018). Though there are less heat

concerns for passive devices, they often require bulky

antennae that can operate at multiple wavelengths.

The cognitive load on a soldier from the devices

would be based on how much human input is required

for the capability. At the low end, communication

denial would require minimal human input outside of

turning on the device. RF localization imposes a

slight cognitive loading on the soldier since they are

provided with additional information, although the

use of Augmented Reality can reduce this cognitive

load. A localized grid attack would require

significantly more human input since the soldier

would be required to work around the different

safeguards. Meanwhile, communication intercept

would incur a large cognitive load on the soldier since

they must make sense of whatever information they

receive and process what is important.

5.3 Operational Analysis

5.3.1 Incorporation of Tactical Cyber

Each model was modified to reflect the addition of

each of the four tactical cyber capabilities. Since

IWARS does not inherently have these capabilities

built in, each capability had to be incorporated

through changing certain model attributes and soldier

behaviors. The localized grid attack capability was

incorporated by increasing the confusion and

acquisition times for red agents inside the relevant

structures. The RF localization capability was

modeled by continuously giving the blue agents the

knowledge of red force locations. IWARS provides

the capability for communication denial through

decreasing the probability of a successful

communication transmission. The communication

intercept capability was modeled by changing the

blue forces mission to reflect intelligence about

enemy plans.

Combat Simulation to Support the Conceptual Design of Equipment for the Soldier System

245

The physical load associated with the devices can

be integrated into the simulations by increasing the

overall load and reducing the speed associated with

soldier movement. Additionally, the cognitive load

can be integrated by slowing reaction times, reducing

their field of view, and including head-down time.

5.3.2 Scenario Results

Each of the four scenarios were rerun with the

incorporation of each of the four different tactical

cyber capabilities. Table 2 displays the survivability

score for each run, and Table 3 displays the change in

lethality score. The items in bold indicate a

substantial improvement from the baseline.

The results indicate that there was only a marginal

increase in the lethality metric in most of the mission

sets. For the most part, the simulations represent

doctrinal missions consisting of battle drills that are

intended to make the blue forces fairly effective at

killing the red forces. As such, the new capabilities

logically only provide marginal benefit in regard to

the number of red soldiers killed. However, further

analysis found that the blue forces were able to kill

the red forces earlier in the scenario.

As such, each of the new capabilities provided a

significant increase in survivability in at least one of

the mission sets. The RF localization capability

increases blue survivability for the raid and combat

patrol, by allowing the blue forces to avoid traps and

“fatal funnels” set by the red forces. Other

capabilities, such as communication denial provided

an increase in survivability by putting the red forces

into disarray and hindering their ability to coordinate

an attack. The communication intercept and localized

grid attacks also provide an increase in survivability;

however, these increases are limited.

Table 2: Survivability metric for each of the 4 combat

scenarios for the four different tactical cyber capabilities

(italicized number is the +/- 95% confidence interval).

Mission

Type

Base

Grid

Attack

Local.

Comm

Denial

Comm

Int.

Raid

56.6 55.5 82.6 67.9 72.9

±1.6 ±2.1 ±1.0 ±0.6 ±0.8

Ambush

34.4 30.7 56.1 38.7 48.7

±2.7 ±2.7 ±3.1 ±2.8 ±3.0

Combat

Patrol

45.0 42.0 73.4 67.2 71.2

±2.6 ±2.6 ±2.6 ±2.5 ±2.6

Destroy

Bunker

44.2 46.0 45.4 55.4 49.2

±2.3 ±1.9 ±2.2 ±1.7 ±2.2

Table 3: Lethality metric for each of the 4 combat scenarios

for the four different tactical cyber capabilities (italicized

number is the +/- 95% confidence interval).

Mission

Type

Base

Grid

Attack

Local.

Comm

Denial

Comm

Int.

Raid

88.3 82.8 97.3 88.8 88.7

±1.6

±1.7 ±1.6 ±1.6 ±1.6

Ambush

52.2 57.8 53.1 56.2 57.8

±2.9

±2.7 ±3.1 ±2.8 ±3.0

Combat

Patrol

56.7 56.9 58.0 57.0 56.1

±4.1

±4.4 ±4.3 ±3.8 ±4.3

Destroy

Bunker

76.8 78.7 77.8 81.3 77.4

±2.7

±2.0 ±2.5 ±2.2 ±2.3

5.3.3 Validation of Results

Since the technology for the different cyber

capabilities are not available, the models cannot be

validated through real-world comparison. The base

scenarios, however, were compared to performance

reports for small-unit exercises in a similar training

site; the model results aligned well with these reports.

The different models were also validated by

consulting with infantry and signal officers who

served as subject matter experts that could evaluate

the scenarios and determine if the model results align

with their expectations. The infantry officers agreed

that based on their best judgement, they would expect

comparable changes in red and blue force casualties

to what the simulation found.

5.4 Case Study Conclusions

The four scenarios of interest—the raid, ambush,

combat patrol, and destroy a bunker—currently incur

a high casualty rate for the infantry squad. However,

the combat models indicate that the inclusion of new

tactical cyber capabilities will allow the unit to take

less casualties over the mission.

The grid attack capability provided a statistically

insignificant increase in survivability across the

mission sets. Though the enemies were less

organized, the increase in cognitive loading on the

soldiers offset this benefit. The RF localization

capability offered the largest increase in survivability

in three of the four mission sets. The benefit for RF

localization is that the system required the least

change in physical and cognitive loading. The

communication denial system and communication

intercept systems both provided benefits in certain

mission sets. However, the communication denial

system imposed a large physical burden on the soldier

due to the weight of the system, and the

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communication intercept system imposed a large

cognitive load on the soldier.

The results of this study indicate that if the Army

can only adopt one tactical cyber capability for

fielding to its infantrymen, they should proceed with

an RF localization capability. Additionally, the

simulations indicate the importance of not increasing

a soldier’s physical and cognitive load, which can

potentially offset any benefit from a new capability.

6 CONCLUSIONS

As the complexity of the world increases, militaries

are required to perform more complex operations. In

doing so, the soldier system, defined as the soldier,

equipment, and their mission sets, increases in

complexity. Therefore, the addition of new

equipment onto a soldier requires a systems level

analysis that involves having soldiers using the

equipment in an operational environment. Since this

is not feasible for equipment, especially in the

conceptual design phase, simulation will play a

crucial role in this analysis.

Several combat simulations are available, though

many have historically been used for training

purposes; regardless, they can be modified to account

for new soldier capabilities. This paper outlines a

methodology for performing such an analysis.

The paper then presented a case study that

performs a trade space analysis on different tactical-

cyber capabilities given to dismounted soldiers. This

analysis used the combat simulation package IWARS

to compare changes in soldier performance with the

additional of different new tactical cyber capabilities.

This methodology was developed primarily to

perform the analysis on tactical cyber trade-space

presented in the case study. Future works will look at

expanding this methodology to other tactical

equipment including biomechanical enhancements,

future weapons, and autonomous systems.

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