Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy: Assessing Indonesian Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono (2004-2014)

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Abstract: This article explores the discourse and practices of Indonesian foreign policy under President Yudhoyono (2004-2014) by using the lens of strategic culture. Based on Ole Waever’s idea of discursive structure, the constructivist’s constitutive logic between foreign policy and national identity, and by combining these with Neumann and Heikka’s idea on strategic culture as interplay between discourse and practices, this article seeks to comprehend the effort to reconstruct Indonesia identity that was articulated during Yudhoyono regime. Therefore, the conduct of foreign policy during Yudhoyono, especially the doctrine of navigating turbulent ocean, was used as a tool to further examine the actual discourse and practice of Indonesian strategic culture at the time. Using the Hansenian methods of poststructuralist discourse analysis, we gathered the speeches made by Yudhoyono and his foreign minister during the timeline of the research. We then charted the emerging patterns of Yudhoyono’s policies, compared the actual policies with the discursive rhetoric and narratives from the official sources, before finally assessed the appropriateness of the discursive patterns by looking at the initial and historical ideas (and practices) of Indonesian strategic culture. Based on our findings, we argue that the initial discursive structures of Indonesian strategic culture, formulated during the history of the nation (as argued by Sulaiman in 2016), limited the choices for foreign policies during Yudhoyono’s regime. This limitation forced Yudhoyono to cling into more inward-looking foreign policy rather than his initial aim for outward-looking options.

1 INTRODUCTION

This article is trying to re-examine the relationship between national identity and foreign policy, by focusing on one concept of national identity which is strategic culture. By focusing on strategic culture, this research will also contribute to the reconceptualization of strategic culture as part of national identity. Empirically, this project’s contribution will be a deeper understanding of the case study. To that end, this study took the case of Indonesia as the focus of the research.

Indonesia is important in the study of national identity and foreign policy. The position of Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, but has a democratic system of government, has triggered the assumptions regarding the identity of Indonesia in the form of moderate Muslim identity. However, in terms of strategic culture, Indonesian identity was discussed (Sulaiman 2016) as its tendency to reject any military alliance with other countries, to focus on the defensive aspects of military policy, and to restrict interference by foreign countries. The problem then, is it true that Indonesia’s strategic culture has causal effect on foreign policy, especially under Yudhoyono? There were few researches dedicated to unravelling the relationship between Indonesian national identity and Indonesian foreign policy. Most of the research was only looking at the “given” identity of Islam and causally tried to explain Indonesian foreign policy within the Islamic identity structure. This project tries to enhance this section of scholarship by re-examining the strategic culture/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia.

The dilemma of the relations between Indonesian identity and foreign policy has been understudied in recent years. The lack of books on this subject was apparent; the only book elaborates this issue was Rizal Sukma’s book, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy (2003). This lack of research or rather, the lack
of published research, was one of the weaknesses in Indonesian academic atmosphere. If Sebastian and Lanti’s research (2010) proved right, this research tries to elaborate one of their outspoken challenge, that is “...while social constructivist variables like identity...have great explanatory value...constructivist approaches need to explain deviant behaviour...” (Sebastian & Lanti, 2010, p.167). One of the challenges in answering Sebastian and Lanti’s research is to conduct research on identity/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia, while not just concentrating on the “Islamic” variables. This is one of the reason why this article focuses on the issue of strategic culture.

In summary, the contribution of this article lies in the ability to deepen the understanding of the relations between identity and foreign policy. On a theoretical level, this research enhances the position of post-structuralist approach in foreign policy analysis by elaborating the notion of causality. By combining the poststructuralist discourse analysis (Hansen 2006) and the inductive recovery of national identity (Hopf 2016), this research promises a modified approach in analysing foreign policy. On the empirical level, this project contributes a new body of scholarships in Indonesian studies, especially related to foreign policy and strategic culture. Policy-wise, this research also contributes to a better understanding of Indonesian history, its strategic tradition, and therefore enriches the decisionmakers options. By reading the findings and results of this research, policymakers will have a better comprehension on how to formulate Indonesian military and foreign policy, while adhering to the limitations and the traditions put by Indonesian strategic culture.

2 RESEARCH METHODS

This research follows Hopf (2016) in inductively uncovering the dominant (and the oppositional) discourses. Where this research diverges from Hopf (2016) is that after uncovering the dominant discourses, this research will examine the mechanism of the causal processes. In that sense, this research will investigate what kind of discourse(s) that exist, and then tries to relate it to the Indonesian policy towards its neighbouring countries (regarding the absence of military pacts while engaging intensively in ASEAN), towards the US (related to the idea of non-interference), and towards the military build-up (related to the defensive tendency of Indonesian military policy).

