The Dynamics of Politics Indonesia: Patrimonial Bureaucracy Model in Indonesia Period of Reform

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Abstract: This article discusses the political relations and bureaucracy in particular UU No. 34 of 2004 on the Principles of Local Governance which provides the direct election of regional heads. It uses a qualitative approach with secondary data sources. The reality occurs in the elections areas, make the bureaucracy to be neutral. Political and bureaucratic rulers take advantage of each other for their own sake. This relation strengthens the literature on the development of bureaucracy in Indonesia, and it appears that patron-client relationship or patrimonialism is apparent. The bureaucratic cooptation on the rulers' political interests is inevitable because, in that relationship, there has been a mutually beneficial or symbiotic relationship of mutualism. The term patrimonialism or patrimonial politics in Choi's study refers to the dominance of patron-client relations in the workings of political institutions rather than applying the principles of public interest and professionalism. In another study, Crouch also saw that the Indonesian bureaucracy still tends to be patrimonial, in which power is acquired and maintained by exchanging loyalty and support with material positions and interests. This pattern of relationships has the potential to ignore the principles of meritocracy.

1 INTRODUCTION

Contribution to the development of bureaucracy is based on the developing bureaucracy by its social environment or in other words, attitudes and values adopted in society. Furthermore, the term bureaucratic culture is the collective character of society in living and treating bureaucracy, so it is not limited to the behavior of the bureaucratic apparatus. Bureaucratic ethics is the character of individual or group of individuals, in this case, individual and collective bureaucratic apparatus in understanding and treating authority as bureaucratic apparatus (Said, 2009).

From the literature on the development of bureaucracy in Indonesia since the colonial era, it is clear that the patron-client relationship or patrimonialism is apparent. Bureaucratic cooptation of political interests is unavoidable because in that relationship there has been a mutually beneficial relationship symbiotic mutualism.

In the period of independent until the end of the Old Order period, patrimonial bureaucracy is still attached, and the influence of feudalism and colonialism continues. In the Old Order era, patron relationship pattern is still active, and it was powerful, and all bosses should be respected, obeyed, and abstinence opposed. At this time bureaucrats become the pedestal of everything. The tyrannical seeds together with the guided democracy environment live on the periphery, and the summit ends with the insistence that gave birth to the New Order.

In the era of the New Order, although there are efforts to modernize the bureaucracy, the characteristics of its patrimonial culture is still thick. Later the term 'ABS' (AsalBapakSenang) or the Origin of Father Glad that shows more bureaucratic functions to the superiors next to the people. Father-child relationship and “ewuh-pekiwuh” culture are still affecting the life of the New Order political era.

In the contemporary context, the so-called patron-client relationship is the ability of a patron to provide chair, position, and employment for the client (subordinate) with subordinate rewards must provide job title, through tribute forms, envelopes, and others. Therefore the subordinate exercises on the boss associated with loyalty and high dedication to his patron and beneficial to the community, which formed them to be influential cultures in the Reformation era.
2 POLITICS AND BUREAUCRACY IN REFORM ERA

The dominant political control of the New Order regime had finally come to an end when a massive wave of student demonstrations took place and demanded the resignation of President Suharto. The fall of Soeharto in 1998 marked the end of the New Order regime and the beginning of the Reformation era.

In order to respond to political reforms, in the context of bureaucracy, the instruments of legislation are revised to adjust to the circumstances of the times. At the time of Megawati Soekarno-Putri, for example, by stipulating Undang-Undang No. 32 of 2004 on the Principles of Local Government. This law is the primary basis for decentralization and regional autonomy. This law also regulates the election of regional heads and their representatives (Governors, Regents, and Mayors) to be elected directly by the people. The law also regulates the relation of officials and civil servants in the Pilkada, where there is a prohibition for officials to involve civil servants in practical politics as well as to engage in practical political activities.

Provisions for civil servants to be neutral are also regulated in Undang-Undang No.43 of 1999 on the Principles of Personnel. In Article 3, paragraph 2 mentions that civil servants should be neutral from the influence of all groups and political parties and not discriminatory in providing services to the public.

Furthermore, with the enactment of Undang-Undang No. 32 of 2004, then the election of regional heads (Pilkada) must be done directly. The Pilkada impacts brought changes to the bureaucratic relations with politics, especially the bureaucratic neutrality of politics. In some areas, the elections have had an impact on civil servants to engage in practical politics in the form of political support to particular candidates.

