Malware Classification Method Based on Sequence of Traffic Flow

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Abstract:

Network-based malware classification plays an important role in improving system security than system-based malware classification. The vast majority of malware needs a network activity in order to accomplish its purpose (e.g., downloading malware, connecting to a C&C server, etc.). Many malware classification approaches based on network behavior have thus been proposed. Nevertheless, they merely rely on either a request URL or payload for signature matching. To classify the network activity of malware, the patterns of network behavior must be understood and the changes in behavior observed. Therefore, the sequence of flows and their correlation caused by the malware should be analysed. In this paper, we present a novel malware classification method based on clustering of flow features and sequence alignment algorithms for computing sequence similarity, which represents network behavior of malware. We focus on analysing the sequence similarity between the sequence patterns of malware traffic flow generated by executing malware on the dynamic analysing system. We also performed an evaluation by using malware traffic collected from a real environment. On the basis of our experimental results, we identified the most appropriate method for classifying malware by similarity of network activity.

1 INTRODUCTION

One of the major security threats on the Internet is malware, i.e., malicious software. According to a report in Q1 2014 by McAfee (McAfee, 2014), the total number of variants of malware in McAfee Labs exceeded 200 million. Security of the Internet systems critically depends on the capability to keep anti-virus software (AVs) up-to-date and maintain high detection accuracy against new malware. However, malware variants evolve so fast they cannot be detected by conventional signature-based detection. Furthermore, in contrast to the growing number of malicious codes, the number of analysts is markedly limited. Therefore, malware classification techniques have been proposed as solutions to deal with these problems.

Classification systems based on malware behavior are generally divided into two approaches. One relies on features extracted from the behavior of a system level, and the other depends on features extracted from network traffic. The vast majority of malware needs a network activity in order to accomplish its purpose (e.g., downloading other malware, connecting to a C&C server, sending spam, stealing personal information, port scanning, and other typical network tasks). Many malware classification approaches based on network behavior have thus been proposed. Nevertheless, they merely rely on either a request URL or payload for signature matching. To classify the network activity of malware, the patterns of network behavior must be understood and the changes in behavior observed. Therefore, the flow sequence should be analysed that provides interactive information of flow parameters caused by the malware and their correlation.

In this paper, we present a novel malware classification method that is based on clustering of flow and sequence alignment of sequence patterns that represent network behavior of malware. We focus on analysing the sequence similarity among the sequence patterns of malware traffic flow that is generated by executing malware on a dynamic analysing system. We performed an evaluation by using malware traffic collected from the real environment. On the basis of our experimental results, we identified the most appropriate method for classifying malware by similarity of network activity.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work on behavioral malware classification and sequence alignment algorithm. Section 3 describes our malware classification

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Copyright © 2015 SCITEPRESS (Science and Technology Publications, Lda.) method. Section 4 details experiments that were conducted and analyses their results to measure the accuracy of the method. We finally conclude this paper and mention our future work in Section 5.

2 RELATED WORKS

2.1 Network Behavior-based Malware Classification

Reliably extracting the features is a considerable challenge in malware classification. The features of malware are difficult to extract using only the static analysis, because the malware is often encrypted, compressed, or complicatedly described to obstruct malware analysis. Accordingly, many techniques have been explored by executing malware to extract its features. For malware classification, network behaviorbased approaches have been proposed in the literature for classifying malware samples.

Although most AVs use signature matching techniques for detecting malware, Berger-Sabbatel and Duda (Berger-Sabbatel and Duda, 2012) revealed that this approach can be easily evaded. They (Berger-Sabbatel and Duda, 2012) presented the method for observing the communication patterns of executing malware with DNS replies. Other papers (Stakhanova et al., 2011; Nari and Ghorbani, 2013) investigated malware behavior using network activity graphs and graph similarity analysis. To focus on more specific information of network behavior, Perdisci et al. (Perdisci et al., 2010) addressed the malware clustering system by extracting HTTP traffic traces and analysing their similarity. Different from previous works, Rafique et al. (Rafique et al., 2014) proposed a framework for extracting the features from the protocol and traffic state in order to use the information obtained from all protocols.

