International Environmental Non-Government Organization (IENGO) Diplomacy in Emerging Countries
The Cases of China, Brazil, and Indonesia

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Abstract: The International Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation (IENGO) has become increasingly influential since the Rio Jeneiro conference in 1992. This paper seeks to investigate the pattern of NGO diplomacy in three countries, namely China, Brazil and Indonesia. Transnational advocacy networks apply boomerang pattern strategies to pressure governments by carrying out information politics, symbolic politics, political leverage and accountability politics. This strategy is also implemented by environmental NGO networks, for example, to drive a soy moratorium in Brazil aimed at mitigating the deforestation of the Amazonian rainforest. In one of the cases in Indonesia, the barriers to cooperation between the government and NGOs, as well as differences in the values and information held between the respective global and local perspectives involved in conservation management, resulted in unjust conservation policies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Studies regarding compliance alongside the current environmental condition state that democracy can provide more freedom for NGOs, enabling the organisation to establish its formation and to strengthen transnational coalitions in order to influence governmental compliance efforts toward international agreements (Jacobson & Weiss, 1998). The recognition of the legitimacy of NGOs by the United Nations has made it easier for it to move within an international scope and this also facilitates the position of NGO Diplomacy in international negotiations. NGO’s diplomacy efforts are reflected in its varied activities, ranging from the most subtle, namely care and welfare, to the more provocative ones aiming to achieve change and development (Ball & Leith, t.t). The recognition of NGO in international relations has contributed to various roles related to the establishment of environmental policies. People are beginning to realise that to come up with an effective global action requires the involvement of stakeholders in policy establishment and their international implementation (Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu, 2002). Some of the roles played by NGO in the Global Environment Governance (Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu) include expert advice and analysis, intellectual competition against the government, the mobilisation of public opinion, representation for the voiceless, service provisions, monitoring and assessments, and the legitimisation of global-scale decision-making mechanisms.

Betsill limits the definition of NGO influence in terms of international negotiations into two dimensions:

- The way NGO diplomats communicate with other actors during the negotiation process, and
- Behaviour changes from the actors in response to the communications.

To analyse the first dimension, identifying the specific content in the NGO’s communications with other actors should be carried out, while the second dimension can be analysed by evaluating the achievement of the NGO’s objectives and identifying the response of the other actors according to their behaviour changes.
2 DISCUSSIONS

2.1 Greenpeace and Brazil’s Soy Moratorium

With the deforestation issue and the power concentrated in the domestic government as the starting points, the role of Greenpeace as an NGO has emerged. Greenpeace, in collaboration with local communities in the Amazon, has performed its investigations since 1998. In 2004, Greenpeace began documenting the impact of industry emergence on the destruction of the Amazon rainforest, especially in the Santarem region, published in a report entitled Eating Up Amazon.

Initially, Greenpeace took note of the soy export data to Liverpool in 2005 from the port of Santarem, Brazil; 340,000 tons, with the other ports in Brazil not included. Greenpeace then investigated soy exports and it was determined that it was not only Liverpool, but also Amsterdam, which had become the two biggest soy importing cities. Soy is used as livestock feed and is considered to be cheap with sufficient nutrition. The increasing level of soy exporting through Santarem resulted in the conclusion by Greenpeace that the establishment of Cargill in Santarem and of farmers in the surrounding areas was closely related to soy production and Amazon rainforest deforestation. Europe is heavily dependent on soy imports for its livestock production. This makes Europe a soy importer, bringing in both seeds and the pulp. Brazil replaced the United States as the world’s largest soy exporter in 2003, and in 2004, Brazil made up 63% of the European Union countries’ total soy imports (Dros, 2004). The soy trade chain is global; exported in the form of soybeans or as livestock feed. Soy and soy-based products have connected producers, traders, and crushers in Latin America to the crushers, food industries, livestock industries, slaughterhouses and retailers in the United States, as well as to European consumers (ISTA & Hadiprayitno, 2010).

On April 6th, 2006, the same day as the publication of the Eating Up Amazon report, several groups of people dressed in large chicken costumes and entered McDonald’s in seven major cities in the UK (Eisenberg, 2006). It was a protest against food producers; chickens symbolise the livestock which consumed soy as the result of deforestation.

Greenpeace is targeting the cessation of the Amazonian deforestation. This demands cooperation from the companies involved in the food chain to commit to boycotting soy deforestation products. One of the voluntary commitments proposed by Greenpeace was the Soy Moratorium, which is a mechanism to monitor and evaluate soy plantations in the Amazon. The Soy Working Group is a monitoring mechanism that was established as a result of the Soybean Moratorium.

