

INFORMATION SECURITY IN HEALTH CARE

Evaluation with Health Professionals

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Abstract: Information security in health care is a topic of much debate. Various technical and means-end oriented approaches have been presented over the years, yet have not shown to be sufficient. This paper outlines an alternative view and approaches medical information security from a health professional's perspective. The Information Security Employee's Evaluation (ISEE) is presented to evaluate and discuss medical information security with health professionals. The ISEE instrument consists of seven dimensions: priority, responsibility, incident handling, functionality, communication, supervision and training and education. The ISEE instrument can be used to better understand health professional's perception, needs and problems when dealing with information security in practice. Following the design science approach, the ISEE instrument was validated within a focus group of security experts and pilot tested as workshops across five hospital departments in two medical centers. Although the ISEE instrument has by no means the comprehensiveness of existing security standards, we do argue that the instrument can provide valuable insights for both practitioners and research communities.

1 INTRODUCTION

Information security is involved with guaranteeing the availability, integrity and confidentiality of information (Stamp, 2006). In health care, correct and in-time medical information is needed to provide high quality care. Unavailable or unreliable information can have serious consequences for patients, such as incorrect or delayed treatment. Also, since this type of information is uttermost sensitive, protecting the patient's privacy is another major security objective. From a health professional's point of view, information security aspects concern issues such as in-time access to medical information during consultation, fast recovery during system downtime and assurance of data integrity.

Throughout the years different perspectives on information security have been described. Nonetheless, it is often the technical perspective that has been the main area of interest. Checklists, standards and risk analysis are by far the most discussed methods within this perspective. The general idea behind these meth-

ods is to identify all possible threats to information and information systems, and to propose solutions. Examples are the UNIX security checklists or the ISO/IEC 27002 standard for information security (International Organization for Standardization, 2005).

In contrast to the technical perspective, social or human perspectives (Ashenden, 2008) are user-centric and concentrate on user-related needs and problems with information security. Examples of user-related issues are lack of knowledge on privacy; lack of computer training and problems with retrieving data when needed.

Recent research subscribes the need for a more social approach to information security (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001) (Siponen, 2005). Part of this approach is to enlighten on the human and cultural elements of information security (Williams, 2008) (Gaunt, 2000). Another part is, since the increase in vulnerabilities and complexity to health information systems nowadays, to create methods to involve health professionals actively within the domain of information security. (Ferreira et al., 2010), for exam-

ple, actively involve health professionals to the design and enhancement of access control policies to electronic medical record systems.

Referring to the aspects of information security, there also seems to be a tendency towards the confidentiality aspect, overshadowing the other two: availability and integrity. Barber, for instance, states that “the issues of integrity and availability will probably deserve more attention than the issues of confidentiality as medical information systems became more inter-twined with clinical practice” (Barber, 1998).

This paper focuses on all aspects of medical information security seen from a health professional’s point of view. The aim of the research is to build an instrument to evaluate and discuss security of patient information with health professionals. The developed instrument, named ISEE (Information Security Employee’s Evaluation), can be used to better understand user’s perception, needs and problems.

The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section reviews related work. The third section briefly describes the research approach. The fourth section describes the development of the ISEE instrument. Subsequently, the fifth section describes the validity and appliance of ISEE. The sixth and final section discusses contributions, limitations and future research for this study.

2 RELATED WORK

It is widely recognized that information security is much more than technology. (Williams, 2008) states that information security is not a technical problem but mostly a human one. Williams identifies poor implementation of security controls, lack of relevant knowledge and inconsistencies between principles and practice as key issues. Williams also states that a trusting hospital environment undermines the need for proper supervision. In a culture of trust, confidence in medical practice staff is high, resulting in little scrutiny of Internet usage, no policy on changing passwords and unmonitored access to clinical records. Fernando and Dawson (Fernando and Dawson, 2009) show similar findings: poor quality training and the hospital environment are constraints on effective information security. Additionally, they argue that wrongly implemented security controls can result in workarounds such as the sharing of passwords or the usage of written clinical notes in case of systems downtime. Security controls often take time from patient care (i.e. logging out of a system). Health professionals are skeptic about such controls that form a constraint on their daily work and that

could, in the worse case, harm the patient. In a complex environment where sensitive information is routinely recorded, spread and used it is a challenge to guarantee the availability, confidentiality and integrity of information.