However, they did not consider the dependency on network flow or capture malware's network behavior well enough to distinguish between different malware. In contrast to these approaches, we use only network traffic flow data and generate representations of malware's network behavior for appropriate classification.

2.2 Sequence Alignment in Bioinformatics

Sequence alignment is a method that compares two or more character sequences to obtain their similarities and dissimilarities. First, Needleman and Wunsch (Needleman and Wunsch, 1970) proposed pair-wise global alignment, which evaluates amino acids by match/mismatch scores and gap penalties. Then, Smith and Waterman proposed pairwise local alignment (Smith and Waterman, 1981). Both are based on dynamic programming.

The Smith-Waterman algorithm replaces all the negatives in the similarity matrix with 0. Despite the increased length of alignment results, if the similarity values no longer increase, this algorithm terminates backtracking and outputs the results. In accordance with the differences between the two algorithms, we could obtain better precision to analyse the pattern of network activities.

Malware classification using sequence alignment has been extensively studied by malware analysis and detection researchers to classify normal, misuse, or unknown behavior. Several studies have proposed malware detection or classification. Inspired by the Smith-Waterman local alignment algorithm, Coull et al. presented a detection approach (Coull et al., 2003). The authors later enhanced it and presented a sequence alignment method using a binary scoring and a signature updating scheme to detect masquerade attacks (Coull and Szymanski, 2008). Another recent approach for detection is analysing API call sequences and classifying them as benign or malicious (Shankarapani et al., 2011).

Two techniques for malware classification using sequence alignment have recently been proposed (Iwamoto and Wasaki, 2012; Pedersen et al., 2013). Both extract more detailed information from binaries, including sequences of API calls and the graphical representations of control flow. We extend the previous studies that focused on network activity of sequencing features.

3 MALWARE CLASSIFICATION

In this section, we describe the proposed method for malware classification based on network behavior. Figure 1 shows an outline of the proposed method, which is composed of the training and classification phases. Both phases consist of four steps, which are summarised below.

- 1. Feature Extraction: Extracts the network flow that reflects the network behavior of malware.
- 2. Feature Clustering: Classifies the extracted flow data to the closest cluster.
- 3. Sequence Generation: For the set of the malware's flow, generates a sequence pattern by using the clustering result.

Dur	Seq	Proto	SrcAddr	DstAddr	Sport	Dport	Dir	State	TotPk
2.99995	1	RARP	00:0c:29:89:7d:fa	00:0c:29:89:7d:fa	-	-	who	INT	2
0.00000	2	IGMP	10.0.0.0	224.0.0.1	-	-	\rightarrow	INT	1
0.00033	3	ARP	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	-	-	who	CON	2
0.75628	4	UDP	192.168.1.2	10.0.0.1	1037	53	\leftrightarrow	CON	2
0.00350	5	TCP	192.168.1.2	*.*.*.158	1035	80	\rightarrow	CON	5
0.00071	5	TCP	192.168.1.2	*.*.*.158	1035	80	\rightarrow	RST	5
0.00005	6	UDP	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.255	138	138	\rightarrow	INT	3
0.00013	6	UDP	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.255	138	138	\rightarrow	REQ	3

Table 1: Examples of Flow Data.



Training Phase Classification Phase

Figure 1: The Overview of Malware Classification.

4. Classification using Sequence Alignment: Classifies the sequence data with similarity on the basis of the sequence alignment algorithm.

3.1 Feature Extraction

The goal of this work is to classify unknown malware in accordance with a sequence pattern of observable features. The features are extracted from the network traffic flow generated by a dynamic analyser during the execution of the malware. To classify malware meticulously on the basis of its behavior, the malware analysis system is recommended to suitably reflect malware activities. Furthermore, to classify malware effectively, the features must be easy to extract and provide sufficient information to discriminate among different malware families. We have gained both the header and payload of network packets. However, when using the payload, it requires a lot of storage space and time for analysing. On the other hand, the header information of the packets can be analysed even if the communication is encrypted. Accordingly, we decided to use the flow sequence that is most suitable to observe the flow of packets.

