Using Eyetracker to Find Ways to Mitigate Ransomware

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Abstract: Ransomware is a form of malware designed to prevent access to data by either locking out the victims from their system or encrypting some or all of their files until a ransom has been paid to the attacker. Victims would know that they had been hit by ransomware because a ransom demand (splash screen) would be displayed on their compromised device. This study aims to identify key user interface features of ransomware splash screens and see how these features affect victims' likelihood to pay, and how this information may be used to create more effective countermeasures to mitigate the threat of ransomware. We devised an experiment that contained three broad types of splash screens (Text, Time-Sensitive Counter, and Other). A total of nine splash screens were shown to each participant, from which data on the participants' eye behaviour were collected. After each splash screen, participants were also asked a set of questions that would help describe their experience and be cross-referenced with the eye tracking data to aid analysis. Our experiment collected quantitative eye tracker data and qualitative data regarding willingness to pay from 25 participants. Several key components of the splash screens such as the text, logo, images, and technical information were analysed. Comments from the participants on whether they would pay the ransom or not, and the reasons behind their decision were also recorded. We found that there is no clear indication that one type of splash screen would have a higher chance of success with regard to ransom payment. Our study revealed that there are some characteristics in splash screens that would strongly discourage some victims from paying. Further investigation will be carried out in this direction, in order to design and develop more effective countermeasures to ransomware.

1 INTRODUCTION

Ransomware is a term used to describe a particular type of malware which restricts the functionality of and/or access to data stored on the infected device. At the same time, ransomware typically displays a ransom note in an attempt to extract payment from the victim in order to restore the functionality/data to the state before the infection.

The first instance of ransomware appeared nearly three decades ago with the concept of cryptovirus that encrypt the victim's files and demand payment (Young and Yung, 1996). However, very little growth of ransomware variants and infections was seen until 2015, perhaps due to the state of the computing technology up to that point, as well as the lack of practical ways to exploit the technique (especially in dealing with the payment part) on a large scale. The increased popularity of cryptocurrencies changed all that. There

were 35 known ransomware variants in 2015, but this figure jumped to 193 in 2016 (Ferreira, 2018).

With the increasing popularity of ransomware – as well as the significant threat that ransomware poses to our society – it is important to understand various facets of ransomware so that researchers can devise ways to mitigate the risks associated with ransomware. Preventative measures such as having a regular backup of important data would help, but many users often did not do this. Detection and recovery actions should ideally be done at the earliest opportunity. However, in most cases, victims would only know that they had been hit by ransomware when their computer was frozen and a ransom note (or a ransomware "splash screen", as we call it in this paper) was displayed. It will be useful to understand the kinds of splash screen used in ransomware, and the likely reaction that a victim may have upon seeing these splash screens. In particular, we are interested to find out whether certain splash screens may have a better or worse success rate (in terms of persuading

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the victim to pay the ransom demand).

As such, the main aims of our research were *to investigate a range of ransomware splash screens* and to address the fundamental research question of *whether the design of a ransomware splash screen has any impact on a victim's willingness to pay*. In turn, this information can be used by security researchers and Law Enforcement Agencies *to devise ways to persuade ransomware victims not to pay the ransom.*

To achieve these aims, we carried out a user study involving an eye tracker and specially selected ransomware splash screens. The set up of our experiment would present a series of splash screens to each participant while their eye activities were being monitored using an eye tracker. Eye-tracking is an established method to understand where individuals are directing their attention when processing information and making decisions (Orquin and Loose, 2013). The participants were then asked whether they would be willing to pay the ransom demand based on the splash screen they just saw. Their answers were then correlated with the eye tracking data to see whether there were any specific characteristics in the splash screen interface that would have positive (or negative effect) on the participants' willingness to pay.

Contributions. Our key contributions are the insights into common types of ransomware splash screens and the suggestion of potential factors that may affect the likeliness of a victim to pay the ransom demand. The results from this research can then be used to see where security efforts may be spent to mitigate the threats of ransomware, or even to devise psychological countermeasures to discourage victims to pay.

