Formalizing the Safety Functions to Assure the Software Quality of NPP Safety Important Systems

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Abstract: One of the most critical tasks in the software complexes quality assurance is the procedure of forming requirements to a developed or modified system and subsequent their verification. The essential errors are making in the first life cycle stages – these are errors in determining requirements, selecting the architecture, high-level design. Faults of safety critically important software may considerably damage the equipment or properties, as well to lead to an essential detriment of the environment and human victims. Increasing requirements to the software quality of NPP (nuclear power plant) safety important systems at all stages of the life cycle is concerned with increasing the software complexity and functionality and has led the necessity of developing approaches to justify both the system itself safety and software involved in the systems make-up. In the paper, an approach is considered, based on the “safety functions”, meeting which in the sequel is verifying. This approach is used under the soft- and hardware complexes software assurance of upper level systems of automated process control systems and may be applied for the fault tolerance analysis, information- and cyber- security of soft- and hardware complexes.

1 INTRODUCTION

Information technologies lay a crucial role in installation, operation, and engineering maintenance of critically important infrastructures that have high requirements for the reliability and safety. Bugs (faults) or emergencies in systems of high operation risk plants, relating to critically important infrastructures, may:

- Lead to destroying or severe damages of highly expensive equipment;
- Considerably harm the environment;
- Lead to threats for the health and life of people.

Developing the automation of critical infrastructure plants with high operation risk, involving ones in the nuclear power engineering, is characterized by the tendency of developing automated process control systems (APCS) implementing considerably more complicated algorithms of control and data analysis with applying compound soft- and hardware complexes (SHWC) (Barmakov, 2006; Byvaikov et al., 2006; Kogan et al., 2014; Mengazetdinov et al., 2014; Poletykin et al., 2017). Developing SHWC, their verification, and validation, and, in the course of the time, modernization is to correspond and meet an adopted safety level.

As requirements to critical infrastructure plants increase, the software complexity and software importance in providing whole system functions are sharply enlarging. Software (SW) plays the increasingly important role in revealing and monitoring critical factors, as well as in safety critical functions (Hill and Tilley, 2010; Rankin and Jiang, 2011; Eoma et al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2014; Maeran et al., 2018). Broad expansion of soft- and hardware systems for high operation risk plants has led to the necessity of developing methods to justify such systems safety.

Under justifying the safety, in existing approaches (Leveson et al., 1991; Bozzano et al., 2003; Jharko, 2003; Akerlund et al., 2006) applying quality and safety models plays the central role. At the same time, the system approach to determining these models is as usual a rarity. Providing the APCS software quality at all stages of its life cycle is based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis that, by the regulatory

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documentation, is to be implemented at all stages. The qualitative and quantitative software quality analysis is to account two constituent parts of software and hardware complexes: hardware and software (Smith et al., 2000).

SHWC SW is an integral system component influencing safety as a whole, but meanwhile, there are absent universal and commonly adopted methods of proving the SW safety. Due to this, an approach is spread being a sophisticated application of methods and tools of increasing the system safety level at all system life cycle stages, meanwhile developing new verification techniques is a vital problem.

Selecting and determining safety functions relate to the validation stage implementing the formalization utility of the safety proof problem and directly influence the quality of the subsequent SHWC verification.

2 SOFTWARE QUALITY AND FEATURES OF DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTIONS

The software provides a considerable impact in functions implemented by systems important for safety. The software can support additional functions introduced by the design of a developed or already performed system. For NPP (nuclear power plant) safety important systems the software safety life cycle is intimately concerned with the safety life cycle of the system itself. Specifying requirements to software is a part of specifying requirements to the system.

Required software quality is hard to achieve, since obtaining the required SW quality is concerned with the process the development, methods and the process control. The SW quality is achieving due to applying the development methodology and applying verification and validation methods within the SW development life cycle of NPP safety important systems. The SW life cycle structure, involving verification and validation, is displayed in Fig. 1. Fig. 2 displays the place of the software verification and validation in the context of quality assurance and the standards hierarchy in the branch of software development for NPP safety important systems. The method of complex software verification developed (Jharko, 2014, 2015, 2018) is based on accounting the safety standards requirements, integrates SW verification stages and their attributes, including personnel involved, procedures, removing drawbacks, and issued documentation. This method includes a set of actions on the verification object analysis, verification planning, as well as stage-by-stage software verification method efficiency has been confirming in the course of works on developing information and control systems important for the NPP safety.

