Hypocritical Policy Viktor Orbán in Crimean Annexation 2014

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Abstract: The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 tempted various reactions from another countries and international communities, including Hungary. Hungary which is part of Visegrad Group (V4) signed joint statement about its respect and commitment for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Yet, this statement was the opposite from Orbán behavior itself which from time to time seems get closer to Putin. Orbán consent hypocrisy in the joint statement of V4 and his behavior can be motivated by rational and cognitive factors of Orbán himself as an individual. Personal character, life experiences, background, up to Orbán's perspective can influence his leadership style also his decision-making process.

1 INTRODUCTION

Since becoming a sovereign country in 1991, Ukraine must face economic, social, and serious legal problems. As a new country, Ukraine must find a way out of the shadow of the “big brother” of Russia and begin to develop its own national identity. On the other hand, Russia is also actually still difficult to release Ukraine into a sovereign and independent country because of its strategic interests. The condition then causes tension in the relationship between the two countries that fluctuate and not infrequently cause conflict. One of the Russian-Ukrainian feuds can be seen in the dispute of the Crimean Peninsula that reached its crisis in 2014. The Crimean Peninsula crisis in fact can be a symbol of the difficult situation facing Ukraine on the ‘East’ and ‘West’ mainly for economic problems that are basically caused because of the difficulty of transformation, more and more of the problems that arise from the apparatus of his own country such as corruption and mis-management (Wydra, 2003: 111). The Crimean crisis also illustrates the problems between different ethnic groups and their desire for self-determination.

Since 1920, the Crimean territory belonged to the Russian Federation before it was finally transferred to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine in 1954 without a referendum but only through a decree approved by Krushchev. In 1991-after Ukraine became a sovereign state, the Crimea automatically became part of the independent state of Ukraine with its own autonomy-obtained through a referendum-named the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic of Crimea which was the restoration of the first and last Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic supported by the people (Bebler, 2015: 38-9). Based on the 2001 Ukrainian census, the Crimean Peninsula is inhabited by a majority of Russian ethnicities-about 58,3%-so not a few of the pro-Russian-oriented Crimean population as a result of their national consciousness. The demographic condition of the Crimea can also serve as a symbol of Russia’s ambitions in the region. In other words, however, the Crimea is still considered a part of history and an integral area for Russia (Wydra, 2003: 113).

The annexation of Russia to Crimea Peninsula in March 2014 caused a new crisis in the European region since the end of the Cold War. This annexation is fundamentally driven by the Crimean strategic values for Russia itself-especially for the Black Sea fleet, as well as Putin’s strong desire to show his confrontation with the West (Wydra, 2003: 116). The annexation of Russia received responses from the international community such as the UN and other countries, not least Hungary. Hungary belongs to the Visegrad Group (V4) through representatives of its officials and diplomats to write a statement in the Visegrad Group Declaration on its contents about Russia’s annexation to the Crimea and to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, basically when viewed from the Orbán’s Vector perspective as the prime minister, Hungary is just as likely to be very moderate in evaluating and reacting to the Ukrainian-Russian since the beginning of Orbán’s
election as prime minister in 2010, Viktor Orbán has attempted to emphasize Hungary’s neutrality with respect to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict to avoid friction relations with Russia given the increasing cooperation built between the two countries especially in the energy sector (Sadecki, 2014: 36). Even so, the neutrality emphasized by Orbán increasingly shifts to the Russian side and begins to turn away from value and dogma from the European Union. The policies and attitudes of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in responding to the Crimean annexation by Russia and the impetus behind these actions—both rational and cognitive factors—have been the focus of the study and will be described further in this paper.

1.1 Presidential Character as Theoretical Consequence

Research that examines the international relations’ phenomenon basically requires a focus in the analysis so that the explanation in the study is more targeted and tangible. This is still related to the wide scope of international relations and can’t be thoroughly researched. Researchers need to reduce and manage the problem of the study, one of which is to use a level of analysis that can serve as a focus and/or tool in international relations research. The level of analysis is defined by David Singer (1961: 77) as a focus taken by researchers with a view to sorting out the studied phenomena to produce more specific and more systemic analysis. Mohtar Mas’oed (1990: 35-6) mentions several points to consider in the use of analytical ratings. The researcher should know the unit of explanation and the unit of analysis in the problem or phenomenon being studied. The explanation unit is an independent variable that will be the focus of the research. After knowing the expansion unit, the researcher should select the appropriate analytical unit as a tool to assess the phenomenon. The analytical rank as a tool was first proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, State, and War (1960) to examine the causes of warring states. Waltz then suggested aspects that are considered to contribute in the occurrence of a war, namely; (1) individuals; (2) the state, and (3) the international system (Waltz, 1960 in Singer, 1961: 78). These three aspects then developed and used as a unit of analysis and a tool in understanding the causes of the international relations’ phenomenon. The analysis of the Hungarian response to the Russian policy to annex Crimea uses individual analysis ratings with more emphasis on the analysis of Viktor Orbán as individual prime minister.