The heads of regions elected by direct regional head elections (Pilkada) must be aware in taking policy included arranging their “cabinet.” Therefore, the cabinet is filled by government bureaucrats officials who will support and implement political policies and as a political channel head of the region.

It is essential for the regional head to have a strategy in recruiting his government's bureaucratic officials. This strategy is needed to get bureaucratic officials who can work together in realizing four things, among others: First, to ensure the program/pledge during the campaign from happening. Secondly, through the support of a stable bureaucracy, the regional head can maintain his power at least until the end of his tenure. Third, creating an effective and efficient government. Fourth, to accommodate the interests of political forces that surround the regional head.

The need and expectation of such bureaucracy are potentially disregarding the principles of meritocracy, where consideration in the recruitment of bureaucratic posts is based on personal interest, placing those close to the leadership of political forces prioritized even though they lack the necessary specifications and qualifications in the bureaucratic position (dilemma of loyalty and competence). Ignoring the principles of meritocracy in the body of government bureaucracy has the potential for bureaucratic disease (bureanomia) which affects:

First, bureaucracy and bureaucrats become neutral or neutral. Second is the non-functioning of promotion mechanisms of positions in career positions within the government structure; Third, bureaucracy and bureaucrats focus on the interests of the rulers or political parties than the community; The four bureaucracies and bureaucrats will perform actions that are not elegant in accordance with his professionalism, but move like a mass as practical politics(Utomo, 2007).

In the case of Major Election in South Tangerang city 2010, for example, became public attention when the Constitutional Court canceled the victory of candidate number four, Airin Rachmi Diany and Benjamin Davnie for being proven to have committed systematic, structured, and massive violations during the elections. Violations committed by this couple, according to the Constitutional Court was involving the power structure, ranging from officials at the city level, sub-district head, village head, until the head of RT / RW. In practice use pressure on employees who are not in line with the interests of the couple (Kompas, 2010). The sovereignty of the candidate in the governor elections in South Sulawesi 2009, and in many other regional elections. This phenomenon shows that there are still problems in bureaucratic reforms that proclaim the beginning of reforms that want the bureaucracy to be modern, and neutral.
3 THE MODEL OF THE PATRIMONIAL BUREAUCRACY

According to the Indonesian Dictionary, the term neutrality shows a condition of someone who is free, and does not take sides with certain groups or groups, or conditions in which a person does not get outside influence from himself (Alwi, 2005). In the context of bureaucracy, neutrality means that the bureaucracy is a system where the bureaucracy will not change in providing services and be free from the influence of certain political parties or groups. The bureaucracy has to be in the framework of professionalism not because of political or class interests (Thoha, 2003). Based on UU No. 43 of 1999 concerning Amendments to UU No. 8 of 1974 concerning the Principles of Employment, Article 3 paragraph 2 states that Public Servants must be neutral from the influence of all groups and political parties and not discriminate in providing public services. Furthermore, the neutrality of civil servants is regulated again in Government Regulation (PP) No. 37 of 2004 concerning Prohibition of Civil Servants to become Members of Political Parties. In the consideration of the Government Regulation, it is stated that Public Servants as elements of the state apparatus must be neutral from the influence of all groups and political parties, not discriminatory in providing services to the public, and prohibited from becoming members / administrators of political parties. In Chapter II, article 2 paragraph 1 of the PP states that civil servants are prohibited from becoming members / administrators of political parties. If there are civil servants who are members / administrators of political parties, then according to the provisions of article 2 paragraph 2 PP, these civil servants must be dismissed from civil servants. Based on the provisions of the regulation according to the author, let alone be a member or manager of a political party, being influenced by certain groups or certain political parties is prohibited for civil servants to guarantee their neutrality.