Figure 1: Structure of processes of verification and validation of software.

In accordance to standards, the NPP safety important systems verification is to be implemented independently of developers. During the safety analysis, an independent verification and validation group is to determine the proven system properties and check it against the correctness, consistency, and traceability. In this process, the first stage is determining the safety functions, implementing which is verifying in a sequel.

Determining and selecting the safety functions have some particularities. First of all, independent determining the safety functions is using for subsequent analysis of the correctness of proving documents submitted by developers. The SW source code and SHWC system solutions are support information, and their analysis can form the behaviour function contradicting to the specifications. During the SW safety analysis, it may occur that the function adopted is not necessary or
sufficient, when the given safety function is too strict or the safety proof is impossible, or, in contrast, is too weak, due to which a finding probability of SW faults decreases. A way to increase the SW quality within the applied complex approach is the correctness proof relating to the formal methods (Pang et al., 2015; Souri et al., 2018).

3 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS TO FORMALIZING THE SAFETY FUNCTION

From the correctness proof, all considered notions (properties, functions, etc.) are to be formalized, since, otherwise, to prove somewhat by the use of any formal methods will be impossible.

The experience of NPP safety important systems verification has revealed a number of situations, when assigning the safety function in a formalized form for some properties does not look possible.

In this case, the solution is a formalized description of properties of the considered notion as a task of proving the correctness and determining the safety function, and in a sequel, an expert conclusion is done whether the certified property is safe or not. For this, at the beginning by use of the correctness proof formalized system properties are determined, and in a sequel, on their basis, an inference is made on the system safety. Let us use three formalization levels:

1) Not-formalized,
2) Formalized,
3) Checkable.

Determining the formalization level is possible to be represented following the algorithm displayed in Fig. 3.

The first level is a verbal formulation. Its drawback is that the necessary in sequel transfer to the formal level is ambiguous, what may lead to safety problems and difficulties under the proof. So, the transfer to the second level is necessary and as early as possible.

The non-formalized level is initial under the formulation, is comfortable in communication, does not require considerable costs, and is abstract. Besides that, it is widely using in regulatory documents. However, in the event of consideration of a specific system and proving its correctness, the formalization is needed those remove ambiguities, improve understanding, and can place in an abstract system for subsequent correctness proof. The formalized level possesses a property that it can be written in the form of characters of a formal system. However, not always a formalized variant may be checkable (fully or partially), i.e., correspond to the third formalization level. This level assumes that the property is to be falsified within available sources for the proof. An absence of a possibility of checking may be conditioned by the system or formulation complexity, limitedness of safety proof sources, or other factors. The proof correctness may work with the second formalization level, but an absence of the check possibility or its limitedness indicate about potential problems since possibly it will be difficult to use other verification ways, such as testing, simulation tests, etc. The necessity itself of transferring to the third level is coordinating with the experience of creating reliable and safe systems.
systems possessing a larger complexity, one proposes to implement the correctness proof on the basis of determining system properties and forming abstractions of a higher level (see Fig. 5). Abstractions of the higher level may involve software modules, functions, objects, statuses subsets, etc. Their choice is defined on the basis of the verification simplification, in other words, a newly formed abstraction is to be simpler than the entity that it encapsulates.

A strict axioms formulation is considered as a powerful tool in the fight against software errors at stages of the life-cycle.

4 CONDITIONS OF DETERминING THE SAFETY FUNCTION

Formal methods as a correctness proof may be applied both for ready SW and at early stages of developing all SHWC, but in any case, one of the first verification steps is determining the safety function subject to correctness checking.