The individual level of analysis includes the factors within an individual to make a policy (decision-making). In this case, the individual who acts as a decision maker—usually represented by leaders, such as presidents or prime ministers—has a significant influence on what the country does. Marijke Breuning (2007: 38-45) proposes three methods that can be used as methods in the individual level of analysis, namely (1) the presidential character, which emphasizes the attitude or character of the leader such as active-passive or positive-negative in performing his role as a decision maker; (2) operational code, by looking at the fundamental beliefs such as norms, perspectives, and standards believed by the leader as a consideration in decision-making, and; (3) leadership trait analysis, emphasizing the personal characteristic of a leader in determining foreign policy and controlling the situation influenced by political life, including his political party. In this paper, the unit of analysis emphasizes Viktor Orbán as the head of government that made the policy, including in determining Hungarian attitudes toward the Crimean annexation by Russia. The method used in Orbán’s analysis as an individual is the presidential character. The reason for choosing this method is to look at the complexity of Viktor Orbán’s background as an individual, shift his political view of Europe, to the long journey and long history of political participation from Viktor Orbán thus contributing to the formation of Orbán’s character as prime minister who can influence his policy-making. That is why the presidential character method was chosen as the theoretical basis in the analysis of Viktor Orbáns in his position against the Crimean annexation by Russia in 2014.

According to Breuning (2007: 40), the method of presidential character focuses on two things; (1) how active or passive the leader is, determined by the efforts mobilized in to shape his political policies; and (2) whether the leader assesses his current position as a task to assume or assumes that his current position is the goal of his politics. This is still related to people’s perception and support for the leader’s policy. From these two questions, will be produced one of the four types of leaders are; (a) a positive, active leader, a leader who exerts much energy and gains satisfaction from his people against the policies taken; (b) an active, negative leader, a leader who puts much effort into his policy but does not get a supportive response from his people. This type of leader tends to focus on trying to establish
his influence and power; (c) passive-positive, the type of leader who has little to do with policy but gets support from his people; and (d) passive-negative, the type of leader with little contribution and no support or satisfaction from the people. Both of these can be a theoretical study to know Viktor Orbán’s reasons for Hungary’s foreign policy making in response to the Crimean annexation issue. Judging from the lens of Realism, the personal character of Viktor Orbán as a dependent variable can be seen as a reflection of Hungarian foreign policy itself. In other words, the thinking and knowledge of Viktor Orbán will be regarded as an act of thought from Hungary in the international system.

1.2 Character Analysis of Viktor Orbán’s on Hungarian Policy in Crimean Crisis 2014

If drawn back, history remains a heavy burden for Hungary, a country located in the heart of Central Europe and as a place for the division of the great powers of the West and the East, so it is very familiar with the geopolitical dynamics. Under current conditions, which Western Europe is preoccupied with its own existential crisis, and Russia increasingly demonstrates its strength, making Hungary inevitably have to position itself between the two sides, one of which is when Russia annexed the Crimea in March 2014. In a statement issued on March 1, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry expressed its concern about the situation on the Crimean Peninsula. The ministry noted that the Foreign Minister of the Visegrad Group had asked the leaders of the Kiev government and the Donetsk region’s political leaders to distance themselves from provocative measures that could increase tensions and lead to violence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). The position taken by Hungary in the case of annexation Crimea by Russia one of them can be seen in the joint statement made by Visegrad Group (V4) -Hungarian, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia- with Ukraine on March 4, 2014. Hungary agreed to the contents of this joint statement, V4 countries reaffirm their strong support for Ukraine and ensure that the V4 countries are in solidarity with the people and the Government of Ukraine and are willing to maintain their strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state (Prime Minister’s Office, 2014).