We suppose that the malware samples were executed by the dynamic malware analyser to collect network traffic capture files. Our method, therefore, adopts traffic data collected by Botnetwatcher (Aoki et al., 2010), which has been developed by NTT Secure Platform Lab and connected to the Internet.

The pcap format file is analysed through Argus¹, which extracts flow data from network traffic files. Table 1 provides examples of flow data extracted from real malware samples. Note that IP addresses are sanitised for privacy protection. As shown in Table 1, the flow extracted by Argus contains all types of protocols of traffic that are invoked by the malware. Among these protocols, TCP and UDP can deeply correlate with behavior of malware, thus we adopt them as features for clustering.

The feature used for the clustering is not a characteristic that only determines whether the packets are normal or malicious. Rather, it is used as a representative attribute of the flow element. Therefore, our method only requires appropriate extraction of the flow characteristics as a preprocessor. We defined the

Table 2: Feature based on Flow Data.

Feature Name	Explanation
Dur	Record total duration
Seq	Argus sequence number
Proto	Transaction protocol
SrcAddr	Source IP address
DstAddr	Destination IP address
Sport	Source port number
Dport	Destination port number
Dir	Direction of transaction
State	Transaction state
TotPkts	Total transaction packet count
SrcPkts	$Src \rightarrow dst packet count$
DstPkts	$Dst \rightarrow src packet count$
SrcLoad	Source bits per second
DstLoad	Destination bits per second

¹http://qosient.com/argus/

Table 3: 1	Result (of Flow	Clustering	(k=8).
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Cluster	А	В	С	D	E	F	G	Н	Total
Number of Flows	3,810	15,545	3,265	3,827	2,541	4,665	12,615	8,342	54,610
Percentage (%)	6.9	28.5	6.0	7.0	4.6	8.5	23.1	15.2	100

Table 4:	Example	of	Sequence	Data	(k=8).
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The name of Malware	Sequence data
Virus.Sality.gen.1	BGGBGGBBBGGBGGBGGBGGEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
Virus.Sality.gen.2	CBGHBGGBBBGGBGGBGGBGGEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
Backdoor.Simda.abxr	DCCCDBAACAAADABAGGADDDDGGBDDCCBD
Backdoor.Simda.acak	DGHGGGHGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
Backdoor.Simda.acam	DGHGGGHGHHGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
Backdoor.Simda.acbg	GHGGGHHHGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.rfjs	DDEEEEEBBEEEEEBEEEEBBHBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.rncv	EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEBGHBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.rofw	BEEEEEBBBEEEEEEBBHBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.qtpy	EEEEEEEEEEEEEEBHBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.qtuj	DEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEBHBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB

following 14 features as listed in Table 2. In addition to the five-tuple (SrcAddr, DstAddr, Sport, Dport, Proto) and direction (Dir) information that can be automatically extracted from a packet header, eight features are defined, including the duration of the flow (Dur), the Argus sequence number from the particular session (Seq), and the transaction state of flow (State).

3.2 Feature Clustering

To cluster flow data, we use a K-means algorithm that is commonly used for unsupervised learning techniques. In the work of Erman et al. (Erman et al., 2006), K-means is suitable to classify the traffic flows faster than the other algorithm. It proceeds by selecting k initial cluster centers and then iteratively refining them through the following steps.

- 1. Select an initial partition with *k* cluster centers; repeat steps 2 and 3 until clusters stabilise.
- 2. Generate a new partition by assigning each object to its closest cluster centre by minimising the square-error.
- 3. Compute new cluster centers

The formula for the square error V is shown by Equation (1).

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \sum_{j \in S_i} |x_j - \mu_i|^2$$
(1)

The square error is calculated as the distance squared between each object x and the centre of its cluster μ_i . Object μ_i represents the respective centre of each cluster.

Table 3 shows an example of clustering under the condition of k = 8. In this example, K-means algorithm is applied to a Botnetwatcher dataset, which consists of 54,610 flows generated by 515 malware samples. As shown in Table 3, clusters are labelled by $A \sim H$.

