Systematic Characterization of a Sequence Group

Paul Irolla
Laboratoire de Cryptologie et Virologie Opérationnelles (CVO Lab), École Supérieure d’Informatique, d’Électronique et Automatique (ESIEA).

Keywords: Sequence, Antichain, Android Malware Detection, Clustering, Classification.

Abstract: Finding similarities in a group of sequences often involves studying their common subsequences or their common substrings. In our case, Android malware detection/classification, we study the event sequences coming from the dynamic analysis of applications. For several reasons, these sequences are mostly comprised of benign events. This specific set up makes classic sequence similarity criteria useless without any machine learning. The sequence membership to a group is characterized by subsequences of any length. Heuristic algorithms for extracting short subsequences already exist, but no attempt to solve the problem systematically has been proposed. We propose a new algorithm for building the Embedding Antichain from the set of common subsequences (noted $A_{\Gamma}$). We show that this mathematical representation is very compact and embed all common subsequences of a sequence set. It is a tool for characterizing a group of sequences. The construction of this representation reveals several complex subproblems. A few of them are solved in this article, along with practical implementations. Moreover, we solved different reduced problems and provided suboptimal solutions for the others. This article opens a new path that has cross-domain applications. Specifically, in the malware detection/classification domain the Systematic Characterization of Sequence Groups is a tool that can be used for automatic generation of malware family signatures and detection heuristics. We experimented $A_{\Gamma}$ for building an Android malware family detector, on the sequences of executed Android API calls and it yields an accuracy of 97.74%.

1 MOTIVATIONS

The classic method of detecting computer malware is detection by signature. When one or more samples of a malware family are found, analysts extract the characteristic features of the malware, called signature. It is often a sequence of opcodes, of library calls or strings in the executable that identify them. This process takes time and requires reverse engineering and malware analysis skills that only a few possess. That is why research currently focuses on Machine Learning to automate the malware detection process. However, the classical method is mostly used in industry and for individuals — in antimalware software. Requiring low computing power and offering a near-zero false positive rate, this is the method of choice still to date. We searched for methods and algorithms to automate the process of creating malware family signatures. Several samples of the same family of malware obviously have common features that differentiate them from other families of malware and benign software.

There are two ways of analyzing malware: static or dynamic analysis. Static analysis consists of reverse engineering the binary without execution. The source code can be rebuilt, as well as the different external resources used. The source code can be interpreted as a graph of calls of functions and instructions, when one knows the entry points — that is to say the functions that can be called from outside the program. On Android, for a given application, there may be dozens of entry points because an application must be able to react to lots of system events (the phone turns off, turns on, changes main application, etc.) in each activity of the application. The static analysis of the code in the form of Control Flow Graph can therefore generate dozens of graphs. Dynamic analysis consists of running the application in a controlled environment and retrieving traces of its execution. These traces are often system call sequences, Android API calls, I/O events, or network communications. The complexity of finding common characteristics between sequences is in essence much less than finding common characteristics between sets of
graphs, so we moved to dynamic analysis.

We started from the assumption that malware applications from the same family run a specific sequence of events that characterize them. However, it can be scattered in a much larger mass of benign event. There are different reasons for that. An Android application manages many events related to the user interface, which are not a priori malicious. In addition, many malware families run their payload through repackaged applications, or through fake applications. A repackaged application is a benign application where malicious code has been inserted by reverse engineering techniques. The cases where an Android malware application contains only a payload being extremely rare, the sequences of malicious events are scattered in a stream of innocuous events.

Finally, the last problem is that Android applications are multithreaded. The reactivity of the user interface is dependent on it. Thus, on a time sequence of events, two consecutive events of a characteristic malicious sequence may be separated by dozens of events from a loop of the user interface. We wanted a method that could handle these different problems, natively, and therefore a method that can be generalized to other problems. Another direction that can be taken, for malware detection, is to pre-filter potentially malicious events in order to reduce the complexity of the problem. Anyway we chose to design a deterministic algorithm able to handle these difficulties. The existing algorithms that study the similarity between sequences cannot handle these difficulties.

