Determinants of Bank Performance in Indonesia: Evidence Rural
Banks in Pekanbaru City
Hamdi Agusti*, Syahdanur, and Azwirman
Faculty of Economics, University Islam of Riau, Jl. Kaharuddin Nasution 113 Pekanbaru Riau, 28284, Indonesia.
Keywords: Bank performance, Rural Banks and Return On Assets
Abstract: The purpose of study to find out how big the financial ratios related to Non Performing Loan (NPL), Operating
Expense to Operating Income (OEOI), Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR), and Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in
terms of affecting profitability that occurred in Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City. The population in this study
using Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City since 2012 until 2015. The number of Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City
as many as 19 RB. Of the total population is taken a sample by using purposive sampling method based on
certain criteria. From the sampling criteria can be obtained the number of Rural Banks that meet the criteria
of 13 RB. The result of study that operational risks proxied through BOPO variables have a negative and
significant impact on Return On Assets (ROA), is due to high operational costs of BR is still not working
efficiently, thus lowering ROA. liquidity risk proxied through LDR variable has a positive and significant
impact on profitability BR. This indicates that any increase in LDR will be followed by increased profitability,
where as the amount of credit disbursed increases, the income from such credit will increase so that the bank's
ability to earn profit is also increasing.
1 INTRODUCTION
Poverty reduction is a Rural Bank or hereinafter
referred to as RB. RB as one of the banking
institutions has an important role in supporting the
economy of Indonesia. One role of RB is difficult to
help people who have access to bank lending public
funds so that people do not need to borrow money
from moneylenders.
RB also participate in supporting the development
of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in
Indonesia, which became one of the largest business
sectors in Indonesia, is assisting the government in
job creation. RB role here is to help the development
of SMEs through lending capital raised from public
funds; RB should improve their business
performance. With good financial performance, the
public confidence in the RB as financial institutions
collector and distributor of funds will also be higher.
RB in Indonesia exist in every district. RB has two
systems, namely Islamic banking and conventional
banking. Hence this study will try to identify whether
the bank system pattern will affect the bank
performance. Why the rural bank performance at
Pekanbaru?. These are the questions that the study
wishes to answer.
The development of Rural Banks in Pekanbaru
City is very fast nowadays, because of the increase of
bank units. BR is one of the business entities that
provide banking services to micro, small and medium
enterprises. Increasingly, the increasing credit units,
time deposits, savings deposits, and withdrawals of
funds in the bank, thus raising a risk faced by rural
banks, the risks that may occur are credit risk,
operational risk, and liquidity risk, these risks will
cause losses to the bank if not managed properly.
Based on these developments, people and
investors can measure financial performance through
the financial statements of Rural Banks. The financial
performance of a company is often measured by how
the ability of a company to generate profits. From a
management point of view, the ratio of Retrun On
Assets (ROA) is seen as a useful measure because it
indicates how well the management utilizes the total
resources owned by the company to generate profits.
Profitability ratios used are Return On Assets
(ROA) which is the ratio of net profit before tax to
total assets. The greater the ROA, the greater the
profitability which means the better the company's
performance, the performance of rural banks
experienced fluctuations (not fixed) income or profit
558
Agustin, H., Syahdanur, . and Azwirman, .
Determinants of Bank Performance in Indonesia: Evidence Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City.
DOI: 10.5220/0010046405580563
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of Computer, Environment, Agriculture, Social Science, Health Science, Engineering and Technology (ICEST 2018), pages 558-563
ISBN: 978-989-758-496-1
Copyright
c
2021 by SCITEPRESS Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved
every year. The following data Ratio Profitability
Rural Bank In Pekanbaru City.
Research on the influence of financial ratios on
previous profitability has been done by several other
studies. From the results of this study seen the
difference in the influence of financial ratios to the
level of profit gain. RB looks still cannot maximize
profitability, it is seen from ROA ratio obtained is still
below the minimum limit set by the bank Indonesia is
1.5%. Return On Asset at Rural Banks is currently
experiencing fluctuations from year to year, this is
due to the unstable growth in profit at the Rural Bank.
The decline in earnings in Rural Banks is due to high
credit failure, and the bank's operational expenses are
too large and inefficient.
