The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2012 and Matching Theory

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Abstract: The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2012 was awarded jointly to A. E. Roth and L. S. Shapley “for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.” The reason why it was awarded to A. E. Roth and L. S. Shapley is two-fold: their extremely valuable efforts in applying scientific findings to very important real life problems such as kidney exchange and student placement problems, and their contribution to the theory of stable matchings.

In this mini survey, we will first present the theory of stable matchings starting from the basics such as the Gale-Shapley Algorithm, and then discuss some variations encountered in various contexts. Two important applications, namely student placement and kidney exchange problems, will be given special consideration. The main focus of the survey will be the role of graph theory in the study of stable matchings. In particular, the links between stable matchings and the problem of finding an inclusion-wise maximal matching of minimum size will be explored. As a natural consequence of this link, the field of graph classes which became increasingly important, will be presented and illustrated with examples from matching theory.

1 INTRODUCTION

When the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to A. E. Roth and L. S. Shapley in 2012, this became the subject of a number of articles in the popular media. This popularity was indeed due to the importance of the two important applications of stable matchings for the whole human kind: placing candidates to institutions in a competitive environment and the allocation of donors to patients for kidney transplantation. Most of these articles emphasized the tremendous efforts A. E. Roth and L. S. Shapley spent for communicating their findings into institutions and the extremely positive outputs resulting from these hands-on experience. However, not surprisingly, the contributions of both Nobel prize recipients to the mathematical background of stable matchings was neglected in these popular articles. In this mini survey, while the subtlety of these applications will be covered thoroughly, we aim at shedding light on the developments in matching theory which led A. E. Roth and L. S. Shapley to the Nobel Prize from the graph theoretical point of view.

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basics on stable matchings. Then, we consider the problem of finding a stable matching under various assumptions that can be encountered in real life applications such as student placement and kidney exchange problems. The existence of a stable matching, and in case it exists, the computational hardness of finding one in each one of these contexts are discussed. Various challenges encountered in student placement and kidney exchange applications are analyzed in more depth in Section 3. In Section 4, we turn our attention to graph theoretical aspects of stable matchings and related problems. We present the notion of graph classes and discuss to what extent it is helpful when considering hard-to-solve problems in general. We illustrate the use of graph classes on the problem of Minimum Maximal Matching which is closely related to stable matchings.

2 STABLE MATCHINGS

The recent book by the Nobel recipient A. E. Roth entitled “Who Gets What âè¢ and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design” (Roth, 2016) gives an extremely rich range of situations where stable matchings play a key role in our daily lives.

Economists study how societies allocate resources. In market economics, most of the allocation problems are solved by the price system: high wages attract workers into a particular occupation,
high energy prices induce consumers to conserve energy, etc. In many instances, however, using the price system would encounter legal and ethical objections. Consider, for instance, the allocation of public-school places to children, or the allocation of human organs to patients who need transplants. This is the territory of matching markets, where â€œsellerâ€™sÂ¹ and â€œbuyerâ€™sÂ¹ must choose each other, and price is noÂ¹ the only factor determining who gets what. In such situations, typically, there are some more desired agents/items than others such as high ranked universities, jobs with higher wages or healthier and richer partner to marry. Markets where conventional price-making does not apply such as markets for kidneys, job markets, assignment of users to servers in a large distributed Internet service, student placement problems and on-line dating services are the topic of matchmaking where a “good” matching is sought. A. E. Roth explains in his book in a very fluent and accessible way how preferences are taken into account in matchmaking by using the principals of stable matchings, illustrated with examples from our daily lives.

The notion of stable matching was first introduced by D. Gale and L. S. Shapley (Gale and Shapley, 1962). In this seminal paper, the authors considered a matching problem between \( n \) women and \( n \) men, each one having a total preference list over the other set; this is where the alternative term stable marriage comes from. Let us first introduce the notion of stable matchings through a placement problem which will help us to give a better illustration of other variations in upcoming sections.

2.1 Gale-Shapley Algorithm

Consider the problem of placing \( n \) candidates \( C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \) into \( n \) institutions \( I_1, I_2, \ldots, I_n \). Each candidate has a total preference order over the institutions and each institution has a total preference order over the candidates. The aim is to find a “good” assignment of candidates to institutions which takes into account the preferences of both sides. This problem can be modeled using a bipartite graph; one part of the bipartition contains vertices representing candidates and the other part contains vertices representing institutions. In case each side has a total preference list over the other set, every vertex in one side is adjacent to every vertex in the other side and we obtain what we call a complete bipartite graph. A placement is an assignment of each candidate to an institution. This corresponds to a matching, that is, a set of edges sharing no common end-vertex, in the related bipartite graph.