2 RELATED WORK

The process of ransomware infection can be typically broken down into the three stages of *infecting the target*, *removing functionality or access to data* and finally *displaying ransom note* (Gazet, 2010). A more detailed analysis of ransomware deployment stages (Hull et al., 2019) sees that ransomware's behaviour may be:

- *stealthy* (it tries to stay undetected while it prepares the groundwork for the attack). Typical operations in this stage include fingerprinting the target device, exploring the possibility of propagation to other systems in the network.
- *suspicious* (it starts performing operations that damage the victim's device, but it likely is still undetected by the victim). This includes the process of encrypting valuable data on the victim's device, and locking functionality of the device.

- *obvious* (it announces its presence to its victim). At this stage, a ransom note will be displayed, and in some cases, destructive actions may also start.

This paper focuses on the *obvious* stage of ransomware deployment. In particular, we would like to investigate the effectiveness of ransomware splash screens in persuading victims to pay. We hope that by understanding the cyber psychology of these splash screens, more appropriate countermeasures can be created to discourage ransomware victims to pay.

Current development in ransomware defence has primarily focused on detection methods aimed to prevent users from infection before the loss of functionality stage. Majority of antivirus software uses signature-based techniques in which known malicious code is assigned a signature by dissembling the binary (Mathur and Hiranwal, 2013). When the antivirus examines any new or existing binary on the machine, it will look to see if this signature is present and if so, block the execution where possible.

Unfortunately, the creation rate of malware often exceeds the creation of known signatures, resulting in machines still being vulnerable to infection. Behaviour-based techniques are designed to analyse a wide range of parameters and determine if any of them start to respond in a way that resembles known infection behaviour (Mathur and Hiranwal, 2013). Kharraz et al. (Kharaz et al., 2016) introduced a ransomware detection and classification system called "Unveil", which identifies ransomware by tracking changes made on artificial environment. An alternative approach by Sgandurra et al. (Sgandurra et al., 2016) proposed an automated program called "EldeRan" which uses machine learning to classify malicious samples based on dynamic analysis of their behaviour. Key behavioural features are then mapped in order to enable detection of new variants.

At the other end of the ransomware life cycle, Huang et al. tracked Bitcoin ransom payments from victims, to the cash-out by the ransomware operators. Their analysis found out that 16 million USD has been extorted from 20,000 victims over 2 years period (Huang et al., 2018).

Game theoretic models examining whether to pay the ransom (or not) are presented by Cartwright et al. in (Cartwright et al., 2018). It compares ransomware to a crime of kidnapping, whereby a criminal takes control of a victim's device in expectation of some financial gain. The paper dissects various aspects, from criminal's incentives to return files, to the challenges faced by the victim on deciding whether to pay or not, due to incomplete information, and even whether the victim should or should not bargain with the criminal.

Designs of ransomware splash screens – whether

conscious or not – often incorporate the use of a wide range of social engineering techniques. Some fundamental techniques have been identified such as scarcity, authority and liking (Hadlington, 2017). Scarcity is used by limiting a person's desires unless they obey a particular request. The perception of authority has also shown to increase the probability of a person complying, a slight contrast from liking where people comply with a greater sense of willingness due to liking someone or something (Hadnagy, 2010).

3 METHODOLOGY

This study aims to investigate various types of ransomware splash screens and see whether their design has an overall effect on a victim's likelihood to pay. The study contained an experiment that allowed for responses from participants to be captured when presented with a ransomware infection. Combined with these responses, we analysed captured eye tracking data to determine whether there was any correlation between the splash screen designs, the participants' responses and their likelihood to pay.

3.1 Experiment Design

The experiment was conducted using a single factor design in which splash screen type was encoded as TYPE, which contains three categories: "Text" (T) type encompasses splash screens that are presented in a textual format; "Time-Sensitive Counter" (C) type uses active countdown timer as a way of applying scarcity (Hadlington, 2017); and "Other" (O) type covers splash screens that do not have any immediately apparent dynamic scarcity, while also providing a more advanced user interface than a simple text file.

