A Preliminary Application of Generalized Fault Trees to Security

Daniele Codetta-Raiteri

2013

Abstract

Fault trees (FT) are widespread models in the field of reliability, but they lack of modelling power. So, in the literature, several extensions have been proposed and introduced specific new modelling primitives. Attack trees (AT) have gained acceptance in the field of security. They follow the same notation of standard FT, but they represent the combinations of actions necessary for the success of an attack to a computing system. In this paper, we extend the AT formalism by exploiting the new primitives introduced in the FT extensions. This leads to more accurate models. The approach is applied to a case study: the AT is exploited to represent the attack mode and compute specific quantitative measures about the system security.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Codetta-Raiteri D. (2013). A Preliminary Application of Generalized Fault Trees to Security . In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2013) ISBN 978-989-8565-73-0, pages 609-614. DOI: 10.5220/0004612606090614


in Bibtex Style

@conference{secrypt13,
author={Daniele Codetta-Raiteri},
title={A Preliminary Application of Generalized Fault Trees to Security},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2013)},
year={2013},
pages={609-614},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0004612606090614},
isbn={978-989-8565-73-0},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Security and Cryptography - Volume 1: SECRYPT, (ICETE 2013)
TI - A Preliminary Application of Generalized Fault Trees to Security
SN - 978-989-8565-73-0
AU - Codetta-Raiteri D.
PY - 2013
SP - 609
EP - 614
DO - 10.5220/0004612606090614