Clearly, there are many matchings corresponding to different placements in such a bipartite graph. What are the “natural” properties we can require for a “good” placement / matching? Let us consider an example (taken from (Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 2012)) where candidates 1, 2, 3 and 4 are to be placed into institutions S, O, D and P. The preferences of every candidate and every institution are expressed as lists where the notation \( B \succ C \) is used to indicate that institution B is preferred to institution C.

\[
\begin{align*}
1 & : S \succ O \succ D \succ P \\
2 & : S \succ D \succ O \succ P \\
3 & : S \succ O \succ P \succ D \\
4 & : D \succ P \succ O \succ S
\end{align*}
\]

D. Gale and L. S. Shapley formalized the notion of a “good” matching as follows. A pair of candidate and institution not matched to each other, but mutually prefers each other to their current matches forms an unstable pair. An assignment is called a stable matching if it contains no unstable pair. In the above example, assume there is a matching with assignments 1-P and 2-D: It can be seen that candidate 1 prefers D to P, and institution D prefers candidate 1 to 2. It follows that 1 and D constitute an unstable pair and therefore such a matching is not stable.

D. Gale and L. S. Shapley proposes the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, thereafter called the GS Algorithm (shorthand for Gale-Shapley Algorithm), which finds a stable matching in a setting with \( n \) institutions, \( n \) candidates and preference lists of each agent over the other set. Before going into detail, let us present the GS Algorithm in its original form of marriages between men and women, and then come back to the problem of placing candidates to institutions for further discussion.

In the first round, first each unengaged man proposes to the woman he prefers most, and then each woman replies “maybe” to her suitor she most prefers and “no” to all other suitors. She is then provisionally “engaged” to the suitor she most prefers so far, and that suitor is likewise provisionally engaged to her. In each subsequent round, first each unengaged man proposes to the most-preferred woman to whom he has not yet proposed (regardless of whether the woman is already engaged), and then each woman replies “maybe” if she is currently not engaged or if she prefers this man over her current provisional partner (in this case, she rejects her current provisional partner who becomes unengaged). The provisional nature of engagements provides the right of an already-engaged woman to “trade up”.

This process is repeated until everyone is engaged, which yields the final set of marriages (a matching between men and women). It should be noted that, once each side reveals their preferences, GS Algorithm works as a black box in the sense that no proposition occurs in reality and the algorithm simply produces the resulting matching.

**Theorem 2.1.** (Gale and Shapley, 1962) In a setting where n candidates and n institutions express their preferences over the other set, the deferred acceptance algorithm always finds a stable matching that places all candidates.

When applied to the above example, the GS Algorithm yields the following matching: (1D, 2P, 3S, 4O). This matching is an institution-optimal stable matching in the sense that no institution is better off in another stable matching. One can also note that the roles of the men (candidates) and the women (institutions) are perfectly symmetric in the algorithm. Consequently, by exchanging their roles in the algorithm, we can obtain the candidate-optimal stable matching.

**Theorem 2.2.** (Gale and Shapley, 1962) GS algorithm where men propose finds a men-optimal matching. GS algorithm where women propose finds a women-optimal matching. The optimal matching for one is the worst matching for the other, but both are stable matchings.

In (Gale and Shapley, 1962) where D. Gale and L. S. Shapley established the theory of stable matchings, they wrote that they hope this hypothetical problem of stable marriage between men and women finds real and useful applications in the future. What they did not know by the time was that, the very same GS Algorithm has already been used in 1952 to assign medical school graduates to hospitals in Illinois (Roth, 2008). After all, isn’t it natural to think that one should not be an engineer or a mathematician to suggest a similar algorithm when confronted with such a problem. Later on, it was noted that the GS Algorithm has been rediscovered and used independently over and over in various contexts (Roth, 2008). On the other hand, as we will see in forthcoming sections, handling new types of constraints and various assumptions will require much deeper mathematical skills.

### 2.2 Incentive Compatible Strategies

Is it possible that candidates, knowing that the placement is made with the institution-proposing GS Algorithm, announce their preferences erroneously on purpose and be better off; i.e. they are placed in a more preferred institution? Even if this seems to be pretty unlikely, a simple example shows that this can happen. In our example, assume the institution-proposing GS Algorithm is applied and the institution-optimal stable matching (1D, 2P, 3S, 4O) is obtained. Now assume that candidate 4 misreports its preference list on purpose as D≻P≻S≻O instead of her real preference order D≻P≻O≻S. Now, institution-proposing GS Algorithm will give the following matching which is stable with respect to the announced preferences: (1O, 2D, 3S, 4P). Candidate 4 is now matched to P which she prefers to O in reality. In other words, by misreporting her preferences, she is matched to a better choice for her. This is called a manipulation and it is indeed not a desired property in such a setting. A natural question is then, whether there is an algorithm which is immune to any kind of manipulation, a so-called incentive proof algorithm? The answer is unfortunately negative as noted by the following “impossibility theorem”:

**Theorem 2.3.** (Roth, 1982) No stable matching mechanism (algorithm) exists for which stating the true preferences is a dominant strategy for every agent.

As stated in Theorem 2.3, the GS Algorithm is not incentive proof. In other words, it does not motivate all agents to express their true preferences in every possible setting. Nonetheless, there are some good news: May be D. Gale and L. S. Shapley were not aware of it when they published their original paper in 1962 (Gale and Shapley, 1962) but their algorithm turned out to be more robust than expected as shown later on by A. E. Roth:

**Theorem 2.4.** (Roth, 1984) The GS Algorithm gives a stable matching with respect to real preferences even in presence of manipulations.