As indicated in the introduction, most evaluation methods of information security are technical and risk based. Our aim is to evaluate information security with health professionals and for this purpose we desire a different type of evaluation. In the discipline of information security such a comprehensive type of evaluation does not exist yet. Most existing instruments are prescriptive (i.e. how should end-user perform?) and focus strongly on the confidentiality aspect. We, therefore, adapt an instrument from the health care domain. The instrument, named the Manchester Patient Safety Framework (University of Manchester and National Patient Safety Agency, 2006), is used to discuss the physical safety of patients with health professionals. The following subsection gives a short overview of this Patient Safety evaluation instrument.

2.1 The MaPSaF Instrument

The Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF) is an instrument to help health care teams assess the safety of patients. Assessment with the instrument is carried out in workshops, led by a facilitator from the health care organization. The workshops start by letting each health professional individually rate dimensions of the patient safety instrument. Dimensions of this instrument are, for example, staff education and investigation of patient safety incidents. Each dimension can be given a score, ranging from low (pathologic) to very high (generative). If, for example, a nurse thinks that staff education is lacking to ‘safely’ perform her daily job, she can fill out a low score. The next part of the workshop is concerned with the comparison of score of the dimensions between participants. Subsequently, a large part is dedicated to a plenary discussion about the low scoring dimensions and about what can be improved within the team or organization. If possible, participants are encouraged to create an action plan to improve the team’s safety practices. The primary purpose of the instrument is not merely to measure safety but to discuss safety with employees. We have adapted MaPSaF for the purpose of evaluating information security. The next section describes what methods we followed to translate MaPSaF to information security.

3 RESEARCH APPROACH

To adapt MaPSaF for evaluating medical information security, we used the design science approach (Hevner et al., 2004). The design science approach consists of two main steps, namely (1) the development and (2) the validation of an artifact. In our case, the artifact is the ISEE instrument. For the adaptation of the MaPSaF instrument and development of the ISEE instrument we performed a literature study. A large part of the literature study was dedicated to construct the evaluation ‘dimensions’ of the instrument. Validation of the instrument was performed within a focus group of security experts and within a pilot study at five hospital departments. Section 4 and 5 explain these steps, and how we performed these steps, in more detail.

4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISEE INSTRUMENT

As said, based on the MaPSaF instrument we constructed the ISEE instrument. We adapted similar elements of MaPSaF for the purpose to evaluate information security with health professionals. In short, ISEE consists of the following elements:

1. A maturity framework to discuss the level of security.
2. A variety of dimensions to rate information security according to this maturity framework.
3. Evaluation with employees in the form of a workshop.

4.1 Maturity Scale

In the MaPSaF instrument, health professionals can rate safety dimensions according to a maturity framework. We copied this framework almost entirely to information security with some slight changes in the terminology. The framework was originally developed by (Westrum, 1993), and was later extended by Reason (Reason, 1993) and Parker and Hudson (Parker and Hudson, 2001). The framework consists of five maturity levels: pathologic, reactive, bureaucratic, proactive and generative. Pathologic is defined as a situation where safety (or security) practices are the barest industry minimum. There is no top level commitment to the pursuit of safety (or security) goals. Reactive is an attitude where changes are implemented after incidents or problems occur. Bureaucratic is a situation where a lot is formalized on paper, but practically a lot is failing. In contrast,

proactive and generative are the opposite of these situations. Table 1 shows an overview of these levels. Health professionals can rate continuously with this scale: they can, for example, rate a dimension as between reactive and bureaucratic (or as 2,5).

Table 1: Information security maturity level descriptions.

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Score 1: Pathologic | “Why waste our time on information security?” |
| Score 2: Reactive | “We act when we have an incident” |
| Score 2: Bureaucratic | “We have systems in place to manage risks” |
| Score 4: Proactive | “We are alert on security related risks” |
| Score 5: Generative | “Information security is a part of everything we do” |

4.2 Evaluation Dimensions

Patient safety dimensions were not directly applicable for information security. The security dimensions were, therefore, initially based on a literature review. At first we identified over 30 user-related (i.e. lack of knowledge, poor security implementation, unusable security controls, workarounds) security issues. Since it was not feasible to include each of these issues individually in this type of evaluation, we decided to increase the level of abstraction. We provide a list of seven dimensions: priority, responsibility, incident handling, functionality of security, communication, supervision and training and education. Table 2 provides a general overview of these dimensions. The table also shows how we mapped various security issues from our literature study to a dimension. Though security involves many more topics than discussed within the evaluation (i.e. network control or protection against viruses), our perspective is restricted to those security issues that were relevant to health professionals.