The safety function is a formalized condition with respect to the verified system, implementing which enables one to make an inference on the performance safety. For a one SHWC the safety function may be determined in different manners, and, and selecting a proven condition may be implemented at different system life cycle stages. Say, for instance, a safety function may be determined on the basis of the system functionality (determining the safety function on the basis of safety assurance strategy for the entire system, safety requirements to a considered soft- and hardware complex and interaction interfaces).

SW developing and operation say that the later a fault is detected, the more complicated both its revealing and removing are, and the more problems it may provide. Meanwhile, removing errors done under formulating requirements to a system costs in dozens time more expensive than errors done under the implementation (Jharko, 2018). Determining the safety function, which is related to the solved problem formalization, is a specification concerning the correctness proof and possesses the same properties as the requirements statement under SW development. Potential errors done under determining this function negatively influence the verification quality and may lead to correctness proof results distortion and, as a consequence, its full reconsideration. Fig. 6 displays the sequence of the safety analysis stages with determining the safety function.

Conditions to determine the safety function are setting at the validation stage by applied components.
characteristics, safety assurance strategies, and the experience available. This process is independent of the subsequent verification; it determines properties subject to checking and forms initial data, by which the safety function is setting used in the correctness proof. If errors make at the validation stage or behaviour particularities influencing the safety are not taking into account, then this directly influence the subsequent verification quality and, correspondingly, the SW and SHWC quality. Moreover, no adequate and diverse methods and tools of the correctness proof can solve problems appeared during the design, since they work with the same specification, and the final user only can indicate an error done under forming the requirements.

The world experience of the NPP safety important systems operation is evidence that faults and emergencies are the cases due no numerous factors, meanwhile a considerable part of accidents, due to (involving) errors done under forming system requirements.

Under system design, implicit admittances may be accepted, which directly are not concerned with the performance safety, but may influence the SHWC performance as a whole. System performance safety conditions may be different in a different environment or performance conditions. Thus of the validation problems is determining conditions subject to checking, and particularities of this process are that after the formalization there is no a univocal criterion and confidence that the proven function approved is necessary and sufficient. During subsequent development and safety analysis one may reveal that the scopes set are too strict and the correctness proof

is impossible to implement, or, in contrast, are very weak, due to what the SW errors finding probability decreases.

NPP safety important systems, as well as other critically important plants with high operation risk (Sakrutina, 2017), possesses a complexity that complicates a formalization of acceptable and safe behaviour. Due to this, errors may make with a large probability. To solve the problem, one may determine such a safety function; in which, these drawbacks are absent. Besides that, under the development and correctness proof, there is no necessity of a strict selection do the safety function; this may be any function meeting the conditions in Fig. 7. Thus, the proven safety function is always to be as strict, or stricter, than acceptable safe behaviour. Developed system behaviour is to meet the condition of the proven safety function.

The NPP safety important systems verification experience gathered is evidence that determining the proven safety function of developed and existing SHWC is to be implemented by:

- The used strategy of the safety assurance, which the system is to keep within all life cycle;
- Safety requirements to all system;
- Safety requirements to the considered SHWC.

Thus, the verification result is a proof that properties of the considered software meet the safety requirements to it and its environment, as well as are coordinating with the used safety assurance strategy.

Determining the proven safety function may be implemented on the technical assignment basis on developed SHWC only, but in this case, it may be a complex and hairy process. Due to this, a transfer to proving a more strict safety function is possible, rather than that was determined due to the safety requirements and accounting the criteria completeness of dangerous faults.

Consideration of system requirements to the safety assurance strategy, safe internal behaviour and coordination of interaction with external components enables on faster and more effective to partition the proven goal safety function on the verification complexity and improve its quality. The safety function formulation is not a final solution, and under a necessity, the safety function may be changed on any other meeting the conditions displayed in Fig. 7. The verification experience shows that the transfer to another safety function should be implemented when in the new consideration angle the system behaviour becomes:

Figure 7: Selecting a proven safety function; Domain A – due to some reasons the system has not implemented the condition of the proven safety function, but this did not lead to a dangerous fault; Domain B – The system behaviour meets the safety function condition.

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More deterministic – one may say more precisely how the system behaves in those or others situations;
Less complicated – there are decrease the safe analysis expenses' and time required for understanding processes available in the system.