However, on the contrary to Hopf’s (2002) work which exclude the policy documents until the latter stages, this research focuses more on the foreign policy documents. Thereby, concerning the applicable methods, this proposal will use the methods offered by Hansen’s (2006) work on discourse analysis. Hansen (2006, p.67) explained that several issues had to be considered while formulating research design. Firstly, how many numbers of selves that would be analysed? In this case, only single number of “Self” might be considered here, which is the Indonesian “Self”. The second issue is which intertextual model that will be used in the research. Hansen (2006, p.57) proposed 3 (three) intertextual research model based on the intertextuality of official discourse, wider debate, cultural representations, and the marginal discourses. To analyse the Indonesian discourse on strategic culture, this research will try to elaborate the model 1 (official) and the model 2 (wider debate, especially in the academic and media). For the official discourse(s), this research will mainly focus on the foreign policy establishments. Meanwhile, comparing it with the media discourses would be useful in examining the potential of the changing or the strengthening of the discourse. This proposal uses shorter timeline, from 2004-2014. The shorter timeframe would allow this research to explore deeply the position of the Indonesia elites during Yudhoyono’s era, Indonesia academia, and the Indonesia media, in viewing the triviality of military pact in ASEAN (Sulaiman’s first point regarding strategic culture), the importance of the US’s presence in Southeast Asia (Sulaiman’s second point), and the priority of defence (Sulaiman’s third point). The Yudhoyono’s first period (2004-2009) is the timeframe when discursive construction of Indonesian “Self” has taken place. The second period (2009-2014) is the timeframe when the concrete policy changes might affect the (re)construction of identity.

The official discourses could be analysed by looking at the official documents, in-depth interview with the decision-makers, and by analysing the speeches and the spontaneous live interviews (Hudson, 2014). The 2nd model consist of the wider foreign policy debate will be analysed by analysing the foreign policy debates in the parliament, the debate held in the media, and the editorial reports of the main media in Indonesia.

The Indonesian case was chosen because of some considerations. Firstly, the understudied body of scholarship on Indonesian identity/foreign policy nexus was the most important considerations.
Secondly, as a country with many possible identity discourses (ethnic, race, religion, political, and many more), Indonesia was being side-lined in the context of the study of foreign policy. Many researches have followed the logic of fault line (Huntington, 1996), and to analyse Indonesia would mean broadening the case study.

As part of the methods used in this research, this research chooses 2 (two) focal points in this study. The first was the conflicting external relations, which will give the insight into how Indonesia perceived itself and how the “Indonesia” was articulated regarding the external “Others”. As Sulaiman (2016) argued, the “Others” in this case would be a hegemonic foreign actor such as the US or China. Whether a territorial dispute or cultural dispute, this first focus would serve as the focus to explore the identity/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia. The second focus was proposed to elaborate the internal discourses (how many articulation of Indonesia) which was problematic enough to be considered in foreign policy context. Regarding the timeframe of this research, this research follows what Hansen (2006) did in her research, by using shorter timeframe. To understand the dynamics of identity/foreign policy nexus in Indonesia, this research argues that shorter timeframe during the first and second term of the then president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will be more contributive. The shorter timeframe would allow this research to focus on the position of the elites and society in the identity/foreign policy nexus.

3 RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS

3.1 Strategic Culture as a Discursive Structure

Concerning the study of strategic culture, there are three generations of scholars. This article follows the logic of the third-generation scholars, who tried to overcome the pitfalls of the first-generation which contained definitional problem that considers the sources of strategic culture as coming from nearly all aspects and the second-generation independent-dependent variable problem by narrowing the conceptualization of strategic culture as independent variable and some strategic decisions as dependent variable (Johnston 1995, pp. 41). This reconceptualization is realized in the work of Kier (1995, pp. 67) by narrowing the sources of strategic culture only from the aspects of domestic politics and military organizational culture in explaining the choice of French policymakers in choosing the preferable military doctrine (offensive or defensive. She asserts that a cultural analysis is fit because it provides a bridge between the culturalist tendency and over-rational mode of analysis and that can be done through analysing only the aspects that is crucial to the objects of analysis (Kier 1995). For example, if Kier’s objective is to explain the French military alternating use between offensive and defensive military doctrine, then one of the tools to analyse it is by tracing the dynamics of French domestic politics and military organizational culture that will determine the formation of principles and guidance during a circumstance whether it is preferable to use an offensive or defensive military doctrine.

The third-generation exhibits some strengths over the previous generations, (1) it avoids determinism in the first-generation, because it leaves behaviour out of the independent variable (Johnston 1995, p. 42) and (2) this generation is committed to competitive theory testing by pitting alternative explanations against each other. For example, Legro (1996) tests a realist model against institutionalism and organizational-culture explanations of restraint in war and Kier (1995) pits structural realism, bureaucratic organizational models and military culture against each other (Johnston 1995, pp. 43).

Regarding the works on Indonesian strategic culture, there was only few authors and most of them did not use the third-generation conceptual understanding and style of analysis, as shown in the work of McElhatton (2008) that analysed the Indonesian strategic psyche by asserting that the modes of guerrilla war in Indonesia that was pioneered by Nasution, is embedded in the Indonesian political and military apparatus and taken the role as an instrumental tools for the government to use anti-guerrilla posture to deflect potential evils and dangers from the internal, such as rebellion and even political opponents and to use the guerrilla posture to fend of external threats. The characteristic of McElhatton (2008) work is similar with the descriptive focus in the first-generation and the use of strategic culture as a toll for the government to create legitimacy in the second-generation.