4.3 Workshop Set-up and Participants

Evaluation of patient safety with the MaPSaF instrument occurs in a two-hour workshop. The participants are a crosscut of a hospital department. Among these participants are managers, doctors, nurses, technicians and other supporting staff. In that way, different perspectives of the subject are highlighted. The workshops are conducted by a sequence of steps defined in a standard protocol. The workshop set-up and protocol of MaPSaF was left the same for ISEE. The following list shows the sequence of steps:

1. Individual evaluation: participants fill out the evaluation individually.

Table 2: Information Security Employee's Evaluation (ISEE) dimensions.

| Dimension | Description | Information security issues |
|------------------------|--|---|
| Priority | How important is security (availability, integrity and confidentiality) of patient information? What is done to provide optimal security? | Lack of time (Fernando and Dawson, 2009) (Nosworthy, 2000) (Williams, 2008), cost (Williams, 2008), the hospital environment (Fernando and Dawson, 2009), conflicting demands (Gaunt, 2000) and productivity (Fernando and Dawson, 2009) |
| Handling of incidents | Is the importance of reporting incidents (system failure, confidentiality breaches, unsafe systems) recognized? What is done with the report of an incident? | Lack of incident reporting and handling (Nosworthy, 2000) and response (OECD, 2002) |
| Responsibility | Who or what is responsible for medical information security? | Attitude and ignorance (Williams, 2008) (Gaunt, 2000), lack of awareness and responsibility (Nosworthy, 2000) (OECD, 2002), skepticism (Fernando and Dawson, 2009), data fragmentation (Fernando and Dawson, 2009) and underestimation of threats (Nosworthy, 2000) |
| Functionality | Is security supported in daily working routines? Do health care professional think this works well? | Usability (Fernando and Dawson, 2009) (Ferreira et al., 2010), Workarounds (Fernando and Dawson, 2009), poor implementation (Williams, 2008), inadequate systems (Gaunt, 2000) and security design (OECD, 2002) |
| Communication | How is the communication about medical information security? Do health care professionals know what is expected? | Communication (Nosworthy, 2000), communication and feedback (Kraemer and Carayon, 2005) and inconsistent policies and communication (Gaunt, 2000) |
| Supervision | Is the correct usage of medical information examined? | Audit and supervision (Fernando and Dawson, 2009), trust (Williams, 2008), ethics (OECD, 2002), reward, punishment and hiring practices (Kraemer and Carayon, 2005) |
| Training and education | What about the knowledge around medical information security? Do health care professionals know how to act? | Training shortcomings (Fernando and Dawson, 2009) (Kraemer and Carayon, 2005), lack of knowledge (Williams, 2008), capability and education (Williams, 2008), (Nosworthy, 2000) |

2. Work in pairs: participants discuss their perceptions with another participant. They are encouraged to explain their scores and exchange anecdotes and personal experiences.
3. Group discussion: general discussion about strength, weaknesses and differences in perceptions.
4. Action planning: the creation of an action plan for weak security issues.

5 VALIDATING THE ISEE INSTRUMENT

Validation of the ISEE instrument was examined from two perspectives, namely (1) through a focus group with security experts, and (2) through a pilot study to actually apply ISEE in the field at hospital departments.

5.1 Focus Group

We conducted a focus group with security experts to further enhance ISEE. A focus group is a form of a group interview that capitalizes communication between participants to generate data (Pope et al., 2006).

A focus group was chosen to stimulate discussion between experts. Focus groups encourage people to talk to one another, ask questions, exchange anecdotes and comment on each others' experiences and points of views. By these means, focus groups are considered to have high face validity (Pope et al., 2006). The purpose of focus group was:

- to determine whether the proposed instrument could be useful to organizations (usefulness).
- to validate the instrument: Do participants understand the concepts? Have we overseen important user related security issues? Do they think the instrument is valid (face validity)?
- to evaluate the willingness to use the instrument

and the set-up requirements (time and people) of the instrument (feasibility).