It can be checked that the matching (1O, 2D, 3S, 4P) obtained under manipulation is a stable matching with respect to real (original) preferences. As suggested by Theorem 2.3, the institution-proposing GS Algorithm is open to candidate’s manipulation (and candidate-proposing GS Algorithm is open to institution’s manipulation). Theorem 2.4 states in turn that, after all, preferences manipulated by candidates can eventually place them into better institutions but never into worse ones. Both in (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and (Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 2012), it is recommended that in order not to encourage manipulations, and also keeping in mind that institutions exist basically for candidates, the use of candidate-proposing GS Algorithm should be preferred in such placement problems. This choice will ensure that truth telling is the best option for candidates. As a consequence, the preferences
will reflect a more realistic value of the institutions, and one will avoid any kind of mistrust in the mechanism due to candidates gaming the system (see examples in Section 3.1).

Let us now focus on some variations of the placement problem that occur in real life situations and discuss how we can deal with them.

2.3 Incomplete Preference Lists with Ties

In a placement problem, what happens if a candidate does not list all the institutions in his/her preference list? Can we still guarantee the existence of a stable matching? If yes, how to find it and how many candidates can be placed in a stable matching? This problem, called stable matching with incomplete preference lists, is considered by D. Gale and M. Sotomayor:

**Theorem 2.5.** (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985) In a stable matching problem with incomplete preference lists, the GS Algorithm modified in such a way that only candidates/institutions existing in a preference list receive proposals always gives a stable matching. Moreover, in every stable matching, candidates and institutions which are not assigned are the same.

It follows from Theorem 2.5 that an instance of stable matching with incomplete lists has all its stable matchings of the same size and a slightly modified version of the GS Algorithm can find one.

Assume now that in addition to incomplete preference lists, we also allow ties, that is, equally preferred candidates or institutions in the preference lists. Such a situation is very likely to happen when institutions order candidates according to their scores at some exam. In a stable matching problem with incomplete lists with ties, if we assume that equally preferred candidates or institutions do not cause an unstable pair, then there is always a stable matching and one can be found in polynomial time. However, these stable matchings do not necessarily have the same size and finding one having the largest size (which is clearly more desirable in all applications) is an NP-hard problem (Iwama and Miyazaki, 2008). On the other hand, if we assume that equally preferred candidates or institutions may cause a pair to be unstable, then the existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed. However, it can be decided whether there is a stable matching or not, and if any, a stable matching can be found in polynomial time. Furthermore, in case there is a stable matching, every stable matching has the same size, thus seeking for a largest stable matching is not an issue (Iwama and Miyazaki, 2008).

2.4 Is There a “Best” Stable Matching?

In Section 2.1, we have already mentioned two special stable matchings, namely candidate-optimal and institution-optimal stable matchings. These two stable matchings are in some sense the two extremes and there can be many others. It has been shown that in a stable matching problem, there can be exponentially many stable matchings in the number of candidates/institutions (Iwama and Miyazaki, 2008). This observation arises the question of whether other optimization criteria could be considered for the quality of stable matchings. Let us mention three classical criteria from the literature. Let $p_I(C)$ denote the position of candidate $C$ in the preference list of institution $I$, and similarly $p_C(I)$ denote the position of institution $I$ in the preference list of candidate $C$. Clearly, every candidate desire to be matched to an institution with higher rank in his/her preference list, and vice versa.

For a stable matching $M$, the regret cost measures the worst assignment in $M$ as follows:

$$r(M) = \max\{\max_{(C,I) \in M} p_I(C), p_C(I)\}.$$ 

The egalitarian cost $c(M)$ and the sex-equal cost $d(M)$ of a stable matching $M$ are defined as follows:

$$c(M) = \sum_{(C,I) \in M} p_I(C) + \sum_{(C,I) \in M} p_C(I).$$

$$d(M) = \sum_{(C,I) \in M} p_I(C) - \sum_{(C,I) \in M} p_C(I).$$

The minimum regret stable matching problem (the minimum egalitarian stable matching problem and the minimum sex-equal stable matching problem, respectively) is to find a stable matching $M$ with minimum $r(M)$ ($c(M)$ and $d(M)$, respectively). Polynomial time algorithms to find a minimum regret stable matching and a minimum egalitarian stable matching have been derived in the literature, whereas the minimum sex-equal stable matching problem has been shown to be NP-hard (Iwama and Miyazaki, 2008). As illustrated in these examples, the computational complexity of finding the “best” stable matching depends on the nature of the optimization criteria.

More details on variations of stable matching problems and their algorithmic and computational hardness issues can be found in (Iwama and Miyazaki, 2008). Now, we will consider two important applications of stable matchings and focus on both practical and theoretical challenges encountered during their implementations.
3 IMPORTANT APPLICATIONS

As we already noted, the first application of the GS Algorithm was a centralized clearinghouse, a matching mechanism, to produce a matching of medical school graduates with hospitals from the preference lists. Note that this centralized clearinghouse, nowadays called the National Resident Matching Program, was subject to an antitrust suit challenging the use of the matching system which was claimed to be a conspiracy to hold down wages for residents and fellows, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Yet, following studies showed that, empirically, the wages of medical school graduates with and without centralized matching in fact do not differ. As a result, the deferred acceptance algorithm has been explicitly recognized as part of a pro-competitive market mechanism in American law (Roth, 2008).