This project combines the logic of the third generation and the work of Hansen (2006) and Campbell (1990) which engages the puzzle of identity/foreign policy nexus by using the methods of discourse analysis and the logic of post-structuralist approach and tries to apply the modified framework and methods under the different case study and within a longer timeline.
This research tries to use poststructuralist approach developed by Campbell (1990), Hansen (2006), and Waever (2002). Poststructuralist argues that identity is relational, related to the “significant Other” (Neumann 1996; Hansen 2006). This idea of relational identity means that identity could only matter in a process of differentiation and linking to others (Waever 2002). As Campbell (1990, p.266) argued, identities are relational, that Self and Other could not exist “prior to a relationship with each other”. In this research, Indonesia identity and strategic culture is evaluated in relation with outside power as the “Others”.

Secondly, poststructuralism understood identity not as a more important concept than material factors. Hansen (2006, p.19) elucidated that poststructuralist understands that ideational and material factors could not have any meaning without each other. In this sense, contrary to constructivism that put ideational factors as the more important factors, poststructuralism argued that both ideas and material factors are important part of the analysis, which they considered as discourse. Instead of differentiating the ideational factors behind material consideration, this research follows Hansen’s (2006, p.20) argument that poststructuralist analytical intent is to “understand both ideas and materials as constructed through discourse which gives materiality the meaning by drawing upon set of identity constructions”. By doing so, this research tries to understand Indonesian strategic culture and its military policies through the historical discourse of Indonesianness.

To further elaborate the poststructuralist theoretical arguments, we use the explanations by Waever (2002) and Hansen (2006). Waever (2002, p.34) argued that poststructuralism, which usually tends to analyse “how foreign policy serves to reproduce a certain identity”, could be used as a theory of foreign policy, explaining state’s options and actions. He (2002, p.21) emphasised the needs of using poststructuralist argument because of the inability of neorealist, neoliberal, and even conventional constructivist, to explain the relations between identity and foreign policy. According to Waever (2002), neorealist neglect the concept of identity altogether (due to the ontological assumption of a coherent state/national identity), neoliberal missed the possibility of ideas and norms as important factors in changing state identity, while conventional constructivist such as Wendt focused too much on the systemic level on international relations. Waever (2002, p.22) even suggested that constructivism failed to address the possibility of change in their analysis, arguing that constructivism is a “very strong theory of non-change”.

To address all those problems, Waever (2002, p.22) then argued about discourse analysis as a theory which respects “the self-producing meaning systems of different actors” and at the same time escapes the ideational-material divide of constructivism. Waever (2002, p.27) also postulated that policy “must hold a definite relationship to discursive structure, because it is always necessary for the policy makers…to argue where to takes us”. The main theoretical argument is that structure put a sufficient pressure so that the policies stay within a certain, limited margin (Waever 2002, p.28). In another word, the discursive structure put some limitations to what the policies could do. On the other hand, these structures are socially constructed and reconstructed through the social process, which refers to Onuf’s (1998) argument that “rules create agents, agents create rules”. Bringing this principle into the context of foreign policy, it resembles what Campbell had said before, that the structure (consist of the process of “othering”) informed the possible policy choices. The chosen policies (limited by the structures) then reproduce the identity discourse.

Using Waever’s and Campbell’s argument about how the discursive structure put limitation to the possible policy choices, this research tries to elaborate the possibility that Yudhoyono’s personal ideas and the elite’s efforts to modify foreign policy (and its subsequent basis of strategic culture) was not followed by some significant changes. Rather, following Waever’s argument, the existing strategic discourses put some restraints to the possibility of closer military alliances, the possibility of strengthening Indo-US relationship, and the possibility of an offensive Indonesian military. These situations reflected the presence of a stable, yet prohibitive, discursive structure of Indonesia identity.

3.2 The Historical Foreign Policies and the Formation of Initial Discursive Structure

In this section, we analyse the relation between Indonesia “pre-Yudhoyono” foreign policy and its connection with strategic culture. The value we seek to analyse is 1) the unwillingness to join a defence or alliance pact, 2) a defensive orientation, and 3) concerns about foreign intervention (Sulaiman, 2016). From the data, we conclude that there is a consistent influencing pattern of strategic culture in Indonesian foreign policy. Therefore, we argue that Indonesia foreign policy is a big part of the discourse
of strategic culture. The foreign policy data used in this study are policy related to security issues and or related to Indonesia's role at international level starting from Soekarno’s era to Megawati’s.