Table 3: Focus group participants.

| Function | Hospital |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| Security Officer | LUMC (Leiden) |
| Security Officer | Erasmus MC (Rotterdam) |
| Staff employee IT | UMC Utrecht |
| Security Officer | AMC (Amsterdam) |
| Security Officer | UMC Nijmegen |
| IT Auditor | UMC Nijmegen |
| Security Officer | UMC Groningen |
| IT manager | LUMC (Leiden) |
| IT Security Officer | UMC Utrecht |

The type of focus group we used was a dual moderating focus group. One moderator ensured that the session ran smoothly (i.e. involving each participant and cutting irrelevant issues). The other moderator observed behavior, took notes, and ensured all relevant topics were covered. The participating experts were able to respond freely during the session.

Participants were able to understand the concepts and recognized the differences between levels. For instance, in case supervision is reactive or proactive at a hospital department. It was argued, however, that a higher maturity is not a goal in itself. Discussion should be the primary goal of ISEE. Participants argued that there was no need to reach consensus within a workshop. Discussion should be based on the differences between scores. The participants argued that two dimensions should be further defined. The dimension *Functionality* should not only incorporate functionality of access security controls, but also incorporate functionality of information systems regarding availability. Supervision should also include issues about staff management such as hiring employees.

The experts acknowledged that evaluation should occur in a small group, preferably a department or team. Participating health care workers should be a crosscut of a hospital department. For feasibility reasons it was suggested to condense the workshop time into one and a half hour. To simplify the evaluation, each dimension should be provided with a few examples per maturity level.

The results of the focus group were incorporated in the instrument and verified by the experts through mail inquiry. Table 4 shows the ISEE instrument with abbreviated examples.

5.2 Pilot Study

The ISEE instrument was pilot tested during five workshops of one and a half our each. The workshops were held at five hospital departments in two university medical centers in the Netherlands. The participants of each of these workshop are listed in Table 6. The goal of the workshops was to test if the instrument is applicable in a practical setting. At each workshop the face validity and feasibility of the instrument were investigated. We asked the participants if they found the evaluation useful and if they thought the scope of information security was covered. Feasibility concerned boundary conditions such as the amount of time. Since the instrument is not a pure measurement instrument validation was kept qualitative. The original instrument, MaPSaF, was also validated in this nature. Additionally, we performed some descriptive statistics on the scores given by the participants. Table 5 shows an example of calculated metrics including floor and ceiling values. These statistics were used to reconstruct what was said during the workshops. Each workshop was evaluated individually. Comments made during workshops were used to enhance the ISEE instrument. Due to paper length constraints, we only discuss one of the workshops in more detail.

5.2.1 One Workshop Highlighted

One of the workshops was held at a Radiotherapy department. There was a total of seven participants. See Table 6 for an overview of participants and Table 5 for the descriptive statistics over the scores. The lowest scoring dimensions were *Supervision* and *Training and education*. The highest scoring dimensions were *Responsibility* and *Handling of incidents*. Most standard deviations of the dimensions indicate an acceptable distribution of responses. Handling of incidents and supervision show the highest variance. Management of the radiotherapy department was very positive on handling of security incidents, which explains the variance. The range of scores on supervision is also broad. Management was also more positive towards this dimension than direct health care workers. The difference in perception brought to light that access control mechanism were not fully implemented.

Most participants prioritize the availability and sharing of information. This may have consequences on the confidentiality aspects. Most participants agreed that more awareness on confidentiality of patient information is desirable. Some even came up with a proposal, such as introducing privacy concerns to new employees or to make ‘confidentiality and electronic medical records’ a recurrent theme. The

Table 4: The ISEE instrument with abbreviated examples.