3.3 Sequence Generation

In this step, a sequence pattern for each variants of malware is generated by using the clustering result. The sequence represents the abstracted behavior of the malware. When two sequence patterns are similar, the same network activity may be the cause. We can identify a malware family with distinctive network behavior.

Table 4 shows an example of sequence patterns generated by K-means clustering with k = 8. As shown in Table 4, similar sequences can possibly belong to the same malware family.

In the next step, therefore, the sequence patterns are used to identify the malware families.

3.4 Classification using Sequence Alignment

For similarity measurement between variant of malware, our research adopted two sequence alignment algorithms introduced in Section 2.2: Needleman-Wunsch and Smith-Waterman algorithms (Needleman and Wunsch, 1970; Smith and Waterman, 1981). These two algorithms belong to the dynamic programming, which is a method for solving complex problems gradually using recurrences. These algorithms do not simply find the longest subsequence shared by two sequences. They have three factors: *gap*, *match*, and *mismatch*. The *gap* factor defines a penalty given to alignment when we have insertion or deletion. Similarly, the *gap*, the *match*, or *mismatch* factor is added to the score. The *match*, *mismatch*, and *gap* factors should be defined in advance. In this paper, we defined the factors as follows: match = 10, mismatch = -5, gap = -5.

The Needleman-Wunsch algorithm computes the similarity between two sequences X_n and Y_m by using the score of similarity. The score of similarity $N_{i,j}$ ($0 \le i \le n, 0 \le j \le m$) between sequences $X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{n-1}, x_n\}$ and $Y = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{m-1}, y_m\}$ can be computed by Evaluation (2). The subsequence with the highest score is defined as a common subsequence between the two sequences.

$$N_{i,j} = max \begin{cases} N_{i-1,j-1} + P(X_i, Y_j), \\ N_{i-1,j} + gap, \\ N_{i,j-1} + gap. \end{cases}$$
(2)
$$P(X_i, Y_j) = \begin{cases} match & (X_i = Y_j), \\ mismatch & (X_i \neq Y_j). \end{cases}$$
(3)

On the other hand, the Smith-Waterman algorithm shows that a local alignment can be computed using essentially the same idea employed by Needleman-Wunsch. The recurrence relation is slightly altered because an empty string is a suffix of any sequence, so a score of zero is always possible. Evaluation (4) is used to compute the score $S_{i,j}$ using Smith-Waterman.

$$S_{i,j} = max \begin{cases} S_{i-1,j-1} + P(X_i, Y_j), \\ S_{i-1,j} + gap, \\ S_{i,j-1} + gap, \\ 0. \end{cases}$$
(4)

For example, we have aligned the malware samples Virus.Sality.gen.1 and Trojan-Spy. Win32.Zbot.rfjs in Table 4 by using two algorithms. Figures 2 and 3 represent results of Needleman-Wunsch and Smith-Waterman algorithms, respectively. In these figures, the symbols – and | indicate the gap and match. The Needleman-Wunsch algorithm attempts to align every element in every sequence.

BGGBGGBGGEEEEEE-EEEEE-EEEEEEEEEEEE
DDEEEEEBBEEEEEBBEEEEBBHBBBBBBBBBBBB

Figure 2: The Alignment Result using Needleman-Wunsch.

On the other hand, for the alignment result by the Smith-Waterman algorithm, this algorithm attempts

to align a part of the two sequences. Therefore, the Smith-Waterman algorithm obtains a shorter total alignment than the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm.

····EEEEEEBEEEEEEBEEEEEBEEEEEEEEEEEEEE	,
DD EEEEEBBEEEEEBEEEE BBHBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB	

Figure 3: The Alignment Result using Smith-Waterman.

In both methods, the similarity between two sequences is given as follows:

$$Similarity = \frac{Length of subsequence with highest score}{Total length of sequence used by alignment}$$

These two algorithms have drawbacks when applied to our method. When the difference between lengths of the sequences is large, they are difficult to define as similar even if their similarity is 100%.