Under Soekarno, Indonesia foreign policy was divided into at least two major parts: the early independence struggle, when Indonesia sought independence support (1945-1955), and guided democracy era (1956-1965). In the first part, Indonesia foreign policy mostly focuses on seeking recognition from the international community. Despite attempting to gain international recognition, Indonesia did not necessarily join in any defence block or alliance that existed at the time, even though the world was slowly polarized toward cold war. This is because Indonesia has deep rooted trauma related to subjugation and occupation. This is due to the 350 years of colonial experience. Mohammad Hatta (then vice president of Indonesia) even stated that the focus of Indonesia’s foreign policy is to encourage unity and to counter the existing subversive acts within the country. This action deemed necessary because they were a threat to the newly united nation (Hatta 1948; 1953).

Indonesia foreign policy doctrine at the time was called “free and active” policy. This free and active foreign policy aims to resolve the main domestic issues in three issues: safeguarding Indonesia's sovereignty and security, maintaining internal consolidation and safeguarding and fulfilling economic interests. The fulfilment of these objectives were carried out through various actions including the dispatch of senior Indonesian diplomats such as Sutan Sjahrir, Agus Salim, even Mohammad Hatta himself to negotiate Indonesian independence to Netherlands and seeking support for the de facto recognition of Indonesia to several countries (Leifer, 1983). However, the need for recognition did not make Indonesia resort to one of the two great powers that existed at the time, the US-led Western Bloc and the USSR-led Eastern Bloc. Hatta firmly stressed that Indonesia would actively and independently participate to avoid foreign intervention from either side (Hatta, 1953). In general, the policy in Soekarno’s first era reflects its strategic culture that focused on inward looking policy with the context of solving post-independence problems such as de facto recognition and economic sustainability. At the same time foreign policy in this era also developed to become the main doctrine in Indonesian foreign policy that is free of active. This doctrine is the result of the existing strategic values and the complicated domestic constraints that happen at the time.

In the second era of Soekarno, Indonesian foreign policy focused on efforts to actively engage in the international order through the spirit of anti-neo-colonialism and the formation of the third bloc in the world (Feith, 1963; Leifer, 1983). The spirit shown by Soekarno still upheld the doctrine of free and active policy but, as in the first era, Soekarno kept adjusting his foreign policy to domestic needs. In this context Sukarno encouraged the establishment of a sovereign Indonesia so he centred his foreign policy to liberate West Irian and encourage confrontation with Malaysia (Sukma, 1995). This policy leads to a general opinion that Indonesia was increasingly shifting from free and active doctrine because Sukarno saw that the West Irian problem was related to the practice of colonialism. Similarly, the Malaysian confrontation was born from Sukarno's assumption of Malaysia as a puppet of new forms of colonialism. Unlike the first period when the spirit of anti-colonialism was used for economic development and the quest for de facto recognition, he became much more nationalist and tend to ignore the principle of free and active policy. This is demonstrated through the making of NEFO ( Newly Emerging Force) and the Asian-African Conference which, although placing Indonesia on the third axis, has made Indonesia gain negative sentiment from Western countries (Leifer, 1983). This policy proved to be the beginning of Soekarno's fall which later replaced by Suharto in 1965. In general, foreign policy during the guided democracy era still incorporates strategic culture value, in the context of fear about foreign intervention. The liberation of West Irian and the maligned doctrine of Malaysia can also be understood as a defensive defence orientation effort in the context of domestic consolidation and the realization of national unity.

During Soeharto’s presidency, Indonesia shift the focus of foreign policy toward economic development and improving its stature in the world. Soeharto also revert back Soekarno foreign policy that is more nationalistic and assertive in action to the basic that is a foreign policy based on the ideology and the constitution. The reversal of this principle was done to encourage the internal consolidation after 1965 revolution. This effort then translated into national development policy (Oei, 1969; Sukma 1995). This policy focuses on efforts to improve Indonesia's economy based on the mandate of constitution and Pancasila. In the context of foreign policy, national development policies were the guideline that put Indonesia closer with the western and other developed country due to the much-needed economic incentives (Kroef, 1970). This close
relationship does not mean Indonesia was part of the western bloc. It is only part of the Soeharto’s pragmatism that heavily influenced Indonesia foreign policy during his reign. A pragmatic and economic-oriented foreign policy has resulted in Indonesia's increasing international confidence. This is the second feature of Soeharto’s foreign policy, namely the increasing role of Indonesia in the international community. This role is shown in at least three occasions. The first was shown in 1985 when Indonesia held the 30th anniversary of KAA in Bandung (Sukma, 1995). This event signifies the intention of Indonesia to become increasingly active in the conduct of international politics. Second, Suharto showed confidence through the normalization of relations with China in 1990 (Sukma, 1995). The normalization became important because Indonesia-China relations had worsened due to the 1965 coup. This normalization made Indonesia not only close to the West but also began to build relationships with the Eastern and ex-communist countries. The third and most important opportunity is the increasing role of Indonesia in ASEAN. Soeharto, in his foreign policy, applied the formulation of concentric circles as his focus. Indonesia during Soeharto era played an active role in Southeast Asia, initially as the founder of ASEAN, and then became an influential country in the region. Not only ASEAN, Soeharto exemplify Indonesian involvement in the wider region of Asia-Pacific through APEC forums (Vatikiotis, 1990; Anwar, 1994; Sukma, 1995). This is the culmination of Indonesia comeback to international politics. It may have seemed that in the context of Soeharto’s foreign policy, strategic culture was heavily influenced by his pragmatism. However, Soeharto’s outward-looking and active-independent foreign policy was based on economic independence and did not contradict the basis of the Hatta ideal-free doctrine. The three values of Indonesian strategic culture, which are the reluctance of making military alliances, defensive orientation, and fears of intervention, were still reflected in Soeharto's policies. This occurred even when Soeharto ruled Indonesia for 32 years. Comprehensive foreign policy formulation still reflected the value of strategic culture, and it was very likely to occur in such a long-time span.