*Longest Common Subsequence (LCS)* (Hirschberg, 1975), *sequence alignment algorithm* (Mount, ), *Levenshtein* (Cheatham and Hitzler, 2013), *Smith Waterman* (Cheatham and Hitzler, 2013), *N-Gram* based methods (Cheatham and Hitzler, 2013) (without any machine learning), are useless on this problem because the characteristic subsequence is a scarce data. We started from the hypothesis that the set of common subsequences of a family of malicious sequences may be separated by dozens of events from a loop of the user interface. We wanted a method that could handle these different problems, natively, and therefore a method that can be generalized to other problems. Another direction that can be taken, for malware detection, is to pre-filter potentially malicious events in order to reduce the complexity of the problem. Anyway we chose to design a deterministic algorithm able to handle these difficulties. The existing algorithms that study the similarity between sequences cannot handle these difficulties.

*2 NOTATION & DEFINITIONS*

Let $\mathcal{A} = \{\lambda_1, \cdots, \lambda_n\}, n \in \mathbb{N}$ be a finite alphabet, of $n$ symbols. A sequence $s = (\lambda_1, \cdots, \lambda_m), m \in \mathbb{N}$ is a sequence of symbols. Let $\Omega$ be the set of all sequences over $\mathcal{A}$.

We define $\leq$, a partial order over $\Omega$, such that (D’Angelo and West, 2000):

$$(\{a\}, \{b\}) \in \Omega^2, \quad b \preceq a \iff \exists k, \quad b_k = a_n$$

Where $n_1 < n_2 < \cdots < n_k$ is an increasing sequence of indexes. When $b \preceq a, b$ is said to be a subsequence of $a$. An antichain $\Lambda$ over $\Omega$ is a sequence set such as:

$$(a, b) \in A^2, \quad a \neq b \Rightarrow b \not\preceq a$$

Let $S_n$ be a sequence set of size $n$. We note $\Gamma$ the set of common subsequences of $S_n$. It is defined such that:

$$\Gamma = \{\gamma \in \Omega | \forall s \in S_n, \gamma \preceq s\}$$

A *Lower Set*, $L$, is a set such that if $s_1$ is in $L$ and $s_2 \preceq s_1$, then $s_2$ is in $L$. $\Gamma$ is, by definition, a *Lower Set*. A *$\Gamma$-embedding set* is a set that generate $\Gamma$ when we list all the unique subsequences of all its elements.
For sake of simplicity, in the rest of the article, an embedding set is implicitly a $\Gamma$-embedding set. A maximal element of $\Gamma$ is a sequence that is not a subsequence of any other elements of $\Gamma$.

Last, we use two common operators on graphs, namely the transitive reduction (Aho et al., 1972) and the transitive closure (Aho et al., 1972). The formal definition of the transitive reduction of a directed graph $G$ is: A directed graph $G'$ is said to be a transitive reduction of the directed graph $G$ provided that $G'$ has a directed path from vertex $u$ to vertex $v$, for any $(u,v)$, if and only if $G$ has a directed path from vertex $u$ to vertex $v$, and there is no graph with fewer arcs than $G'$ satisfying condition. The formal definition of the transitive closure of a directed graph $G$ is: A directed graph $G'$ is said to be a transitive closure of the directed graph $G$ provided that $G'$ has an edge from vertex $u$ to vertex $v$, for any $(u,v)$, if and only if $G$ has a directed path from vertex $u$ to vertex $v$. Figure 1 illustrates both operators, for directed acyclic graphs (DAG) in our context.

3 THE EMBEDDING ANTICHAIN

We define the Embedding Antichain, noted $A_\Gamma$, as the Antichain that generates $\Gamma$.

**Proposition 3.1.** The Embedding Antichain is the minimal set that represents all common subsequences from $n$ sequences.