We looked at each splash screen's *Areas of Interest (AOI)* under four key categories: *Objects*, *Text*, *Pressure*, and *Technical*. Each of the categories contain several tags as shown in Table 1.

We collected 38 splash screens from New Jersey Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Cell (NJCCIC, nd), and from that list, a selection of 22 where chosen for the experiment, to cover a mixture of designs and complexity, from plain text files, to interactive elements and active components such as timers. Selection was also determined by the presence of the social engineering techniques (scarcity, authority and likeness) as well as the inclusion of some large profile attacks such as WannaCry. The full list of the ransomware splash screen used, their statistical usage data in the experiment, as well as their success rates can be seen later in Section 4 as Table 2.

Before each splash screen was presented to the participant, a simulation of a Windows 10 environment displaying a webpage was shown for 3 seconds. This was followed by a simulated ransomware infection for 2.5 seconds, where visible desktop files were encrypted and deleted, and the desktop background was changed to black. The ransomware splash screen could be displayed for up to a minute or terminated early by the investigator. A blank screen would appear at the end of the splash screen, with the next splash screen in the sequence only commencing at the investigator's control.

3.2 Setup

The experiment used a computer with a 13.3" LCD at a resolution of 1920 x 1080 and set to a maximum brightness of 500 nits. A Tobii X2-30 compact eye tracker (Tobii Pro, nd) – which allows for eye tracking data to be captured at a rate of up to 60Hz – was placed at the bottom centre of the display. The centre alignment of the eye tracker was also reconfigured via Tobii software at the start of each setup. Each participant was seated and placed approximately 60-65 cm (23-26") as recommend by the Tobii user guide (Olsen, 2012). The placement was based on the display size, to ensure that the participant was within the recommended gaze angle.

3.3 Sampling

For the experiment, a total of 25 participants were recruited (mostly from the research team's circle at the university), with their ages ranging from 18 to 59 years old. To participate, subjects had to meet the condition that they currently used a personal computing device frequently, whether for personal or professional use. Participants were not paid for their time.

3.4 Ethical Considerations

The research was assessed and approved by our Universitys Research Ethics Committee. The experiments were conducted on an individual basis. Each participant was given a participant information sheet that outlined the detail of the experiment. They were also presented with a consent form, which explained the voluntary nature of the participation. Each participant was required to sign a consent form before proceeding. All collected data were anonymised and saved in a password protected environment.

Table 1: Summary of AOI Tags.

Categories	Object	Text	Pressure	Technical
Tags	Button, Contact, External link, Graphic logo, Image, Input field, Payment amount, Text logo	Heading, Subheading, Bullet point, Numbered list	Static timer, Active timer, Language	Encryption type, Key

3.5 Procedure

At the start of an experiment, the eye tracker was configured in which the angle and distance from the participant were adjusted to meet the previously described settings. Once set, a five-point eye tracking reference was done to complete the configuration step and would be repeated in the event of insufficient data.

Before beginning the ransomware simulation, the investigator would give the participant a sense of what questions would be asked about each splash screen to minimise any order effect on the questionnaire results. Once the ransomware simulation began, eye data was recorded to be able to identify the order in which AOI was viewed. The investigator would allow the participant to view each splash screen for 30 seconds before prompting the participant on their thoughts concerning the splash screen. Participants were allowed to start communicating before the investigator prompt, as preliminary testing showed this helped reduce the chances of respondent fatigue.

At this stage, the investigator was not required to ask all four questions about each splash screen directly and was permitted to extract those answers from casual conversation with the participant, asking directly when needed, and echoing their response back when clarification was required. The process was repeated for the remaining eight splash screens.