Unlike Soeharto, Habibie as his successor did not have a clear doctrine of foreign policy as he only serve for less than 3 months before succeeded by Abdurrahman Wahid. The main feature of Habibie foreign policy was the effort to reclaim international trust mainly from the financial institution such as IMF and the World Bank. This effort was vital to help Indonesia rebuild and stabilize after the financial crisis and 1998 reform (He, 2007; Mashad, 2008). Habibie's efforts to revive the international faith were done through the Reform of the human rights sector. This action received good reception from the international community (Mashad, 2008). Despite the successful return of international attention, the failure to prevent East Timor independence became a testament of Habibie's foreign policy failure. In the context of strategic culture, Habibie foreign policy is one of the most distorted because there are various obstacles and challenges that must be solved internally in such a short term. This is mainly related to the 1998 reform and the fall of Indonesia's economy. Habibie’s foreign policy, therefore, does not necessary reflect the strategic culture. Although, considering the heavy criticisms towards Habibie to the problem with East Timor suggested that the discursive structure of Indonesian strategic culture which also emphasise the importance of sovereignty was still very strong.

After Habibie, Indonesia was led by Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur. The foreign policy of the Gus Dur era tended to be close to Sukarno's nationalistic and active ideas. This is conceived by Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab as an ecumenical foreign policy (Anwar, 2004). This foreign policy considers that all countries in the world have the same importation for Indonesia in a way that the national interest of Indonesia can only be achieved when relations with this country is maintained (Smith, 2000). Through this doctrine, Abdurrahman Wahid had the most frequent overseas visits in the presidential history by visiting more than 80 countries in less than two years (Dhurorudin, 2008). The visit also included some controversial act such as opening ties with Israel and a visit to Cuba after a trip to Washington DC. However, Wahid stated that these visits were aimed at encouraging the normalization of the Indonesian economy after the 1998 reform and the financial crisis (Smith, 2000, Anwar, 2003). In addition to the ecumenical doctrine, Wahid have a bigger concern regarding the national integration issues. This concern then translated into policy by his enthusiasm to the formation of the West Pacific Forum, which consists of Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, PNG and Timor Leste (Smith, 2000; Anwar, 2004). This move has been criticized by ASEAN members mainly Singapore because it will threaten the existence of ASEAN. This step can be understood as one of the efforts to increase attention to the separatist movement in Maluku and Papua. In general, Wahid's foreign policy has close ties to the value of strategic culture because Indonesia under his...
reign becomes more neutral and relatively safe from foreign intervention through his ecumenical doctrine. Wahid also represent the inward-looking strategic culture through his attention to issues of disintegration by dealing with separatist movements such as GAM, OPM and RMS in the conduct of foreign policy. Generally, Wahid era proved that Indonesian foreign policy was closely linked with strategic culture even though Wahid became a controversial figure in the country that led to his resignation in 2001.

In Megawati era Indonesia's foreign policy was focused on efforts to restore national stability and maintain Indonesia's role in the international world. One of the typical features of the Megawati era is the development of Indonesia image as a country that remains actively contribute in the international world despite having problems domestically. Megawati revived the concept of Soeharto era so called concentric circle by highlighting the importance of ASEAN. ASEAN considered important to maintain the stability of security and economy in the region to further solve the domestic problems faced by Megawati. Then, in the second concentric circle Megawati pushed Indonesia's relations with the pacific countries as Wahid built through the West Pacific Forum. The last in the third concentric circle is the East Asian countries (Anwar, 2004). Relations with these countries are important and actively pursued by Megawati because of the much-needed economic incentives. In addition to using the concentric model, Megawati strongly encourages bilateral relations with many countries such as Japan, China, European countries to the United States. One of the most remarkable ties under Megawati's relations with the pacific countries as Wahid built through the West Pacific Forum. The last in the third concentric circle is the East Asian countries (Anwar, 2004). Relations with these countries are important and actively pursued by Megawati because of the much-needed economic incentives. In addition to using the concentric model, Megawati strongly encourages bilateral relations with many countries such as Japan, China, European countries to the United States. One of the most remarkable ties under Megawati's relations with the pacific countries as Wahid built through the West Pacific Forum. The last in the third concentric circle is the East Asian countries (Anwar, 2004). Relations with these countries are important and actively pursued by Megawati because of the much-needed economic incentives. In addition to using the concentric model, Megawati strongly encourages bilateral relations with many countries such as Japan, China, European countries to the United States. One of the most remarkable ties under Megawati's relations with the pacific countries as Wahid built through the West Pacific Forum. The last in the third concentric circle is the East Asian countries (Anwar, 2004). Relations with these countries are important and actively pursued by Megawati because of the much-needed economic incentives. In addition to using the concentric model, Megawati strongly encourages bilateral relations with many countries such as Japan, China, European countries to the United States. One of the most remarkable ties under Megawati's relations with the pacific countries as Wahid built through the West Pacific Forum.

