Redefinition of National Interest in Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Joko Widodo

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Keywords: Indonesia Foreign Policy, Joko Widodo, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, ASEAN, national interest.

Abstract: This paper discusses the foreign policy of Indonesia during President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Although foreign politics is generally static and has the same principles, every head of government such as the President often has a new style and approach in foreign policy. Even a country with an established system like the United States, the President's role in foreign policy is significant because it determines the direction and choice of relationships with other countries. Indonesia cannot be separated from such a phenomenon. President Jokowi has different styles and approaches in foreign policy from his predecessor President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). If SBY was very active with ideas for the regional order and future of the region, then Jokowi sees the importance of Indonesia to select the choices of foreign policy in accordance with the urgent matters that have a direct interest for Indonesia. Using interviews with both academics and foreign policy officials and literature review, we see that this different view is quite convincing that it has redefined the national interests and practices of Indonesia foreign policies during President Jokowi. Although this kind of position is not a new one in the course of Indonesian politics and can be traced along the history of Indonesian foreign policy, Jokowi's foreign policy approach has important consequences in Indonesia's relations with ASEAN and with the wider region. Indonesia is now seen as less active or in other words less assertive within ASEAN and does not make a significant contribution to the strengthening relations in the region.

1 INTRODUCTION

After the first period of President Joko Widodo (hereafter Jokowi) is almost over, it is sufficient to see the achievements of his foreign policy especially in view of whether there is a significant difference or departure from the previous foreign policy of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). This discussion of achievement becomes more meaningful because from the beginning Jokowi's administration showed a strong desire to abandon the previous SBY foreign policy and priorities. The preliminary statements of President Jokowi and his advisors indicate that he will deal with foreign policy differently with a stronger emphasis on Indonesian interests than the previous administration.

The difference in question is the emphasis of people's diplomacy while the foreign political identity it fights for is the identity of Indonesia as a maritime state. Jokowi for example wants a more concrete output of Indonesian diplomacy. The extent to which these claims materialize, what the background is, and what the consequences for Indonesian foreign policy, are the subject of this paper. In some cases of foreign policy discussed in this paper, Jokowi's administration does show different ways of dealing with foreign policy issues. Jokowi is more persistent in defining and running what is claimed as Indonesia's national interest. But in other cases, that persistence has caused controversy in neighbouring countries of Indonesia. We argue that Jokowi's claim cannot be released from the populist background behind his emergence with the famous slogan of 'work, work, work!'. Having this, he was seemingly trying to differentiate himself from its the former President as well as constructing his own image of being a problem solver for any trouble faced by the common people, by insisting that under his administration any adopted foreign policy should have actual impacts on them.

In discussing the above problem, this paper is divided into four sections. First, the paper will discuss the concept of populism and its context related to Jokowi's foreign policy. Secondly, the paper discusses Jokowi's approach in his foreign policy. Third, this paper looks at the implementation of
Jokowi's initial commitment to the implementation of foreign policy, particularly focusing on maritime and ASEAN issues. Fourth, several issues of foreign policy and its relation to populism.

2 LITERATURES ON JOKOWI'S FOREIGN POLICY

Before examining how Jokowi redefines and executes Indonesian foreign policy, it is important to see how some previous writings address this issue. Departing from various perspectives, recent studies on Indonesia foreign policy have highlighted Indonesia's leadership role in creating orders in Asia Pacific. This is reasonable considering Indonesia does play an important position in the Asia Pacific region which is also referred to as the centre of gravity of the future. The weakening of the US influence in the region and the emergence of China as a new force that fills the US absence have led academics to pay attention to the reaction of countries in the region, including Indonesia.

In addition to China and India which are candidates for major power, Indonesia has also seen as able to play a leading role in the Asia Pacific architecture. Vibhanshu, for example, writes about Indonesia's grand strategy in the region that shows the ambitions of Indonesian leaders and their foresight about Indonesia's role. The writings on the role of Indonesia's leadership in this region with its ambitions and limitations have received considerable attention recently due to changes in the Asia Pacific region. These writings do not specifically highlight Jokowi's government but they see Indonesia's role and vision in the context of history and fears of instability in the Asia-Pacific region due to changes in the regional political maps. Among the writings, only the writings of Rosyidin reviewed Jokowi's government which he criticized as focusing on domestic issues and ignoring the possibility of Indonesia raising its status to become a major power in the region.

The above writings show that Indonesia cannot escape the responsibility of maintaining peace and stability in the region. Even the writings reminded that Indonesia has done some things that make Southeast Asia stable with the establishment of ASEAN in the past and Indonesia can still take this role as it has the potential to do so. Indonesia often shows intellectual leadership and diplomacy to build a regional order in the region.

Yet none of the articles captured directly the shifts that took place in Indonesian foreign policy during Jokowi's time. After several years running, Jokowi's government showed that the focus of attention of Indonesia, as many predicted, shifted from international oriented in SBY's time to domestic-oriented. Whether Indonesia will abandon SBY's foreign policy is an important question. The legacy of foreign policy that has been pioneered by SBY is quite significant and leaving all his efforts and diplomacy can make a big hole in the sustainability of Indonesian foreign policy. However, that is what actually Jokowi does. His attention is more on Indonesia's national interests than any other interests whether it is the interests of ASEAN or any other regional interests. How do we explain this shift?

Populism is one possible alternative approach that may explain the phenomenon. Although the main purpose of the populist movement originally is to win electoral votes, the attitude of its leaders in turn has implications on foreign policy. The position of the political party and of the populist leaders used to reflect the anti-immigrant attitude, emphasizes the sovereignty of the state, and rejects the cultural and economic globalization. The leftist populist regime usually refuses neo-liberalism and free markets. Its elites often play a role in voicing people's concerns about globalization and foreign control over their country. They follow the logic and sentiment of society and not follow to an ideology.

In the case of some countries in Europe and America, including Latin America; populism is clearly related to foreign policy. The populist leader succeeds in raising the voice of people marginalized in economic matters and the notion that their country's original identity is being threatened by the arrival of so many foreign immigrants. Right-wing figures, such as Marine Le Pen in France and Trump in America, have captured such situation well. The success of capturing this issue made them popular and even made some of the characters, like Trump has, succeeded in becoming President of the United States. Trump’s victory raises international concerns as his emphasis on ‘America First’ slogan has spawned policies that harm other countries and accordingly disrupts the existing relationships. Similarly, in Latin America President Hugo Chaves of the Venezuela, and in Asia President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines and Prime Minister Narendra Modi from India also used populist rhetoric and nationalism to win the elections. Populism works on the components of society who feel not only ignored, but also anxious due to being siege by the threatening globalization.
As some phrases say, foreign policy begins at home; foreign policy can also be used to increase the popularity and legitimacy of the regime in power. Our paper further discusses this internestic linkage and we will see how ‘pro-people diplomacy’ or perhaps more accurately ‘Jokowi’s populist foreign policy’ has been popularized and what effect it has on the redefinition of Indonesia’s national interests in international community. In this context, we will use the concept of populism that is often used in seeing Jokowi’s victory in Presidential election. To some extent, populism can be used for understanding the various foreign policy decisions taken by Jokowi’s government. While Jokowi populism has been accepted as something natural and necessity in domestic politics, in foreign relations, populism has some important consequences in dealing with other countries.