Therefore, this study aims to find out how big the
financial ratios related to Non Performing Loan
(NPL), Operating Expense to Operating Income
(OEOI), Loan to Deposite Ratio (LDR), and Capital
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in terms of affecting
profitability that occurred in Rural Banks in
Pekanbaru City.
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 Financial Intermediary Theory
The main function of the bank is as a financial
intermediary where the bank will sell a financial
claiming product on the bank such as savings account
and current account. At the same time, banks will also
purchase financial products such as mortgages,
business loans and personal loans. With this activity
the financial transfers occur from units with surplus
funds to units with insufficient funds through
financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries
have advantages over individual or non-financial
companies due to three factors. First, financial
institutions or intermediaries can reduce transaction
costs such as search costs, information costs and
contract costs. The cost of information exists because
there is one party who does not know exactly about
the information related to the other party.
There are two situations of asymmetric
information in financial markets ie adverse selection,
which occurs before a transaction occurs, and the
moral hazard, which arises after a transaction (Allen
& Santomero, 1998). Adverse selection occurs when
the surplus unit has no accurate information regarding
unit deficit. Therefore, the lack of information about
the deficit unit will expose the surplus unit to greater
risk if the surplus unit lend to a deficit unit. Financial
institutions through experience can reduce the
adverse selection problem.
Moral hazard refers to the misuse of the loan
obtained by the deficit unit where the deficit unit will
use the loan for a more risky and different purpose
than the stated purpose of the loan application.
Financial institutions can mitigate moral hazard
problems through loan contracts and oversight over
the operations of deficit units.
The advantage of the second financial institution
is that financial institutions can enjoy economies of
scale as financial institutions have the ability to
handle large and large-scale transactions. Therefore,
financial institutions can reduce the fixed cost for
each unit of output. Thirdly, since financial
institutions have the advantage of evaluating a decent
loan deal, it ensures that the loan issued will have a
lower risk. Furthermore, financial institutions will
manage a large amount of loans. Thus, financial
institutions can diversify their portfolio and thus
reduce the risk of such financial institutions. This is
different from those of non-financial intermediaries
or companies who do not have the skills in assessing
a loan and do not have a large capital to diversify their
portfolio.
2.2 Agency Theory
This section must be in one column.
In the area of study of the influence of ownership
on bank performance, the most frequently used theory
is agency theory. Agency theory describes the
relationship between the owner as a principal and
manager as an agent. The relationship is very
important because it affects the performance of a
bank. Thus the competitiveness of a bank depends
largely on the ability of managers to manage their
respective banks. In addition to the magnitude of the
role of managers in managing the bank in order to
perform well, the role of the bankers is also vital for
monitoring and ensuring that managers are working
hard to advance the bank under its management.
Therefore, in the relationship between the bank
owner and the manager usually there will be a
performance contract where the bank owners are
aligning the interests of the manager with the interests
of the bank's owner. Performance contracts are
formed so that rewards received by managers are
closely linked to bank performance. The contractual
relationship between the owner and the manager is in
line with agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) reveal that the difference
in importance between owners and managers that
creates an agency conflict occurs because the
Determinants of Bank Performance in Indonesia: Evidence Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City
559
manager does not hold company shares or has
insufficient ownership.
The concept of agency as disclosed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) can be seen in the results of the
study of Berger and Bonnaccorsi (2006), Basu et al.
(2007) and Sulivan and Spong (2007) which indicate
that bank owners are handing over to the manager as
an agent to manage the bank. This is because the
owner has difficulty managing the company directly
because of the following factors. First, the size of a
growing bank will be difficult to manage. Second, the
need for specialized expertise to manage large banks
and generally the owners have no such expertise.
Third, bank ownership is determined by the number
of shareholders. If the number of shareholders is too
high and each person holds a small number of shares
then this situation does not allow all owners to
manage the activities of banks effectively.
The manager can be seen as an agent by the bank
owner who appoints them and is authorized and
responsible for making the best decisions in the
interest of shareholders. One way to measure success
and efficiency of managers is to look at the
profitability of the bank. Performance can be
measured through bank's ability to secure a stable
profit while at the same time maintaining shareholder
wealth increase in the company.