In (Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 2012) and (Roth, 2016), disadvantages of decentralized systems compared to centralized matching mechanisms are explained with examples from our daily lives. In markets for skilled labors (such as doctors or lawyers), offers are made to specific individuals rather than “to the market” or a central clearinghouse. When an offer is rejected, it is often too late to make other offers. Thus, employers impose strict deadlines which force students/applicants to make decisions without knowing what other opportunities would later become available to them. In a decentralized market, the problem of coordinating the timing of offers can result in an unstable outcome. This phenomena is called congestion. A stunning example of congested markets is about law students hired by judges as early as second year of law school. This is clearly not beneficial for neither employers nor applicants but the congestion causes such an undesired situation (Roth, 2016). Another result of a bad market design addressed in (Roth, 2016) is about the admission of kindergarten students in Boston public schools, which consequently forced parents to go to playgrounds to “collect information” about other parent’s preferences in order to manipulate the system by making strategic choices (instead of expressing their real preferences).

Let us now focus on two important applications along with their practical and theoretical challenges.

3.1 School Admission

Whenever there are more than one school option for a given student, various placement systems are used throughout the world in order to place students to schools. Students (or their parents) are usually the main actors expressing their preferences. However, schools may also have preferences over students; an applicant may be given higher priority if for instance she lives close to the school, has a sibling who attends the school or has a higher score on a centralized exam. This student placement problem can be seen as a stable matching problem in a bipartite graph, where students are applicants and schools are institutions. One important point to note is that, unlike the example of applicants and institutions, the preferences of schools over students are required by regulation to be based on objectively verifiable criteria. It means that the incentive compatibility does not apply on the part of schools. In other words, it is out of question for schools to manipulate their preferences. It is therefore recommended to use the applicant-proposing GS algorithm in school admission problems. This would avoid the applicants to game the system by making strategic choices since they would know that, by telling their true preferences, they would be placed in their best choice, among all possible stable matchings.

Two implementations of the GS algorithm in school admission systems are given special consideration in (Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 2012); the New York City public high schools and Boston public schools which started to use a version of the GS Algorithm in 2003 and 2005, respectively.

The New York City public high schools were asking applicants to list five most preferred schools. Then, a three-round acceptance/rejection/wait-list procedure was applied. Those students who were not placed after the third round were assigned via an administrative process to a school for which they have not expressed any preference. This system suffered from congestion and resulted about 30,000 students per year to end up via the administrative process (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005a). As soon as a version of the applicant-proposing GS Algorithm adjusted for regulations and customs of New York City was implemented in 2003, only about 3,000 students ended up with the administrative process, a 90% of reduction compared to the previous years.

Unlike the New York City where the schools were active players expressing their choices by the acceptance/rejection/wait-list, in Boston, the placement system did not let the schools to express their preferences. The placement system, known as the “Boston mechanism”, was a central clearinghouse that can be seen as a priority based system which is still widely used in the world. It first matches as many applicants as possible with their first-choice schools, then tries to match the remaining applicants with their second-choice school, and so on. When a school is
demanded by too many students, some students are rejected using some priority criteria (e.g. sibling already attending the school, geographical proximity, etc.) previously fixed by the school authority. In order to be placed in a more preferred school, applicants had to identify which schools were realistic options for them and falsify their reported preferences, or else they would suffer from poor outcomes. In (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005b), the authors gave evidence of how the applicant-proposing GS algorithm would eliminate the need for making strategic choices, thus manipulating the system. After these successful implementations, other school systems in the US have followed New York and Boston by adopting similar algorithms.

3.2 Kidney Exchange

We now focus on the kidney exchange problem which was at the heart of the Scientific Background document compiled by the Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 2012). It is a known fact that the number of patients waiting for kidney transplantation is increasing every year. According to the United Network for Organ Sharing / Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network data, around 95,000 patients were in the waiting list for kidney transplant in 2019 in the US. Only 13,400 of them could be transplanted a kidney, 9,300 of which from deceased donors and the rest from living donors. Despite the fact that many patients die while waiting and many others become too ill to be eligible for transplantation, the waiting lists get longer and longer every year. Indeed, this makes any progress in the kidney transplantation problem extremely valuable for the human kind. L. S. Shapley and A. E. Roth, along with all the authors cited in (Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 2012), made giant steps towards improved solutions for the kidney transplantation problem via their contributions to the theory of stable matchings, and their extremely valuable efforts in implementing their findings in various institutions. In (Roth, 2012), A. E. Roth describes these developments as “a history of victory after victory in a battle that we are loosing” since the waiting lists become longer and longer every year despite all progress.

The conventional procedure for kidney donation is as follows. Some patients may have a willing kidney donor. However, a direct donation may be ruled out for medical reasons such as blood type mismatch. Still, if patient $P_i$ has a willing (but incompatible) donor $D_i$, and patient $P_2$ has a willing (but incompatible) donor $D_2$, then if $P_i$ is compatible with $D_2$ and $P_2$ with $D_1$, an exchange is possible: $D_2$ donates to $P_1$ and $D_1$ to $P_2$. Such a two-pair exchange is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Kidney exchange between two incompatible donor-patient pairs.