In its initial campaign, Greenpeace proposed the idea of establishing a working group consisting of soy traders, producers, NGOs and the government to come up with an action plan. Greenpeace’s advocacy in relation to mobilising the public opinion is comprehensive as it does not only involve support from the community and the consumers, but it also brings in the local producers.

Greenpeace invited a number of companies with large purchasing power, such as Cargill, ADM, Bunge, Dreyfus and Amaggi, to attend and negotiate together about the threat posed to the survival of the Amazon rainforest (Greenpeace, 2006). Greenpeace’s proposal received support from WWF, which considers that the circulation of soy farming businesses can be safe if accompanied by transparent land use planning, supervision and government policy support.

The willingness of McDonald’s to cooperate with Greenpeace constituted a turning point for Greenpeace’s diplomatic power. By cooperating with McDonald’s as a representation of large food companies, it became easier for Greenpeace to gain support from other food companies. This is proven by the support of Alpro, ASDA (Wal-Mart), El Corte Ingles, Lidl, Marks & Spencer, Morrisons, Ritter-Sport, Sainsbury’s, Tegut, Tesco and Waitrose. Alongside this increasing support, Cargill and other companies, which are members of ABIOVE and ANEC as soy trading companies, were forced to evaluate their production system. The willingness of McDonald’s became an entry point to the negotiation agenda.

The approval of the Soy Moratorium in July 2006 by ABIOVE and ANEC was unpredictable. In October 2006, the Soy Working Group was established to ensure the implementation of the moratorium consisting of soy companies, environmental NGOs and civil society groups. Upon the achievement of the Soy Moratorium agreement in July 2006 and the establishment of the Soy Working Group in October 2006, a meeting between the representatives of the Brazilian Government and the Soy Working Group was held in April 2007. The Brazilian government was represented by Dilma Rousseff, the Chief of Staff, responsible for the implementation of the National Plan against Deforestation.
2.2 NGO’s Boomerang Pattern Strategy in Influencing China’s Position in relation to the Construction of the Three Gorges Dam in 2000

A massive petition was held focused on requesting compensation for the construction of TGD, resulting in the imprisonment of the petition perpetrators by the Chinese government. He Kechang, Ran Chongxin, Jiang Qingshan, and We Dingchun have been detained by the Chinese government since March 2001 due to the petition that they led (Friends of the Earth, 2002). Amnesty International took part in the demand to free the four Chinese citizens and to ensure their access to their families, doctors and lawyers regarding their case.

Attempts to prevent the government from building the dam was supported by academics and experts including hydrologists, historians and environmentalists. Student organisations even attempted to build a diaspora and international network.

On the international scale, various protests emerged. These protests included a coalition of US wilderness observers and a lawsuit in the United States district court to block the participation of two federal agencies in contributing to the planning and construction of the TGD. (Zhu, t.t). In addition, more than 60 environmental groups worldwide sent a letter of protest to the Canadian Prime Minister for his financial support toward the TGD’s development (Probe International, 2008).

On March 25th-27th, 1999, Chinese President, Jiang Zemin paid a visit to Switzerland in connection with the TGD. A few days prior to his arrival, Amnesty International, the Berne Declaration, and several human rights groups held a march and sent an open letter to the Chinese president stating their strong opposition to the involvement of companies, banks and the Swiss government in the TGD project.

Friends of the Earth managed to convince the U.S. Export-Import Bank not to fund the TGD project (Beijing Energy Efficiency Center, n.d). Friends of the Earth also assisted Chinese anti-dam groups, allowing them to gain more publicity in domestic China. This allowed them to obtain representation in environmental and social projects and to provide guidance to the government staff on the potential impact of the dam’s construction. The same action was performed by the International Rivers Network. On May 1996, the U.S Export-Import Bank eventually issued a statement that they would not provide a warranty to the US companies wishing to establish contracts in the TGD project.

The success of International Rivers Network in lobbying the U.S. Export-Import Bank did not affect the companies that dominated the TGD’s funding, namely Chinese International Capital Corporations. Approximately 35 percent of the funds in the Chinese International Capital Corporations controlled by the TGD project were owned by Morgan Stanley. The International Rivers Network finally decided to walk out of the negotiation process and declare a boycott of the customer service of Chinese International Capital Corporations.