As many may have known, Jokowi’s populism has attracted popular supports and brought him to power. The important question here is whether populism developing in the many part of the worlds also colours the Jokowi’s foreign policy, how significant it is and whether it will develop into foreign policy that creates worry to other countries, especially to Indonesian neighbours. We are of the view that in some respects populism does characterize the foreign policy of Jokowi’s government, especially in the short term. In his several foreign policies related issues, such as in the effort to safeguard the territory of Indonesia’s sovereignty and commitment to ASEAN, this populism raises the concerns of some of Indonesia’s neighbours. Some other Jokowi’s foreign policies can also be said to have populist elements in it. However, unlike populism in Europe and America, Jokowi’s populism is not ethnocentric and nativist. It only gives a stronger emphasis on some existing foreign policies and in other policies such as marine guard policies through ship sinking actions; populism requires a securitization process to make the policy successful.

The policy is taken on the consideration of what benefits Indonesia most. In the perspective of populism, if the profit gained from the relations is not in line with expectations, then it is possible that the cooperation will be abandoned. According to Magcamid, a populist government must continue to maintain its popularity by assuring the supporters and the people that the actions taken are for the benefit of the people. The relationship of populism and Indonesian foreign policy is something that is rarely discussed until quite recently. As said before, populism is generally associated with elites’ efforts to win elections in the country. Populism has its own appeal because it represents the will of the people who feel neglected in the political process which is considered elitist and beneficial to the elite. Populism can take the form of anti-foreign sentiment that is considered threatening both national identity and material sources such as natural resources and employment opportunity. In other words, populism related to nationalism, namely the preservation of national territory from foreign attacks and to people, particularly the importance of prioritizing the interests of the people above other interests.

Populist regimes cannot be separated from politicizing and securitizing efforts, so that their political performance is always good in the eyes of their supporters. Politicization is related to foreign policy actions that require greater attention and responsibility. While securitization relates to the efforts of the populist regime to gain greater support in its policy towards controversial issues in foreign policy, in the securitization process the regime wants to convince people that their actions are not only necessary but urgent to save the country. Magcamid elaborates it as follows:

“By presenting domestic issues as existential threats not only to the state’s national interests but also to the survival of the state itself, populist leaders (the securitizing actors) are, in effect, taking these issues outside the jurisdiction of ordinary politics into the sphere of emergency politics, where they can be dealt without the democratic rules and procedures of foreign policy making. Once successful in labelling these issues as existential threats, populist leaders are then able to claim rights to extraordinary measures, which under the normal realm of politics would not have been allowed”.

In the case of Indonesia, as part of the populist action, such a kind of existential threat to national interest seemed to be deliberately bolstered. Amongst Jokowi’s foreign policies, the sinking of foreign vessels violating the Indonesia’s maritime territory was an example. This required the process of securitization to become an urgent matter as it is related to both national interest and state’s sovereignty, and it thus needed to be seriously managed. It apparently even becomes one of the most widely applauded policies in Jokowi’s foreign policies, although it created concerns and even protests from the affected neighbouring states.

In terms of foreign policy analysis, the uses of foreign policy for domestic purposes actually are not new in the Indonesia case. Based on his study on Indonesia’s foreign policy elites, Fanklin B. Weinstein found that that Indonesia’s foreign policy had been used for three purposes involving to
maintain independence, to mobilize overseas sources for national development, and to win domestic political competition. Among these purposes, the last one was very political compared to the other purposes and in terms of the linkage between foreign policy and domestic politics, it to a large extent fits with the relationship between populism and the recent Indonesian foreign policy though Weinstein did not use the term populism. For him, foreign policy can be used to increase the legitimacy and popularity of government in a country. His paper is relevant in examining how foreign politics is actually a part or extension of domestic political struggles. He used the concept of the uses of foreign policy, among others, to explain how Sukarno for example confronted Malaysia to overcome internal political differences. In other words, Sukarno used foreign policy to strengthen his position and, at the same time, to solve the political divisions within the country.

In Indonesian politics today, especially in Jokowi's government, there is no political struggle as it was during Soekarno's time. But under the current adopted democratic system, every single politician including the President always wants to increase its legitimacy, trust and power. He always wants to be seen by the audience doing something that adds to his popularity. Jokowi emerged as a ruler because of the nature of populism attached to him. Populist government is a government that is considered to represent the interests of the people directly. In this respect, Jokowi can be regarded as a populist leader because he meets the above requirements. With his jargon of ‘work, work and work’, Jokowi wants to show that he will indeed work hard for the people, including to issues that relate to foreign policy.

The populist assumption becomes the main basis for the formulation and implementation of the program both at home and abroad. Every step or decision in this context is measured from its concrete results for the practical interests of the people and the state and also for the regime's popularity and legitimacy. In some cases, such as decisions relating to ASEAN, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM - Papua Liberation Movement) and bilateral relations, populism therefore play significant role. In some other cases, the relationship of populism to the national interest has been taken through a process of securitization.

The emphasis on Indonesia's national interest (or "Indonesia First" - borrowing Trump’s ‘American First’ slogan) should take precedence, and came strongly at the beginning of Jokowi's reign. The President issued several statements about the virtue of preserving Indonesia's interests. He said "Indonesia under my administration is open to business. But Indonesia, like other sovereign nations, must ensure that no harm comes to our national interests'.

3 JOKOWI’S DIFFERENT APPROACH IN FOREIGN POLICY

At the beginning of his reign, the sign that Jokowi will distance himself and shift from the style of prior government diplomacy is quite clear. Jokowi stressed the importance of grounded diplomacy relevant to the interests of the people. In a certain degree if President SBY seeks to create a system of new norms of international relations that fit the perspective critical theory in international relations, then, President Jokowi on the contrary tries to show that Indonesia still needs theories called problem solving theories. Implicitly his views criticized the previous government's diplomacy which was thought to run some diplomacy that was not directly related to the interests of the people. For Jokowi, relations with other countries must be seen from the direct benefits to Indonesia's national interests. In relation to other countries if that is not profitable, then Jokowi says he will not do that. He said "Our [foreign] policy is free and active, befriend all countries but [we will put first] those who give the most benefits to the people." He said, "What's the point of having many friends but we only get the disadvantages? many friends should bring many benefits."

Jokowi called his diplomacy as pro-people diplomacy which was considered a departure from the internationalist approach of SBY. Economically, more emphasis is placed on increasing trade, promoting Indonesian products and increasing investment. He said 'the roles of our diplomats are crucial in the efforts to turn our negative trade balance into a surplus one. Ambassadors must be able to promote our product. In interpreting this vision, Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno LP Marsudi said, Indonesia would focus on people-oriented diplomacy that provides actual benefits for the people. She said that "foreign policy must be grounded, so diplomacy that will be done is pro-people diplomacy, for people. According to the her, pro-people diplomacy includes emphasis on 4 (four) foreign priorities of Indonesia, namely Indonesian unity, protection of Indonesian citizens overseas, economic diplomacy and increasing the role of Indonesia in regional and global scale. In terms of the last priority, Indonesia will
encourage the creation of peace and stability in the region, one of them by realizing Vision 4000 Peacekeepers in 2019.