In addition to the ban on impartiality for civil servants, the government also regulates the prohibition of constituents or candidate pairs to involve civil servants in politics. The provision is regulated in PP Number 6 of 2005 concerning Election, Ratification, Appointment and Dismissal of Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads. This regulation was issued on February 11, 2005. In article 62 the PP clearly stipulates that the candidate pair is prohibited from involving the Civil Servants, Members of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, members of the Indonesian National Police as campaign participants and campaigners in the election. The neutrality of civil servants in the context of Pilkada is further regulated in the SE Menpan No. 8 of 2005. In this circular it is stated that civil servants who are candidates for the Head or Deputy Regional Head, are obliged to make a statement of ability to resign from office if elected as Regional Head / Deputy Head Regions, are required to undergo leave / inactive while in state positions during the election process in accordance with the provisions of the prevailing laws and regulations, are prohibited from using government and / or regional government budgets, are prohibited from using facilities related to their positions, are prohibited from involving other civil servants to provide deep support campaign. Whereas for civil servants who are not candidates for Regional Head or Deputy Regional Head, it is prohibited as an Election Supervisory Committee, except from the Prosecutor and Higher Education elements or unless there is an element of the Attorney General's Office and Higher Education, civil servants can be domiciled as the electoral supervisory committee appointment of KPUD with the approval of the Regional Head, is prohibited from engaging in campaign activities to support candidates for Regional Head and or Deputy Regional Head, is prohibited from using facilities related to his position in campaign activities, is prohibited from making decisions and or actions that benefit or harm one candidate during the period campaign, is prohibited from being a member of the District Election Committee (PPK), the Voting Committee (PPS) and the Voting Organizing Group (KPPS), except in the electoral district there are no independent community leaders as referred to in Government Regulation Number 6 Year 2 005 for the appointment of KPUD with the approval of the Regional Head. These provisions regarding the neutrality of civil servants are also regulated in SE Menpan No. 7 of 2009.

Karl D Jackson tried to explain the involvement of the bureaucracy in politics by using the bureaucratic polity model, where there was an accumulation of power in the State and the removal of society from politics and government. The interest of participation at the elite level outside the State is only at the stage of policy implementation. They are small adjustments at the local level. This model explains the existence of a form of political system with the power to make decisions lies entirely in the hands of state rulers, especially military officers, high-ranking bureaucrats, and no
community participation. The only mobilization in bureaucratic politics is competition between the bureaucratic circles and the military elite. This elite, especially the President, will determine socioeconomic change, with the possibility of the following: (a) the development of a competitive democratic political system based on mass political parties and citizen participation; (b) the motion to a single party, to a mobilization regime with ideological underpinnings; or (c) bureaucratic political survival. The country of bureaucratic policy is different from the militarist politics because its basic style and purpose are more bureaucratic and technocratic than military. While the sole ruler (Sultanic regime), whose legitimacy based on the authority of the leader's charisma, is different from bureaucratic power in the decision-making process. Because in bureaucratic politics decisions are taken jointly in bureaucratic and military alliances. Jackson also saw a patrimonial element, namely the elite relationship of the state united through patron-client relationships (Jackson, 1977). In line with Jackson, Harold Crouch sees that bureaucratic politics in Indonesia contains three main features. First, the dominant political institution is bureaucracy. Secondly, other political institutions such as parliaments, political parties, and interest groups are in a state of weakness that is unable to compensate or control the power of the bureaucracy. Third, the mass outside the bureaucracy is passive, which is partly the weakness of political parties (Crouch, The New Order: The Prospect for Political Stability, 2006). In another study, Crouch also sees that Indonesian bureaucracy is still a patrimonial tendency, in which power is acquired and maintained by exchanging loyalty and support with material positions and interests (Crouch, Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia, 1979).

Meanwhile, William Lidde rejects the view that in bureaucracy crucial decisions are taken on a scientific basis by long-term social and political interests to achieve an equitable society. He argues that bureaucratic networks rely on patron and client networks called neopatrimonialism. "Neopatrimonialism" bureaucracy is the power relationship between the rulers and the subordinate bureaucracy (Patriarchal, priyayi, and other) patron-client networks. The ruler as a patron (Gusti / Father/ Master), while bureaucracy as a client (Kawula / Abdi / Anak). The relationship is nothing more than an exchange between loyalty and position. If not loyal and serve maximally to the ruler, a client will not get a position. In neopatrimonial bureaucracies or relationship, positions are the sources of material income. The higher the position, the higher the income earned because there is a presumption that in the office attached great authority to expand the opportunity to earn income(Lidle, 1992).

Donald K. Emmerson also presented the theory of patrimonialism in the bureaucracy by examining the bureaucratic structure of the New Order. Patrimonialism refers to a power centered on the acquisition of certain individuals who accumulate power, while others identify their interests. The ruler distributes the resources of his power to a credible party and has significant influence in the community to maintain the sustainability and stability of his power. While for, for those interested parties, have accessibility in seeking political and economic protection within the power structure. The relationship takes place in a profitable exchange maintained nearly by both parties (Emmerson, 1983).

Although the above research is not new, in the context of analysis it is still necessary to illustrate how bureaucratic patterns in Indonesia in the past few decades have somehow contributed to the current pattern and color of the bureaucracy.