Data from all 25 participants were exported using the "Metrics export" feature integrated with Tobii Pro Lab and applying the fixation filter to the results. The filter enabled the raw eye data that had been captured to be viewed in a tabled format, displaying key areas of interest with recorded measurements in seconds. There are several key parameters in relation to AOI:

- *Total Fixation Duration (TFD)* reports an average time of how long a participant spent looking at all of the AOI on the particular splash screen
- *Time to First Fixation (TFF)* defines how long it would take a participant to locate an initial AOI
- *Time to Next Fixation (TNF)* reports how long it would take the participant to move on to another AOI; in combination with TFF, it allows for the AOI attention effectiveness to be determined
- *Total Visit Duration (TVD)* measures how long the participant looked at a particular AOI, which can be a good indicator to determine what parts of the splash screens captured the participant's attention the most overall


Figure 1: A sample heatmap of the AES-NI splash screen.

Figure 2: Fixations sequence on VenusLocker.

- *Fixation Count (FC)* and *Visit Count (VC)* provide an insight into how many times the participant would visit an AOI and how many fixations would occur in the AOI

Heatmaps from each splash screen were gathered, with an example from the AES-NI ransomware is shown in Figure 1. A heatmap indicates the attractive elements of the screen in the form of "hot" (red) and "cold" (green) regions.

The Tobii tool can also capture the trace of the order of fixations, with the highest intensity being the most recent, as shown in an example involving VenusLocker (see Figure 2). The lines here are just indicating how the participant's eyes moved from one point to the next.

4 RESULTS

From the questionnaire data, we compiled a table of each ransomware's success rate, which is calculated using the answer that each participant gave after being shown a splash screen and asked whether they would pay or not (see Table 2). The key findings are:

- The highest success rate recorded was 44.44%, with BadRabbit, BTCWare and CryptoShield.
- In three cases (Matrix, RedBoot and Shifr), all of the involved participants just refused to pay.
- The highest success rates for each type were 44.44% for Counter type (BadRabbit), 44.44% for Other type (BTCWare, CryptoShield), and 33.33% for Text type (AES-NI).

We then looked into the eye tracker data to see if there was any correlation with various AOI. The dependent variables are represented in seconds with the mean and standard deviation (enclosed in parentheses). Table 3 shows that there is some difference between the three types, but this appears to have minimal impact on the overall success rate. Further analysis of the data showed that there is signification variation between four out of the six dependent variables, suggesting there is enough variation between the three types to cause a difference in participant attention.

Table 2: The list of the ransomware splash screens used, their type, how many times they were used in the experiment (denoted as '#'), how many participants would pay, and success rates.

Ransomware	Type	#	Pct	Would Pay	Success
AES-NI	Text	9	4.00%	3	33.33%
Amnesia	Text	9	4.00%	2	22.22%
Apocalypse	Text	16	7.11%	4	25.00%
BadRabbit	Counter	9	4.00%	4	44.44%
BTCWare	Other	9	4.00%	4	44.44%
CERBER	Other	7	3.11%	2	28.57%
CradleCore	Counter	9	4.00%	1	11.11%
CryptoShield	Other	9	4.00%	4	44.44%
FireCrypt	Other	9	4.00%	3	33.33%
JigSaw	Counter	16	7.11%	3	18.75%
Matrix	Other	7	3.11%	0	0.00%
ODCODC	Text	16	7.11%	4	25.00%
OpenToYou	Other	9	4.00%	3	33.33%
PyCL	Counter	16	7.11%	4	25.00%
RedBoot	Other	9	4.00%	0	0.00%
Sage	Counter	9	4.00%	2	22.22%
Samsam	Other	7	3.11%	2	28.57%
Shifr	Text	9	4.00%	0	0.00%
SyncCrypt	Other	9	4.00%	1	11.11%
VenusLocker	Counter	7	3.11%	3	42.86%
Wannacry	Counter	9	4.00%	3	33.33%
xData	Text	16	7.11%	5	31.25%

Figure 3 shows the spread of TVD AOI tags, with *Object: Images* having the highest proportion at 22%, and *Technical: Encryption* receiving the lowest at 2%. It should be noted that in some instances, *Object: Images* contained some of the largest AOI hit zones due to the use of background images which would be a contributing factor to its high score. It is also shown that *Text* AOI had the second and third highest TVD proportions.