From the above explanation we conclude that in general Indonesia's foreign policy is mainly the continuation of its strategic culture. This can be seen from the development of foreign policy in each presidential era that still encourage inward looking orientation and at the same time encourage the active role of Indonesia according to the free and active foreign policy doctrine. But it must be understood that in each era there are anomalous conditions that make foreign policy may deviates from its strategic culture.

3.3 Yudhoyono’s Policy and the Discursive Limitation of Strategic Culture

During the reign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), Indonesia has been trying to redefine, reshape, and project Indonesia internationalism that has long been undermined under the barrage of domestic problems during the early reformation era. When Yudhoyono first entered the State Palace in Jakarta in 2004 as the President of Indonesia, he declared his objective to manage domestic challenges alongside the restoration of Indonesia’s past internationalism and active foreign policy leadership on both regional and global scale (Marton 2015, p. 25). Yudhoyono reigned with great ambitions to which during his speech to a U.S. audience in 2005 (Mitton 2005 in Tan 2007, p. 180), he said that “…we are now an outward-looking country, eager to shape regional and international order and intent on having our voice heard…” and drawing on past achievements, he reminisced during a speech at his foreign ministry at its sixtieth anniversary breakfast that “As former president Soekarno and others showed us, we should be able to lead on certain issues in international relations. This is our ultimate goal and we can only achieve it if we are doing well at home, such as creating good governance, so we can have strength, capacity and credibility to do more in world affairs” (Susanti 2005 in Tan 2007, p. 180).

Furthermore, Yudhoyono (2005, p.326) emphasized that “We should never be inward-looking. We should be non-exclusive and be willing to cooperate with all stakeholders”.

Yudhoyono still endorse “independent and active foreign policy” as his basic foreign policy principle. As in a statement during a speech at the ICWA in 2005, that “Over the years, governments have come and go, Indonesia has had six presidents, and our political system has undergone major changes, but “independent and active” remains the primary policy principle for Indonesia” (Yudhoyono 2005, p. 385). He stated his vision during the inaugural speech in
2009, which is to “Maintain a friendly and moderate spirit of nationalism. Indonesia is facing a strategic environment where no country perceives Indonesia as an enemy and there is no country which Indonesia considers an enemy. Thus, Indonesia can exercise its foreign policy freely in all directions, having a million friends and zero enemies” (Jakarta Globe 2009). Yudhoyono’s mission to address the challenges to Indonesian foreign policy is to come up with “navigating the turbulent ocean”, that was developed from Hatta’s “rowing between two reefs” policy which addresses the problem of choosing sides between the Soviet Union and the US. Yudhoyono (2005, p. 385) described that the problems of nowadays world required a newly developed concept and stated that “Our forefathers did not know the terms and phenomena such as globalization, CNN, NGOs, sophisticated international terrorist networks – all the things which part of are our present-day world”.

Indonesia’s approach toward the world is described as constructive approach that utilizes constructivism that “Denotes an ability to turn adversary into friend, and to turn friend into partner. It means having the diplomatic, intellectual, and emotional capacity to respond to complex foreign policy issues. It also means putting to rest a siege mentality, wild conspiracy theories, excessive suspicion, an overly defensive attitude, or the fear that the world is out to get us” (Yudhoyono 2005, p. 387). In addition, Yudhoyono adopted a defense and strategic posture that is non-threatening to its neighbors and the region and aim toward strengthening peace and stability and thus Indonesia “Will not enter into any military alliances… We will continue our policy of not allowing any foreign military bases on Indonesian territory” (Yudhoyono 2005, p. 387).

