Asymmetric Decentralization in Coastal Areas Strategic Boundary of Indonesia: Law-Political-Decentralization Perspective

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Abstract: In the era of globalisation, the problems of policy overlap, poor inter-agency coordination among central agencies and minimal budget support are the main obstacles to the implementation of Asymmetric Decentralisation in strategic border coastal areas such as Pasir Limau Kapas [henceforth Palika], Rokan Hilir District and Riau Province [Provinsi Riau]. The study aims, first of all, to explain the implementation of Asymmetric Decentralisation in Palika as a strategic coastal area on the border. Second, this study will explain the major obstacles to the implementation of Asymmetric Decentralisation as a strategic coastal area on the border. Law Political and Political Decentralisation have been used as an analytical framework. This study used a qualitative approach through a descriptive analysis method. The data was collected based on documents supported by interviews. The results of the study conclude that, firstly, central government inconsistencies implementing Asymmetric Decentralisation as a strategic policy to develop border coastal areas involves the practice of Decentralised Politics. Second, the main obstacle to the implementation of Asymmetric Decentralisation is the overlapping regulations between regions and centres showing an inconsistent (central-regional) government. This reality has negative implications for development in Palika as a strategic border coastal area.

1 INTRODUCTION

The theme of the conference, "Empowerment & Impairment in The Global Age", is a reminder of the border issues related to the Asymmetric Decentralisation policy. Pasir Limau Kapas [henceforth Palika] sub-district, one of the study areas, has several reasons to support it. [1] Panipahan is the only capital city in Palika, Rokan Hilir District [Rohil], Riau Province which is not accessible by road while still being on the island of Sumatra. [2] The sub-districts have direct border conflicts with neighbouring countries; Malaysia, and North Sumatra Province. [3] The Border Management Board was liquidated in 2016, having been established 2014, as a result of government regulations on regional apparatus. These three reasons are academically supportive if this study can contribute by: [a] creating an equitable distribution of coastal the border area studies that have been concentrated around the Kalimantan and Riau Islands [Batam-Bintan-Karimun]; [b] the regulations leading to the management of Batam Island [Pulau Batam] in terms of an overlapping authority between regional centres (Albintani, 2016). Based on the aforementioned explanation, the paper aims to first explain the implementation of Decentralisation in an asymmetric manner in Palika as a strategic coastal area on the border. Secondly, this paper aims to explain the major obstacles to the implementation of Asymmetric Decentralisation in Palika.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of the existing literature seeks to explain, first of all, the earlier studies that became the comparison reference to the significance of this study. Second, it seeks to explain the use of law-political-decentralisation in order to understand the
phenomena associated with Asymmetric Decentralisation in the strategic coastal border region of Palika.

2.1 Previous Study

In the implementation of various studies on border areas, especially areas that are considered to be strategic, there needs to be serious attention that is both focused and integrated. Related to this study is [1] JPP-UGM (2010), "Asymmetric Decentralisation in Indonesia: Practice and Projection." and [2]. The study by Bappenas [2016]; "Study of Asymmetric Policy Development in the Boundary Areas."

Based on these two studies, this paper focuses on the implementation of Asymmetric Decentralisation in the Strategic Coastal Border Area of Indonesia. This study examines the perspective of the Law Political and Political Decentralisation through to Law-Political-Decentralisation.

What distinguishes this study is [1]. Very limited studies have been conducted on coastal border area development [especially in international trade areas], especially focused on the coast of Sumatera. Most areas of study are focused on strategic border areas, such as Riau Islands and Batam Island. [2] There is a dichotomy between the decentralisation policy [regional autonomy, symmetrical] and Asymmetric Decentralisation [soft decentralisation, ‘intervensi lunak’ term in Indonesia]. As a strategic border coastal zone, Palika seems to be ignored by both the central government and local government. [3]. Concerns over the experience of Simpadan and Ligitan island clarifies the ignorance of the [central government] state at managing and taking care of the outer islands at the border.

2.2 Strategic Border Areas and Asymmetric Decentralization

Facilitating the concept of a strategic coastal border area with the concept of asymmetric decentralisation and the relationship of both requires an academic explanation. It is important to point out that this explanatory context is an early attempt to understand the importance of the relationship of strategic border region development and Asymmetrical Decentralisation. Various items of literature (Prescott, 1987; Albintani, 2016; Bappenas, 2016) have mentioned if the border area of the country is a region that has a strategic position. This position is attributed to the existence of a neighbouring country which is [adjacent] to the Melaka Strait. Sovereignty and security become a strategic issue of the border area, as it is the front porch of the country.

Law Political, in this context, is interpreted as an approach to tackling the phenomenon of the interaction between the power actors in parliament, government and justice in producing various policy products such as the constitution, MPR decree, Law/Perpu, PP [government regulation], Perpres [President Regulation], Perda [Local Regulation] and others within the arena of contestation between the political actors in various political institutions (Mahfud, 2001). Meanwhile, Political Decentralisation is the transfer of planning, decision-making or the division of authority from the central government to its branches of organisation, local administrative management units, local government or non-governmental organisations (Prasojo, 2016).

In this context, Asymmetric Decentralisation is a central or regional government strategy to fighting for the right and authority to carry out autonomous regional obligations to regulate and manage its own governmental affairs in the interests of the local communities. Law-Political-Decentralisation is a perspective used to understand the phenomenon of Asymmetric Decentralisation in the strategic border coastal area of Palika. This perspective clarifies the struggle between contradictory central and local governments in certain contexts.

