

Anomaly Detection Approaches for Secure Cloud Reference Architectures in Legal Metrology

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Abstract: Securing Computer Systems against all kind of threats is an impossible challenge to fulfill. Although, in the field of Legal Metrology, it shall be assured that one can rely on the measurement carried out by a trusted computer system. In a distributed environment, a measurement instrument cannot be simply disconnected to guarantee its security. However, being able to monitor the computer systems constantly in order to deduce a normal system behaviour, can be a particular promising approach to secure such systems. In cases of detected anomalies, the system evaluates them to measure the severity of the detected incident and place it into three different categories: green, yellow and red. The presented Anomaly Detection Module can detect attacks against distributed applications in a cloud computing environment, using pattern recognition for clustering as well as statistical approaches. Both, inexperienced and experienced attacks have been tested and results are presented.

1 INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of Legal Metrology is to establish trust between the consumer and the user of a measuring instrument, since none of them can guarantee the validity of the measurement result. This task has to fulfill the notified body, in Germany the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) is responsible for this. The focus hereby lies on the essential requirements of the Measuring Instrument Directive (MID), like reproducibility, repeatability, durability and the protection against corruption of the measuring instrument and its measurements (European Parliament and Council, 2014). The key purpose of legal metrology is to assure the correctness of measurements and to enhance public trust in them especially when the measuring instruments are becoming more complex and the used technology is not easily to comprehend anymore.

Like many other areas, Legal Metrology faces a big transition from well contained measuring instruments to distributed measuring systems. By introducing Cloud Computing to Legal Metrology, the measuring instrument, as we know it today, will be reduced to a sensor with a communication unit, while processing and storing of the measurement results

will be done in the cloud. The manufacturers want to employ Cloud Computing to provide, e.g. their customer a more comfortable, modernized and flexible way of dealing with their meters at home. This can mean on the one hand, that measurement results become accessible via mobile devices or on the other hand providing better service via intelligent data services.

In 2016, a secure reference cloud architecture was described (Oppermann et al., 2016) that addresses the mentioned transition as well as the security challenges in Legal Metrology. Furthermore, the proposed architecture had to deal with the requirements of the MID and the WELMEC guide (WG7, 2012). Via fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) (Oppermann et al., 2017) the authors addressed the main threats, like an insider attack and data manipulation in the cloud, in order to create an acceptable solution that provides adequate security. To test FHE under real world demands, four application scenarios are developed and applied to the Smart Meter Gateway (SMGW) tariffs. These Tariff application (TAF) are derived from the technical guide for SMGW of the Federal Bureau of Information Security (BSI) in Germany (BSI, 2013).

In this paper we propose the bases for an anomaly detection module for the secure cloud reference ar-

chitecture described in (Oppermann et al., 2017). This module will constantly monitor the platform while learning the *normal* behaviour and pattern of the tariff applications. In cases of detected anomalies, the system will evaluate it to measure the severity of the detected incident. Then, accordingly, an alert will be triggered. This alert classifies the incident into three categories: green, the system is in a normal state; yellow, the system has an anomaly but the system stability is not affected; red, the system has an anomaly and the system stability is affected.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states the related work in anomaly detection; Section 3 describes the cloud reference architecture and all its modules; Section 4 details full lifecycle example for Legal Metrology; Section 5 describes the anomaly detection module, as well as simulated inexperienced and experienced attacks on the lifecycle; Section 6 gives an overview of the results, conclusions and further work.

2 RELATED WORK

Anomaly detection in distributed software architectures has evolved over the years and developed many different tools and methods in that area. Depending on the analyzed input for detecting anomalies in cloud computing architectures two most significant approaches can be extracted namely (Barbhuiya et al., 2015):

1. Console log based anomaly detection
2. Anomaly detection based on system metrics.

A brief overview of these two approaches is given in the next paragraphs.

Console Log based Anomaly. Typical tools for detecting anomalies in log files, like Simple Event Correlator (SEC) (Rouillard, 2004), Logsurfer (Prewett, 2003) and swatch (Hansen and Atkins, 1993), have a set of rules from which they deduce a *normal system behavior*. Normally, these rules will be set and tuned manually by developers, which makes these systems error prone, complex, and expensive because of the human factor, needed expert knowledge and the general caused inefficiency. These factors led to statistical learning in log based analytic tools (Xu et al., 2009), that use statistical techniques based on pre-filtered log files to build automatically models for system anomaly recognition.