In addition, Yudhoyono was proud and asserted the looming influence on Indonesia in the international system. Yudhoyono boasted Indonesia’s position, he said during the 2005 speech in ICWA that “We are a proud nation who cherish our independence and national unity. We are the fourth most populous nation in the world. We are home to the world’s third largest democracy. We are also a country where democracy, Islam, and modernity go hand-in-hand… we are also proud of our diplomatic heritage. Indonesia convened the historic Asian-African Conference in 1955. We are a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. We are a founding member of ASEAN. We are at the forefront of North-South Dialogue. We were at the forefront of international law of the sea diplomacy. We helped the peace settlement in Cambodia and in the Southern Philippines. We are helping to manage potential conflicts in the South China Sea. We helped design the ASEAN Security Community. We have always been active in shaping regional order. And recently, we hosted the historic second Asian-African Summit in Jakarta” (Yudhoyono 2005, p. 390). Apart from those things, Yudhoyono prioritize Indonesia’s role within the ASEAN and it becomes the main organization for Indonesia to build upon and develop a close relationship with the member countries. Yudhoyono (2005, p. 395) stated that “At the regional and sub-regional level, the mainstay of our foreign relations is our involvement with ASEAN… In building this community, we in ASEAN are taking full responsibility for our own security. We will also complete our integration into a single free trade and investment area”, this statement refers to the non-interference policy.

One of the prominent tenets of Indonesia’s outward-looking policy is Yudhoyono’s concept of “thousand friends zero enemies” in which its defence posture is not to easily feel threatened and adopt a defensive attitude. However, this defensive attitude and the fear “that the world is out to get us” was displayed after the declared agreement between Obama and Australia’s PM Julia Gillard in 2011 regarding the stationing of 2,500 US Marines that was planned to be conducted by 2017 (McDonnell and Brown 2013). Then foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, stated that he wanted to ensure that the US and Australia will not pull anything funny, he said “…what I would hate to is if such developments were to provoke a reaction and counter-reaction precisely to create that vicious circle of tensions and mistrust or distrust. That’s why it’s very important when a decision of this type is taken there is transparency of what the scenario being envisaged is and there is no misunderstanding as a result…” (McDonnell and Brown 2013). He referred to the meeting that was held between Indonesia and Australia.

In addition, Anwar (2012) noted that there are suspicions regarding the US marines positioning in Darwin among Indonesian politicians, NGO, and academics that it is not aimed to counterweight Chinese influence, but to enhance American interest toward Indonesia and even Papua and that this defensive attitude is aimed at defending Indonesia’s territorial integrity and to avoid invasion and encroachment of Indonesia’s territory by the US and Australia as Indonesian still believe that the Dutch’s success is partially attributable to both countries. Darwin is located at about 600 miles from Indonesia’s shores. While some perceived the US troop
deployment as an effort to project power and deter threats to peace, Indonesia has directly linked it to regional disputes over the oil-and-gas-rich South China Sea (Petersen 2011). Admiral Agus Suharto feared that the decision would put Indonesia in an armed conflict and said “Their military fleets would very likely go back and forth through our waters, given the analysis that the planned base will have to conduct [military exercises] due to rising tension in the South China Sea. We haven’t learnt clearly but we have been studying the plan and analyzing any potential impacts on Indonesia. We have been consulting all sources” (Petersen 2011).

The era of SBY was marked by the growing cordiality between Indonesia and China. In the realm of humanitarian aid, during the Aceh tsunami disaster in December 2004, Beijing provided medical team and donation worth 63 million USD. In addition, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao attended tsunami aid summit in Jakarta on 2005 to coordinate assistance program (Suryadinata 2017, p. 2). In 2005, Yudhoyono signed the Strategic Partnership joint declaration which covers many realms of cooperation, including economy, politics, culture, defence, and security (Suryadinata 2017, p. 3). Regarding economic relationships, trade and investment between Indonesia and China continued to grow and there are major joint projects, one of them was the Surabaya-Madura Bridge (Suramadu) between China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and Indonesian SOEs (Suryadinata 2017, p. 4). However, these cordial relationships only occurred and limited to the realms of economic, trade, and other than military and security, in which Indonesia is wary toward China’s increasing presence in is nearest territory, Natuna Island and Malacca Straits. China made a territorial claim over the waters surrounding Natuna Islands in 1993 and its show that during 2011, there are 50 Chinese maps which includes an area north of Natuna Islands that falls within Indonesia’s EEZ (Brown 2011, p. 8). However, Indonesia always downplayed it during Suharto’s era because they’re afraid that the act of retaliation will legitimize China’s claims.

However, in 2009, there are incidents of China’s encroachment in Indonesian’s territory during which it detained 75 Chinese fishermen operating in Natuna Islands and it escalates in 2010 and 2013 when Chinese gunboats forced Indonesian fisheries protection craft to release Chinese poachers caught fishing in Natuna waters (McBeth 2016). Natuna Islands is seen as strategically and economically important for Indonesia which provide geographical gateway to the Malacca Strait – which is another important territory for Indonesia (Brown 2011, p. 8). After the 2009 onward escalation of tensions in Natuna Islands, there were two diverging discourse in Indonesian government regarding their position on the issue. The first position was held by the military which treats this problem as a problem of territorial sovereignty, as stated by Commodore Fahru Zaini, then Assistant Deputy to the Chief Security Minister for Defence Strategic Doctrine, that “China has claimed Natuna waters as their territorial waters. This arbitrary claim… will have a large impact on the security of Natuna waters” (Suryadinata 2014) and was added by then Commander of the Indonesian Chief of Staff, General Moeldoko that “There are significant changes in the stable and calm conditions that existed in the region a decade ago. So everyone has an opinion that China is a threat to the neighborhood” (Dw.com 2014). These point of view produces military’s eagerness to increase defense in Indonesia’s surrounding waters (Suryadinata 2014).