Berger and Bonnaccorsi (2006) point out that
managers may ignore the interests of shareholders,
instead paying attention to their interests such as job
continuity, luxury lifestyle, professional membership,
personal vehicle facilities, all of which are borne by
the company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stipulate to
address agency issues, shareholders have incentives
to monitor managers so as to minimize the problem
of principal-agents. However, the level of incentives
depends on shareholder ownership. If the owner holds
a small number of shares, the owner will not have the
incentive to monitor the manager's behavior. This is
because the profit earned by the owner is less than the
cost of supervision. Therefore, it is expected that
private banks, most of which are owned by a family,
will have a better performance compared to
government-owned banks.
For a bank that is largely owned by the family,
conflicts between bank owners and managers are rare.
Arifin (2003) notes that when a majority of the shares
are owned by the family, it reduces the agency's
problems compared to companies owned by many
shareholders. In Indonesia, 90 percent of the
company's shares are owned and operated by a
family. This situation is not much different from other
countries such as Spain (La Porta et al., 1999). Arifin
(2003) states that the advantages of a family owned
and operated company are family members will
manage the company and this will reduce agency
problems. However, because a family is also a
manager of the company, the agency problem will
arise between the family, as a majority shareholder
and a minority shareholder. In addition, according to
Allen et al. (2011) bank capital also affects the
performance of a bank. Due to the large capital of
private banks in Indonesia issued by individuals or
families, they have higher incentives to monitor loans
issued due to bank performance and their wealth will
be affected by repayments
. Government-owned companies may not be
efficiently managed because the board and
management do not hold any shares in the company.
This causes the company's performance to be affected
(Megginson, et al, 1994; Megginson & Netter, 2001).
The agency problem in the context of government
ownership is more complicated as the government
holds shares in the company on behalf of the public
or the people. Since governments are led by
politicians who have no ownership in these
companies, they may not monitor the actions of the
board of directors or management. In addition, the
objective of a politician who leads a government may
differ from an individual who owns a business.
Shleifer (1998) and La Porta et al. (2002) states that
governments tend to meet political goals that may
negatively affect the financial performance of the
company. This view is supported by Paskelian (2006)
and Xu and Wang (1999) stating that the company
becomes inefficient due to an agency problem arising
from government political motives. In addition,
government-owned banks may have lower profits
because they finance a project that does not bring
financial gain but brings social benefits.
The study Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006),
Mashharawi and Al-zu’bi (2009), Barry et al. (2011),
Hoffmann (2011), Gul et al. (2011) and Trujillo-
Ponce (2011) found that the ratio of equity have
negative influence on ROE. This suggests that the
cost of the agency consistent with the theory that the
increased use of debt to increase ROE. Meanwhile
Mashharawi and Al-Zu'bi (2009), Alexiou and
Sofoklis (2009), Sufian (2010), Davydenko (2010),
Sufian and Majid (2010), Barry et al. (2011), Javaid
et al. (2011), Ramadan (2011), Riewsathirathorn et al.
(2011) and Sufian and Habibullah (2012) found that
the ratio of equity have a positive influence on ROA.
This shows the high equity ratio to increase banks'
ability to overcome the loss of assets, including loans,
increase the income of the bankruptcy cost reduction,
higher gain if do offer some product expansion in
profitable bank. High equity can reduce the amount
ICEST 2018 - 3rd International Conference of Computer, Environment, Agriculture, Social Science, Health Science, Engineering and
Technology
560
of outside capital requirement which is higher than
the cost of equity capital to be able to reduce bank
profits.
Sufian (2011) and Trujillo-Ponce (2011) found
that the ratio of loans to assets have positive influence
on ROA and ROE. While Mamatzakis and
Remoundos (2003), Staikouras and Wood (2005),
Fernandez et al. (2005), Trivieri (2007), Mashharawi
and Al-zu’bi (2009) and Gul et al. (2011) found that
the ratio of loans have a positive influence on the
ROA. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000)
Kosmidou et al. (2007), Garcia-Herrero et al. (2009)
and Javaid et al. (2011) found that the ratio of loans
to assets have an influence on ROA.