4 POPULISM IN MARITIME POLICY

Maritime axis is the main doctrine of Jokowi’s foreign policy. This is actually not something new because Indonesia has long been familiar with the concept of the maritime country. Indeed, every single presidency had contribution in it. This can be traced from the declaration of Juanda doctrine in December 1957 during the period of Soekarno presidency, the first President of Indonesia. The doctrine, which then was stipulated into a statutory law in the ACT no. 4 in 1960, was declared aiming to grab international attention that Indonesia is an ‘archipelagic state’ with its all consequences. It proclaimed that ‘all waters, surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesia state, regardless of their extension or breath’. By this, Indonesia essentially is a maritime country, in which geographically the doctrine had significantly expanded Indonesia’s sea water from 2.8 to 5.8 million square kilometres. The strategic value of the concept was even underlined by Soekarno himself. In his famous opening speech in front of the first National Maritime Consultation meeting in 28 September 1963, he cogently urged the audiences to have good maritime awareness by saying:

“We now, every single of us, have to be convinced that Indonesia cannot become a strong, tranquil and prosperous country if we do not go back to also mastering the ocean, if we do not go back to be an oceanic nation, if we do not go back to be a nautical nation, a nation of sailors as we have known it during the ocean age’.

During Suharto’s New Order regime another milestone was achieved. The concept of Indonesia as a maritime country went a step ahead in 1973 by the incorporation of Wawasan Nusantara (archipelagic outlook) into Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN – the Board Guidelinies of the State Policy). This outlook confirmed that Indonesia is as a quintessence of social, economic and political unity as well as the unity of defence and security in which all elements supposed to be Indonesia’s national development goals. Having all these, both Sukarno and Suharto basically have laid the foundation of the concept of Indonesia as being a maritime country, both in character and legal-constitutional basis.

Yet, the contribution of Yudhoyono presidency should not be underrated. During the period a further development found its result by the release of a comprehensive ‘Indonesia’s Maritime Policy Book II’, which identifies five pillars of Indonesia’s maritime policy involving: ocean culture, ocean governance, ocean economy, maritime security and marine environment. Having such all-encompassing elements involved, to be a maritime country any government of Indonesia would be the agent in charge to doing a nation building project. Interestingly, however, although the real developments went on during the three former presidencies, their real impacts had been limited. It seemed that none of them was able to effectively resonate it into national and international public, because they “could not generate enough political momentum”.

It was President Joko Widodo who championed the moment by echoing the discourse nationally and internationally. Through his presidential campaign and during his presidency, by using the populist rhetoric, the maritime state doctrine became more pursed and formally the basis of policy. Therefore, how this view of the maritime axis has been constructed and belongs to the present government is of paramount importance.

There are two important discourses that surfaced in the construction of this maritime fulcrum. First, it relates to the sea area utilization and how to connect the vast territories of Indonesia so that the character of Indonesian maritime can become stronger. For example, it says the Indonesian marine territory is so wide but the main relationship is on land. We must make use of that sea connection. Second, maritime axis is a matter of Indonesia sovereignty. Outside countries are considered to have violated the sovereignty, especially by stealing Indonesian fish. This has cost the State trillions of rupiah. If Indonesia can overcome the theft of the fish by keeping the sea border then, as will be shown below, the profits will return and the Indonesian fishermen will be more profitable.

Jokowi’s government tries to solve both problems. However, the second issue seems to be more important to overcome to satisfy the already believing audience that this government will rebuild Indonesia’s maritime glory. Therefore, this paper will first address the issue of maritime sovereignty and then discuss the construction of the maritime fulcrum.

Violations of Indonesian sovereignty by foreign fishermen who stole Indonesian fish became a very...
shocking issue in the context of the Indonesian maritime fulcrum. Fish theft and border violations are long-standing issues, but in Jokowi’s time it is a very urgent issue to overcome. This is also followed by the appearance of the maritime minister who is a woman, brave, firm and communicative with the people. Handling the issue of marine sovereignty is then indeed the most important populist policy Jokowi government so far.

Some people view this issue as a domestic problem, but it has big ramifications abroad especially in relationships and solidarity with neighbouring countries. This last thing has become the consideration of the previous President SBY not to drown the fishing boats of neighbouring countries that cross the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. During SBY, there were certainly patrols to guard Indonesia maritime territory and the arrests to the violator of RI territory. Yet the SBY administration resolved the issue following common practice with negotiations and courts. Following the principle of “million friends zero enemy”, friendship with the neighbouring states whose fishing vessels were captured, was of paramount importance.

On the contrary, Jokowi's government has taken a firm different position early on this issue. Since the campaign and before being inaugurated, Jokowi insisted that he would take decisive action including drowning the ships and supervising the sea areas by using drones. Problems which were initially resolved following normal practice need to be determined urgently and need public support. In other words, during his Presidential campaigns and the early days of his administration, there were efforts to securitize the threat of the Indonesian Ocean sovereignty. The existential threats encountered are the sovereignty and richness of the Indonesian seas that need urgent action to protect them.

Before reviewing how populism and securitization relate to this case, it is important to see how the previous administration dealt with this issue. The SBY administration also concerned with the problem of fish theft and sea border crossers in Indonesia. This issue has been a long-standing issue and a real threat that has become a public concern in general. Indonesia’s losses due to the theft of this fish are very large and not counted with certainty because of the vast performances. Jokowi's campaign team, followed by ministers and presidential statements, claimed that the losses were around 300 trillion rupiah. However, the actual figure according to Sharif C. Sutardjo's Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) is not that large and is estimated to be only US $ 3.5 million or Rp 42 billion (with an estimated exchange rate of Rp 12 thousand). In this respect, whatever the different figures do not really matter, because the most important is its message of how Jokowi’s administration made populist narrative on it.

According to Sharif, to keep the scale of fish theft does not continue to increase the government needs cooperation from all parties and not just the responsibility of the ministry. Previous step taken to overcome this was to take care and catch the ships crossing the border. Indonesia has an institution called Badan Kemanan Laut (Bakamla – Maritime Security Board of Indonesia) to inspect and to catch fish thieves. The Indonesian policies were common practices that are also taken by other Indonesian neighbours. Once Indonesia captured the crew of the violating vessels and it brought them to justice. In addition, negotiations are also made when the government of the State concerned defends its citizens. This policy is considered a normal step in accordance with Indonesia's abilities and prevailing practices. This practice was also taken considering the fact that Indonesian fishermen have also crossed the perimeter boundary of Indonesia to other state sea territories. Therefore, the government is also considering the impact of relations with other countries when crackdown is taken.

The shooting and sinking action of the ship, against the background above, is thus a new act that exceeds the limits agreed upon so far. How this action can be done, cannot be separated from the presence of Jokowi's government that offers a decisive action in guarding the border. Since the emergence of Jokowi and in the campaign, Jokowi and his team popularized the view of the need for firm action to overcome the theft of fish in RI waters. As President, the new government with this pro-people slogan needs to take more concrete steps to address the problem of maritime border violations and the theft of this fish thoroughly. They need to show that in contrast to the previous government, they will address this issue better. Jokowi for example says he will check the reports of violations and people who feast on stealing fish. He also said he would buy and install a drone to monitor the theft of the fish. The moratorium on the granting of fishing vessels and ship bombing looted even before Jokowi was inaugurated as President and created hopes for society that the theft and border violations will be resolved soon. On various occasions Jokowi said he regrets the stealing of large Indonesian fish and will order the shooting of the thief's ship so they will be deterred.

