E-SERVICES IN MISSION-CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONS:
IDENTIFICATION ENFORCEMENT
Carlos Costa, José Luís Oliveira, Augusto Silva
Universidade de Aveiro, DET/IEETA, 3810-193 Aveiro, Portugal
Keywords: E-Services Security, E-Commerce, Digital Credentials, Authentication and Identification.
Abstract: The increasing dependency of enterprise on IT has rise up major concerns on security technology and
procedures. Access control mechanisms, which are the core of most security policies, are mostly based on
PIN and, some times, in Public Key Cryptography (PKC). Despite these techniques can be already broadly
disseminated, the storage and retrieval of security secrets is yet a sensitive and open issue for organization
and users. One possible solution can be provided by the utilization of smart cards to store digital certificates
and private keys. However, there are special organizations where even this solution does not solve the
security problems. When users deal with sensible data and it is mandatory to prevent the delegation of
access privileges to third persons new solutions must be provided. In this case the access to the secrets can
be enforced by a three-factor scheme: the possession of the token, the knowledge of a PIN code and the
fingerprint validation. This paper presents a Professional Information Card system that dynamically
combines biometrics with PKC technology to assure a stronger authentication that can be used indistinctly
in Internet and Intranet scenarios. The system was designed to fulfill current mission-critical enterprises
access control requirements, and was deployed, as a proof of concept, in a Healthcare Information System
of a major Portuguese Hospital.
1 INTRODUCTION
Enterprises and organization are increasingly using
network-supported services for personal and
professional tasks, migrating many of traditional
personal interaction to the cyberspace domain. In the
past, almost business and social processes were
based on paper and physical procedures. Nowadays,
these relations are making use of global IT
infrastructures, the Internet.
The new environment offers much more
qui
ckness, optimization and efficiency of work
processes, with huge cost savings. However, it is
important to organizations the understanding of new
security threads and the design and implementation
of secure infrastructures and E-Services. In other
hand, in order to be friendly usable, the user comfort
and convenience are important factor of success of
security technologies.
The consequences of an insecure and inefficient
so
lution can compromise the whole information
system with directly and eventually disastrous
impact on the respective enterprises. Examples can
be the loss of privacy, the exposure to denial of
service attacks, the compromise of the data integrity
and the invalidation no-repudiation mechanisms. A
crescent number of organizations start now to
provide their employees and external partners with
secure tokens to build several fundamental security
services – like authentication. However, none of
these security services is effectively achievable if the
token owner authentication and identification are not
enforced. This last aspect is the major concern for
organizations that are dealing with critical
information systems.
A variety of security technologies are already
available like pass
words, physical tokens,
biometrics, crypto smart cards and PKC digital
signatures. Some of these mechanisms can be used
together in order to achieve a higher degree of
robustness.
In here we present a model that integrates smart
cards
, digital credential, biometric fingerprint and
user password (PIN), according to the organization
access policy. The main goal was the achievement of
a flexible and robust security access system to verify
and ensure that the users are in fact who they claim.
In the developed model, biometrics recognition and
password acquisition have been integrated into a
Professional Identification Card (PIC) to achieve
strong identification and authentication of users.
389
Costa C., Luís Oliveira J. and Silva A. (2004).
E-SERVICES IN MISSION-CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: IDENTIFICATION ENFORCEMENT.
In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, pages 389-396
DOI: 10.5220/0002649103890396
Copyright
c
 SciTePress

2 PIC IN MISSION-CRITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS
As previously mentioned, PIC appears as a core
element concerning the migration of entities
relations, rights and obligations from the physical
world to the cyberspace. Nowadays, the
organizations implementation of secure PIC
solutions is mainly encouraged by the follow
advantages:
•Improvement of business processes (DSI, N/A)
(Booz, 2000);
•Provisioning of enhanced security to network and
systems (Jones, N/A) (Datakey, N/A);
•Scalability and multi-application flexibility.
Support for new applications, dynamically
loaded after cards are issued. If the card driver is
rich enough, updates and modifications to
existent information or functions do not impose
card re-issuance;
•Yield costs saving on processes, improves
readiness and increases quality and quickness
(Booz, 2000);
•Improves user confidence on security
mechanisms.
Currently it is possible to identify some core
services that can be provided to institutions
employees, and implemented upon a professional
identification card:
•Physical Access Control – Used to restrict and
control the access to the physical institution
structures;
•Authentication Token – The card works as a
token that grants access to applications or
systems. The authentication is based on some
information “securely” stored on the card. The
strong authentication is typically based on
Public Key Cryptography and Digital
Credentials.