In many countries, non-profit organizations significantly increase kidney transplantation rates by centrally collecting donor and patient data and finding compatible donor-patient matches to perform kidney exchanges (in addition to direct donations from deceased or living donors). Using various medical indicators, doctors evaluates the compatibility of each donor with each patient. Below some threshold value, a donor is said to be incompatible with a patient. Let us represent each pair of patient $P_i$ and donor $D_i$ (who is willing to donate to his/her patient $P_i$, but not compatible with) by a vertex labeled $D_iP_i$. If donor $D_i$ is compatible with some patient $P_j$ for $i \neq j$ then add an arc from vertex $D_iP_i$ to vertex $D_jP_j$. It is important to note that the graph obtained in this way is directed; moreover it is not necessarily bipartite as in the case of student placement problem (see Figure 2 for an example). Each patient $P_i$ has a list of compatible donors represented by the end-vertices of the incoming arcs to vertex $D_iP_i$, and $P_i$ can possibly express his/her preference order over these donors.

Let us observe what a feasible kidney exchange solution corresponds to in this graph. One major difference with respect to the stable matching problem is that, exchange chains involving more than two vertices are possible: Donor $D_1$ donates to patient $P_2$, donor $D_2$ donates to patient $P_3$ and so on until donor $D_k$ donates to patient $P_1$. In the graph model, such a chain corresponds to a directed cycle since every incoming arc to a vertex should be followed by an outgoing arc (recall that a donor is only willing to donate his/her kidney if his/her patient can receive a kidney from another donor). See Figure 2 for an example of a graph modeling the kidney exchange problem and a possible solution.

Since a matching edge in the stable matching problem can be seen as a directed cycle between two vertices, these exchange chains are a generalization of matchings. Accordingly, A. Abdulkadiroğlu, A.
Figure 2: A graph modeling a kidney exchange relation (with compatibility estimates on arcs which are not shown) and a solution shown with bold arcs.

E. Roth and T. Sönmez extended previous works on kidney exchange where only two donor-patient pairs are allowed to the case of exchange chains by developing an algorithm called Top Trading Cycle (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999; Roth et al., 2004). Unfortunately, this nice theoretical achievement had very limited impact in real life due to several practical constraints. For example, for technical and ethical reasons, a kidney exchange requires simultaneous surgeries of all donors and patients. This implies six simultaneous surgeries (thus six surgical teams, six operating rooms, etc.) for an exchange chain of size three: which makes such exchanges impossible in practice due to infrastructural shortcomings and the hardness of scheduling medical staff. This fact implied the need for new methods which allow exchange chains involving only two donor-patient pairs. The Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences emphasizes the valuable contributions of A. E. Roth, T. Sönmez and M.U. Unver to show that one can still come up with efficient outcomes even if we restrict the size of the chains to two (Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 2012).

Note that the kidney exchange problem where only two-pair exchanges are allowed is modeled as a stable matching problem in a general graph (which is not necessarily bipartite) where edges are not directed since the two-pair condition implies that if donor $D_i$ donates to patient $P_j$, then necessarily donor $D_j$ donates to patient $P_i$. However, preference lists are not necessarily symmetric in the sense that the vertex $D_jP_i$ may prefer $D_iP_j$ the most whereas $D_jP_i$ is the least preferred neighbor of $D_iP_j$. This new problem is called the stable roommate problem in the literature. Unlike the bipartite case, a simple example shows that a stable matching does not necessarily exist in such a setting (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Let 1, 2, 3 and 4 be four students who will be placed in two rooms. As roommate, Student 1 prefers most Student 2, Student 2 prefers most Student 3 and Student 3 prefers most Student 1. Let also Student 4 be the least preferred roommate of all the others. Independently from the preferences of Student 4, no matching would be stable: let $i$ be the student matched with Student 4. Then the student whose most preferred roommate is $i$ and Student $i$ form an unstable pair since they prefer one another compared to their current roommates. This observation shows that the structure of the graph modeling the stable matching problem (here bipartite versus general) plays a key role in the solution of the problem. So, a natural question is the following: Under which circumstances in terms of the graph structure, the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed? We will come back to this question in Section 4.2 where we will discuss how graph classes play a key role in the computational complexity of various optimization problems.

Although the existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed in a general graph, it is possible to decide in polynomial time if a graph (with given preference lists of every vertex over its neighbors) admits a stable matching or not, and find a stable matching if any (Iwama and Miyazaki, 2008). On the other hand, in the context of kidney exchange (and also in other circumstances where a stable matching is sought), if there is no stable matching, it is desirable to find a matching which is as large as possible (to ensure a maximum number of kidney transplants) whilst the number of unstable pairs is kept minimum. Unfortunately, this problem turns out to be NP-hard and therefore related research is mainly focused on (sub-optimal) approximation algorithms. In addition to exchange chains, taking into account volunteer donors with no associated (incompatible) patient and transplants from deceased donors makes kidney exchange a very complex problem both theoretically and in practice. On the other hand, in practice, doctors express that preferences of patients over donors can be (and should be for ethical and efficiency reasons) neglected and considered as 0/1 preferences (Roth et al., 2015). This basically makes the kidney exchange problem a maximum (cardinality) matching problem (in case only two donor-patient pair exchanges are allowed).