In contrast to the statements of the country contained in the joint statement, Orbán individually precisely initially chose a moderate attitude in response to the annexation case. Having chosen to remain silent for several days and start raising public criticism, Orbán’s first short comment on this issue was finally made on March 3, 2014-the day before the joint V4 and Ukraine statements were made-as quoted from the MTI news agency, “Hungary is not part of the conflict” (Mergit, 2014). The statement gives a picture to the public that Orbán as an individual and prime minister seeks to be neutral against the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. In fact, as a member of the V4 tied to the EU, Orbán may openly favor Ukraine-either bilaterally or within the framework of the EU-with regard to its sovereignty over its territory and denounced Russia against annexation on the Crimean peninsula. Statements from Orbán related to the Crimean case focus more on the security of the minority of 156,000 Hungarians-especially in the Transcarpatia region that inhabited by many Hungarians-in Ukraine rather than the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation itself (Racz, 2014: 4). The policy chosen by Orbán can be encouraged for reasons or considerations embodied in the development of bilateral relations -particularly in the nuclear power plant- with Russia that approved in early 2014 (Racz, 2014: 3). Orbán signed a contract with Russian President Vladimir Putin in January 2014, asking the Russian company to expand its Hungarian nuclear plant in the city of Paks. In this case Moscow is willing to provide large loans (about USD 13.33 billion) to Hungary that can be used to finance about 80 percent of its energy expansion (Mergit, 2014).

The difference in Orbán’s attitude compared with the statement Hungary has poured out in this joint statement is basically still related to the character or type of Orbán leadership which, when analyzed using a presidential character, is included in an active-negative type. The active type of Viktor Orbán as a policy maker can be seen from the beginning of Orbán’s political career itself. Viktor Orbán has served as the Hungarian Prime Minister since 2010. This is the second time Orbán has served as the Hungarian Prime Minister after previously also been elected for the period 1998-2002, which at that time made Orbán the youngest prime minister of the 20th century at the age of 35 year (Waller, 2015). His political career began when Orbán became one of the pioneers of the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) on March 30, 1988 as well as acting as a spokesperson. In October 1988, at the first Fidesz congress, Orbán was elected a member of the Fidesz national presidency until October 1989. His speech intelligibility was
increasingly recognized publicly when Orbán gave a radical speech on June 16, 1989 to urge Hungary’s democratic transition from Soviet communist influence and to call for withdrawal Soviet troops from Hungary. Orbán was elected to Parliament since 1990, before finally serving as Fidesz factional leader in the period May 1990-1993. Orbán also served as President of Fidesz for three periods, 1993-1995. Under the direction of Orbán, Fidesz, which tended to be a radical student movement, was slowly transformed into a moderate liberal party and renamed Fidesz to the Hungarian Civic Party in 1995 (Waller, 2015). From his early experience in politics this was the embryo of Orbán’s active character as a leader begins to form.

In the first period of his reign as a prime minister in 1998 and 2002, Orbán had in fact been pro-EU and had widened his country’s access to the regional container of Europe. But after his re-election in 2010, his outlook on the European Union began to shift due to the economic recession in Europe in 2008. It also makes Orbán as a Eurosceptic leader (Mong, 2016). Orbán’s ideology is slowly shifting and more directed to populism. His liveliness is also demonstrated through his desire to create “illiberal democracy”, as expressed in his speech on July 26, 2014 in Bâile Tuşnad, Romania: “systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even democracies, can nevertheless make their nations successful. The stars of the international analysts today are Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey” “....meaning that, while breaking with the dogmas and ideologies that have been adopted by the West and keeping ourselves independent from them, we are trying to find the form of community organisation, the new Hungarian state, which is capable of making our community competitive in the great global race for decades to come” “....and so in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state” (Orbán, 2014).

The speech emphasizes Orbán’s activeness to create policies deviating from Western dogmas and getting closer to Russia. With its populist principles, Orbán then adopted policies such as media restrictions, fence-making to exclude migrants that considered by society as job-stealers and poison for their country (Bayer, 2016), to bilateral relations with Russia with Putin as his “example”. Orbán that almost never praise other politicians, has blatantly praised Putin as a strong national leader who adhered to Western liberalism but continued to use traditional social values. Contrary to his thinking when he became a young communist combat activist, Orbán implicitly put Putin on his role model list in the famous state speech in Bâile Tuşnad -as above. This gives a “signal” that the Orbán is increasingly bringing the Hungarian orientation into the Russian direction and gradually begins to turn away from the EU. This statement can be affirmed in his speech:

“The reason a dispute has now developed between the EU and Hungary is that we have changed this system and the Government has come to a decision according to which within this new state concept, this illiberal state concept, ....” (Orbán, 2014).

Orbán’s personal interest in Putin has been in effect visible since the election of Orbán in 2010. He directly visited Moscow to talk about economic cooperation and the development of the nuclear power plant (Bayer, 2017). Implicitly, his allegiance to Putin in the Crimean annexation than following the guidelines of the European Union can be seen in Orbán’s statement in an interview with the Politico media of November 23, 2015, which states:

“Putin is someone you can cooperate with” “I would not deny if I would have a good personal relationship with Putin because I don’t like to follow the request of the Western approaches” (Orbán, 2015 dalam Kaminski, 2015).