In this securitization process, conventional measures are deemed insufficient to enforce
Indonesian sovereignty at the sea border. Nationalist groups want to see concrete steps. For example, the Minister of Politics and Security, Luhut B. Panjaitan, said that Indonesia will protect their sovereignty in Natuna islands and its surrounding sea by any means. He also said the sinking of the vessels was carried out against foreign ships entering Indonesian territory. This action should be done because previous ways such as dialogue, arrests and trials against those who committed this territorial violation are ineffective. President Jokowi himself says this is a shock therapy act. Director General supervision on marine sources and fishery, Ministry of Marine and Fishery, Syahrin Abdulrohman, said that the activities of foreign ships that steal the wealth of Indonesia's sea not only brought economic losses, but also ecological and social fatalities. While being quoted losses of about hundreds trillion rupiah per year, the illegal fishing also significantly decreased stock of fish in which it made many fishermen lose their jobs and a lot of domestic fishery industries stopped their production. Minister of Marine Affairs Susi continues to issue a statement to carry out the bombing of the ships. President Jokowi on November 18, 2014 said that the government will sink 10-20 ships and later those who violate it will think and believe. The policy attracted international attention and received support internationally. The reputable international NGOs, such as the Greenpeace, even demanded the government to fulfil that promise. The intensive campaign was finally held from 5 December 2014 signalled by the execution of three Vietnamese ship which were detonated with a bomb. The amount, as mentioned above, is not important anymore, the important thing is that governments take quick action, which conveyed a message that any illegal fishing would face harsh response.

This action received mix-reaction. Negative response came from Vietnam which launched a protest against the execution of their fishermen’s ships, while China asked for clarification to Indonesia about the execution relation to Chinese ships that had been captured. Facing these protests, Jokowi continued to firmly defence his policy by insisting that ‘the sinking [policy] of the illegal fishing ships is criminal not neighbouring issue’. By describing it as the action against thief’s fish, he seemed wanted to attract positive response from the community. Interestingly, support came from the former Minister of fishery of the SBY cabinet, Freddy Numbery, who praised Jokowi's actions as so supposed indeed. He once suggested similar action but President SBY objected because it would disrupt relations with neighbours. This wide greeting and support provides legitimacy for subsequent sinking actions. As reported, the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries has drowned as many as 236 ships of 781 arrested, from 2014 until the end of 2016. Throughout 2016 alone there are 236 foreign vessels drowned. The number even increased at the following year. At the Our Ocean Conference held in Malta on 5 July 2017, Minister of Marine and Fishery, Susi Pudjiastuti, testified that from July 2014 to July 2017, 317 foreign fish-theft ships had been executed to sink, in which most of them came from the neighbouring countries, such as Vietnam (142) followed by Philippine (70) and Malaysia (58). At many occasions, President Jokowi also often reveals the losses incurred by the theft. He said that the amount of loss due to theft is for example mentioned reached US$ 20 billion annually. It was also reported that fishermen were often harmed by the presence of foreign ships stealing fish with sophisticated tools, such as trawlers, fish thefts were also often displayed visually where hundreds of thousands of fish were caught by ships with sophisticated equipment at Indonesian waters. The ships' experience would also have a deterrent effect on foreign ships. But, more importantly, the result of the policy has claimed to be concrete, particularly for domestic fishermen. Minister Susi Pujiajastuti vividly said that since the assertive policy came in effect there had been many changes in marine and fishery industries, ranging from fisherman’s value-exchange to the increasing amount of fish stock in the sea and export. Statistics seemed to confirm the positive changes. Over three years of Jokowi’s administration she claimed that from the end of 2014 up to March 2017 she had drowned 663 fish theft ships, and the impact of the policy was significant. The fish stock increased from 6,52 million ton in 2011 to 12,54 million ton in 2016, fish exports also boosted from US$ 3,94 billion to US$ 4,17 billion.

The securitization of the threat of fish theft is getting stronger because it is associated with the issue of sovereignty. This action received stronger approval in the community when Jokowi visited the Natuna marine area after a clash between Indonesian vessels and Chinese vessels that were deemed to violate the territory of Indonesian sovereignty at the end of June 2016. To react against this, only less than a week after the incidence President Jokowi reacted by chairing a cabinet meeting on a warship in the waters off Natuna Islands to show that Indonesia is not playing games in guarding its borders. He cogently said ‘I want the Indonesian Defence Force and the Sea Security Agency to improve security (in Natuna sea),
including with the use of radar technology’, while Coordinating minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Luhut B. Panjaitan, who accompanied the President added a warning ‘We don’t anyone disturbing stability in the region’. The cohesion, according to Jokowi, is fruitful. Since Jokowi ordered to sink a fishing thief ship, the Satuan Tugas (taskforce) 115 has drowned as many as 176 ships across the Indonesian waters. This figure, according to Jokowi, is very big compared to other countries. Because of the cohesiveness, the number of foreign ships that fish thieves ‘paced’ in the waters of Indonesia was much less than before. "We must dare to fight the theft of our marine resources," said President Jokowi in the State of the Republic of Indonesia President's Speech in Joint Meeting of Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD - Senate Assembly) and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR-House of Representatives) in Jakarta, Wednesday (16/08/2017). According to President Jokowi, various parties should not hesitate to maintain sovereignty, safeguard the sea, maintain borders, and safeguard the natural resources owned by Indonesia. On that occasion, President Jokowi also reminded that the government must dare to drown the illegal fishing boats to protect the domestic fishermen.

The action to catch a Chinese fishing boat that had caused the clash was well supported by both friends and opponents Jokowi. Members of the Houses who vocal anti Jokowi appreciate Jokowi's actions. Jokowi's actions received tremendous sympathy not only from supporters but also from a figure who always criticized him. So, the symbolic action and speech act done thus ensures that Jokowi has done a legitimate and correct action according to the interests of the people of Indonesia.

A series of massive campaigns and actions Jokowi this makes the policy to sink the ship becomes not only possible and even should be done. Not only the Minister of Marine and Fishery, Susi Pujastuti, who enthusiastically took action firmly, but the minister of the Yudhoyono era who supports even claim that the policy is also the policy of SBY. The policy of drowning became one of the most popular traits among the people. The fact that at the time of SBY there was such a policy but was not done indicated that at that time there was no mutually strong agreement to implement the policy. Thus, after going through the securitization process initiated by the Jokowi government, and supported by the media and academics, the issue is seen as an urgent problem that must be resolved firmly.

With this securitization process the ship's sinking policy becomes part of the Jokowi populist government's actions. It strengthens the legitimacy and popularity of his government. However, this policy is not long lasting. There have been protest among neighbouring countries to this policy. After taking place for over three years there is considerable effort among governments to resolve the issue of border area violations to be resumed in the conventional manner. In other words, there is a process of de-securitization of the policy. Although the President still supports the sinking policy, the Coordinating Minister for the Economy and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, for example, wants the ship's sinking policy to be terminated due to counter-productive results such as relations with neighbouring countries.