Another interesting challenge in kidney exchange problem arose due to hospitals’ profit maximization motive which led them to try to arrange as many exchanges as possible in their premises. Large transplantation centers, becoming “individually rational” players, tend to withhold information about their easy-to-match (over-demanded) donor-patient pairs (with high compatibilities) and expose only their (under-demanded) hard-to-match donor-patient pairs (with low-compatibilities) to a centralized clearinghouse. They think that they may loose by showing their over-demanded pairs in the kidney market and thus prefer to match locally those over-demanded pairs before or after the exchange clears. In order to convince hospitals to the value of fully participat-
ing to the kidney market, experimental studies are conducted using randomly generated compatibility graphs (see e.g. (Ashlagi and Roth, 2012; Toulis and Parkes, 2011)). The random graph models in (Ashlagi and Roth, 2012) also took into account the “jellyfish structure” of real compatibility graphs; over-demanded pairs are highly connected between them and under-demanded pairs form rather sparse components. Studies on Erdös-Renyi random graphs allowed them to derive the following:

**Theorem 3.1.** (Ashlagi and Roth, 2012) In almost every large graph without non-directed donors, there exists an efficient allocation with cycles of size at most 3 where all over-demanded pairs are matched.

In (Roth, 2012), A. E. Roth notes that this result is in line with the so-called Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (Plummer and Lovász, 1986): vertices of a graph \( G \) are uniquely decomposed into three sets \( D(G), A(G), C(G) \) where \( D(G) \) contains all vertices which are not matched by at least one maximum matching (under-demanded vertices), \( A(G) \) is the set of neighbors of \( D(G) \) in \( V(G) \setminus D(G) \) (over-demanded vertices), and \( C(G) \) is the rest of vertices which are perfectly matched in between by every maximum matching. Main results from simulations on random graphs show that in the worst case, the cost of fully participating to the market place can be “very high” for hospitals as compared to being individually rational players. However, it is observed that on average, sharing full information with the kidney market has “almost no cost” to hospitals. This empirical evidence supports the full participation of hospitals to the kidney market, rendering this later more efficient in practice.

As outlined in this section, several practical and theoretical challenges are faced in the kidney exchange problem. This explains why matching related problems in the context of kidney exchange continue to be a major research area in economics, computer science and mathematics.

## 4 MATCHING THEORY

In this section, we will discuss matchings in more depth from a graph theoretical point of view. We will first introduce the notion of maximal matchings in relation with stable matchings. Then, we will give special emphasize to the approach of graph classes for solving hard problems, in particular related to matching problems.

### 4.1 Minimum Maximal Matchings

A matching is called (inclusion-wise) **maximal** if there is no other matching which properly contains it. In other words, no new edge can be added to a maximal matching. Clearly, a maximal matching is not necessarily of maximum size, unlike a maximum matching (with respect to its size) which is necessarily maximal (or else its size could have been increased by adding a new edge). In particular, a graph can admit maximal matchings of different sizes as illustrated in Figure 3.

![Figure 3: Maximal matchings of size 2 and 3 shown by bold edges.](image)

It can be noted that a stable matching is necessarily maximal by definition; otherwise, there would be a pair of vertices which are adjacent (thus, eligible for each other in the sense that they are in their respective preference lists), yet not matched to any vertex and would prefer to be matched to each other rather than not being matched at all. Consider the following example with candidates 1, 2 and 3 and institutions A, B and C with incomplete preference lists:

- 1: A\(\succ C\)  
- 2: A  
- 3: B\(\succ C\succ A\)  

The graph in Figure 4 models this stable matching problem and the application of the GS Algorithm (where institutions propose) gives the matching shown with bold edges. Clearly, this stable matching is maximal but not maximum as there is a matching of larger size: namely, (1C, 2A, 3B) forms a matching of size 3 (but it is not stable because 1 and A form an unstable pair).

![Figure 4: A stable matching is necessarily maximal but not necessarily of maximum size.](image)

Remind that in presence of incomplete preference lists with ties there can be stable matchings of different sizes. Since large stable matchings are more desirable in all applications, a natural question is how small can a stable matching be in the worst case. By the above observation, the size of a stable matching is bounded below by the size of a maximal matching of minimum size. In other words, a stable matching...
can not be smaller than a smallest maximal matching. We call the problem of finding a maximal matching of smallest size the Minimum Maximal Matching problem (MMM for short). It is well known that, given a graph, a maximum (size) matching can be found in polynomial time by the so-called Edmond’s Augmenting Path Algorithm (Plummer and Lovász, 1986). However, the problem of finding a minimum maximal matching (equivalent to a minimum edge dominating set in terms of optimization problem) is known to be NP-hard (Garey and Johnson, 1979).