| Dimension | 1: Pathologic | 2: Reactive | 3: Bureaucratic | 4: Proactive | 5: Generative |
|--|--|--|---|--|---|
| Priority: how important is security (availability, integrity and confidentiality of patient information)? | Risks are not recognized | After incidents there is an increase in priority | Now and then plans are made for improvements | Plans are made and evaluated | Employees are involved, security is a management cycle |
| Incident handling: is the importance of reporting incidents (system failure, confidentiality breaches, unsafe systems) recognized? | It is not clear how and where incidents should be reported | Incidents are handled unstructured and on ad-hoc basis | There is a formal reporting systems, but is not fully implemented | Incidents are handled swiftly. | Trend analysis takes place to prevent incidents for future happenings |
| Responsibility: who or what is responsible for medical information security? | Information security is not my responsibility | Security is something management does | Security is about defining roles and responsibilities | Security is everybody's concern. | Employees know how to enhance security |
| Functionality: do systems support security in daily working routines? | Functionality comes with the systems | Temporary solutions are constructed | Needed system security functionality is planned | Systems work correctly and new improvements are considered | Systems fully support the process of care! |
| Communication: how is the communication about medical information security? | There is no possibility to discuss concerns | Communication is one way | Communication is paper work | Communication is a two-way process | Employees are aware and have a questioning attitude |
| Supervision: is the correct usage of medical information examined? | Incorrect usage has no consequences | Sanction are taken by severe shortcomings | Most of procedures are in place | Evaluation of behavior is done on periodic basis | Management and employees are widely involved on this topic |
| Training and education: do health care professionals know how to act? | Employees should not be bothered with security | Training is done if it is an absolute necessity | Training is highlighted, but not enforced | Employees are encouraged to participate | Training is part of the day-to-day job |

Table 5: Workshop II: Radiotherapy (scores are based on 7 participants).

| INSTR. Dimensions | Mean (1-5) | Std | Range (1-5) | Floor (x) | Ceiling (x) |
|------------------------|------------|------|-------------|-----------|-------------|
| Priority | 3,21 | 0,69 | 2-4 | 0 | 0 |
| Handling of incidents | 3,42 | 0,93 | 2-5 | 0 | 1 |
| Responsibility | 3,29 | 0,57 | 2,5-4 | 0 | 0 |
| Functionality | 2,71 | 0,57 | 2-3,5 | 0 | 0 |
| Communication | 2,93 | 0,84 | 2-4 | 0 | 0 |
| Supervision | 2,57 | 0,98 | 1-4 | 1 | 0 |
| Training and education | 1,93 | 0,45 | 1-2,5 | 1 | 0 |

discussion also brought forward that many security issues (such as automatic logging out of systems) can be easily implemented. However, a reactive attitude causes that this does not happen. As one participants stated: "things should go wrong, before something eventually happens".

Furthermore, a variety of contemporary issues were discussed. Amongst these were:

- Unavailability of patient's status information.
- Slow security incident handling according to some health care workers.
- Poor integration with another system which made

it impossible to write down medical information.

- The transition towards electronic medical records systems made that information was scattered (partly digital and partly on paper).

Based on these differences between experiences regarding the supervision and functionality dimensions the department created an action plan. Participants considered the workshop useful to discuss information security. Most participants encouraged the multidisciplinary setup to discuss different perceptions on information security. Some participants, however, considered the instrument to be a bit man-

Table 6: An overview of all participants in the pilot study and their associated scores.

| Department and participants | P | I | R | F | C | S | T |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Workshop I: Radiology | | | | | | | |
| Quality Assurance Officer | 2,5 | 3 | 2 | 3,5 | 2 | 2 | 2,5 |
| Doctor | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3,5 | 2 | 3 | 1,5 |
| Doctor | 2,5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Head Front Office | 3 | 2,5 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Front Office Secretary | 2 | 3,5 | 3 | 2,5 | 1,5 | 2,5 | 2 |
| Team Leader Front Office | 2 | 2,5 | 4 | 3,5 | 1,5 | 2,5 | 2 |
| IT system controller | 2,5 | 2,5 | 4 | 2,5 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Unit head Angiography | 3 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2,5 |
| Workshop II: Radiotherapy | | | | | | | |
| Manager Quality Assurance | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 |
| Manager Department | 3 | 5 | 3,5 | 2,5 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Doctor | 4 | 3,5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Head of Laboratory | 3,5 | 3,5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2,5 |
| Laboratory worker | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Laboratory worker | 3 | 2 | 2,5 | 3,5 | 2,5 | 3 | 2 |
| Front Office / secretary | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Workshop III: Skin Diseases | | | | | | | |
| Chef de Clinique | 3 | 3,5 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| Medical Head doctors | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Head of secretary | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3,5 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Medical secretary | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3,5 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Doctor | 3 | 2,5 | 3,5 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Doctor | 3 | 4,5 | 3 | 4 | 3,5 | 2 | 3 |
| Doctor | 3 | 3,5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Doctor | 2,5 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2,5 | 4 |
| Photographer | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Nurse | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| Workshop IV: Hematology and Short Stay | | | | | | | |
| Head Nursing | 2,5 | 2,5 | 3,5 | 3 | 2,5 | 2,5 | 3 |
| Team Leader Nurses | 3 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 2 | 2 | 1,5 |
| Senior Nurse | 2,5 | 2 | 3,5 | 2,5 | 3,5 | 5 | 3,5 |
| Senior Nurse | 4 | 3,5 | 4 | 3,5 | 4 | 3 | 4,5 |
| Medical secretary | 3,5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2,5 | 3,5 | 2 |
| Medical secretary | 3,5 | 3 | 3,5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| Team Leader / Senior nurse | 3,5 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3,5 |
| Stem cell coordinator / nurse | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3,5 | 3 | 3,5 |
| Workshop V: Urology | | | | | | | |
| Head nursing | 2,5 | 2,5 | 3 | 2 | 3,5 | 1,5 | 2 |
| Team leader urology | 2,5 | 2,5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| IT coordinator | 3 | 4 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 3,5 | 2,5 | 3 |
| Doctor's assistant | 4 | 3,5 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2,5 | 2,5 |
| Nurse | 2,5 | 3,5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Secretary | 3,5 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3,5 | 2 | 2 |
| Doctor's assistant/secretary | 2,5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| P=priority, I=incident handling R=responsibility, F=functionality, C=communication, S=supervision, T=training and education 1=pathologic, 2=reactive, 3=bureaucratic, 4=proactive, 5=generative | | | | | | | |