### 3.1 Cases of Bureaucratic Politicization in the 2009 Election

In the 2009 election, there are still many cases of bureaucratic politicization, although this is the third election era of Reformation and these bureaucrats have long been getting socialization about the necessity to uphold the neutral attitude. Moreover, the issue of bureaucratic politicization has also considered as an election criminal act. There are three categories of election violations:

1. **Administrative Offenses:**
   a. Campaign state officials without a letter of absence
   b. The campaign over time
   c. Cross-regional campaign
   d. Change of campaign type
   e. Convoy not previously notified to police & off track
   f. Violation of the limitations of the frequency and duration of the campaign's ad impressions

2. **Election Crime Violations:**
   a. Engaging children
   b. Civil servants who use civil servant attributes
   c. Civil servants who mobilize civil servants in their work environment
d. Campaign out of schedule
e. Destruction or disappearance of campaign props
f. Implementers and campaign officers contempt other campaign participants
g. Use of the state or government facilities
h. Involvement of state / regional / military / village officials
i. Money politic

3. Other Violations:
   a. Traffic violations
   b. Not reporting campaign implementers to KPU / D and copies to Bawaslu / Panwaslu

The exposure of the Minister of Home Affairs Mardiyanto in a meeting with the Commission II of the House of Representatives on May 4, 2009, found several cases of legislative election campaign involving bureaucracy, i.e., 2 cases of state officials mobilizing civil servants in Papua. Four cases stated officials were campaigning without a permit from the Minister of Home Affairs, 12 cases of civil servants conducted campaigns using certain political party attributes and using civil servant uniforms, 68 cases of state officials using the state facilities, and 21 cases involving civil servants, TNI / Polri, and village apparatus.

Another case was in the North Sumatera Election Supervisory Committee; it found at least seven regional heads to mobilize their government apparatus to win specific candidates and political parties. The seven areas were PematangSiantar City, Binjai, Mandailing Natal District, Central Tapanuli, Asahan, SerdangBedagai, and LabuhanBatu. In Kabupaten Tapanuli Tengah, Panwaslu found evidence of recording of village heads and sub district heads who deliberately called for the people to vote for the Democratic Party. The same thing happened in PematangSiantar.

Meanwhile, in PematangSiantar, Panwaslu also found the Head of Education and Teaching Office, SurungSialagan, conducted a veiled campaign involving principals, overseers, teachers. The campaign was done to win the Democratic Party. Integrated Law Enforcement Center 2009 PematangSiantar City has officially designated Surung as a criminal suspect.

The above cases show that the tendency to make bureaucracy as a political machine and money machine to win certain political parties strengthens in the regions. In addition to the issue of the many heads of regions coming from politics, this tendency also arises because of supervision in weak areas. It also undeniable that the election moment serves as a venue for repayment for party cadres who have been elected to be executive officers to show loyalty and devotion to his party by trying to maximize his party in the region.

3.2 Cases of Bureaucratic Politicization in Major Election in Depok (2005 and 2010)

The case of a Major election in Depok is an example. Major Election in Depok is the first Pilkada in West Java Province. Thus the success of election in Depok will become the first barometer of the success of elections in cities and districts of West Java. The Major election in Depok is also the means to see how the implications of decentralized politics, especially the struggle of local elites in power struggle. In the context of bureaucratic and political relations, the election is also an instrument to see if the neutralism of the bureaucracy.

In the process of the election in Depok, 2005, has also been an inconvenience among civil servants. Badrul has a relatively powerful bureaucratic machine, from the municipal level to the village, to be driven for his victory. The non-neutrality of civil servants is due to the strong influence of Badrul Kamal among the bureaucracy has caused the civil servant to side with this incumbent candidate. For civil servants in Depok, it is better to support an obvious candidate, rather than choosing other candidates from outside who are not clear and may not be able to support the acceleration of his career. Moreover, at that time rumours circulated, the urban village and sub district officials in Depok were promised Badrul Kamal's team that if he were re-elected, all Sub-District Heads and Lurahs would be re-appointed for the next term. For officials, the lure of the reappointment or the extension of tenure by his direct supervisor is undoubtedly exciting. Proof of the allegation of civil servants is the emergence of a letter of rejection to NurMahmudi Ismail signed by 42 urban villages of Depok. On December 30, 2005, 42 the heads of the local district (Lurah) from 63 urban villages in Depok City also sent a letter of rejection of the Supreme Court's Decision to President SoesiloBambangYudhoyono, House of Representatives, and Minister of Home Affairs. Rejection of the lurah who incidentally PNS certainly very surprising because in this position they should be neutral. One of these cases shows how powerful Badrul Kamal's influence is capable of mobilizing the bureaucracy for his political interests.