**Proof.** A property of an Antichain is that it can generate a Lower Set of the subsequences of its elements. As there is a one to one correspondence between an Antichain and a Lower Set, the Embedding Antichain is unique and is constituted by the maximal elements of $\Gamma$. Hence, the Embedding Antichain is the minimal set that represents all common subsequences from $n$ sequences.

The representation of the Embedding Antichain can be even more compact by constructing the minimal acyclic finite-state automata (AFSA) (Daciuk et al., 2000) of this sequence set, because elements of $A_\Gamma$ share symbols. It is a directed acyclic graph, that has one root node (named START) and one leaf node (named END). When enumerating all paths from START to END, it generates $A_\Gamma$. So our goal is to build a minimal DAG that generates exactly $A_\Gamma$. In Figure 2, we show how $A_\Gamma$ represents $\Gamma$ on a small example.

In Figure 3, we show an example of the construction of $A_\Gamma$ DAG from 4 more complex sequences. In this example, enumerating all paths of the DAG from START to END ends up generating $A_\Gamma$. This DAG has been generated by an implementation of the algorithm we present in section 7.

We have identified that the number of intra-sequence symbol repetitions — i.e. multiple occurrences of the same symbol in a sequence — is a factor that has a very high impact on the branching factor and the number of nodes of $A_\Gamma$ DAG. To get a better understanding of the problem, we started solving a problem with a reduced difficulty by adding a constraint on sequences: the case where each sequence contains only unique symbols. We then expand the solution found for the subproblem to build a solution for the real problem. Throughout the article, we display instances of the algorithms on simple cases with words. The sequences that we use on our real application, and the output graph, cannot be displayed. They are simply too large.

\[
S_n = \{ \text{"abcd"}, \text{"abdd"} \}
\]

\[
\Gamma = \{ \text{"a", "b", "c", "d", "ab", "ac", "bc", "bd", "dd", "ad", "abc", "bdd", "add", "abd", "abdd"} \}
\]

\[
A_\Gamma = \{ \text{"abc", "abdd"} \}
\]
As we show in the next parts, repeated symbols in a sequence are an important contribution to the complexity of the problem. Adding constraints to our problem helps to compartment the different subproblems.

The following algorithm computes a DAG that exactly produces $A_\Gamma$ when enumerating all possible paths from the START node to the END node. Each step is illustrated with an example, with the sequences 'ABCDEFGH' and 'BDFAGHCE' (Figures 4, 5 and 6):

**Algorithm 1**: $A_\Gamma$ for two sequences with no repeat.

```plaintext
input: s1 and s2, two sequences of size |s1| and |s2|
output: G(V, A), a DAG
begin
    create a matrix M of size (|s1|+2) * (|s2|+2)
    fill M[0][0] with a node of value START
    fill M[|s1|+1][|s2|+1] with a node of value END
    for 0 < i < |s1|
        for 0 < j < |s2|
            if s1[i] = s2[j]
                fill M[i+1][j+1] with a node of value s1[i]
            else
                fill M[i+1][j+1] with a node of null value
            end if
        end for
    end for
    mark the node START as a node to process
    while there are nodes to process
        node <- take the first one on the list
        mark all non null nodes in M as valid
        mark all nodes in M with i <= node.i and j <= node.j as invalid
        L <- list elements in M
        sort L in increasing order with the manhattan distance between node and L elements
        for element in L
            if element is valid
                add an edge linking node to element
                mark all elements in M with i >= element.i
                and j >= element.j as invalid
                add element as a node to process
            end if
        end for
    end while
end
```

**Proposition 4.1.** Algorithm 1 produces the minimal $A_\Gamma$ DAG.

**Proof.** The DAG nodes are common symbols and they are connected in increasing index order — increasing from both sequences. It produces $\Gamma$, the set of all common subsequences, meaning that the DAG produces a $\Gamma$-embedding set.

Moreover let us assume that the DAG does not produce any antichain. Let us consider all the possible paths from START to END. The sequences have
The next node can not come before D in s2.

Once F is chosen, the nodes after it in s1 & s2 are beyond the scope of the current iteration.