Note that the student placement problem is modeled as a stable matching problem in a bipartite graph. So, it is crucial to know whether the bipartite structure of the graph makes MMM any easier to solve, so that a lower bound on the size of a stable matching can be efficiently computed. Unfortunately, it turns out that MMM is NP-hard even when the input graph is restricted to be a 3-regular bipartite graph, that is, a bipartite graph where every vertex has three neighbors (thus, every candidate lists 3 institutions and every institution lists 3 candidates for each quota) (Demange and Ekim, 2008). It has been shown that if the structure of the 3-regular bipartite graph is further restricted in such a way that the vertices in each side can be ordered so that every vertex is adjacent to three consecutive vertices in the other side, then MMM can be solved in polynomial time (Alkan and Alioğlu, 2015).

As illustrated by these examples, the structure of the graph that we obtain when we model a real life problem is crucial in deciding how efficiently we can solve it. In other words, it does not really matter that a problem is NP-hard in general graphs if the real life application implies a structure on the graph that makes the problem easier to solve. This notion is best captured and formalized by the notion of “graph classes” which is the topic of the next section.

4.2 Graph Classes

We will first address the approach of graph classes in general, and then focus on MMM from this point of view. Many optimization problems in graph theory are NP-hard and thus do not admit efficient solution procedures unless P=NP. A classical approach to solve these problems consists of taking into account the structural properties of the graphs arisen from the related applications and developing efficient algorithms by the help of these properties. The set of graphs defined by a common property is called a graph class. Various graph classes obtained by modeling several real life applications and the complexity of the related problems in these graph classes are nicely illustrated in (Golumbic, 2004). In this approach, whenever a real life problem is modeled with graphs, it is crucial to understand the structure of the graphs obtained in this way and whether this structure is of any help in solving the related problem. An NP-hard problem can sometimes be solved efficiently in some special graph classes; in such cases polynomial-time exact algorithms can be derived. On the contrary, sometimes an NP-hard problem remains NP-hard even when the input graph is restricted to a special graph class. A systematic analysis of such polynomial and NP-hard cases gives important insight about the real difficulty of the problem under consideration. According to (http://www.graphclasses.org/, 2019), there are more than 1600 graph classes in the literature and there is a huge literature about polynomial-time exact algorithms or NP-hardness proofs for various optimization problems in special graph classes. Motivated by the fact that structural properties of various graph classes are at the heart of the complexity studies, many books consider the structure of special graph classes and the relationship between different classes (see e.g. (Brandstädt et al., 1999; Golumbic, 2004)). The complexity analysis of an optimization problem with respect to various graph classes is based on the following observation.

Let \( G \) and \( H \) be two graph classes such that \( G \subseteq H \), that is \( G \) is a subclass of \( H \), or equivalently \( H \) is a superclass of \( G \). Then the following hold:

1. If problem \( \Pi \) is NP-hard in \( G \) then \( \Pi \) is also NP-hard in \( H \).
2. If problem \( \Pi \) can be solved in polynomial-time in \( H \), then it can also be solved in polynomial-time in \( G \) (using for instance the same algorithm as for \( H \), but hopefully a more efficient one using the additional properties of \( G \) with respect to \( H \)).

It follows from this observation that it is crucial to decide whether a graph model falls into one of the known graph classes. The problem of deciding whether a given graph belongs to a graph class or not is called the recognition problem for this class. It should be noted that this decision problem is not always an easy one. Although recognizing bipartite graphs or planar graphs (modeling the famous map coloring problem) can be done in polynomial time, the recognition of disk graphs (modeling frequency assignment problems), for instance, turns out to be NP-complete (http://www.graphclasses.org/, 2019).

We note that the above observation does not always allow us to conclude about the complexity situation of our problem in a given graph class \( G \). This might be the case when \( G \) has no containment relation with other graph classes where the complexity of the problem is known; that is, either \( G \) is completely...
disjoint from such a class, or \( G \) intersects with such a class but they have non-empty symmetric differences. Alternatively, this can happen when all graph classes for which the problem is known to be polynomial time solvable are subclasses of \( G \), and all graph classes where the problem is known to be NP-hard are superclasses of \( G \); we note that nothing can be concluded in these cases.

Let now \( \mathcal{G} \) be a graph class where the complexity of the problem under consideration is open. In light of the above discussion, if we fail to find a polynomial-time algorithm in some graph class \( \mathcal{G} \), then we either consider a subclass of \( \mathcal{G} \) in order to derive a polynomial-time algorithm, or search for an NP-hardness proof for the problem in \( \mathcal{G} \). On the contrary, if we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm in \( \mathcal{G} \), then, as a next step, we can consider a superclass of \( \mathcal{G} \) to generalize our polynomial-time algorithm, keeping in mind that the problem can possibly become NP-hard in this larger class. An NP-hardness result would have analogous effects in guiding our research.