The behaviour of civil servants above shows that there has not been a loss of patron-client relationship.
culture which can affect the performance of bureaucracy that should distinguish themselves from the practice of particularism both by nepotism and primordialism. The client's patron relationship which is an emotional connection between the servant and the devotee is thought to affect the bureaucratic system in Depok government. This phenomenon occurs along with the work and the spread of sympathizers of certain parties in positions and positions on the city government. The sympathizers of political parties who have been in government can be influenced by the interests of the group or party because of the relationship between the person who serves and devote.

In the case of a Major election in 2010, there are four pairs of candidates. NurMahmudi pair with KH. Idris Abdul Somad (PKS, PAN, PNPK, Pioneer Party, and Republican), YuyunWirasaputra Paired with PriyadiSupriyatna (Hanura, Gerinda and 13 Small Party), GantahSuhuSumantri-Derry Dragat (Independent) and Badrul Kamal-AgusSupriyanto (Golkar, Democrat, PDI-P, PPP, PKB, PDS, and PDP).

When examined by the candidates who fought in this election, three of them have the potential to present the practical politics of bureaucracy. Three candidate packages have a strong background to mobilize the bureaucracy. It can be seen by categorizing it in incumbent and ex-incumbent.

Incumbent category attached to the couple NurMahmudi-Idris Abdul Samad and Yuyun-Priyadi. NurMahmudi is the mayor of Depok who is still in office, while YuyunWirasaputra is the Deputy Mayor who is still in office. The ex-incumbent category attached to the bureaucracy which was his former subordinate when he served as mayor. These positions cannot be denied leaving traces of superior and subordinate relationships. That way the incumbent or ex-incumbent package is sure to have a network with bureaucracy.

With this condition, in this election civil servants are fragmented in the political camps that can divide civil servants. Some civil servants support NurMahmudi, some support Yuyun, and some support Badrul Kamal. This situation, of course, makes the work situation becomes uncomfortable because there is mutual suspicion-suspect, to whom the civil servant is in favor.

The incumbent mayor NurMahmudi Ismail is more supported by civil servants who have strategic positions, such as heads of departments, subdistricts, and lurahs. While the incumbent vice mayor of YuyunWirasaputrais partially supported by a mutated official or civil servant who has hope to improve his career if the incumbent he supports becomes the winner. Meanwhile, Badrul Kamal was supported by officials who were mutated or demoted when NurMahmudi became mayor in 2006 and civil servants who wanted to improve his career if Badrul Kamal was elected as mayor.

The alignment of civil servant officials can be seen from the policies made by the official that favour certain candidates. For example the installation of banners or the spread of strikers with images of particular candidates. In the report Bawaslu for example, there are reports in Bedahan Village Lurah local distributed door to door money to the public to pick specific candidates. Mutation practices are also done to suppress officials who are considered to support their political opponents. The case of DepokWinwinWinantika's sudden removal, for example, is allegedly loaded with political content.

Similarly, the failure of the incumbent to resolve the conflict at the beginning of his administration will generate grudge and result in support for the ex-incumbent candidate with the hope that if this ex-incumbent candidate is re-elected, then his career will increase. In another case, according to the Chairman of DPRD Depok, Drs. RintisYanto, a form of official bureaucratic support is demonstrated by making a campaign facility policy that benefits specific candidates, such as the Cimanggis Subdistrict by making the incumbent incarcerated PSN data collection form and Head of Fire Department who also deploy incumbent stickers on the eve of the elections.

### 3.3 Pilkada Siak 2011

In the elections of Siak District, for example, there are many problems in the implementation of elections, one of which is the neutrality of bureaucracy. The bureaucratic neutrality of the Siak District Government is questioned after the phenomenon of alignment of some civil servants in the scope of Siak District Government to one of the candidates of the regional head of Syamsuar-Alfredri. The phenomenon of alignment in the number three pair is seen in various ceremonial moments or activities in some places. Like Rebana Performances in Tualang District Hall, PGR Hospitality in Sungai Mandau Subdistrict, Education Quality Seminar and PGR Holiday in TualangSubdistrict and Apit River.