5 THE EMBEDDING ANTICHAIN OF N SEQUENCES WITHOUT INTRA-REPETITION

The strategy we chose for finding the minimal $A_\Gamma$ DAG of more than two sequences is incremental. We start with the previous algorithm for two sequences to get an initial $A_\Gamma$ DAG. Then we process the sequences one after the other. We have found that this problem we are solving is very similar to the problem of building a minimal acyclic finite-state automata (AFSA) (Daciuk et al., 2000) of a word set. In this domain, researchers also chose an incremental strategy. Nonetheless, there are two major differences between this problem and ours. On the first hand we cannot represent or know in advance the elements of the word set. In our problem the word set is the common subsequence set, and as shown previously it grows exponentially with the sizes of the sequences. As such, we cannot represent it at any point of the solution. On the other hand, our DAG must be a transitive reduction (Aho et al., 1972), meaning we cannot remove an edge from the graph without removing a path from a vertex $v$ to a vertex $w$. Hence, any solution for building the AFSA in the literature are of no help here. Moreover, our graph yields more constraints than the classical AFSA. The new DAG exhibits the following properties:

- The DAG must be a transitive reduction otherwise there would be a path that is a subsequence of one other path.
- Each symbol is unique in the DAG because in each sequence, symbols are unique.
- As we process new sequences, the graph cannot grow in terms of vertices because symbols are unique.
Let \( n \) be a node from the new DAG. Its children cannot come before in the topological order of the current DAG and in the indexes of the new sequence to process. These constraints hold because symbols are unique both in the current DAG and in the sequence to process.

An edge cannot exist in the new DAG if this edge is not in the transitive closure of the current DAG. In other words, a node \( B \) is reachable from \( A \) in the new DAG if \( B \) is reachable from \( A \) in the current DAG.

The following algorithm computes the minimal \( A_\Gamma \) DAG and is illustrated with an example on three sequences ‘ABCDEFGH’, ‘BDFAGHCE’ and ‘EBGDFHAC’. The first and second sequences have been processed by the algorithm from the previous section to generate an initial DAG (Figure 7).

### Algorithm 2: Minimal \( A_\Gamma \) DAG of \( n+1 \) sequences with no repetition, from the minimal \( A_\Gamma \) DAG of \( n \) sequences.

**input:** \( G(V, A) \) a DAG and \( s \) a sequence of size \(|s|\)

**output:** \( G'(V', A'), a \) DAG

begin

Let ‘depthMap’ be a map, that take as value a list of nodes and as key their corresponding depth in the DAG

\[ \text{depthMap} \leftarrow \text{topologicalSort}(G(V, A)) \]

Let ‘maxDepth’ be the maximum key of depthMap

Let ‘TC’ be the transitive closure matrix of \( G(V, A) \) (size \(|V|*|V|\))

mark the node START as a node to process

while there are nodes to process

node \( \leftarrow \) take the first one on the list

for element in M

if element.i > node.i and element.j > node.j

and element is reachable from node in TC

add an edge linking node to element

endif

endfor

endwhile

\[ G'(V', E') \leftarrow \text{transitiveReduction}(G(V, E)) \]

end

The Figure 10 presents the result on the three sequences example.
applying the transitive reduction, the graph becomes the minimal $A_{\Gamma}$ DAG because symbols are unique so there cannot be two equal paths in the DAG. As nodes have unique symbols, no edge can be removed from the transitive reduction of the DAG without removing a subsequence. Therefore the graph is minimal and its paths form an antichain. It is the minimal $A_{\Gamma}$ DAG.

6 THE EMBEDDING ANTICHAIN OF TWO SEQUENCES

The intra-sequence symbol repetition invalidates the proof of the algorithm 1. To understand what symbol repetition induces, we applied the algorithm 1 on this new problem. We choose the sequences "absolumentsongeur" and "mensongeabsolu" (Figure 11) to illustrate the problematic.