For the Unified algorithm, we calculate the average of the similarity of the two algorithms. The similarity of the Unified algorithm is given as follows (Similarity_N: Needleman-Wunsch, Similarity_S: Smith-Waterman, Similarity_U: Unified algorithm):

$$\text{milarity}_U = \frac{\text{Similarity}_N + \text{Similarity}_S}{2}$$

For example, the results of similarity between the variants of Sality and Zbot in Table 4 (Sality 1: Virus.Sality.gen.1, Sality 2: Virus.Sality.gen.2, Zbot: Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.rfjs) are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Example of Similarity Results (%).

	Similarity _S	Similarity _N	Similarity U						
Example 1	91.2	91.0	91.1						
Example 2 94.7 5.6 50.2									
Example 1: Sality 1 and Sality 2									

Example 2: Sality 1 and Zbot

Si

As shown in Table 5, the Unified algorithm overcomes the shortcomings of the two algorithms.

4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

In this section, we demonstrate the results of our experiments. We first generate training and testing

Table 6: Number of the Training and Testing Datasets.

	Training	Testing	Total
# of Family	23	23	
# of Sample	58	383	441

No.	Family Label	# of Sample	# of Training	# of Testing	Average Similarity
1	Backdoor.Androm	4	1	3	44.3
2	Backdoor.DarkKomet	5	1	4	45.1
3	Backdoor.Simda	6	1	5	60.1
4	AdWare.NSIS.Agent	3	1	2	51.1
5	AdWare.Agent	3	1	2	41.9
6	nMonitor.Ardamax	2	1	1	78.5
7	Packed.Katusha	3	1	2	39.9
8	Trojan.Agent	5	1	4	43.1
9	Trojan.Badur	4	1	3	75.2
10	Trojan.Inject	8	1	7	45.8
11	Trojan.Neurevt	3	1	2	58.7
12	Trojan.Pakes	2	1	1	73.8
13	Trojan.VB	3	1	2	65.4
14	Trojan.Yakes	206	21	185	74.7
15	Trojan-Downloader.Agent	2	1		51.2
16	Trojan-FakeAV.FakeSysDef	67	7	60	73.8
17	Trojan-PSW.Tepfer	2	1	1	33.6
18	Trojan-Ransom.Agent	11	2	9	72.1
19	Trojan-Ransom.Foreign	81	7 9	72	73.2
20	Trojan-Spy.Zbot	9	1	8	53.5
21	Virus.Sality	2	1	1	91.1
22	HEUR:Trojan-Downloader		- CCCC		49.5
23	HEUR:Trojan	4	1	3	64.3
	Total	441	58	383	-

Table 7: Family Name and Number of Samples in the Training and Testing Datasets.

datasets from real malware samples. The datasets for measuring the effectiveness of experiment are important, because they are to be the criteria for classification. We then discuss the classification accuracy of the proposed classification method. Finally, we discuss the experiment results.

4.1 Family Labeling and Datasets

For evaluation, we used the malware dataset provided by NTT Secure Platform Lab. This dataset consists of the network traffic (pcap file) gathered by 30-minute execution of each malware sample using a dynamic malware analysis system, namely Botnetwatcher.

The dataset also includes labels assigned by 11 kinds of antivirus software that scanned each malware sample. Among them, we used the labels from Kaspersky to create the labelled dataset, because the classification criteria applied to Kaspersky are based on the behavior of malware.

Kaspersky has classified malware using all features of malware, including network traffic flow. In contrast, our method only focuses on the network behavior of malware extracted from network flow. In the experiment, we compared the classification of Kaspersky and our classification method. If the results of the comparison are similar to the labeling of Kaspersky, it is possible to prove the effectiveness of the classification based on the network behavior. We identified 23 families of malware samples with Kaspersky. We divided them into training and testing datasets. We extracted 10% of samples from each 23 families of malware samples in the training dataset (58 samples) and the remaining samples from the testing dataset (383 samples). To obtain a balanced training dataset, we limited the distribution of each family in the training dataset to 40% of the entire dataset. Table 6 shows the number of families and samples in the training and testing datasets. Table 7 shows the families of samples in the training and testing dataset.

Table 8 shows similarity between the variants of Backdoor.Simda, which is one of the families we identified. The maximum and minimum values of the similarity are 89.7% and 31.1%. The average percentage of similarity is 60.1%. Table 7 indicates the average percentage of similarity calculated for malware samples in each family.