The unbreakable potential of bureaucracy in Pemilikura of Siak Regency in 2011, is driven by several reasons. First, the extent of political
accessibility, especially for incumbent candidates or candidates who received support from the head of the region at the time. The explanation was an incumbent candidate or candidate who received support from the head of the ruling region at that time had a natural political force, namely the prerogative to change the position of Civil servants under it. It makes the bureaucracy psychologically relatively less courageous to choose other candidates. It is what happened during the Pemilukada of Siak Regency in 2011; the Syamsuar-Alfedri couple was supported by the Head of Siak H. Arwin Regency, all political actions were done for the sake of the Syamsuar-Alfedri partners. Second, the proof is difficult. Not infrequently the use of bureaucracy in politics is closed.

Consequently, the indications of not being neutral bureaucracy are not natural. Third, still lax rules of law. Article 79 paragraph (4) of Law no. 32 of 2004 does mention that candidate pairs are prohibited from involving Civil Servants, members of the Indonesian National Army, and members of the Indonesian National Police as campaign participants in the election of regional heads and deputy head of the region. However, this article in practice still contains weaknesses. The case of bureaucratic utilization by the regional head for another candidate (not himself) as described above cannot be charged because the law does not regulate it. The involvement of bureaucracy in the process of Pemilukada of Siak Regency is considered to have damaged the ideal bureaucratic image. Pemilukada has changed the face of bureaucracy into a practical political machine that stands above the political interests of the perpetrators.

4 CONCLUSIONS

The history of Indonesia's bureaucracy since pre-colonial, colonial, independence until the New Order era cannot separate itself from political influence. Bureaucracy has always been a tool of authority and used for the sake of the authorities. As a result, such long-standing bureaucratic and political contacts have become a culture that undermines the mentality and performance of the bureaucratic apparatus.

The revolving reforms since 1998 have brought the message of a fundamental change to aspects of democratic life in Indonesia, including changes to the bureaucracy. The planned bureaucratic reforms are expected to be the starting point of a professional, neutral and clean bureaucracy from corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). It is this spirit that makes people optimistic that the era of Reform will erode all forms of bureaucratic corruption as it did in the previous era.

Through the spirit of good governance, the community demands the government to realize and implement good governance. The old patterns of governance must be changed with new patterns of governance based on the principles of good governance.

Furthermore, various legislation products appear as a legal umbrella for bureaucratic reform such as Undang-Undang No. 43/1999 on civil servants, PP No. 37/2004 on the prohibition of civil servants as members of political parties, and PP No. 42/2004 concerning the Development of Corps of Life and Code of Ethics of civil servants. This research found that the implementation of the regulation has not been effective. The discovery of patrimonial bureaucratic model proved it. The relationship model is clear in the case of bureaucratic politicization in the election. There are three elections in this era of Reformation, and they always found cases of bureaucratic politicization. Violations committed by civil servants are usually associated with the use of state facilities for the interests of a particular party; the mobilization of superiors for civil servants to choose a candidate or a particular party. The use of civil servants attributes in campaigns, or covert campaigns conducted by civil servants in each installation by affecting colleagues, work to choose a particular candidate or party.

In conclusion, the cause is still the politicization of bureaucracy are among others: First, the attitude of politicians / Heads of regions who are not statesmen. Based on the cases mentioned above, often the cause of the involvement of bureaucracy in politics instead of encouragement from superiors. Regional Heads who are politicians or party cadres are often not professional. They use the bureaucracy for the sake of their political party. Secondly, the political culture of the patron-client that still exists within the bureaucratic body causes the strong desire of these bureaucrats to provide the best service to their superiors, including providing political support to their superiors. It is clearly followed by the hope that if his boss is re-elected or his political party wins, these bureaucrats will gain an uplift and a bureaucratic position. Third, excessive personal Fanatism. That is civil servants who have the right to vote to have the space to express their political choices. Often excessive fanaticism of the political parties of his choice carried in his work environment. It is shown by overtly bolding them to
install certain party strikers in their workplace, or using hours of work to attend a particular party's campaign. Fourthly, the attitude of the boss is not assertive. Often the politicization of bureaucracy occurs because of an unresponsive boss's attitude cracking down on his subordinates involved in practical politics. The fifth is the weakness of the law enforcement process. This issue can also be considered the cause of bureaucratic politicization. Punishments that do not create a deterrent effect and lengthy legal process for civil servants who are considered to violate the election, make the case of bureaucratic politicization always happen.

REFERENCES