The objective is to produce a minimal $A_{\Gamma}$ DAG. We note that the DAG does not represent an antichain, we have highlighted in Figure 11 two edges that produce sequences that are subsequences of longer paths from START to END. The DAG is also not minimal because we can merge the two nodes 'u' while being able to produce the exactly same unique paths. However the DAG produces a $\Gamma$-embedding set. The DAG nodes are common symbols and they are connected in increasing index order — increasing from both sequences. It means that the DAG always produces a $\Gamma$-embedding set.

We can easily make the DAG minimal by merging equivalent nodes at the end of the algorithm 1. Equivalent nodes are nodes with equal symbols that have exactly the same children or parents. When equivalent nodes are merged, a new node is created with children and parents from both equivalent nodes. However, designing an algorithm for finding the supernumerary edges (marked in red in Figure 11) is a challenging task regarding the fact that path enumeration in the graph has a polynomial complexity of high order.

**Proposition 6.1.** The worst case complexity of path enumeration of a minimal $\Gamma$-embedding DAG is $O(n^{k+1})$ where $n$ is the maximal number of nodes from all topological levels and $k$ is the number of topological levels.
Proof. We construct a DAG, denoted $B$, that contains all the sequences from a minimal $\Gamma$-embedding DAG, denoted $A$. This DAG has $nk^2$ paths, so the worst case complexity of $A$ is $O(nk^2)$. □

For the computation of the minimal $A_T$ DAG, we tried different methods. None of them can compute the minimal $A_T$ DAG with an acceptable algorithmic complexity. Our best attempt is founded on the fact that with reversed sequences for each DAG node, its children should be its parents and conversely. We note that applying 1 in forward and backward order leads to different DAG that are not equivalent when reversing children and parents. Relying on this observation, we reached an algorithm close to the solution:

Algorithm 3: Subsequence DAG for two sequences.

1. Apply algorithm 1 from Start to End (forward pass) and from End to Start (backward pass). The backward pass is the equivalent to a forward pass with sequences in reverse order.
2. Merge equivalent vertices. Equivalent vertices are two vertices that have the same symbols and the same parents. Edges from the forward and backward passes are considered for the children/parent comparison. If no nodes have been merged, go to step 5.
3. Apply the transitive reduction on both forward and backward graphs. If no edge has been deleted, go to step 5.
4. Go to step 2.
5. Delete all edges that have no equivalent edge in the other pass. An edge from vertex $v$ to $a$ from the forward pass is considered equivalent to an edge from $a$ to $v$ from the backward pass.
6. Some nodes can be left without parents, we call them orphan nodes. Link the orphan nodes to its parents in the forward and backward DAG. If no such parent has been found, delete the orphan node.
7. Some nodes can be left without children, we call them single nodes. Link the single nodes to its children in the forward and the backward DAG that have a common symbol and that still exists in the current DAG. If no such child has been found, delete the single node.
8. If an orphan or single node has been deleted, go to step 6.

This algorithm works on the example with "absolutemengesongeur" and "mensongeabsolux", as shown in Figure 12.

However, when tested with longer sequences we noted that this additional constraint on the edges induces a problem and we found that this algorithm does not produce $A_T$ or a $\Gamma$-embedding set, but a set that contains less or equal information. This problem arises when a forward path is equivalent to a backward pass but with different nodes.

### 7 THE EMBEDDING ANTICHAIN OF N SEQUENCES

Compared to the same problem without intra-repetition, processing the $\Gamma$-embedding DAG of $n+1$ sequences from the $\Gamma$-embedding DAG of $n$ sequences brings two new difficulties. The first one is that each node from the previous DAG, that have several matches in the new sequence, must be duplicated in the $\{\text{topological level} / \text{sequence index}\}$ matrix. It means, when using the algorithm 4 for an arbitrary node, that it can connect to children that are duplicated, actually creating duplicated paths or supernumerary subsequences. To cope with this problem, a node must not be connected to more than one duplicated child. The second problem is the introduction of duplicated paths as two different nodes can have the same symbols. Like in the previous section, we apply a $\{\text{merge} / \text{transitive}\}$ reduction phase to remove the most part of it. If the previous graph is a $\Gamma$-embedding DAG of $n+1$ sequences then the result is a $\Gamma$-embedding DAG, because none of the steps can remove a node or an edge that breeds a unique subsequence. Here is the full algorithm:

Algorithm 4: $\Gamma$-embedding DAG for $n+1$ sequences from a $\Gamma$-embedding DAG of $n$ sequences.

