

# IMPLEMENTATION OF A HYBRID INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM USING FUZZYJESS

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Keywords: Fuzzy logic, data mining, intrusion detection.

Abstract: This paper describes an implementation of a fuzzy inference engine that is part of a Hybrid Fuzzy Logic Intrusion Detection System. A data-mining algorithm is used offline to capture features of interest in network traffic and produce fuzzy-logic rules. Using an inference engine, the intrusion detection system evaluates these rules and gives network administrators indications of the firing strength of the ruleset. The inference engine implementation is based on the Java Expert System Shell (Jess) from Sandia National Laboratories and FuzzyJess available from the National Research Council of Canada. Examples and experimental results using data sets from MIT Lincoln Laboratory demonstrate the potential of the approach.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

A significant challenge in providing an effective defense mechanism to a network perimeter is detecting intrusions and implementing countermeasures. Components of the network perimeter defense capable of detecting intrusions are referred to as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Typically, an IDS uses boolean logic in determining whether or not an intrusion is detected. More recently, the use of fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1984) (Zadeh, 1988) has been investigated as an alternative to boolean logic in the design and implementation of these systems. Fuzzy logic techniques have been successfully employed in the computer security field since the early 90's (Ovchinnikov, 1994) and provides a sound foundation to handle imprecision and vagueness as well as mature inference mechanisms using varying degrees of truth (Hosmer, 1993). Because boundaries are not always clearly defined, fuzzy logic can be used to identify patterns or behavior variations (Gomez and Dasgupta, 2002). This is accomplished by building an IDS that combines fuzzy logic rules with an expert system capable of evaluating rule truthfulness. This combination results in an IDS capable of applying fuzzy logic reasoning to incoming data streams. Our approach uses an optimized deterministic algorithm together with a preprocessor to help reduce the amount of data that needs to be analyzed by the inference engine.




Figure 1: System Architecture

## 2 ARCHITECTURE

The Hybrid Fuzzy Logic IDS architecture (see Figure 1) has two modes of operation: rule-generation and detection. When operating in the rule-generation mode, the system processes network data and uses a fuzzy data mining algorithm to generate rules. A subset of the rules produced by the data mining algorithm is used as a model for the input data. The detection mode uses this rule subset for intrusion detection.

The Preprocessor is responsible for accepting raw packet data and producing records. This component is used in both modes and is capable of reading packets from the wire or a tcpdump file. The output consists of records, each containing aggregate information for

each packet group. Using records and concentrating only on attributes of interest greatly helps in reducing the amount of information used by more computationally intensive components of the architecture. Specifically, records (and not packets) are used by the inference engine in our system to evaluate fuzzy rules.

The Data Miner implements a variation of Kuok's (Kuok et al., 1998) algorithm that allows for efficient, single-pass, record processing by partitioning data into hierarchical files to produce output rules. Candidate rules are expressed in terms of *itemsets*, a grouping of relevant attributes. In order to minimize the potentially large number of candidate rules, the algorithm uses the concept of *large itemsets* to maximize the expressive power of the rule. Our implementation integrates the *Apriori* and Kuok's algorithms and is capable of discovering association rules for binary, categorical and numerical attributes. The final output of the algorithm is a set of fuzzy rules. Rules are expressed as a logic implication  $p \rightarrow q$  where  $p$  is the antecedent and  $q$  is the consequence.

The fuzzy inference engine implements fuzzy logic reasoning to evaluate the truthfulness of the incoming records against the rules produced by the Data Miner. Its implementation is the focus of this paper and a more detailed description follows.

### 3 IMPLEMENTATION

The Fuzzy Inference Engine (Figure 1) makes use of FuzzyJess (Orchard, 2001), a rule based expert system shell that integrates the functionality of the FuzzyJ Toolkit (Orchard, 2001) with Jess (Friedman-Hill, 2004). The FuzzyJ Toolkit allows the expression of fuzzy reasoning within the Java environment and Jess provides a Java-based rule-engine in which rules can be applied to data.

Jess, the Java expert system shell and scripting language developed by Sandia National Laboratories, can be used as either a general-purpose programming language or as a rule-engine to efficiently apply rules to data. Rule-based expert systems developed in Jess can be firmly linked to Java code. Jess rules allow for reasoning about knowledge that is expressed as facts. These facts and rules, though, cannot handle the imprecision and uncertainty that often abounds in real-life applications.