Table 3: Mean AOI recordings across types (in seconds) and their success rates (participants' likelihood to pay).

	TFD	FC	TFF	TNF	TVD	VC	Rate
T	2.24 (1.72)	5.00 (3.35)	5.74	10.07	2.40 (1.90)	3.39 (1.74)	35.09%
C	1.93 (0.87)	5.45 (2.10)	8.69	4.00	2.08 (0.95)	3.53 (1.09)	35.09%
O	1.91 (1.20)	4.83 (2.46)	3.15	7.74	2.06 (1.27)	3.29 (1.29)	29.82%

Scores of TFF from six splash screens – comprised of two highest success rate (BadRabbit and BTCWare), two mid success rate (AES-NI and CradleCore) and two lowest success rate (RedBoot and Shifr) – show that while these splash screens had distantly different characteristics, there was little divergence when comparing the ranges of TFF AOI (see Figure 4). The TFF values for the six splash screens range from 0.3 to 34.68 seconds, following a similar gradient. Perhaps what is interesting to see here is the TFF values for RedBoot, which had a zero success rate. These were notably much lower (1.19-13.17 seconds) in comparison to other TFF values, including Shifr (which also had a zero success rate). This could be due to the simplicity of the RedBoot interface (only 3 lines of text).

TVD scores for the same six had displayed that in general, splash screens managed to obtain a steady growth in user attention for AOI. The majority of the TVD values fell within the 0.1 to 5.69 seconds bracket (see Figure 5). However, AES-NI had a spike of AOI values of 6.62 and 10.78 seconds. A plausible explanation for this is because AES-NI is a Text type ransomware, and some participants might have tried to read the ransom note more carefully.

4.1 Participants' Comments

On top of these technical and quantitative data, we also collected qualitative data from the participants, in the form of free text to explain why they would or would not pay for a particular ransomware. These data provide a richer context to the thinking process behind the participants' decision. They list some unexpected factors that would *discourage* victim to pay:

- Authoritarian tone of the note (e.g. pretending to


Figure 3: AOI tags TVD.

Figure 4: Six mixed performing splash screens' TFF AOI.

Figure 5: Six mixed performing splash screens' TVD AOI.

be the FBI, like in the case of Matrix, which had a zero success rate) seemed to have put off participants from paying

- Having the ransom note containing typos/grammatical mistakes also discouraged people to pay (e.g. RedBoot and SyncCrypt, which had 0% and 11.11% success rates)

- Some participants had a negative pre-conception on Bitcoin (which is the common cryptocurrency used for paying the ransom), in which they associated Bitcoin with illegal online activities, which in turn dissuaded many people to pay due to the mention of Bitcoin

- Having complicated instruction (or too much information) in the splash screen also put off our participants from paying

- Not having a clear way to contact the ransomware operator appeared to make several potential victims decided that there was no way to check whether their payment would have reached the destination or not, hence they opted not to pay

5 DISCUSSION

Over the course of the experiment, splash screens were shown a total of 225 times (see Table 2). The results showed that while the distinctions between the three types led to a difference in participant's FC, TFF, TNF and VC, the study did not find any statistically significant difference that would influence a participant's likelihood to pay.

5.1 Insights from the Text Type

When exploring the responses received for the highest success rate splash screen of TYPE Text (AES-NI), participants that were willing to pay had all stated that the *Object: Text logo* was a key element that stood out. The participant's response remained consistent with the tracking data which showed that this was the first AOI they viewed, having 62.5% of participants recorded a TFF of less than 2 seconds and an average TVD of 8.25 seconds – at least seven times longer than any other AOI (as can be seen in Figure 5).

While it is evident that the *Object: Text logo* is effective in engaging participants' attention, there is no evidence to suggest that there is any correlation between this element and a participant's likelihood to pay. This can be deduced from the observation that the remaining 66.67% participants who did not want to pay showed some of the more compelling results when it came to capturing user's attention.

