Authors:
Nada El Kassem
1
;
Wouter Hellemans
2
;
Ioannis Siachos
3
;
Edlira Dushku
4
;
Stefanos Vasileiadis
3
;
Dimitrios S. Karas
3
;
Liqun Chen
1
;
Constantinos Patsakis
5
and
Thanassis Giannetsos
3
Affiliations:
1
University of Surrey, Guildford, U.K.
;
2
ES&S, COSIC, ESAT, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
;
3
UBITECH Ltd., Athens, Greece
;
4
Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark
;
5
University of Pireaus, Piraeus, Attiki, Greece
Keyword(s):
Swarm Attestation, Privacy, Direct Anonymous Attestation, Remote Attestation, In-Vehicle Networks.
Abstract:
In modern large-scale systems comprising multiple heterogeneous devices, the introduction of swarm attestation schemes aims to alleviate the scalability and efficiency issues of traditional single-Prover and single-Verifier attestation. In this paper, we propose PRIV´E , a privacy-preserving, scalable, and accountable swarm attestation scheme that addresses the limitations of existing solutions. Specifically, we eliminate the assumption of a trusted Verifier, which is not always applicable in real-world scenarios, as the need for the devices to share identifiable information with the Verifier may lead to the expansion of the attack landscape. To this end, we have designed an enhanced variant of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol, offering traceability and linkability whenever needed. This enables PRIV´E to achieve anonymous, privacy-preserving attestation while also providing the capability to trace a failed attestation back to the compromised device. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper presents the first Universally Composable (UC) security model for swarm attestation accompanied by mathematical UC security proofs, as well as experimental benchmarking results that highlight the efficiency and scalability of the proposed scheme.
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