•No-repudiation token – The card supports digital
credentials (certificate + private key) oriented to
support digital signatures of documents and
actions;
•Encrypt Token – The card supports digital
credentials (certificate + private key) oriented to
support decryption of documents destined to the
user;
•ID Token – oriented to provide the card owner
identification services, including academic and
professional licenses. Commonly, this service
appears embedded in all cards.
Many of actual PIC implementation combines, in
a unique token, several of the above services or
functionalities. Namely, it has become usual to find
scenarios with demanding security requirements that
impose the implementation of most of these
services. In areas like healthcare, education,
military, justice and the E-Government in general, it
is possible to identify some excellent examples of
these PIC implementations, from this point forward
denominated as “Mission-Critical PIC”.
2.1 Mission-Critical Implementations
Nowadays, there are very powerful tolls concerning
the actual migration of traditional society relations to
the electronic and virtual world. If, it is not very
Table 1: PIC Mission-Critical Implementations
Examples Issued
Cards
Targets Card-Owner
Authentication
Services
USA Department of
Defence military cards,
(Common Access
Card) (DSI, N/A).
13
millions
Active Duty Military,
Selected Reserve
Personnel, DoD civilian
employers, approved
contactors
PIN and
Biometry
Physical Access to building areas, PKC network
Identification and Authentication (I&A), personal
identification and electronic commerce functions.
Rabobank Group, the
largest Dutch retail
bank (Datakey, N/A)
33,000 Internal users and
secure online
transactions
PIN Strong Authentication in accessing to centralized
application, digital signatures in highest security
level transactions and physical access.
Shell Group (petrol)
(Jones, N/A)
85,000 internal employees PIN Physical Access, network login, no-repudiation of
digital transactions, digital signature and
encryption Email and documents.
Dutch Judicial Smart
Card, implemented
under ROBIN project
(Norbert, 2003)
12,500 judicial authorized
personnel
Fingerprint Strong Authentication (workstation login and
secure access to server, using a Single Sign On
system), no-repudiation of digital transactions,
digital signature of Email and encryption of
networked documents.
Deutsche Healthcare
Professional Card
(HCP, 1999)
N/A Physicians PIN Strong Authentication, no-repudiation (digital
signature) and decryption of documents.
ICEIS 2004 - SOFTWARE AGENTS AND INTERNET COMPUTING
390

common find examples using theses mechanisms in
a regular cybernetic user domain, in the last three
years it has possible to identify several mission-
critical organizations scenarios where they are in
use. A common technical characteristic to these
examples is the use of PKI, Digital Certificates and
crypto Smart Cards as the key core elements.
In Table 1 some illustrative examples are listed,
in distinct society areas, where mission-critical PIC
are fundamental technologies. However, some other
critical scenario could be identified like, for
instance, the education sector (Lutz, 2002) or
National Critical Infrastructures (Booz, 2000).
2.2 PIC Services
Considering the card identification service it is
possible to isolate two functional approaches. First,
the surface card user elements – name, photo,
number, issue date, validation, etc. – are typically
used to physical conventional ID purposes. Second,
the internal card elements are used to provide
identification to applications or systems, based on
ID elements securely stored inside the card.
Considering the security services that were
identified previously in this session, physical access
control and the basic authentication token security
services are based on primitive and weak structure
and will be excluded from our analyses. In almost all
of these services implementations, the PIC works as
a basic access token element. Looking more in detail
to the remaining security services, the strong
authentication, no-repudiation and
encryption/decryption, it is possible to identify two
structural key points: the usage of public key
cryptography and digital signatures to implement
these services. Typically, the implementation of
these services are based on three distinct digital
credentials securely stored inside de PIC, which
means that, at least, six different storage containers
are required (3 to digital certificates and 3 to private
keys).
From Figure 1, it is possible to identify several
relationship processes inherent to Mission-Critical
PICs, with the card as core element. The PIC can
interact with application systems to provide security
services or with other cards in the context of services
like mutual authentication. For instance, in the
healthcare sector, many operations demand the
mutual authentication between patient cards and
professional cards (HCP, 1999). On the other hand,
the PIC must establish a relation with the
professional, enforcing that cardholder and card-
owner are the same.
2.3 PIC Technologies
Most of the current electronic applications are
supported by well-known security protocols, like
SSL or S/MIME, that rely on strong cryptography,
particularly the Public Key Cryptography (PKC).
These cryptographic algorithms can be implemented
either in software or in hardware devices and their
management is supported by a Public-Key
Infrastructures (PKI) (Johner, 2000).