Since the beginning of 2018, there has been a process of de-securitization of the ship's sinking policy. De-securitization is an attempt to bring back the issue of urgency to the realm of political and legal settlement. Coordinating Minister for the Economy Luhut supported by the Vice President requested the sinking to be terminated immediately and the settlement of violation issues was done within the framework of the legal process. The government began to lay the issue not in the context of urgency but in the context of law enforcement. According to Jokowi "So, the drowning is a form of law enforcement that we show that we are not kidding against illegal fishing, against the theft of fish, not playing games," said President Jokowi. "Because of the most drowning of the most intimidating thing, for the deterrent effect," he added.

In the context of populism, this policy has gained the goal it wants to achieve where the people consider this government has the courage and firmness in defending the sovereignty of Indonesia and also maintain the Indonesian sea richness. But this policy does not seem as simple as imagined. Resolving maritime issues requires the cooperation of many parties. The government is now even pushing the need for sea management cooperation through investment. During his visit to Beijing attending the 2014 annual APEC summit, as his first stop in visiting several countries, Jokowi met with several world leaders, what Rizal Sukma described as ‘the trip will showcase Jokowi’s maritime axis to the world’. And, Andi Wijajanto, the Cabinet Secretary insisted that when met with President of China, Xi Jin Ping, 'President Jokowi will try to incorporate our [nation] idea of the world maritime axis with China’s 21st century [maritime] Silk Road concept’. Interestingly, though he was actively promoted Indonesia Global maritime Fulcrum, in his speech in the 2014 East Asia Summit Jokowi introduced the five pillars of
Indonesia’s maritime policy formulated during the SBY presidency. In other words, the policy is ultimately back on the original settlement process as in SBY period, but Jokowi was nicely able to give narrative on it for his own favour and benefits.

The world maritime axis is basically a strategic idea that affirms oceanic as the nation's main focus. To make it happen, that is by setting a development agenda that focuses on the five main pillars. These five pillars include the rebuilding of Indonesia’s maritime culture, safeguarding marine resources and creating sovereignty of sea food, giving priority to infrastructure development and maritime connectivity, such as sea tolls, deep seaport, and logistics.

However, the limitation of financial ability causes the government to find alternative funding. As such, one main aspect of the maritime axis is to make effort to have international cooperation to build the ideal of the axis. Its realization thus requires a large fund so that Indonesia thinks about how to overcome them. Jokowi must have liked what he heard today, as the joint statement with Xi noted that "the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, proposed by President Xi Jinping, and the Strategy of the Global Maritime Fulcrum initiated by President Joko Widodo are complementary." Indonesia, China Seal 'Maritime Partnership' During President Jokowi’s visit to China, he and Xi Jinping pledged increased maritime cooperation. The statement also said that the two countries would develop a "maritime partnership. One of these is to associate this with Chinese silk roads. There is an effort to exploit this opportunity. Indonesia is touched what opportunities can be entered in the modern inter-country silk route, known as the One Belt One Road (OBOR). Therefore, President Joko Widodo will be present in Beijing, China in order to meet with countries that participate in the new trade pattern initiated by China. "We want to know the direction of where this OBOR is, so we come to see what the big concept of OBOR is like," said Jokowi at Halim Perdanakusuma airport, shortly before flying to Beijing on Saturday (13/05/2017). "Later after we see the big concept, then we will be able to enter from which side," he continued. Jokowi mentions, there are 50 countries who attended the meeting that was held on 14 to 15 May 2017. However, there were only 29 heads of state participating. The Head of Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM-Investment Coordinating Board), Thomas Lembong, added that the potential investment that can be expected from the OBOR summit is quite large. Understandably, Indonesia is currently only getting an investment of about US $ 5 billion from the OBOR program. In fact, Pakistan has currently received investment of US $ 55 billion from OBOR program, while Malaysia has been ranked in an investment of about US $ 30 billion from this new silk line program; "so Indonesia is still far behind," he said.

Yet, Indonesia seems to be critical on the OBOR concept. Arief Havas Oegroseno, the Deputy of Maritime Sovereignty, Ministry of Marine and Fishery, insisted that ‘we are not very stupid, there should not be ‘One Belt One Road [OBOR], there must be many roads’. One main possible reason for this is related to independency. In terms of financing the maritime infrastructures Indonesia does not want to be dependent on China alone, concept seems not to only have an economic dimension but also geostrategic aspects namely political and military aspects. Hence, in getting of investments for construction of maritime infrastructures, Jokowi’s administration thus not merely reliant on the China, but also made bilateral cooperation with several countries. Some of them are cooperation with USA for civil products and shipyard development, with the Dutch focused on port and surrounding economic zones, hinterland management was done together with Germany and with South Korea focused on marine defence. All the projects are closely related to sea toll project in a sense that overcoming development gaps and prices are of major concern. With the sea toll it is expected that the sea connections will be faster. The goods will also come sooner so that the border areas no longer need to buy goods from other countries that are geographically closer to them.

Maritime state becomes an important obsession of Jokowi’s government and the people give great hope that this will be realized. Therefore, those above measures are the important effort to overcome difficulties in realizing the concept of the maritime world. The link with OBOR China and IORA shows that optimism and hope are still there. The most important thing is that the government needs to show that Indonesia is still in the right path in realizing the doctrine of the maritime world. Leadership that became inheritance of Indonesia in the Indian Ocean cannot be separated from the idea of a maritime axis of the world which brought by President Jokowi. Indonesia Foreign Minister, Retno LP Marsudi, said that: ‘IORA is the embodiment of Indonesian maritime diplomacy to support the vision of Indonesian maritime axis’.

In the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) summit held on March 2017 at Jakarta, President Jokowi in his speech insisted that the world’s trade
traffic through the oceans in the south of Indonesia. "Half the container travels through the Indian Ocean, two-thirds of the shipment of energy tankers is also through the Indian Ocean and 2.7 billion people live in the IORA region ... Therefore the Indian Ocean is the ocean of the future and the future of the world economy exists in this region," he said. The condition of the Indian Ocean is strategic, according to Jokowi, in line with the ideals of the government who want to make Indonesia as the maritime axis of the world. Jokowi wants the program to be in line with the condition of the Indian Ocean. "Indonesia wants to strengthen the maritime axis to be linked with IORA', said Jokowi who was then greeted applause from invited guests.

So, it can be said that the IORA Summit is in line with the idea of a maritime axis desired by President Joko Widodo. Maritime axis manifested through inter-island connectivity, shipping and fisheries industry development, improvement of marine transportation and maritime security. This is the strategic idea of Jokowi’s government that is in line with the condition of this country as an archipelagic country.

One way that has been done to realize the maritime axis is the development of sea toll which is the vision of Jokowi government's especially concerning with the development of maritime infrastructures. Through the development of integrated and connected marine infrastructure, efficiency will be achieved, especially faster travel time and lower cost. Through IORA, inter-state connectivity becomes more realizable to open trade, fisheries, and industry cooperation. Indonesia officially holds the position of IORA Chairman for the period 2015 - 2017 with South Africa as Vice Chairman at the 15th Ministerial Meeting (PTM) in Padang, and, fascinatingly, Indonesia is so far the only IORA chairman which determines itself the theme of the meeting, namely ‘Strengthening Maritime Cooperation in a Peaceful and Stable Indian Ocean’. The theme showed, or at least symbolically indicated, that Indonesia was serious to implement its maritime vision, including in the newly IORA geographical architecture.

