RESOURCE BOUNDED DECISION-THEORETIC BARGAINING WITH FINITE INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGIES

Paul Varkey, Piotr Gmytrasiewicz

Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of bilateral bargaining under uncertainty. The problem is cast in an interactive decision-theoretic framework, in which the seller and the buyer agents are equipped with the ability to represent and reason with (probabilistic) beliefs about strategically relevant parameters, the other agent’s beliefs, the other agent’s beliefs about the current agent’s beliefs, and so on up to finite levels. The inescapable intractability of solving such models is characterized. We present a realization of the paradigm of (resource) bounded rationality by achieving a trade-off between optimality and efficiency as a function of the discretization resolution of the infinite action space. Memoization is used to further mitigate complexity and is realized here through disk-based caching. In addition, the inevitability of model extinction that arises in such settings is dealt with by indicating an intuitive realization of the absolute continuity condition based on maintaining an ensemble model, for e.g. a random model, that accounts for all actions not already accounted for by other models. Our results clearly demonstrate an operationalizable scheme for devising computationally efficient anytime algorithms on interactive decision-theoretic foundations for modeling (higher-order) epistemic dynamics and sequential decision making in multi agent domains with uncertainty.

References

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Varkey P. and Gmytrasiewicz P. (2011). RESOURCE BOUNDED DECISION-THEORETIC BARGAINING WITH FINITE INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGIES . In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-8425-41-6, pages 219-225. DOI: 10.5220/0003176802190225


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart11,
author={Paul Varkey and Piotr Gmytrasiewicz},
title={RESOURCE BOUNDED DECISION-THEORETIC BARGAINING WITH FINITE INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGIES},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2011},
pages={219-225},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0003176802190225},
isbn={978-989-8425-41-6},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - RESOURCE BOUNDED DECISION-THEORETIC BARGAINING WITH FINITE INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGIES
SN - 978-989-8425-41-6
AU - Varkey P.
AU - Gmytrasiewicz P.
PY - 2011
SP - 219
EP - 225
DO - 10.5220/0003176802190225