Orbán’s activism with its populist intuition has pushed him to make the political agenda far beyond the Hungarian state itself. Even since the start of its second term as an prime minister, Orbán began to spread his power to bring change in the EU. This is certainly related to the background of Orbán who has understood the inside and outs of Hungarian politics for nearly three decades by being a part of it. The radical character since youth has been obtained from childhood since Orbán himself was born and grew up in the countryside as the son of a miner with a disciplined father and a loyal member of the communist party, which Orbán himself described in an activist interview in the 1980s:

“I remember when he used to beat me, he would yell that I should keep my hands down and things like that, I remember I had some pretty bad experiences,” “I was never delighted with myself, I always had a bit of a schizophrenic inclination; I was able to view myself from the outside” (Orbán, 1989 dalam Waller, 2015).

Starting his political career in the radical party and feeling for firsthand the demands of Hungary’s reforms against the Soviet communists, made Orbán an active political person and a freedom fighter who was not afraid to take risks. In this regard it can be
seen in the Hungarian position of being one of the poorest members of the European Union, but Orbán has succeeded in shaping the policy in the European Union especially on migration and refugees, demands better protection of external borders, criticized Angela Merkel’s policy towards refugees. Even Orbán claimed his own victory in a referendum on the mandate of quota refugees for European countries (Kidik, 2016). In the case of the Crimean annexation, although in the joint statement V4 Orbán also agreed to respect the integrity of Ukraine, Orbán also did not hesitate to show its closeness to Russia. Even after the imposition of economic sanctions for Russia due to annexation that is considered illegal on the Crimean Peninsula, Orbán personally objected on the grounds that it may contribute to his dependent state on Russia in energy (Sadecki, 2014: 26).

His participation in carrying out policies contrary to EU values did not get the satisfaction of his pro-European majority. This confirms that Orbán’s leadership style belongs to a negative type, which means it tends to focus on the defense of power and its influence in Hungarian policy shaping. Based on the Hungarian 2016 Hungarian survey, Orbán’s leadership style and political actions by some Hungarian societies are more of a dictatorial, autocratic, corrupt, or even a mafia than democracy (Balogh, 2016). Hungarian public discontent with Orbán’s style of government is based on Orbán’s hypocritical actions that are not infrequently contrary to his statements. Orbán is also considered often create enemies for himself and his followers and create scenarios to describe him as if they were their savior—the followers of Orbán—from the actions he had prepared (Magyar, 2012). One empirical example that can be seen in the refugee crisis for example, Brussels became the main enemy of Orbán at least for trying to force Hungary to accept 1,294 refugees under the EU quota system (Kulik, 2016). In the case of the Crimea itself, Hungary discontent continued when Orbán was unresponsive in conveying the Hungary position in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Unlike other EU leaders who immediately issued statements about their allegiance to Ukraine, Orbán precisely preferring not to comment directly, before Monday, March 3, 2014. It is immediately criticized by the Hungarian people who are beginning to assume that it is increasingly leaning towards Russia and increasingly turning away from the EU.

From the Crimean crisis in 2014, Orbán showing an indifference to EU commitments that tend to limit the relations of its countries to Russia. His Euroscepticism towards the EU made Orbán no matter how his government was seen abroad, or the diminished Hungary diplomatic influence at the EU, not to mention European Parliamentary (EP) resolutions that had several times criticized his government. Orbán personally doesn’t want his country forced to choose one party or another, which is a nostalgic stalemate of the Cold War style. In response to the largely pro-European Hungarian demands, Orbán with its populist principle argues that the world today has entered the so-called “new paradigm” of a world of multiple centers of power. This new paradigm means that European countries—including Hungary—should be free to pursue their own path in their relations with Moscow which may be considered unreasonable to the EU countries. This assumption is stated in a statement in his speech on January 23, 2017 at the Lámfalussy Conference:

“the era of multilateralism is at an end, and the era of bilateral relations is upon us. For us this is good news, because it is an unnatural state of affairs when, influenced by external pressure, one dare not state that one’s own country comes first when governing, making decisions, or considering what the central bank should do” (Orbán, 2017).