The statistical learning techniques in general consist of a learning process and a detection process (Lou

et al., 2010). The learning process first pools log message parameters and then derives the invariants within the log message parameters. The so acquired knowledge will then be used on new input data and matched against their invariants. An anomaly is found, in case of a mismatch of the compared invariants.

Another approach is described in (Xu et al., 2009) that harvest console logs to automatically detect system problems. Based on the log files a feature vector is created and then evaluated by Principal Component Analysis (PCA) algorithm to find anomalies.

Albeit, to provide a reliable feature vector as well as to learn the existing structure of the log files a customized parser with access to the sources of the monitored application is needed.

System Metric based Anomaly. System metrics can be collected without causing great impact on the monitored system nor the need of accessing the source code of the monitored application. Further advantages for this monitoring approach are that it is easier to cope with traditional demands of cloud computing system in respect of elasticity, scalability and migration as well as termination of services in short periods of time. Thus, there exists a wide range of anomaly detection tools that take advantage of system metrics (Tan et al., 2012)(Wang, 2009)(Ward and Barker, 2013)(Kang et al., 2010)(Jiang et al., 2009) and realize all these advantages despite their different evaluation techniques.

EbaT (Wang, 2009) uses an entropy based anomaly detection and focuses on dispersal or concentration of the measured metric distribution. To detect anomalies in the entropy time-series, EbaT employs third party online evaluations methods like spike detection, signal processing and subspace methods. Despite the variety of evaluation methods the complexity rises at the same time.

Varanus (Ward and Barker, 2013) implements a gossip communication protocol to collect system metrics from virtual machines (VM) and can analyze them in situ for anomalies. This approach can spare dedicated monitoring server for data storage. However, due to the nature of the gossip protocol a lot of redundancy of metric-data is generated, the communication is not reliable and maintenance of the communication protocol is quite complex.

PeerWatch (Kang et al., 2010) specializes in correlations of multiple system resource metrics like CPU utilization, memory utilization and network traffic and evaluates them with the help of canonical correlation analysis (CCA). An anomaly is detected whenever correlations between the chosen metrics drop notably. PeerWatch detects anomalies on the




Figure 1: Example of a typical point anomaly. Illustration from (Sari, 2015).

application-level, but this approach needs knowledge of the employed applications, which is challenging in a huge distributed environment with many different applications running.

A Light-Weight-Failure-Detection (LFD) algorithm is proposed in (Tan et al., 2012) that is designed to work with a metric-based black box. This approach does not need any insight of the monitored application neither in source code nor training or understanding of the underlying structured application. LFD allows an decentralized monitoring approach and is less complex compared to EbAT, Varanuns and Peer-Watch. Anomalies are detected by LFD if correlations drop significantly between two specific system metric. However, the decentralized monitoring approach can be the bottleneck in large-scaled cloud system, due to the overhead of implementing LFD on each node.

The anomalous patterns in collected system metrics, such as CPU utilization and network traffic provide important information to the responsible entities and help to mitigate probable system failures, attacks and to locate and trace the cause of errors. The three most common anomalous patterns (Marhas




Figure 2: Example of a typical contextual anomaly. Illustration from (Sari, 2015).

et al., 2012) will be described in the following paragraphs.




Figure 3: Example of a typical collective anomaly. Illustration from (Sari, 2015).

Point Anomalies are the easiest and most important form for anomaly detection. The data diverges from the expected and lies outside the boundaries of what is prior defined as normal (see Figure 1).

Contextual Anomalies are described as occurrences of information that show anomalous behavior in a context of a normal data instance. This kind of anomaly detection usually needs an idea or intuition of the context of the monitored data (see Figure 2). It is also known as conditional anomaly (Song et al., 2007).

Collective Anomalies occur in collected data sets that show anomalous behaviour in related data. This anomaly cannot be detected in a singular metric but rather in relationships among different correlated metrics like in sequential, spatial or graph data (see Figure 3).