agerial. Some participants suggested to remove all managerial examples.

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Health professionals are the first in line to experience disturbances with the availability and integrity of patient information. Furthermore, concerning the confidentiality of information, they play an important role

in the protection of such information. Based on the MaPSaF instrument, that discusses the safety of patients, we constructed the Information Security Employee's Evaluation (ISEE) to evaluate information security with health care workers.

Overall, this pilot study showed that the instrument is useful to:

- Discuss medical information security within a hospital department.
- Identify and discuss weak and strong points.
- Discuss different perceptions on information security between employees.

A workshop can best be held at one single department (i.e. an outpatient clinic or nursing department). At Workshop IV two departments participated. Some security issues that were problematic at one department (availability of electronic nursing records) were never heard of at the other department. It was interesting to see such differences between departments. It is, however, hard to discuss and identify single points for improvements with such diverse groups. We, therefore, recommend using the evaluation within a single department.

The multidisciplinary set-up of participants highlighted various perceptions on information security. For instance, Workshop III indicated that management had a very positive view on incident handling. Further discussion however, showed that staff had no idea how to report problems, and even when they did, they were not pleased with the department's solving skills. At Workshop II the multidisciplinary set-up even took care of some quick fixes: A doctor indicated that during night shift, magnetic resonance information about patients was not available. An employee of the IT supportive staff argued that this was an unknown issue, yet provided a quick solution.

Reflecting on all five workshops of the pilot study, we found that the dimensions priority and responsibility show the least amount of variance and range of scores. These dimensions, since they relate to attitude, might suffer social desirability bias. Floor effects occurred most frequently at the dimensions functionality and supervision. A majority of these low scores was explained by the participants. Ceiling scores were only given by management staff. Overall, management gave relatively higher scores than direct health care workers which might indicate a too optimistic view by management.

For future purposes, it might be interesting to further develop the instrument and apply it as a measurement instrument in a survey-format. Dimensions can be further defined with specific characteristics. To give an example, the dimension training and educa-

tion could be further defined on the issues 'knowledge of privacy legislation', 'knowledge of information security' and 'knowledge on how to use security controls'. Such refinement makes the instrument more applicable for actual measurement within a hospital environment. Further work, then, will be needed to address these characteristics specifically. Also, such a measurement instrument, gives opportunities to examine in greater depth the instrument's psychometric properties including measures of internal consistency, reliability and construct validity.

This research has shown that the ISEE instrument can effectively assist health professionals in their efforts to improve information security within their hospital departments. The ISEE instrument has by no means the comprehensiveness and completeness of existing standards or other security checklists. We do, however, argue that the instrument and the human perspective can provide additional insights. Implementing secure systems does involve health care workers, both in respect of functional security controls as in human characteristics such as awareness, responsibility and knowledge.

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