5 RELATIONS WITH ASEAN

Over the last four decades ASEAN used to be important for Indonesia. Since its inception in 1967 the regional organization had become the focus and the main priority of Indonesia’s foreign policy. It was the former Foreign Minister Adam Malik himself, also one of the founding fathers of ASEAN, who said that ASEAN is the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. During the period, Indonesia, as the largest member in terms of the population and geographical area, had traditionally played a leading role in the ASEAN development. One prominent contribution, among others, was its intellectual leadership in establishing the pillar of ASEAN Political and Security Community in 2005. The acknowledgment of Indonesia leadership in ASEAN was nicely described by the former ASEAN Secretary General, Rudolfo C. Severino, who said ‘Indonesia, in its wisdom, allowed itself to wield its already considerable weight in the world in the context of ASEAN’.

Notwithstanding with the privilege status, some Indonesian experts and foreign policy elites were dissatisfied, or at least sceptical, with the benefit got by Indonesia of being ASEAN member. Since 1980s, indeed, there has been a view that ASEAN basically is ‘a golden cage’ for Indonesia arguing that ASEAN was too small for Indonesia’s international play ground and it might be functioned to control Indonesia as the biggest country in the region. This was aggravated by the fact that ASEAN was hardly united and its cohesion was empirically weak in which it make Indonesia serious efforts in establishing cooperation often received somewhat unsatisfactory responses from other members such as lately with the clash of Cambodia with Thailand and ASEAN’s split in the face of conflict in the South China Sea. Adjacent to the reality, Djauhari Oratmangun, Director-General of ASEAN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: ‘Our involvement in ASEAN is not optional. We want to establish relations with both ASEAN and other countries. It is important for us to make sure that we establish good relations with our own neighbours before we embark on new co-operations [sic] with countries beyond the region.’

But, Rizal Sukma, a foreign policy expert, even showed his impatient and critical expression by vividly insisted that: ‘If other ASEAN countries do not share Indonesia’s passion for and commitment to ASEAN, then it is indeed time for us to start another round of debate on the merits of a post-ASEAN foreign policy. We have many other important foreign policy agendas to attend to other than just whining and agonizing over ASEAN’s failures.’

Such above disappointed expressions seemed to have indicated that there had been hope that Indonesia should be more assertive in its relation with ASEAN,
in a sense that Indonesia should get more benefits from the regional body otherwise it would search other prioritized foreign policy.

However, there is an alternative view against the above opinion. Until quite recently ASEAN had been still very mosaic in character coupled with lack of cohesion and divergent views often emerged among its members accordingly. It would be hard and unrealistic, therefore, to hope that ASEAN would be unified in the near future because diplomacy is merely an end, but also a process. Moreover, distrust and suspicion among the existing members are also still embedded in this organization. When being interviewed by Elisia Yeo in 2003, the former Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, frankly said ‘When we talk about the perception of threat, [if] you ask Singapore what it thinks of [as a] threat … it’s immediate neighbours. … [until now, within ASEAN] there are more elements of competition rather than cohesion’. Given the fact, such a kind of condition arguably gave Indonesia a chance to creatively make its own distinct approach in diplomacy. The former Foreign Minister under the SBY’s cabinet, Marty Natalegawa, said that the fragmented ASEAN had enabled Indonesia to make a nuanced diplomacy. In an interview he said as follows:

As being the largest country in this region, Indonesia is still the determining factor in the region. But, different from other region with the same condition, the biggest country was unfavoured due to it often put in force its own desire. Indonesia has become a unifier and balancer … The Indonesia’s position and behaviour is rare … it is very rare a big country can be influential due to its diplomatic strength and ability. If we want, we can enforce our own desire. But, by managing its self-restraint Indonesia can instead show its [diplomatic] quality and even be able to umbrella the world. In the context of ASEAN, we had become the unifying factor. In a wider context, Indonesia wants to play a role as the determining factor of dynamic equilibrium as a concept which is now we are trying to develop … [thus] as a metaphor, Indonesia is just like a conductor of an orchestra.

Nevertheless, the view to put Indonesian interest first above other interests is most clearly stated in relation to the regional body. Rizal Sukma, one of the prominent Jokowi’s advisors, for example, said ASEAN is only one among many cornerstones of Indonesian foreign policy. This has spawned numerous controversies and concern from neighbouring countries. One of the concerns related to the worry that Indonesia will leave ASEAN. This view has become a widespread spotlight in ASEAN and shows that Indonesia will limit too many meetings but seen not give concrete results for Indonesia. Previously Sukma said that “Indonesia should free itself from any under serving obligation to follow the wishes of any state or a grouping of states, including ASEAN, if by doing so we sacrifice our own national interests” and that it “no longer hesitant about taking a different track from other ASEAN member countries.” Gone are the days of the naïve “millions friends zero enemies” foreign policy.

Interestingly, however, Jokowi was in line with the above idea favouring different approach on ASEAN. Indonesia’s relationship with ASEAN is one of the important issues which has been highlighted during the Jokowi’s presidency. In the context of populism, Jokowi does not use open rhetoric like Donald Trump's populism. Different from Trump who decisively declared no interest in the international environmental regime, and cancelled the previously ratified Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, Jokowi instead just said that he would not do anything that the benefits are not clear to the people. On various occasions, Jokowi in fact mentioned that the interest of the people is always considered more important than other interests; or, borrowing Trump’s slogan, can also be called ‘Indonesia First’. In terms of economy, for example, Jokowi sent a warning to other ASEAN countries that Indonesia will secure its national interest first instead of its prestige in ASEAN by saying that “Indonesia will not allow itself to become merely a market,” which in some cases is viewed as referring to the fact that Singapore and Malaysia banks are free to operate in Indonesia but not vice versa; and Indonesia is also seen as no longer need to be a big brother in ASEAN.

However, despite some preliminary statements that ASEAN is no longer the main focus of Indonesian policing, over time, cooperation within ASEAN is normal and routine, President Jokowi always attending the ASEAN Summit and ASEAN Summit with partner countries such as India and Australia. On the other hand bilateral or trilateral sub-regional cooperation with ASEAN countries is also given attention. However, in many ways Indonesia may be more critical of ASEAN for example by requesting ASEAN to resolve differences especially in the face of China.

Another example that shows that Jokowi’s government is still concerned about ASEAN is Jokowi's statement that approves the view that Australia can become an ASEAN member that will make ASEAN more dynamic. The offer is certainly only a unilateral statement from Indonesia that has not been discussed with other members and the
possibility to agree on this proposal is very difficult in ASEAN. However, the proposal shows that it is important for ASEAN to make breakthroughs. The proposal itself creates a negative and positive reaction. The expansion of ASEAN is unlikely to include Australia that is geographically and culturally different from that of Southeast Asia. But for Australia, this is seen to be quite positive as it is a sign that ASEAN considers Australia to be part of Asia, an issue that has continued to be controversial throughout Australia. Jokowi’s statement shows that ASEAN is no longer like the era of Suharto.