3 SECURE CLOUD ARCHITECTURE

In this section an overview of the proposed secure reference architecture (Oppermann et al., 2016) and its modules are given (see Figure 4). It makes use of virtualization techniques, in order to keep legally relevant software modules apart from legally non-relevant. Among other advantages, like increasing workload, decreasing idle time of servers and improving the overall cost-efficiency ratio, it would also ease software updates for manufacturers within the non-relevant part, since it could be updated without prior verification by a notified body.

The Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) layer is constructed with the help of the Openstack framework, it comprises the actual physical devices like servers, storage, and the network. The network is separated into logically smaller entities via sub netting. IaaS enables also a first low-level separation of legally relevant processes.

The Platform as a Service (PaaS) layer is build up using the microservice pattern (Richardson, 2011)




Figure 4: Overview of the cloud reference architecture. The measurement device is reduced to only a sensor and communication unit, while processing and storage will be moved to the cloud environment.

and Spring Boot¹ with Spring Cloud² and the Netflix software stack³. By implementing microservices it can be guaranteed that each service maintains its core functionality while at the same time reducing the software lines of codes (SLOC), which helps to maintain a clear code basis. Moreover, microservices help to scale the system seamlessly and use the resources more efficiently with less idle times for the hardware. Microservices are polyglott. This means each service can be written in a different programming language which ever fits to solve the problem best.

The communication is established via a consistent RESTful API that allows a simple yet reliable interchange of messages. Further an active message queue is installed that guarantees pseudo resilience, that means if a service is unavailable, e.g. due downtime, the messages will be queued and delivered at a later time. The measurement data itself is directly encrypted in the sensor unit via fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) (Gentry et al., 2009). The encrypted data will be send to the cloud, is being processed and stored without leaving the encrypted domain once.

Furthermore, virtual machines (VM) are created for the most important legally relevant tasks to increase their security and deliberately separate them from other third party services, e.g. to ease update processes. Among security advantages, VMs increase the portability, distributability and scalability.

Logbook. The Logbook VM hosts the software process responsible for logging all relevant activities around the measuring system, i.e. arrival, processing, saving of measurement data, user activities, software updates etc.

Legal Processing. The Legal VM is responsible for processing measurement data. This VM has the most

¹<http://projects.spring.io/spring-boot>

²<https://cloud.spring.io/spring-cloud-netflix/>

³<http://netflix.github.io>




Figure 5: Overview of the network topology of the cloud reference architecture with its different subnetworks. The blue shape is the Legal Metrology Network. The red shape is the ingress network, which separates the other subnetworks from the internet.

cpu cores available, since it has to carry out all the computation for the measurement data.

Download Manager. The Download Manager receives signed software update from the manufacturer. After carefully checking the integrity and authenticity of the received update, it will spread the update to the dedicated machine.

Storage Manager. The Storage Manager is designed to store measurement data for a long time period. Thus it will handle a database and will make the measurement data available through the secure display VM, which hosts services to demand data from the Storage Manager.

Monitoring Service. The Monitoring Service constantly monitors all the VMs while learning their individual pattern for the running tariff applications, in order to detect anomalies within the system.

4 LEGAL METROLOGY APPLICATION LIFECYCLE

Based on the infrastructure described the last section, a lifecycle is set up to simulate the normal behaviour of the cloud architecture that can be

monitored to later be used to carry out attacks (see Section 5.1).

The test life-cycle for the proposed legal metrology processing service is formalized in the follow

Algorithm 1 : Legal Metrology Application Lifecycle (overview).

Input: Measurement data $m_1 \dots m_n$, Price data $p_1 \dots p_n$, index of elements $i = 1 \dots n$

Output: Measurement results $mr_1 \dots mr_n$

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1: Server:
2: checks certificate and the origin of messages
3: if check is successful then
4:   notify logbook of received measurement data
5:   process data
6:   sum  $m_i$  with previous measurement data  $m_{i-1}$ 
7:   if additions are succesful then
8:     compute price  $p_i$ 
9:     save price  $p_i$ 
10:    notify logbook of successful price calculation
11:   end if
12:   save data  $mr_i$ 
13:   notify logbook of successful addition
14: else
15:   throw data away,  $\rightarrow$  error message to logbook
16: end if

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ing algorithm listing and only shows the server side. The communication endpoints, sender and receiver, are not considered for this particular case.