The findings Beck et al. (2005), Mashharawi and
Al-zu’bi (2009) and Mirzaei et al. (2011) found that
the ratio of operating costs to total assets has a
negative influence on ROA and ROE. Meanwhile
Kosmidou et al. (2007) showed that the ratio of
operating costs to total assets has no influence on
ROA.
3 DATA AND METHODS
The population in this study using Rural Banks in
Pekanbaru City since 2012 until 2015. The number of
Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City as many as 19 RB. Of
the total population is taken a sample by using
purposive sampling method based on certain criteria.
From the sampling criteria can be obtained the
number of Rural Banks that meet the criteria of 13
RB. Multiple linear regression equation as follows:
Y = α + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + ε
Y = ROA
X1 = Credit Risk (NPL)
X2 = Operational Risk (OEOI )
X3 = Liquidity Risk (LDR)
X4 = Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)
ε = ResidualWe hope you find the information in
this template useful in the preparation of your
submission.
4 RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Table 1: The result Regression Dependent Variable: ROA
Mode
l
Unstandardiz
ed
Coefficients
Standardiz
ed
Coefficient
s
t
Sig
.B
Std.
Erro
r
Beta
(Constan
t)
13.21
6
.932
14.18
0
.00
0
NPL
.002 .041 .004 .050
.96
1
OEOI
-.138 .011 -.978
-
12.10
1
.00
0
LDR
.015 .005 .202 3.253
.00
2
CAR
-.016 .019 -.068 -.838
.40
6
Based on the results if statistical data can be seen that
the credit risk proxied through NPL has a positive but
not significant effect on profitability of BR. This
indicates that the RB has other income that can
overcome the losses of NPLs.
Based on the results of processed statistical data
can be seen that operational risks proxied through
OEOI variables have a negative and significant
impact on ROA, is due to high operational costs of
BR is still not working efficiently, thus lowering
ROA. The results of this study in consistent with
previous research is Beck et al. (2005), Mashharawi
and Al-zu'bi (2009) and Mirzaei et al. (2011) Luh and
Ni Luh (2013).
Based on the results of processed statistical data
can be seen that liquidity risk proxied through LDR
variable has a positive and significant impact on
profitability BR. This indicates that any increase in
LDR will be followed by increased profitability,
where as the amount of credit disbursed increases, the
income from such credit will increase so that the
bank's ability to earn profit is also increasing. The
results of this study are consistent with previous
research of Sufian (2011) and Trujillo-Ponce (2011)
found that the ratio of loans to assets have a positive
influence on ROA and ROE. While Mamatzakis and
Remoundos (2003), Staikouras and Wood (2005),
Fernandez et al. (2005), Trivieri (2007), Mashharawi
and Al-zu'bi (2009) and Gul et al. (2011) and Si Luh
and I Gusti (2014).
Based on the results of research, CAR has
negative and insignificant effect on Return On Assets
(ROA). This is caused by the increase in own capital
Determinants of Bank Performance in Indonesia: Evidence Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City
561
cannot increase credit. The results of this study are
inconsistent with previous research such as
Mashharawi and Al-Zu'bi (2009), Alexiou and
Sofoklis (2009), Sufian (2010), Davydenko (2010),
Sufian and Majid (2010), Barry et al. (2011), Javaid
et al. (2011), Ramadan (2011), Riewsathirathorn et al.
(2011), Sufian and Habibullah (2012) and Si Luh and
I Gusti (2014) found that the ratio of equity have a
positive influence on ROA.
5 CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine the Rural Banks in
Pekanbaru City performance of community
development banks in Indonesia from 2012 to 2015.
Our study uncovers interesting results. We find that
the the result of study that Based on the results if
statistical data can be seen that the credit risk proxied
through NPL has a positive but not significant effect
on profitability of BR. Operational risks proxied
through OEOI variables have a negative and
significant impact on Return On Assets (ROA), is due
to high operational costs of BR is still not working
efficiently, thus lowering ROA. liquidity risk proxied
through LDR variable has a positive and significant
impact on profitability BR. This indicates that any
increase in LDR will be followed by increased
profitability, where as the amount of credit disbursed
increases, the income from such credit will increase
so that the bank's ability to earn profit is also
increasing. CAR has negative and insignificant effect
on Return On Assets (ROA). This is caused by the
increase in own capital cannot increase credit.
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