The National Research Council of Canada developed The FuzzyJ Toolkit, a Java API that extends Jess to allow reasoning about some forms of uncertainty through the use of fuzzy sets and fuzzy reasoning. Fuzzy concepts are represented in the FuzzyJ Toolkit using the keywords **FuzzyVariable**, **FuzzySet**, and **FuzzyValue**. A **FuzzyVariable** describes a general fuzzy concept (Zadeh, 1975). It consists




Figure 2: Fuzzy variable

of a name (*TCP*), its units (*NumberOfPackets*), a range ( $[0, 100]$ ), and a set of terms that describe specific fuzzy concepts for this variable. These fuzzy terms are defined using a term name (*Average* or *AboveAverage*) together with a fuzzy set.

A **FuzzySet** (Zadeh, 1965) identifies the degree of membership of the term over the range of the fuzzy variable. Figure 2 illustrates the use of fuzzy sets to describe the fuzzy variable *TCP* over  $[0,1]$  using three fuzzy term sets. Thus, the fuzzy variable *TCP* is a measure of the number of TCP packets received within a certain time frame. All values that *TCP* can assume must fall into at least one of those fuzzy sets.

Membership functions (Zadeh, 1965) map each object in the fuzzy set to a real number in the interval  $[0,1]$ . Fuzzy membership functions are used to evaluate degrees of membership for each category or term. Thus, the membership function  $f_A(x)$  produces a value that indicates the truth value of  $x$  in the term  $A$ . For instance, in Figure 2,  $f_{BelowAverage}(0.2) = 70\%$  indicates that a *TCP* value of 0.2 belongs to *BelowAverage* with 70% certainty.

A **FuzzyValue** represents a specific fuzzy concept. The logic of the expert system is expressed in terms of **FuzzyRules**. A **FuzzyRule** holds three sets of **FuzzyValues** representing the *antecedents*, *consequences*, and *input* values of the rule. The antecedents must be *true* before the rule can execute (or fire) and consequences asserted. An example of a fuzzy rule is

**if** TCP is Average **then** SYN is Average

For this rule to fire the *TCP* value needs only to match the fuzzy concept of *Average* to some degree for the antecedent to be true.

Simple fuzzy systems can be created quite easily using the FuzzyJ Toolkit, but larger systems with a greater number and type (fuzzy, crisp, fuzzy-crisp) of rules suggest that a convenient way to encode many types of applications is needed. FuzzyJess is a rule based expert system shell that integrates the fuzzy logic of the FuzzyJ Toolkit with Jess to provide a more robust tool for fuzzy reasoning. The Fuzzy Inference Engine is implemented using FuzzyJess.

The Fuzzy Inference Engine can be used with sample offline data or live traffic. Use of sample data (read




Figure 3: Analysis of fuzzy rules

as records) is useful to test the system and evaluate the validity of the rule base.

The three inputs to the Fuzzy Inference Engine are 1) the configuration parameters that FuzzyJess uses to define the FuzzyVariables; 2) the rules produced by the Data Miner; and 3) the records, which are asserted as facts in FuzzyJess. The three term functions of *Below Average*, *Average*, and *Above Average* were defined for each fuzzy variable using the parameters in the configuration file. The definitions made use of functions within FuzzyJess as indicated: *Below Average*: uses *RightLinearFuzzySet*, *Average*: uses *TrapezoidFuzzySet*, and *Above Average*: uses *LeftLinearFuzzySet*. The Fuzzy Inference Engine uses FuzzyJess to determine the firing strength of each rule applied to each fact. FuzzyJess can be configured to use Mamdani or Larsen inference mechanisms to compute output. The evaluation of rules (see Figure 3) begins with the analysis of the antecedent, *p*. The following cases for *p*:

- *p* does not have a fuzzy match so the rule does not apply to the record and the firing strength is one
- *p* does have a fuzzy match and the analysis of the consequence *q* begins

Note that a fuzzy match occurs when the truth value of the predicate is greater than zero. Similarly, the following cases are considered for the consequence *q*:

- *q* does not have a fuzzy match and the firing strength of the rule is zero
- *q* has a fuzzy match and the firing strength of the rule is determined using Mamdani's inference mechanism.