1. Process a topological sort and the transitive closure of the DAG.
2. For each node in the DAG create a new node for each corresponding symbol in the sequence. Every new node created at one iteration is called duplicated node.
3. Connect each new node, of topological level $i$ and of sequence index $j$, to all new nodes that satisfy the following conditions:
   - It comes from a node reachable in the transitive closure of the DAG.
   - Its topological level is at minimum $i+1$.
   - Its sequence index is at minimum $j+1$.
   - The node has not been connected to another duplicated node.
4. Merge equivalent vertices. Equivalent vertices are two vertices that have the same symbol and the same children or the same parents. If it is not the first iteration of the merge phase and no vertex have been merged, stop the algorithm.
5. Process the transitive reduction of the current graph. If no edge has been deleted, stop the algorithm.
8 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

In this part, we test our final algorithm on sequences coming from the dynamic analysis of benign and malware applications. In a first part, we explain how we gather and process the sequences from Android applications. In a second part, we explore a way of using the graph produced by our algorithm to detect if an application belongs to a particular malware family.

8.1 Sequence Collection and Processing

We use a dataset of 719 Android malware and 521 benign samples. Malware samples come from the Drebin Dataset (Arp et al., 2014). It is the most widely used malware dataset, in the domain of Android malware detection. In a previous study (Irolla and Dey, 2018), we observed that a large part of malware samples from this dataset share the same opcode sequences — i.e. the bytecode sequence without the operand. A large part of malware applications use repackaging, this is why for two malware samples that share the same opcode sequence, the only changes are often strings, class names, and assets. 49.35% of applications have this characteristic. We showed that it artificially boost the performance of machine learning algorithms because samples that have been learned from the training set are also found in the testing set.

So, in our experiment we only use malware samples that exhibit different opcode sequences, that way we get an unbiased performance result of generalization capacity of the algorithm. The benign samples come from F-Droid, a repository of Free and Open Source Android applications. These applications cannot a priori be malicious.

We chose to represent a sample by the sequence of Java calls to the Android API it executes during a dynamic analysis process. The Java call sequence is used to model the behavior of the application. It is an information used in the detection of malware, recovered mainly through static analysis. Java calls can be methods implemented by the developer — which then have a prior unknown behavior — or methods implemented in external libraries. The Android API is often the only entry point for accessing certain phone features. Information that identifies the phone or the user, access to SMS, calls, contacts, etc. Using these calls to the Android API in an unusual way may reveal mischievous behavior. Researchers have already studied the usage of these API call sequences to the malware detection problem. DroidAPIminer (Aafer et al., 2013) achieve 99% accuracy with KNN (Aha et al., 1991), on a dataset of 3987 malware samples and 500 benign samples with split testing (66% learn-
ing, 33% testing). Feng Shen et al. (Shen et al., 2018) achieve 94.5% accuracy with a SVM classifier on a dataset of 3899 malware samples, 3899 benign samples with split validation (90% learning, 10% testing). It appears that API calls are also a feature with potent discriminative power.

The whole system that tests, executes applications and collects Java calls is Glassbox (Irolla and Filiol, 2017). The application UI relies on pooling loops to be reactive, and a large portion of the code logic is handled by loops. This results in repeated substrings within the sequence. These repeated substrings do not convey new information and hinders both the performance and efficiency of algorithms that process them. These artefacts, in the domain of biology are called tandem repeats. Lin & al. (Lin et al., 2015) also identified this problem in their study of system call sequences from the dynamic analysis of applications. They solved it by removing consecutive call repetition, i.e. tandem repeats of size 1. We designed a tandem repeat removal algorithm to increase both performance and efficiency of downstream algorithms. Let be \( \text{trr} \), a function that keep only the first instance of tandem repeat. For example:

\[
\text{trr}("aezezeabcdabed") = "aezabcd"
\]

The algorithm we use is inspired from a naive approach. In Figure 13 we show this algorithm running on the previous example.