In light of these facts, we use diagrams to summarize the complexity situation of an optimization problem in various graph classes. Such a diagram for MMM is given in Figure 5 where an arc from a graph class \( \mathcal{H} \) to another graph class \( \mathcal{G} \) means that \( \mathcal{G} \subset \mathcal{H} \). Note that this diagram is not comprehensive in terms of graph classes; it should be rather seen as a snapshot of complexity results in some graph classes. See (http://www.graphclasses.org/, 2019) for definitions of various graph classes used in Figure 5. Bold framed graph classes indicate a result shown in an original research paper whereas the complexity results in graph classes without bold frames are directly implied by these results and the relations between the graph classes. For instance, the NP-hardness of MMM in bipartite graphs with maximum degree 3 \((\Delta \leq 3)\) (Yannakakis and Gavril, 1980) implies directly that MMM is also NP-hard in (general) bipartite graphs, and thus also in perfect graphs, by the containment relation. In a similar way, the existence of a polynomial time algorithm for MMM in unit interval graphs (Boyaci et al., 2017) directly implies that MMM is also polynomial time solvable in trees (which are contained in unit interval graphs). Other results represented in Figure 5 by bold framed rectangles are the NP-hardness of MMM in \( k \)-regular bipartite graphs for every \( k \geq 3 \) (Demange and Ekim, 2008), in planar graphs of maximum degree 3 (Yannakakis and Gavril, 1980), in 3-regular planar graphs (Horton and Kilakos, 1993) and in induced subgrids (Demange and Ekim, 2013); and the polynomial time solvability of MMM in bipartite permutation graphs (Srinivasan et al., 1995), in series-parallel graphs (Richey and Parker, 1988), in unit interval graphs (Boyaci et al., 2017), in block graphs (Hwang and Chang, 1995) and in trees (Mitchell and Hedetniemi, 1977). Such a diagram guides researchers by displaying graph classes where the complexity of a problem is open. For instance, it can be seen in Figure 5 that it is not known to date whether MMM is NP-hard or not in interval graphs, in grid graphs, or in chordal bipartite graphs. Each one of these questions is open for investigation.

As illustrated with examples in the previous section, when a real life problem is modeled using graphs, some structural properties on graphs are implied. Several graph classes are defined in this way. Some, however, are defined by asking a reverse question with respect to a problem. Remind that MMM is NP-complete in general. So, a reverse question is, what are the graphs for which MMM can be solved in a “trivial way”? This trivial way is usually formalized by a greedy algorithm, which depends on the problem under consideration. In case of MMM, it would be natural to think about an algorithm which greedily constructs a maximal matching by adding edges (to an initially empty set) until no more edges can be added. Then the question is, what are the graphs for which this greedy algorithm always yields a maximal matching of minimum size? As any maximal matching is likely to be produced by this greedy algorithm, a minimum size will only be guaranteed if every maximal matching has the same size. The family of graphs having this property is called equimatchable graphs. An example of an equimatchable graph along with all of its maximal matchings is given in Figure 6.

We note that if the input graph of a stable matching problem is equimatchable, then every stable matching has the same size (as they are all maximal). Equimatchable graphs are first considered independently in (Grünbaum, 1974), (Lewin, 1974), and (Meng, 1974). They are formally introduced by (Lesk
et al., 1984) where their characterization with respect to the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition (see Section 3.2) has been presented and a polynomial time recognition algorithm is derived from this characterization. A more efficient recognition algorithm is then given in (Demange and Ekim, 2014). Structural properties of equimatchable graphs such as connectivity, forbidden subgraphs and girth have also been studied extensively in the literature (see e.g. (Favaron, 1986; Eiben and Kotrbčík, 2015; Dibek et al., 2016; Akbari et al., 2018)).

Several graph classes are defined in a similar way as equimatchable graphs with respect to other NP-hard problems. Some well-known examples of such classes are well-covered graphs where every (inclusion-wise) maximal independent set has the same size, and well-dominated graphs where every (inclusion-wise) minimal dominating set has the same size (http://www.graphclasses.org/, 2019).

Now, let us turn our attention back to the stable matching problem. Remind that Theorem 2.5 guarantees the existence of a stable matching whenever the input graph is bipartite, unlike the general case (called the stable roommate problem) where a stable matching might not exist. So, a similar question in the framework of stable matchings can be formulated as follows: what are graphs for which every preference list admits a stable matching? It turns out that these graphs are not more general than bipartite graphs as stated in the following.

**Theorem 4.1.** (Abeledo and Isaak, 1991) A graph $G$ admits a stable matching for every possible preference lists (of a vertex over its neighbors) if and only if $G$ is bipartite.

Theorem 4.1 implies in particular that whenever the input graph is not bipartite, there exists a preference list for which no stable matching can be found.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS

In their seminal paper where they introduced the notion of stable matchings in the literature, D. Gale and L. S. Shapley expressed their hope for their new theory to find real applications (other than the hypothetical marriages between men and women) in the future. We can see that their wish became true quite rapidly.

As illustrated with examples, different challenges are faced when searching for a stable matching in various applications. Each one of these challenges motivates the development of new methods. For instance, the practical reasons which implied that only two-paired exchanges can be allowed in the kidney exchange problem motivated new studies in this area. Likewise, theoretical advances allow us to solve more and more complicated problems in practice. The Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science expresses that A. E. Roth has received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2012 for his valuable contributions in both directions of this process. Even if sometimes the theory and the applications seem to progress independently from each other, the story of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 2012 shows that sooner or later contributions in both directions complete each other.

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