The European economic crisis in 2008 and 2013 and the rules on receiving refugees for EU countries—contrary to the will of Orbán—are still a trauma to Orbán so that the Euroscepticism values remain in its policies. With his euroscepticism background and the nature of the “rebels” in himself, it becomes clear that behind its moderation, Orbán’s findings for more inclination to the Russians in the annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Approval of the joint statement with Ukraine on March 4, 2014 which is in the form of a commitment to the domesticity of the Ukrainian face parliamentary elections held on April 6, 2014. With style of government that increasingly similar to Putin, Orbán’s personal relationship with Putin is getting closer while his attitude with the EU is increasingly skeptical. Cooperation in the energy sector in the Paks region can serve as a claim of Orbán’s interest in Putin (Sadecki, 2014: 6). While Putin itself requires Orbán as a “friend” in Europe as well as ease of the economic sanctions provided by the EU to Russia due to the annexation of the Crimea. The proximity of both of them are essentially criticized by most Hungarians because of the energy expansion that was once Orbán’s personal ambition but to exacerbate corruption in his budget and also increase Hungarian dependence on Russia (Bayer, 2017). The Hungarian opposition also protested
against Putin’s bilateral ties amid fears that Orbán is considered to build a “too close” cooperation with the Russian leader.

2 CONCLUSION

The annexation of the Crimea by Russia that took place in early March 2014 led to various reactions for countries and international communities around the world, especially for the European Union countries. Hungary as a member of Visegrad Group (V4) approved a joint statement issued on March 4, 2014 as a declaration that the V4 countries are committed to continue to recognize respect for Ukrainian independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity internationally, and to exercise a non-recognition policy over the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia. But behind the official statement, the real action of Viktor Orbán as prime minister suggests otherwise. Personal relationships with Putin woven since 2010 became closer and can be used as an indicator of Orbán’s allegiance to Russia. Especially the two had recently agreed on the cooperation of Hungary’s nuclear energy development in the city of Paks, with the help of Russia of about US$ 13.33 billion that can be used to finance about 80 percent of the energy expansion.

Orbán’s policies that tend to lean toward Russia rather than openly favor the EU which is its regional framework, is inseparable from the character he possesses as an individual. The result of the presidential character analysis above shows that Orbán is an active-negative type leader in carrying out his policy. Orbán’s activity as the decision maker can be seen from the beginning of Orbán’s own political career to be elected for the second time as Prime Minister of Hungary. Her activism became more visible when Orbán entered into a partnership with Putin in 2010 on economic issues and plans for the construction of the nuclear power plant. Participation showed by Orbán as a prime minister tends to be aimed at Hungarian policy shaping in order to be independent of Western values and dogmas. The purpose of his action is to create Hungary with the principle of illiberal democracy just like his ambition. One of them can be achieved through the approach to Moscow and European Union refugees quota referendum which is considered by Orbán too incriminating.

The negative nature of Viktor Orbán can be seen from the style of radical leadership with its populist principle, which makes Orbán increasingly skeptical of the EU and getting closer to Russia. This is a contrast to the largely Hungarian people that pro to EU and oppose the closeness of Orbán with Putin which they consider will only bring Hungary into a worse condition due to dependency with Russia. However, the criticism of his people does not become an obstacle for Orbán to keep up with policies that are consistent with his ambitions. Orbán’s remarks on EU skepticism are often made in official speeches as well as interviews with the media. Unlike other V4 leaders who responded with a direct statement that they firmly reaffirmed their commitment and respect for the integrity of the Ukrainian territory-and strongly condemned Russia’s illegal annexation act, Orbán chose to be moderate without comment for several days before issuing a statement on March 3, 2014, which became the indication of Hungary’s neutrality. Whereas as a country leader committed to the European Union, Orbán can usually openly favor the Ukrainian-colleagues in the region-both bilaterally and within the framework of the European Union.

The active-negative type of Viktor Orbán’s leadership emphasizes that Orbán’s policies are deemed necessary only to spread influence and maintain its power. Orbán’s approval in the joint statements of the V4 countries to fully support the territorial integrity of Ukraine in the Crimean Crisis of 2014 can be said to be a mere motive to gain the sympathy of the people, given that in the near future Hungary will hold parliamentary elections on April 6, 2014-which was then won by Fidesz with 2/3 majority votes. His skepticism toward the EU has brought Orbán-and Hungary- more indifferent to EU policies, even deepening ties with Putin in order to realize Orbán’s personal ambitions and interests that want to build a nuclear power plant with Russian help. The presidential character analysis above shows that Orbán’s personal character as an authoritarian leader as well as the Hungarian prime minister influences the country’s foreign policy even more in the case of the Crimean annexation in 2014. Starting the hypocrisy of Orbán’s actions with what was agreed in the joint statement with Ukraine in the Crimean crisis made Hungary increasingly seen as black sheep and the most controversial country in Europe; this is of course apart from the growing opposition or opposition groups of Orbán.

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