In the context of ASEAN, Indonesia thus still regards it as an important pillar of foreign policy, but Indonesia is more critical to this organization. But as Poole mentioned Indonesia now considered the benefits its engagement with ASEAN or, in other words, Indonesia is critical about what Indonesia is getting from this organization instead of following the common international liberal assumption that regional cooperation will benefit a country.

6 POPULISM AND SOME OTHER JOKOWI’S POLICIES

Jokowi’s approach in some Indonesian foreign policy cases also has some populist elements in it. The policy is not necessarily different from the previous government but what Jokowi wants to emphasize is that the solution is more precisely oriented and more prominent. Some of these cases indicate a desire to solve Indonesian foreign policy problems directly and quickly. Successes in handling aborted labour migrants, tackling victims of hostage taking by Abu Sayyaf groups, adjusting ties with Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), increasing ties with the Palestinians, settling the role of mediators in Afghanistan and OPM settlements are some of the cases to be addressed in the context of this populism. The handling of this issue has been done in the previous government but there is an effort to show more concrete actions put forward in Jokowi Indonesian foreign policy.

6.1 Role in Bali Democracy Forum (BDF)

The notion of what Indonesia obtains in regional cooperation also applies to explain Indonesia’s diminishing role in the BDF. This forum basically was another manifestation of Indonesia’s intellectual leadership in international diplomacy. The purpose was to hold a dialogue forum which in turn can strengthen regional or international cooperation in particular related to encourage democratization. Rizal Sukma described it as Indonesia’s response to the lack of a regional mechanism in encouraging democracy in Asia. In other words, the BDF was Indonesia’s initiative to promote democracy to be part of strategic regional discourse.

As Hasan Wirajuda, the former Foreign Minister under the SBY’s cabinet, said, the idea of the Forum originated from his contemplation of Indonesia’s experience during the 1998 monetary crisis. Among the Asian countries hit by the crisis, it was Indonesia which suffered most, and Indonesia experienced a slow recovery compared to its Asia counterparts. For him, this worse condition was the serious impact of the previous development which heavily focused on economy and ignored the social and political development, particularly related to democracy, human rights, and conflict resolution. In other words, any implemented imbalanced development would threaten the survival of the regime at any time, in which this, direct or indirectly, would have serious impacts on the region. He then considered this issue was then urgent to discuss against the background that, referring to Freedom House statistics, of 56 Asia-Pacific countries, only 28 % were free, while 32% were partly free, and the rest 40% not free.

Perhaps considering that the issue is crucial and strategic for regional and international stakeholders to discuss, President SBY then took an initiative to develop and make it happen by establishing a forum to share experiences. In the first BDF meeting held at 10 December 2008, it was agreed to place promotion of democracy as a strategic agenda in Asia-Pacific region. In terms of participants the forum is inclusive for any highest state leaders, not limited to democratic countries but also those who came from non-democratic countries who were ‘interested to learn about democracy’, such as China and Myanmar, and attracted many other countries. Some critics saw this forum to be sceptical and would ineffective in its mission because of its informality with no legal binding agreement. In arguing against the view, SBY said the BDF is merely ‘an avenue to freely share experience and exchange minds’. By this, while the BDF was seen strategic in its mission, it seemed to be also a forum to raise Indonesia’s international prestige, given the fact that Indonesia is the third largest democracy as well as the largest democratic moslem country in the world.

Under Jokowi’s presidency, the BDF continued to be held but it seemed to be done half-heartedly. The
BDF has been downgraded to be a ministerial meeting to discuss issues of peace and democratization. In the current developed discourse, the decline in the status of BDF is considered a reasonable one and so far the co-operation has been viewed only for prestige and gives no actual result for Indonesia. Hasan Wirajuda regretted this development by saying that ‘the Forum is a soft-power project in which its return is intangible and cannot be measured’, but he was convinced that slowly Jokowi would also need to play a diplomacy that shows Indonesian prestige.

6.2 Relations with Palestine

More intense engagement is also addressed in the settlement of the Palestinian issue. Jokowi's government promised the opening of the Indonesian embassy in Ramallah Palestine which he had discussed in his Presidential campaigns. Palestine is indeed one of the most sensitive issues and has drawn the attention and concern of the Indonesian people for a long time. The House also shows Indonesia's commitment to support Palestine by making various visits to Palestine. Given this fact, therefore, any action taken by government to support Palestine issues and to blame Israel will get strong support in domestic politics.

After his inauguration, Jokowi attempted to fulfil his promise to give strong support to Palestine issues. He said that "As part of the international community, Israel must immediately stop its illegal activities and policies in the occupied territories and Indonesia and the Islamic world are ready to take concrete steps to press for Israel to end its occupation of Palestine and stop the arbitrariness in Al Quds Al Sharif," urged President Joko Widodo.

Jokowi pushed the effort to open the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Palestine. The plan to open the embassy has long been there since the era of SBY and after the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) made a joint decision for its member countries to open a representative office in Ramallah in March 2012. But because of the difficulty to realize, the move was delayed. President Jokowi finally made breakthrough by realizing that commitment although finally Indonesia only succeeded in opening the honorary consul of RI in Ramallah on March 15, 2016, as the most likely done by Indonesia in supporting the struggle for Palestinian independence.

6.3 Protection of Indonesian Citizens Overseas

Protection of citizens abroad is one of the main foreign policy priorities formulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Citizen protection is the concern of every government. In this context, the distinction between Jokowi's Indonesian foreign policy and the previous government is the attempt to show that the government is more serious to handle this issue. This issue has a direct impact on Indonesians staying abroad and therefore it is in the interest of the populist regime to declare to its audiences that they can solve this problem well. In late 2015, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs completed the evacuation of 2,393 Indonesian citizens from the civil war in Yemen, which the Ministry claims as 'the biggest, most complex and quickest' evacuation Indonesian government had ever done in history.

Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Retno, the government tries to solve the security problems of the Indonesian citizens quickly and straightforwardly. The protection of Indonesians trapped in the Syrian conflict is one example. The Government of Indonesia opened a 24-hour hotlines, the Foreign Minister continued to update developments and ensure all 17 Indonesian citizens survived and can be evacuated from ISIS stronghold in Raqqa of Syria. In the release of hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines, the Jokowi government also made various diplomatic channels to free them. The effort of liberation was gained broad media coverage and details including diplomatic steps both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by the network owned by Indonesia. The seriousness of the government is also demonstrated by the continuing statement that Indonesia is ready to send military forces to free the hostages at any time if necessary. Then the readiness was followed by conditions when the Philippine government allowed it. The deployment of Indonesian troops was in fact a complicated and almost impossible thing to do. But this is not an important thing in the perception of the age because that is an important part is the government has made a very heroic effort in an effort to free the hostages. In the end the hostages were released and President Jokowi made a speech which among other things said: "Through thorough diplomacy from various channels, we managed to free 14 Indonesians held hostage by armed groups in the Southern Philippines," said Jokowi at the Parliament Complex on Tuesday (16 / 8/2016). Through diplomacy also, continued Jokowi, two Indonesian citizens who were held hostage in Papua
New Guinea successfully released. By the end of July 2016, 7,555 cases of Indonesian Citizens abroad were completed, most of which were Indonesian migrant workers. "At the same time, not less than 23,651 migrant workers facilitated repatriation in various ways", said Jokowi.