5 APPROACHES TO DETERMINING SAFETY FUNCTIONS

Fundamental ways of changing the safety function are its expansion (weakening, weaker definition). Besides that, the safety function may be changed as a not severe weakening or enforcing, but in any case, it is to be within the acceptable safe behaviour (see fig. 7).

Let us consider three behaviour functions $h_1$, $h_2$, and $h_3$, each of which depends on the argument vector $\vec{θ}$ and has the value domain true/false. Then enforcing the function $h_2$ is the function $h_3$, transfer to such function $h_3$, under which conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied:

$$\forall(h_3(\vec{θ}) = true) \ h_2(\vec{θ}) = true \quad (1)$$
$$\exists(h_2(\vec{θ}) = true) \ h_3(\vec{θ}) = false \quad (2)$$

As weakening the function $h_2$, a transfer to such a function $h_1$ is, under which the conditions are satisfied:

$$\forall(h_2(\vec{θ}) = true) \ h_1(\vec{θ}) = true \quad (3)$$
$$\exists(h_1(\vec{θ}) = true) \ h_2(\vec{θ}) = false \quad (4)$$

Thus, weakening the function is transfer from one function $h_2$ to other function $h_3$ such that always, when $h_2$, is a truth, then the $h_1$, is truth too, but meanwhile there exist such truth values of $h_3$, under which $h_3$ is false. Enforcing is the analogous inverse transfer. Graphically relations between the functions are displaying in Fig. 8.

Let us consider an example of the safety functions, selecting which may influence the correctness proof. Let us assume that there exist SHWC SW, whose functionality is implemented in the closed cycle, for which each subsequent implementing is to be different of preceding, and for this in the memory the identifier $id$ stored. Let us assume that the number of cycles is finite, and each of them is numbered sequentially in time from 1 to $n$, and, correspondingly, there exists the number of identifiers $θ = \{id_1, ..., id_n\}$. For the considered case, let us present several variants of the safety function. The first function has the form:

$$h_1(θ) = true, \forall(i \in N, i < N) \ id_i \neq id_{i+1}.$$  

This function guarantees the distinction of the identifier from preceding one and may be applied for a safe update of incoming information.

The second safety function guarantees the identifier uniqueness within all SHWC performance time from the instant of its launching and may be used to update information, which is implementing at not each turn of the full cycle:

$$h_2(θ) = true, \forall(i \neq j \in N, i, j < N) \ id_i \neq id_j.$$  

The next safety function guarantees that each subsequent identifier is more than preceding one exactly by 1 and may be utilized to calculate the number of full cycles between events:

$$h_3(θ) = true, \forall(i \in N, i < N) \ id_i = 1 + id_j.$$  

Verification of a more strict function is more complicated, than a weak one – this requires more quantity of resources and not always is possible. However, if a possibility is available, one recommends to prove the correctness of the more strict function, since this has the following positive effects:

- Obtaining more exact representation about the system performance – properties and behaviour are determined more strictly;
- Decreasing the analysed performance complexity, and due to this, increasing the errors detection probability;
Functions proven may be applied in a sequel for more effective implementing other correctness proofs of considered SHWC.

However, in the case of the safety analysis, when it is impossible to prove the correctness in a proposed form, or resources for implementing such a works volume are absent, then weakening the verified function is possible, what enables one conclude the SW safety.

Determining the safety functions for implementing the verification is an essential stage of the safety analysis and its selection is a compromise between resources available and proven properties. The NPP safety important systems verification

6 CONCLUSIONS

For SHWC used in NPP safety important systems, a problem of assurance of a correct (concerning the specification), safe, and full meeting the requirements. Justification of the safety system, safety, and integrity of specific software is based on the design and design documents, presented during the system development, specification analysis results, algorithms, and implementation. The approach to determining the safety functions was applied:

- Under software verification of upper-level systems of NPP APCS, relating to safety important systems;
- To reveal software design errors at early development stages in order decreasing risks of an appearance of non-regular situations in the plant’s operation process;
- Under justifying NPP safety important systems software at all life cycle stages, moreover, has enabled one to increase the quality of developed/modified software.

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