Table 8: Similarity between Variants of BS (%, k=8).

	bs 1	bs 2	BS 3	bs 4	BS 5
bs 1	-	-	-	-	-
BS 2	76.5	-	-	-	-
BS 3	89.7	75.6	-	-	-
BS 4	77.5	69.3	78.9	-	-
BS 5	32.0	37.2	33.4	31.1	-

BS : Backdoor.Simda



4.2 Classification Accuracy

We measured the similarity between the training and testing datasets, that is, we calculated similarity between one testing dataset and each individual training dataset. Then, we sorted them by the rankings from No.1 to No.58 in decreasing order of similarity and made comparisons by using the labels assigned by Kaspersky. By taking comparison results into account, the testing data are classified into the family with the highest degree of similarity. We define the following indices for performance comparison (T: malware samples of the Testing dataset). The results are shown Table 9.

Classification Accuracy =
$$\frac{\# \text{ of } T \text{ classified correctly}}{\# \text{ of } T}$$

To calculation algorithms, we used the three algorithms referred to in Section 3.4. We obtained 8.9% and 30.1% by using Smith-Waterman and Needleman-Wunsch algorithms, respectively. By using the Unified algorithm, which is the average value of the two algorithms, we obtained the highest result, 38.4%.

Figure 4 indicates the classification accuracy with the three algorithms. According to Figure 4, when we take care of classification within the Top 3, the classification accuracy exceeds 60%. This result shows the feasibility of our method by improving our algorithm.

4.3 Discussion of Classification Results

The results of our experiment show that malware can be classified on the basis of network flow sequence with sequence alignment.

First, we have examined the impact of cluster k on the classification accuracy. Figure 5 shows the accuracy of each rank for when the cluster k changed from



Table 9: Classification Accuracy (%).

Algorithm	Smith	Needleman	Unified
Accuarcy	8.9	30.1	38.4
Smith: Smith-W	Vaterman A	lgorithm	
Needleman: Ne	edleman W	Junsch Algorith	m

Needleman: Needleman-Wunsch Algorithm Unified: Unified Algorithm

6 to 11. As shown in Figure 5, there is no significant impact on the accuracy under the difference on k. This means that our clustering of flow is stable.

From Table 7, the majority of families have a few samples. On the other hand, Trojan.Yakes accounts for almost half the samples. Also, some families, such as Trojan.Yakes (14) and Trojan-Ransom.Foreign (19), have much larger numbers of samples than the other families. This is because the dataset that we used is real malware collected from October 2013 to March 2014, focusing on specific distribution of malware samples. For future work, we will complement the distribution of malware samples.

As the results in Table 9 show, the highest classification accuracy was obtained by the Unified algorithm, which is the average value of the two algorithms and not the method using only one algorithm. This shows that using the Unified algorithm can overcome the shortcomings of the two algorithms. We obtained a low accuracy, less than 40%, which we must devise measures to improve. This should be solved by improving the algorithm to take advantage of the accuracy in the Top 3 rankings shown in Figure 4.

Finally, the method needs to be improved to classify unknown malware. In this study, we performed experiments with only the known families. For future work, we need to improve the classification method for new malware.

5 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we proposed a malware classification method based on sequence pattern generated by network flow of malware samples. The goal was to classify malware only by using its network behavior. The method begins by extracting flow data from traffic extracted by a dynamic analyser of malware. We extract features of flow and cluster them by a K-means algorithm. On the basis of the clustering result, the sequence patterns are generated. These patterns represent the network behavior of a malware family. Finally, we classify the malware's behavior by using a sequence alignment algorithm. Although our experiment is preliminary, its results show that it can classify new types of malware into appropriate families as their variants.

Our future work will focus on studying the classification of unknown malware against known malware families using network behaviors. We intend to continue developing and testing the classification system, while expending our malware samples and refining our classification algorithm. We are also going to compare our method with other classification systems that use malware behavior. Our classification method has the potential to accurately analyse malware behavior, which should assist developers of antimalware software to catch up with the rapid evolution of malware.

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