The other position, which is more dominant, was held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which the then Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa stated in response to the military apparatuses statements that “There is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and China” and that he emphasized the ongoing maritime cooperation between China and Indonesia at the deputy foreign minister level and pointed that one of those cooperation involved foreign investment in Natuna for fish processing and canning (Suryadinata 2014). However, the diplomatic apparatus questioned and rejected China’s “nine-dash line” claims and sent a diplomatic letter to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf and expressed concern of China’s overlapping claim through Indonesia’s EEZ in Natuna Islands (Dominguez 2015; Suryadinata 2014). However, Indonesia’s position remained cautious and that it didn’t treat the Natuna Islands as a territorial and threat to sovereignty (Suryadinata 2014).

Another instance of Indonesia’s inward-looking foreign policy was shown in its fear regarding external powers domination and their conduct in Malacca Strait. Indonesia is responsible for ensuring the safe passage of more than half of the world’s commercial maritime traffic. To ensure this responsibility, Indonesia needed the help of foreign powers, in which Indonesian defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono asked Japan, China, and South Korea for technical assistance in 2007 (Brown 2011, p. 9). Ironically, however, Indonesia rebuffed the offers by America, India, Australia, Japan, and China to help secure the waterway for the reason that Indonesia did not want to attract impressions which
betrays to those foreign powers a sense of Indonesia’s inability to secure the waterway (Brown 2011, p. 9). Indonesia feared that technical assistance could lead to greater cooperation and then domination by external power might become a huge possibility. In another incident, the paranoid element toward foreign powers was shown in 2004 when Indonesia was confronted by unconfirmed reports that contained suggestion in which America would begin sending patrol boats to nearby waters, which was then responded angrily and claimed that it would not only attracted Islamic extremists to target US vessels, but it was considered an infringement of Indonesia’s sovereignty (Brown 2011).

Indonesia’s relations with its Southeast Asian neighbour too was sometimes caught within Indonesia’s fear of sovereignty infringement. Indonesia planned a joint defence pact with Indonesia after the problematic sand trade for Singapore’s reclamation and territorial extension (Asia Sentinel 2007). The agreement was approved by President Yudhoyono and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in April 2007 and that this defence deal is consists of both countries’ cooperation on the extradition treaty and Indonesia to provide land, sea, and airspace within its jurisdiction for Singapore’s armed forces to conduct training exercise (Asia Sentinel 2007). However, Indonesian lawmakers criticized the latest version of the defence agreement, mainly because of the lack of benefits to be gained by Indonesia and that Indonesia would be selling its sovereignty to Singapore, referred to one of the clause in the pact which would permit Singapore to invite “third parties to conduct and take part in future joint military exercises (Asia Sentinel 2007). Previously, Indonesia also complained to Singapore that they threatened Indonesia’s sovereignty by frequently involving US and Australian forces and then Indonesia unilaterally stopped the use of training areas (Asia Sentinel 2007).

These cases had shown that Indonesia’s outward-looking foreign policy and discourse during the Yudhoyono era worked best in the realm of in the economic, trade, and other international traditional and non-traditional problems alike that is not in the immediate urgency and not pertaining to Indonesia’s immediate threat and problems, such as Indonesia’s national sovereignty and territory. In addition, the dominant discourse of outward-looking foreign policy is one amongst many other discourses. These seemingly unequivocal dominant discourse withered when faced with the fears of foreign powers infringement of Indonesia’s sovereignty and matters pertaining to military and defence, in which Indonesia suddenly switched from being an outward-looking country to an inward-looking one.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Several things could be summarised from this article. Firstly, previous investigations on Indonesian foreign policy have neglected the importance of strategic culture as a possible explanans.

Of those few who focused their research on Indonesian strategic culture, they mostly traced the origins of Indonesian strategic culture. Anwar (1996), Sulaiman (2016), and Arif & Kurniawan (2017) spent their time to trace the origins first, before focusing only on one aspect of military policy. Instead, this research tries to reconstruct Indonesian strategic culture from the actual discourse and practice during the Yudhoyono’s regime.

As we have shown, Indonesian foreign policy since Soekarno have the tendency to adhere to the limits set by the discursive structure of the strategic culture. Even during the more outward-looking period of Soeharto’s later years, the more pragmatic parts of the policies were contained to the more economic aspects.

Secondly, by using the poststructuralist theory, this research argues that the existing discursive structures limit the policy options. Therefore, it was not possible to Yudhoyono’s regime to change its policy drastically (whether to create a stronger military pact in the region, to strengthen Indo-US relationship, or to change Indonesian inward-looking policy and defensive posture of the military).

REFERENCES