The interaction between the pro-dam and anti-dam sides resulted in a network that had the potential to influence the Chinese government's political policies.

China joined the WCD membership as an attempt to follow some of the international development standards. China's adjustment to the standards set by WCD in relation to the dam construction process reflected China's position, which began to change. China's membership in the international community was at a crucial point, given how the state viewed the dam’s development through an international viewpoint. The government agreed to make improvements in the calculation of economic risks based upon the results of an evaluation conducted by WCD (Allin, 2004). Moreover, the Chinese government was also willing to conduct a basic watershed ecosystem survey, which was initially not a concern of the Chinese government. Economic risk calculations and a basic
watershed ecosystem survey were attempts made by the Chinese government to create a win-win solution between its economic interests and environmental sustainability.

2.3 NGO and Conservation in Indonesia

Cooperation was established between the Indonesian government through the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) through a memorandum of understanding (MoU), number 4578/IV.Sek/PA/02 on the assignment of TNC assisting the Komodo National Park in carrying out conservation and community empowerment around the Komodo National Park area.

The achievement of this collaboration was in the form of a tourism concession company that was a Joint Venture of ‘PT. Putri Naga Komodo’ (PNK). In the Joint Venture, 60% of its funding came from TNC and 40% came from the Indonesian tourism company, PT Jayatasha Putrindo Utama (JPU). The Joint Venture set out to increase the tourism infrastructure by collecting tourism revenues of which some was used for Komodo National Park management. Furthermore, some of the revenue was used to fund community development programs. The Joint Venture was summarised in a document called the Komodo Collaborative Management Initiative (KCMI) (Fajarudin, 2009).

The World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and The Nature Conservancy provided US $10 million over a seven-year period to cover the initial cost, as well as the operational and management costs of the national park. During this period, Komodo National Park generated ecotourism revenue for management and the district, provincial and central government revenue was nearly US $8 million. By the end of the seventh year, Komodo National Park was expected to be financially independent in order to generate an operating budget of US $2 million/year.

Tension came from the envious officers of the Komodo National Park regarding the involvement of the TNC staff, considered to be new parties in the area. This was worsened by the TNC personnel earning a higher income. Problems among the leaders also caused the performance of TNC to decline, which eventually caused tension, namely the worsening relationship between the head of Komodo National Park and the leader of TNC. This lead to several of the programs proposed by TNC not getting approval. In addition, problems with the TNC’s leader caused delays in funding and delays in realising activities, which resulted in increased tension within the community.

This triggered an increasingly complicated conflict. It caused the government to heavily highlight the existence of TNC as one of the stakeholders and the founder of PNK. At the same time, it highlighted its position as an NGO, which in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), meant that it was not allowed to profit from its operations (Agroindonesia, 2009).

When TNC conducted fish cultivation in Loh Mbongi, TNC handed over the facility to PT. Keramba to manage. In accordance with the MoU, Loh Mbongi was a local asset, so it should be handed over to the local government (Pos Kupang, 2006). By transforming itself into PT. PNK, TNC was violating the MoU (Amiwijaya, 2003).

People were marginalised in their own area. People were oppressed due to the existing regulations and they felt disadvantaged. They considered TNC to be responsible for a situation that harmed the community. Security operations were carried out by TNC in the Komodo National Park area. This safeguarding approach was considered to be a repressive method, since there were many cases of fisherman being shot dead in the Komodo National Park area without the incidences being legally resolved.

In the Komodo National Park Management Planning, it was explained that zoning must be approved by the community and the related authorities (The Directorate General of Marine and Fisheries Resource Surveillance). However, TNC was considered to have taken shortcuts when setting the zoning policy, without consent from the local community and with a lack of socialisation. The TNC programs that were socialised are not well-implemented. It was often delayed in that TNC was considered to have deceived the community.
3 CONCLUSION

Various studies regarding NGOs in Brazil, China and Indonesia show that as a non-state organisation, NGO has an influence related to its access to funding as well as its influence as a transnational advocacy network. The presence of NGO can provide benefits in terms of democratisation, but at the same time, it can also be a threat to the economy of the local community and also weaken the position of the state as the primary policy maker. In the case of Brazil, Greenpeace was even able to change the state’s policy. In the case of China, the NGO had an influence, as it established a transnational advocacy network despite its scope. In the case of Indonesia, the existence of the NGO colonised the local community interests and minimised the authority of the state as a manager.

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