On the diagonal is the number of the iteration. To detect a tandem repeat, we run the matrix, noted \( m \), downwards, starting from the current iteration on the diagonal, until we find a position where \( m(i, j) = 1 \). The distance \( d \), between the starting point and the first valid position is saved. Then, we run the matrix diagonally until a non-valid position is found, i.e. \( m(i, j) = 0 \). We save the traveled distance, \( d' \). We have \( d' = k.d + r \) with \( (k, r) \in \mathbb{N}^2 \). Last we erase the \( k.d \) first positions from the diagonal. To erase a position \( (i, j) \), we remove all \( (i', j) \) and all \( (j, i') \) for all \( i' \) possible positions. Then the matrix is reassembled. In our example, removal appeared at iteration 2 and 4. This naive algorithm is obviously of \( O(n^2) \) time and space complexity where \( n \) is the sequence size. It is impractical. We noted that tandem repeat size in our data rarely exceed 10. So we break the sequence in parts of random size — between 100 and 500 — and apply this algorithm on them. As the breaks can happen in the middle of a tandem repeat, we apply again this procedure until there is no change in the sequence or 3 times maximum. In this way, our tandem repeat removal algorithm becomes \( O(n) \) in time and space complexity.

8.2 Classification Experiment

The \( \Gamma \)-embedding DAG contains common information between a group of sequences. To exploit these data for assessing if a new sequence belongs or not to the group, we need to define measures. Let us detail our approach. We collect common symbols between all sequences from a group, then we remove any non-common symbols from all sequences. These sequences are sorted by their length in increasing order. It becomes the order of sequence processing. As the shortest sequences are treated first, it is most likely that at each iteration, we get the smaller possible DAG.

We apply the algorithm 3 on the two first sequences and the algorithm 4 for the following ones. To assess if a new sequence belongs to the group, we use the algorithm 4 again with the DAG from the group. Then we define several measures that give indications about the changes on the DAG. The less the DAG is reduced, the most likely the new sequence belongs to the group because it shares a wide number of common subsequences.

Let \( N_a, E_a, P_a \) be respectively the number of nodes, edges and paths (from START to END) in the DAG before the new sequence processing. Let \( N_b, E_b, P_b \) be respectively the number of nodes, edges and paths in the DAG after the new sequence processing. We define three criteria: node expansion, edge expansion and path expansion noted \( N_{\text{ex}}, E_{\text{ex}} \) and \( P_{\text{ex}} \).

\[
N_{\text{ex}} = \frac{N_a - N_b}{N_b}, E_{\text{ex}} = \frac{E_a - E_b}{E_b}, P_{\text{ex}} = \frac{P_a - P_b}{P_b}
\]

Algorithm 4 is very sensitive to outliers in sequence clusters. The sequence that share the less common subsequences with the group will reduce the graph the most. For that reason, we re-clustered malware families to get groups of sequences that are re-
ally close. To accomplish this task, we use a distance between two sequence clusters that favor common subsequences:

\[ D(c_1, c_2) = \frac{1}{|A_{c_1} \cap A_{c_2}|}, \text{ the inter-cluster distance} \]

\[ D(c, c) = \frac{1}{|A_c|}, \text{ the intra-cluster distance} \]

Where \( A_c \) is the set of symbols in the sequence cluster \( c \). \( 0 < D(c_1, c_2) \leq 1 \). When the sequences in a group share a lot a common symbols, \( D \) tends to 0, and conversely when the sequences share just a few symbols, \( D \) tends to 1.