3 METHOD

This study used a qualitative approach through a descriptive analysis method. The data was collected based on documents supported by interviews. Once collected, the data was analysed qualitatively. In order to explain if Palika is a strategic border coastal area, please refer to Figure 1.
4 ‘AUTONOMY CENTER’ IN THE LOCAL AUTONOMY

4.1 Recentralisation in the Era of Regional Autonomy

4.1.1 Institutional Decentralisation: Variety Policy

The findings of this study indicate that the various regulations related to the implementation of Asymmetric Decentralisation in coastal border areas have created opposing policies. As a result, local governments have set ambiguous policies. This can be observed after the establishment of the Border Management Agency [Perda (Local Regulation) No.10/2013]. Based on Perda No.11/2016, the Border Management Agency was abolished. The reality of the study findings can be observed based on the chronology of various policies.

Regulation begins with the establishment of the Border Management National Agency [BNPP] through:

- President Regulation No.12/2010 [drafting of the Grand Design] and the Master Plan for the Management of State and Boundary Areas and the boundary of Nawa Cita,
- Presidential Regulation No.2/2015 on the "National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019" [this policy laying the groundwork for the start of Asymmetric Decentralisation,
- Regulations of the Minister of Home Affairs No.2/2011 on "Guidelines for the Establishment of Border Management Bodies in the Regions",
- Provincial Regulation No.3/2014 on the "Organisation of the Inspectorate, Regional Development Planning Board and the Regional Technical Institute of Riau Province",
- Riau Governor Regulation No.21/2015 on "Details of the Duties, Functions and Work Procedures of the Border Management Agency of Riau Province Conducting Renduk PBWNKP",
- Local Regulation No.10/2013 on the “Rokan Hilir District Border Management Agency”,
- Government Regulation No.18/2016 on "Local Devices" and
- Local Regulation No. 11/2016 on "The Device Formation of Rokan Hilir District".

Based on the policy chronologies that have been submitted, this study found that inter-policy conflicts can eliminate the institution that manages the border. In the Asymmetric Decentralisation Assessment [2016], the second conclusion confirms that developing policies of institutional and administrative structuring in government administration in border areas is a strategy focused on strengthening the authority and institutional districts at the border. It can be further explained that the importance of sub-district [kecamatan] strengthening is in line with the mandate of Law No.43/2008 on “State Territories” and Law No.23/2014 on “Local Government”, in which the roles of the authority and institutions in governance in the region’s state borders are to be found in the sub-district.

4.2 Asymmetric Decentralization in Constrain

4.2.1 Policy Construction: Position Strategy and Security Issues

An important aspect is that a strategic area has major potential as an important part of the implementation of decentralization. Strategic understanding should also come into the context of areas related to the shoreline. The existence of various forms of special economic zones, for example, should interplay with the variants to be found in the decentralisation era [the implementation of regional autonomy]. In this case, the palika [in the agricultural area] is not much different from the island of Batam [in the archipelago], which is discarded because it is adjacent to Singapore. Meanwhile in Palika, Panipahan is the capital and Pulau Jemur [Jemur Island] is directly in the Melaka Strait. Based on Figure 1:

- Palika's position as part of Rokan Hilir regency means that it is adjacent to Rupat Island [Pulau Rupat];
• The Obor Policy means that there is one belt, and one road: 60 countries show China's 'plan of dominance' in the wider world [the glory of the world trade coming from the silk road]; Palika's strategic position;
• Planning cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and
• The opening plan of the Kra Canal in Thailand. The aforementioned help to clarify Palika's position as a strategic border coastal area.

Instrumentation in government management comes with costs and maintenance. Rhi’s study also has a tangible context, as the [central and regional] governments are in a position that cannot be developed due to the various projects being made that are 'incapable' of being done.

4.2.2 Ambiguous Policy:
Resentralization Budget and Dissolution of Institutions

With regard to the constraints related to implementing Asymmetric Decentralisation, if observed on the basis of the role of local governments in trying to develop border areas in Palika, then the findings show something that is ambiguous and seemingly unresponsive. This dilemma is related to the condition of the regional budget that continues to decline. This was, for example, in 2015, Rp 2.27 trillion. In 2016, it was Rp 2.6 trillion more.

In 2017, there was a significant decrease from Rp 2.6 trillion to Rp 1.5 trillion. This decrease in budget has become a dilemma and has an impact on ambiguous policy decisions. The sincerity to develop border areas based on Asymmetric Decentralisation becomes delayed.

Meanwhile, related to the existence of the Border Management Agency, it was liquidated. The reason for this was crucial, as it was because of the limitations and the decrease of the budget. Budget efficiency becomes the cause argument. This is complemented by the reason behind the issuance of government regulations on the regional apparatus. Walaupaun is still under debate. The question is related to how seriously can the border management agency join with other work units.

Based on this argument, the seriousness of the Rokan Hilir regional government becomes questionable. This is the background of the government; through its officials on many occasions, it has always declared seriously that it seeks to build a strategic coastal border region. The government regent of Rokan Hilir appealed for the central government's help to develop the potential tourist area of Pulau Jemur, which is located besides the Melaka Strait in contact with international trade route. On the other hand, local governments are reluctant to maintain border management bodies.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This study concludes that, firstly, the inconsistency of the central government when it comes to implementing Asymmetric Decentralisation as a national strategic policy of building border areas in Palika is part of the practice of Political Decentralisation. Political practice is a subtle part of central intervention in the region. Second, these interventions have an impact on the overlapping regulations between regions and centres, indicating that central-regional inconsistency appears to be prominent. Practically, this study suggests that Asymmetrical Decentralisation is a manifestation of the will of the state governmental condition dictating that there should be regional dependence on the centre.

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