BadRabbit – which held the highest success rate within TYPE Time-Sensitive Counter – somewhat emphasises this. This splash screen had been marked with seven AOI compared to AES-NI's nine. Like AES-NI, BadRabbit also incorporated the use of an *Object: Text logo*, but in this instance, when participants were asked of any elements that stood out to them, only one out of the group who said they would consider paying had mentioned that particular AOI. With the BadRabbit splash screen, in general participants took longer to visit their first AOI with the first TFF being recorded at an average of 11.07 seconds. However, this AOI was not an *Object: Text logo*, but rather a *TEXT: Subheading*. On average, *Object:Text logo* had a TFF of 12.50 seconds and an average TVD of 2.35 seconds, placing it fourth amongst other AOI. It is worth noting that the participant who was willing to consider payment and did mention this element had a significantly higher TVD on this AOI. However, 50% of participants who also stated they would consider payment did not even register a gaze reading for this object, suggesting that it had a little overall effect.

5.2 Insights from the Time-sensitive Counter Type

BadRabbit's highest recorded TVD was for *Pressure: Active timers* at 4.03 seconds with a TFF of 13.90 seconds, which is 2.38 seconds slower than the average first TFF. 50% of participants who would consider paying had mentioned the counter as being the primary reason for payment which could be due to the short timer variant being used in this splash screen.

Upon further analysis, it would appear that overall this may not be the case. PYCL splash screen had a long and short variant for testing, and when comparing these two, it was found that the counter providing participants with around 72 hours had a success rate of 42.85%, in contrast to the short 20-minute version which only yielded a success rate of 11.11%. In this case, 66.66% of participants who responded with considering paying the long alternative had not even registered a gaze on the *Pressure: Active timers* AOI.

Further exploration amongst *Pressure: Active timers* with the lowest success rate splash screen under TYPE Time-Sensitive Counter (CradleCore) uncovered that for this element, participants' TVD was the second longest viewed AOI at 1.29 seconds but was fifth in TFF (at 18.50 seconds) out of 8 AOI. These figures are comparable to BadRabbit and PYCL TFF order which was third out of six and second out of seven respectively. With relatively little variation in the order the AOI was viewed across different success rates, we deducted that there is no significant effect with the incorporation of *Pressure: Active timers*.

5.3 Insights from the Other Type

Last but not least, we looked at splash screens that adopt the use of *Object: Graphic logo*. WannaCry implemented the use of this element in the form of a padlock, a design choice that also appears in OpenToYou, both of which share the same success rate of 33.33%. A critical distinction between these two is the amount of AOI, with WannaCry containing nine and OpenToYou only containing three. 66.66% of participants who did not object to potentially paying OpenToYou had commented on the padlock, whereas none of the participants that were subject to WannaCry had mentioned the AOI. Eye tracking data showed that participants who saw both splash screens shared virtually identical TVD with only 0.03 seconds separating them apart, even though the use was far more pronounced in OpenToYou (with only two other AOI to contend with).

While *Object: Contact* and *Text: Heading* seem

to appear in multiple high success rate splash screens, they are also prevalent across the set of splash screens, so their effectiveness cannot be concluded in this instance. Note that some participants did respond by stating that they would get in contact with the attacker on occasions where contact information was available, before deciding on whether to pay or not. Therefore, there is a slight indication that *Object: Contact* can be a contributing factor to a victim's decision.

Exploring the effects caused by *Technical: Encryption type* highlighted that it appeared in splash screens with a success rate of 25% or greater. This includes CryptoShield, which shared the highest success rate of 44.44%. An interesting discovery obtained by participant's answers was that even though they did not pick up specifically on technical language, the appearance of being technical was enough to persuade them into considering paying. xData – which had a success rate of 31.25% – had responses that commented on its technical appearance but in actuality had no *Technical* AOI, which indicates that participants may not necessarily be fully absorbing the information in these circumstances and that perhaps giving the illusion of technical know-how may be a sufficient attribute in encouraging victims to pay.