This application lifecycle will be the studied case for the next section for the implementation of the AD-Module. Also, both kind of attacks from inexperienced and experienced attackers will be used against the lifecycle and is described in the following section, as well as results for the AD-Module implementation.

5 AD-MODULE APPROACH

As described in Section 3 a monitor service is planned and part of the secure cloud architecture. The anomaly detection module will be part of the monitor service. An evaluation of the anomaly detection approach is represented here, in order find the perfect fit in the area of Legal Metrology.

For monitoring in a distributed environment a very flexible and easy deployable system is needed, since many different virtual machines need to be monitored across various time-zones, networks and teams. Furthermore, the monitoring approach may not generate too much overhead, so that the monitored VM do not need an unreasonable amount of resources and becomes cost-ineffective.

Considering the demands on a cloud environment, the highly distributable and modularized open source

monitoring software Performance Co-Pilot (PCP)⁴ is used to monitor the deployed virtual machines. PCP collects over 300 metrics for example CPU utilization, network bandwidth, disk I/O and memory usage. The modular approach of PCP allows to detach the logging and collecting. The logging agent (pmlogger) can be deployed on any VM and being gentle on resources at the same time. For collecting these log files a collection daemon (pmcd) can be deployed on a centralized instance.

PCP allows real-time monitoring as well as collecting archives to replay system behaviour, in order to analyze for example system anomalies. For visualizing real-time monitoring the open source software Vector⁵ is being used. PCP allows through standardized APIs an exchange of metrics to any software. The PCP archives can be visualized with the *pmchart*-module.

In this paper, only the most significant metrics are collected and evaluated as part of the AD-Module approach. Further development will increase the number of metrics and the level of logging, since more metrics can be collected on a service level for each microservice, in order to determine its current status and health.

The already yielded results stated in Figure 6 and 7 are promising to further pursue this approach. By finding the correlation between specific metrics related to the Legal Metrology Lifecycle (see Section 4), the cloud environment normal and anomalous behaviour can be represented.

5.1 Simulation of Attacks / Attacker Model

This section deals with the edge cases of attacker models, the inexperienced attacker and the experienced one. The first is usually easier to detect, since she/he does not aim for real harm but rather for attention and fame. The latter attacker has a most likely financial motivation and thus is more cautious and tries to stay undetected.

5.1.1 Inexperienced Attacker

The inexperienced attacker motivation is usually driven by fame and the urge to show off the own talents. This results into a noisy and obvious attack. The attacker sees no need in staying low and undetected, since this would undermine the original objectives.

Often the attacks carried out are not very specialized nor do they aim for big harm, instead they are

⁴<http://www.pcp.io/>

⁵<http://vectoross.io/>




Figure 6: Anomaly measured during a simulated attack of an inexperienced attacker. The attack generated a lot more network traffic (packets) and increases CPU utilization significantly. Upper cluster is the anomaly and lower cluster is the normal behaviour.

often sensational, imprecise and inefficient. Nevertheless those attack can cause a lot of costs and inconvenience on the carrier side.

An inexperienced attack was simulated to see if the pursued anomaly detection approach can detect such an assault. The results can be seen in Figure 6. Noteworthy is here that there are two distinct cluster that are easily to distinguish. The attacker achieved a noteworthy anomaly and consumed more resources than the normal application lifecycle, this can be seen in the Figure 6, since the upper cluster represents the attack which consumed more network bandwidth and CPU utilization. Also, Table 1 represents the anomalous behaviour of network traffic compared to CPU utilization and puts it into contrast of the normal behaviour.

5.1.2 Experienced Attacker

The experienced attacker is more cautious and has of-




Figure 7: Anomaly measured during a simulated attack of an experienced attacker. The attack generated more network traffic (packets) and increased CPU utilization but not that significantly compared to the inexperienced attacker.

ten a money-driven motivation. Those attacker want to stay undetected and do not brag about their achievements in public.