6.4 The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) Completion

Jokowi's government also gave greater attention to solving the province of Papua problem. In addition to improving infrastructure development such as roads, the government is also taking steps to stem the influence of United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). Although militarily weak and believed to lack sufficient support, the ULMWP continues to expand its influence in the South Pacific nations that share tribal similarities with them. The Papua Movement for example now has representative offices in Vanuatu, Solomon, and Wamena in Jayawijaya, Papua. Diplomatically, Indonesia actually still has more influence. ULMWP did manage to become an observer at MSG, but Indonesia also managed to improve its status in MSG to become an associate member. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a more systematic strategy by representing that in addition to the Malay race, Indonesia was also a Melanesian race. Indonesia plays a role as a link for Melanesia with Asia.

However, Jokowi's government wants to show that they have more commitment to solve this Papua problem. Indonesia for example takes direct actions to maintain support from Fiji, the influential state in South Pacific. Indonesia, for example, brought aid to Fiji during a visit led by Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security at the time Luhut B. Panjaitan. This strengthens the efforts of the Foreign Ministry which has made a long diplomatic effort in resolving this problem for example through MSG. Luhut says, Indonesia’s relationship with the countries in the South Pacific is not too good in the past. "In the future, we will make better, now we rarely visit there, how to get better". This former Chief of Staff of the Presidency also acknowledged Indonesia's desire to forge better relations with the South Pacific countries on the back of a growing awareness that the region is affecting Papua.

The above step also got supports from a member of parliament. "I consider this a step forward for the seriousness of the Indonesian government in maintaining good relations with countries in the South Pacific region," Tantowi told CNN Indonesia on Tuesday (29/3). What's more, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, he said, are the two countries that have been most friendly to Indonesia. "The visit is also linked to the long-delayed provision of relief aid to the Government of Fiji," he said. Furthermore, Tantowi believed that in the future the government will send representatives to several countries in the South Pacific which has been considered less friendly with Indonesia.

On other side, Indonesia received a good response. Fiji's foreign minister, Kubuabola, said he would propose an upgrade of Indonesia's status on Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) from associate member to full member. This status will strengthen Indonesia's position in the group of Melanesian countries", said Luhut. Papua New Guinea's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Kimbink Pato, according to Luhut B. Panjaitan also supports the increasing membership of Indonesia to become a full member of MSG. This of course gave an advantage for Indonesia as the MSG countries previously claimed Spokesperson of Papua Liberation Movement, Benny Wenda, supports his organization. The racial similarity with the majority of Papuans, Melanesians, encouraged the Papua Liberation Movement to make the South Pacific and the MSG their campaign base. Since June 2015, Indonesia has been a member of the MSG Association, while the Papua Liberation Movement formed in December 2014 is an observer in the organization. Having this, Indonesia is now eyeing an increase in membership status in MSG to block the Papuan Liberation Movement.

6.5 Populism Mediator in Afghanistan Conflicts

Indonesia's role in conflict resolution in Afghanistan is interesting to look at from a populist perspective. Indonesia from the beginning was not involved in the settlement of conflicts involving various Islamic tribes and tribes in the country, but later Indonesia became involved in the peace process after Jokowi visited Afghanistan in late January 2018. The arrival of Jokowi not only indicated the willingness of Indonesia to be a mediator but an opportunity for Jokowi to show his concern for the fate of citizens and the Islamic State.

It is widely known that Jokowi is not from among the followers of Islam who are obedient but from the Islamic community mostly in Java. Many people even doubt his Islam. This Indonesian involvement not only gives new hope to the peace process but also gained appreciation from the Muslims who have been doubting its commitment to the Islamic world. The
leader of one of the PKS opposition parties, for example, thinks this is a remarkable thing since Indonesia’s last visit to this country against Afghanistan was in 1964 by President Soekarno.

The moment of the visit, therefore, was used by Jokowi to show the audience that Indonesia is also active in defending Muslims. On that occasion, Jokowi even became a prayer imam (leader) who symbolically showed that he was worthy to lead the Muslims. The steps of diplomacy and peace were then passed under the leadership of Vice President Jusuf Kalla.

7 CONCLUSION

Foreign policy always related to domestic politics. But how they relate and what domestic impacts on foreign politics often spark debate. This paper sees that relationship can be understood through the concept of populism. Populist regimes claim that the interests of the people are the main priorities above other interests. Although not as extreme as the Trump doctrine in the US with the term America First, Indonesian foreign policy during Jokowi also has populist elements in it.

In populism, the important question for foreign policy is what we get in the engagement of our country with other countries and it is not what contribution we can give. Populist foreign policy becomes controversial if consideration of the immediate benefits we can get, lead to negative reaction of the country affected by the policy. Several Jokowi’s foreign policies have caused considerable controversy. In some other respects, populism arises in some practical policies taken by the Jokowi’s government.

Jokowi’s policies, which are to be different from those of SBY, sometimes spark controversy. The policy of sinking of foreign ships which managed illegal fishing, for example, is essentially part of the effort enforcing Indonesia’s sovereignty over its maritime territory by accusing them as violating Indonesia’s border. This policy is very populist and has been applauded by both people and opposition though it has led to protests of several affected neighbouring countries. Indonesia’s stance towards ASEAN and the BDF has also caused controversy with the emergence of some concerns that Indonesia would leave ASEAN and not be active in the region. Dealing with ASEAN, Jokowi in fact does not abandon the regional body and still active to participate. But, different from his predecessor who actively use the leverage of Indonesia’s leadership of ASEAN to bolster Indonesia’s international prestige, Jokowi has a more assertive policy and even critical to the regional organization. In terms of the BDF, he also continued to held but by lowering it from state-leader summit down to the ministerial level of meeting. One possible reason for this is the Forum has no concrete and direct result for people. In other cases, the Jokowi government has shown a strong commitment to sensitive and populist foreign policy issues such as the establishment of the Consul General of the Republic of Indonesia in Palestine and as mediator in Afghanistan conflicts, the protection of the Indonesians shown in the effort to free hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf and the strengthening of Indonesia’s unity and sovereignty against Papua Movement’s efforts to widen its influence. Nevertheless, instead of being narrowly, or even blindly, inward-looking; Jokowi’s administration still continues to manage Indonesia to be active in international organizations, such as IORA, OBOR and G20, with the main mission to seek cooperation opportunities that can give actual support for domestic development, especially in maritime and infrastructure aspects.

Therefore, populism in the Jokowi context seems only a matter of how to deal with the problems of Indonesian foreign policy and at some point, in the course of Indonesian foreign policy, such an attitude might be needed to do. But, Indonesian foreign policy under Jokowi’s presidency also does not drastically redefine the national interests of Indonesia. It can be said to be an attempt to regulate Indonesian foreign policy priorities. However, we do not know for sure the impact of this great concern on Indonesia’s interest on Indonesia’s long-standing international role in the region over the long term. In other words, we argue, Jokowi does not necessarily seen as ignoring or even leaving the basic foundation of Indonesia’s foreign policy, namely free and active, by abandoning Indonesia’s regional and international commitments; but, he has just been insisting a new approach of Indonesia’s foreign policy, by moving away from the SBY’s ‘normative-ideal’ by introducing his own ‘practical-populist’ approach.

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