5.4 Ideas for Mitigating Ransomware

It is often difficult to persuade victims not to pay the ransom. For example, in some circumstances – such as if the victims' livelihood or business critically depend on the data or services being ransomed – it may look like paying the ransom is the easiest way out. Moreover, the amount of the ransom demand may not sound too expensive (compared to the associated costs of the clean up actions or loss revenuess) which might tip the decision making process towards paying up. Some companies even have cyber insurance policies to cover the ransom.

Therefore, mitigating the effect of ransomware once an infection occured (in particular, minimising the chance of victims paying up the ransom demand) is a very complex challenge. However, insights from our study suggest there are some ideas that can be followed up to construct more practical mitigation strategies against ransomware:

- Setting up more human-centric awareness campaigns to discourage victims to pay. This includes providing advice based on human traits/aspects of the splash screen that victims should consciously pay attention to (in some cases, nudging), which will evoke a feeling on the victims' part that the attacker cannot be trusted and that paying ransom should be avoided. For example, victims should

be directed to spot any spelling or grammatical mistakes in the ransom notes, and they should be made aware that impersonating an authority is often the modus operandi of the attacker.

- By understanding the characteristics of ransomware splash screen that are likely to be more successful in persuading victims to pay, Law Enforcement Agencies can prioritise in tackling these first, so that that the impact can be minimised. Of course this is not an absolute measure, so such approach should be taken more as a heuristic rather than a prescribed protocol.

These should be taken in consideration along with effective preventative measures (e.g. having a sensible backup system, and not clicking potentially malicious links), better detection and containment tools against ransomware infection (so that the damage can be minimised), and appropriate recovery mechanisms (so that valuable data can be salvaged).

5.5 Limitations

Our results showed that a victim's likelihood to pay could potentially be linked more to psychological reasoning and personality characteristics. Future studies should consider a multi-factor experiment design, taking into account other factors such as age, gender, technical know-how, and so on.

The experiment has low ecological validity as participants had nothing to lose or gain. The ransomware splash screens were simulated on the researcher's device. The sample size (25 participants) was rather small, so we would like to increase this in the future. Furthermore, in this setup participants were primed to expect a ransomware splash screen, which is different from what they would encounter in real life. These issues will need to be considered for improving the validity of the findings.

6 CONCLUSION

Investigating the aspects of ransomware splash screen design and its effects on a victim's likelihood to pay was the main aim of the study presented in this paper. To achieve this aim, we carried out an experiment that enabled participants' eye tracking data to be monitored and examined when presented with a variety of ransomware splash screen. Three types of splash screen designs (Text, Time-Sensitive Counter, and Other) were examined, and they contained a collection of four possible AOI categories, which in turn consisted of a total of 17 sub-categories or tags.

It was found that between the three types, there was no inherent impact on participants' likelihood to pay. When looking at the six key parameters to AOI (TFD, FC, TFF, TNF, TVD, and VC) we found that TFD and TVD were the only ones that retained the null hypothesis with no significant difference found. This finding verified that there was enough distinction between the three types that led to a difference in participants' eye tracking data.

A comparison between the two highest-rated splash screens from different types revealed that while they both had common AOI of *Object: Text logo*, participants' TFF and TVD between the two types did differentiate with a large portion having failed to register gaze data for this element. This would strongly suggest that the use of this element plays no significant role in a victim's likelihood to pay.

One of the interesting insights we gleaned from our study is the identification of some characteristics of the ransomware splash screens that would *discourage* victims to pay. This finding can be used to devise more effective countermeasures, such as to provide a list of things to watch out for in the ransom note that can help make victim realise that the ransomware operator cannot be trusted, and paying a ransom is not a good idea (e.g. the threatening nature of the demand, or the mistakes contained in the note).

We hope that the results of this study may also assist in the construction of technical defensive countermeasures against ransomware. Possible uses may include an advanced antivirus software that incorporates behaviour-based techniques to monitor programs for any active User Interface elements that indicate ransomware infection, and automatically take a preventive action to mitigate the risk (e.g. by making all files read only to protect them).

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