Table 1: Comparison of inexperienced attacker to normal life cycle.

| CPU | Normal Packets in | Anomaly Packets in | Normal Packets out | Anomaly Packets out |
|--------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 30-40% | 1928 | n/a | 1506 | n/a |
| 40-50% | 603 | 23025 | 487 | 33286 |
| 50-60% | 780 | 4532 | 497 | 6708 |
| 60-70% | 320 | 2945 | 195 | 4210 |
| 70-80% | n/a | 4101 | n/a | 5809 |
| 80-90% | n/a | 6764 | n/a | 9909 |

The attacks are often hard to detect because they are very specialized with a lot of insider knowledge. Furthermore, these operations are careful planned and carried out with a minimal offset of the normal behaviour, which is a challenge to detect and prevent those attacks. In Figure 7 a simulated insider attack is carried out and monitored. In contrast to the other case, one hardly can differentiate two cluster and tell normal behaviour apart from anomaly. Table 2, compares the anomalies to the normal behaviour by representing the network traffic in relation to CPU utilization.

5.2 Description of the Collected Results

As stated in the previous subsections, the attacks differ in their kind and methodology. This results into two distinct anomalies stated in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The latter scatter plot does not show the same distinct characteristics of two separated clusters, instead they are almost identical and overlaid. The clustering for pattern recognition technique is not enough for this kind of subtle anomalous behaviour.

Changing the perspective of evaluating the collected data and considering also the data density of the amount of network packages compared to the CPU utilization, the anomalous behaviour becomes more perceivable. Looking at the data in Table 1, for example, there are parallels to the plot in Figure 6. For the normal behaviour, CPU utilization never goes beyond 70% of usage, but rather stays below. Also, there is no

Table 2: Comparison of experienced attacker to normal life cycle.

| CPU | Normal Packets in | Anomaly Packets in | Normal Packets out | Anomaly Packets out |
|--------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 30-40% | 1928 | 6155 | 1506 | 4449 |
| 40-50% | 603 | 4 | 487 | 3 |
| 50-60% | 780 | 838 | 497 | 627 |
| 60-70% | 320 | 1991 | 195 | 1825 |
| 70-80% | n/a | 199 | n/a | 114 |

data for 70-90% for the normal cases, which makes it obvious to see the anomaly.

On the other hand, in case of the experienced attacker, the behaviour seems cautious, not raising an suspicion for heavy CPU utilization, Table 2 offers additional information to be able to detect anomalies. Regarding the cases of 40-50% and 70-80% of CPU utilization, for example, anomalies seem clear, especially taking the collected network traffic into account. In a normal behaviour around 600 incoming packages were counted and outgoing around 500 packages for 40-50% CPU usage while in the anomalous case only received four packages and sent only three packages.

Enough information to detect anomalies was found between the collected data in Table 1 and in the plot in Figure 7. Although it was not as simple as to detect the anomaly in the inexperienced attackers case. Using this statistical approach was helpful to generate more precise information to detect and expose anomalies from different kinds of attackers. Further research is needed to tackle the problem of finding a simple approach to unmask most anomalies properly while generating minimal amount of false positives.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK

In this paper an overview of our anomaly detection approach is given. Also, special requirements in Legal Metrology are pointed out and the resulting secure cloud reference architecture was briefly described. Furthermore, an anomaly detection module application is presented with promising results. This approach was tested against simulated attacks on the secure cloud reference architecture, especially against the legal metrology processing service. The lifecycle of this service was described and tested against two extreme cases of the assumed attacker model; the inexperienced and experienced attacker.

It was shown that in this early stage, anomalies caused by an inexperienced attacker, can be easily detected by the AD-Module, by simple pattern recognition of the clustering. Whereas, the experienced attacker caused anomalies that can only be detected aided by other statistical approaches, such as used data density technique.

Further work will concentrate in finding more correlations between metrics to detect more anomalies in distributed environments. Part of this future work will be evaluating more metrics in depth and creating a test pipeline for automated testing and anomaly detection, as well as to improve the statistical methods and evaluation. This will give us a better understanding of se-

cure cloud reference architecture behaviour to assess a full risk analysis of the system.

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