We have designed a hierarchical clustering to group similar sequences based on the \( D \) distance. At initialization, each sequence is within a separated cluster, then at each iteration, the clusters that have the lowest distance are merged. The common symbols between both clusters become the symbol set of the new cluster. In that sense, when clusters are created we lose the information about the individual sequences. To find the optimal number of cluster we minimize a Ward criterion:

\[
r = \sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} \sum_{c_i, c_j \in C} D(c_i, c_j)^2 \]

Where \( \mathcal{C} \) is the set of clusters. At each iteration \( r \) is calculated and the iteration with the lowest \( r \) is considered as the optimal iteration. To promote clusters that are consistent regarding our problem, we added several constrains to the clusters:

- At least 50% of the points must be clustered
- Clusters of size 1 are not considered (even in \( r \) calculation)
- Clusters of size below 20% of the maximal size among clusters are not considered (even in \( r \) calculation).

These rules ensure that small clusters are filtered — they are outliers regarding our problem — and that at least a majority of the malware dataset is taken into account. Another issue is that Android malware and benign applications share API patterns linked to the use of UI. The common subsequences derived from UI API calls is of little use on malware detection. Hence, to refine malware sequences, we first cluster benign applications, take the symbols sets of the valid clusters and subtract them from malware sequences (Table 2).

Then we cluster malware sequences, results are presented in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Number of sequences</th>
<th>Number of common symbols</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Leave-one-out cross validation measures.

We note that benign sequences are more diverse — 48 / 521 benign sequences within selected clusters — than malware sequences — 121 / 719 malware sequences within selected clusters. We use only malware clusters 0, 1 and 4 because they lead to \( \Gamma\)-embedding DAG that are very fast to generate. Other clusters lead to DAGs with more than \( 10^6 \) nodes and edges. They require too much computing time to generate. The approximation we get lead to errors, mostly added nodes and edges. These errors grow with the number and size of the common subsequences. For some pathological cases, the graph is constituted mostly by errors. So, before the graph is reduced by the node merging and transitive reduction phases, the intermediate graphs are already too big to be processed. A better approximation should enable more cases to be processed. This subject still requires extensive research, as it is a domain at its beginning.

Next, for each cluster we use leave-one-out cross validation. One sequence is removed from a cluster, then the \( \Gamma\)-embedding DAG is processed from the rest. The sequence that has been left out is added to the DAG and we measure the node, edge and path expansion, the results are presented in Table 4.

The standard deviation of \{node, edge, path\} expansion is used as a criterion of a sequence belonging to a cluster. We consider that a new sequence belongs a cluster if its \{node, edge and path\} expansion deviation from the mean is below the respective standard
We tested all benign sequences and all malware sequences — that were not already belonging to a cluster. The results are presented in Table 5.

A sequence is considered to be correctly classified if a sequence is predicted to belong in the right cluster for leave-one-out malware sequences or if the sequence is predicted to not belong to any of the clusters for the rest of the sequences. The overall results of 97.74% accuracy is close to the state-of-the-art (98% (Deshotels et al., 2014), 99% (Aafer et al., 2013), 97.3-99% (Yerima et al., 2015)). The limitation is that we could not make consistent $\Gamma$-embedding DAG for the whole dataset. The process of DAG creation or clustering needs improvement to enable a larger usage of the $\Gamma$-embedding DAG. However it shows that this mathematical object ($\Gamma$-embedding DAG) is useful for production applications.

### 9 Conclusion

This article contributes to the state-of-the-art by defining, formalizing and constructing a new representation for the common subsequences of a sequence set. It is called $\Lambda_F$ DAG. We showed that the $\Lambda_F$ DAG contains all information about the common subsequences and is expressed in a very compact form. We succeed to design an algorithm that is able to build this construction for sequence without intra-repetitions. For other sequences, we have designed an algorithm that is able to construct a structure close to solution.

We assessed its utility for classification heuristics. With simple metrics we came to 97.74% accuracy for singling out clustered malware from other applications with the sequence of their Android API calls executed during dynamic analysis. While it does compete with state-of-the-art malware detection with machine learning, it shows that $\Gamma$-embedding DAG conveys enough information for classification. The exploitation of this representation for data mining needs further researches.

### REFERENCES