Fuzzy rules, as produced by the data mining algorithm, model a behavior represented by the data set employed to run the algorithm. The output of the Fuzzy Inference Engine is the firing strength of each rule for a given fact. This firing strength determines whether or not the fact satisfies the modeled behavior. Firing strengths that have a value close to one indicate that observed behavior closely follows the modeled behavior, but when several facts register firing strengths at or close to zero for a given rule, then it is likely that a deviation from the model has been detected (a potential attack).




Figure 4: TCP fuzzy definition




Figure 5: SYN fuzzy definition

## 4 ANALYSIS

The following examples illustrate how three records are processed and rules evaluated by the Fuzzy Inference Engine. Consider the following rule:

**if TCP is Average then SYN is Average**

where the *Average* membership function may be defined differently for each attribute. The input records for the Fuzzy Inference Engine contain values for each attribute in the form of {TCP, SYN}. The first record is {0.591, 0.372}. The Fuzzy Inference Engine evaluates the first record against the rule by beginning with the antecedent; from Figure 4 we observe that  $TCP_{Average}(0.591) = 0.6297$ . Once the antecedent has been evaluated and has a truth value greater than 0.0, then the consequence is evaluated:  $SYN_{Average}(0.372) = 0.8718$  (see Figure 5). Thus, this rule has a firing strength of 0.6297 for this record.

The second record is {0.011, 0.013}. Evaluation of the antecedent shows  $TCP_{Average}(0.011) = 0.0$ . Thus, the rule does not fire, the consequence is not analyzed, and the firing strength of the rule is 1.0 for this record. The third record is {0.266, 0.895}. Therefore,  $TCP_{Average}(0.266) = 1.0$  but  $SYN_{Average}(0.895) = 0.0$ . Thus, the truth value of the rule for this record is 0.0.

The Fuzzy Inference Engine is used to analyze sets of data and the training data used in our experiments correspond to the 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection offline evaluation (Haines et al., 1999) data set as provided by Lincoln Laboratory (MIT, 1999). Data for this experiment was taken during an *ipsweep* (pings on multiple host addresses) attack. More specifically,




Figure 6: Rule output detects *ipsweep* attack

the traffic seen from 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm of the fourth day of the second week. The attack begins at 4:36pm. For the next 5 minutes at least one ping request packet is made from an outside network to each host on an internal segment of the network. This scan drastically increases the number of ICMP packets in the attack time interval. The Preprocessor produced approximately one record per second of data resulting in 3570 records from all of the packets sent during this specific time frame.

The Data Miner produced 31 rules with a 95% confidence value when inspecting normal traffic data, which were sent to the Fuzzy Inference Engine. Note that since these rules model normal behavior, i.e., attack traffic was not used by the Data Miner, the system serves as an anomaly-based IDS. The Fuzzy Inference Engine compared each record against all of the rules and output a listing of the firing strengths of each rule for each record. These firing strengths are used to determine the likelihood that an attack is in process. It took the Fuzzy Inference Engine about 13 minutes to evaluate 3570 records against 31 rules. Thus, it took about 13 minutes to evaluate 60 minutes of offline data. Our current implementation is capable of handling real-time data using time windows (records) in the order of milliseconds. Clearly, smaller time windows would result in greater Fuzzy Inference Engine times as the number of records to be evaluated increases.

Figure 6 shows the firing strength of Rule 2 for attack data (solid line). In light grey, a count of recent records with firing strength below a value of 0.5 is used to provide additional feedback. It is clear from Figure 6 that this rule evidences an attack starting around record 2,100 (see increasing counter value).

## 5 CONCLUSION

FuzzyJess proved to be an invaluable tool during our implementation of a Hybrid Fuzzy Logic Intrusion Detection system. It saved invaluable implementation

time by providing an efficient inference engine that could be easily integrated into our code base. Experimental results show that the amount of time required to process a relatively large number of records against a set of rules allows this prototypical IDS to be used in a real-time environment (for reasonably small time windows). Optimization of the Fuzzy Inference Engine implementation would provide even faster analysis times and quicker attack detection by opening the door to new analysis and visualization techniques. Future work will also concentrate on identifying sets of relevant attributes that will allow detection of a wide variety of attacks.

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