The core solution of PKC consists of a pair of
complementary (asymmetric) cryptographic keys:
the public key and the private key (Menezes, 1996).
The PKC usability is based on two key points. First,
it is essential that private keys of individuals are
stored and maintained secret by the user, which
involves securing the private key(s) using protected
containers and passwords. However, the best way to
do that is by storing it in the protected chip of a
smart card. Second, the register and distribution of
public keys must be maintained and administered by
a trusted third party. The use of Digital Certificates
issued by certification authorities is, actually, the
best vehicle to do that.
Actually, the huge majority of recent Mission-
Critical PIC solutions are making use of PKC
services and credentials, stored inside crypto smart
cards. Storing digital credentials (digital certificate
and private key) on a secure token like a crypto
smart card solves the storage problem offering yet a
superior transport mechanism with secure protection
(Marvie, 2000). Cards with embedded public key
capabilities do not give access to the sensible PKC
private key at all. The success of the Card Holder
Verification (CHV) process uniquely grants the
access to internal cryptographic functions that
handle internally the private key.
The nowadays-electronic world economy tells us
that PKC is the most accepted and used mechanism
in electronic transactions to implement security and
access control services. However, even this system
can be insufficient in specific applications. In
information systems that are dealing with very
sensible information it must be guarantied that the
legitimate card owner (PKC-private key) is himself
on the communication end-point. This central issue
is the avoidance of illegitimate use or delegation of
access permission to third persons. For instance, in
health care environments, where legal issues such as
the patient data privacy have to be respected, the
"share" of PIN between professional individuals
cannot be tolerated.
E-SERVICES IN MISSION-CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: IDENTIFICATION ENFORCEMENT
391

2.4 PIC Owner Authentication
Security assurance in most of the current
commercial transactions is typically provider-
oriented, i.e. the service provider just imposes its
security policy to the user that has to assure that its
own secrets are preserved. Although for most of the
scenarios this solution is acceptable, since the
disruption of secrets only affects the owner-provider
relation, there are situations where the loss of
privacy involves third persons, like the patients in
the healthcare scenario.
One of the most important issues related with
this mixed technology (PKC + smart cards) is the
implementation of an effective verification process
of the cardholder, which works as second
authentication factor (Figure 1). In most of the
application scenarios the PIN presentation is
satisfactory enough to provide that guarantee.
However, the implementation of biometric
techniques to control the access to the reserved card
data or capabilities is, in focused scenarios, an
essential authentication element to prevent the
delegation of card to third parties (and enforce a
strong identification).
On other hand, to the same service, the second
authentication mechanism can change according
with access environment. For instance, the PIN
mechanism can be enough inside the institution
access. However, in an external access it may be a
weak solution because the physical employee
identification factor disappeared.
In fact, in Mission-Critical PIC implementations,
the second authentication factor appears as the most
important aspect and a fundamental requirement to
the implementation of PIC services. This means that,
if the system cannot guarantee that PIC legitimate
owner exclusively uses them, none of implemented
secure services (strong authentication, no-
repudiation and decrypt messages) makes sense. In
fact, this second factor must both authenticate and
enforce the identification of PIC holder.
Nowadays many of implanted access control
systems are still based on the “what he knows”
mechanisms, which provide a cheap security
solution that is good enough for several network and
application needs. However, this authentication
policy is inadequate for the nowadays high-
demanding security environments. The PIN
elements are very predictable, usually changed with
very low frequency and they can be illicitly acquired
by direct covert observation. In this way, there is no
effective protection against repudiation by the user
ID owner. In other hand, there are scenarios where
the access authorization cannot be delegates to other
persons.
2.4.1 Biometry
Comparatively to the previous “what he knows”
access mechanism, biometrics devices appear as a
much more accurate and reliable user authentication
method. The user is recognized based on “what he
is”. The biometrics is actually playing an important
role in systems security allowing the identification
of a person based on his or her physiological or
behavioral characteristics (Riha, 2000). The user’s
physical characteristic is acquired and converted to a
bit stream, usually denominated as a template.
The biometric authentication procedure can be
divided into three parts: 1) In the enrollment the user
templates is extracted from individual in question; 2)
The extracted master template is stored securely for
future reference; 3) During verification time the
master templates is compared with a live template
captured from candidate individual to identification.
User / Professional
PIC
(Professional ID Card)
Application
Systems
Other Cards
Applications
PIN / Password
Biometry
Security
Services
2nd Auth. Factor
Figure 1: PIC Services
The biometrics key point is that it work well
only if the verifier can ensure two things. First, that
live biometric template came from the person at the
time of verification. Second, that this biometric
template matches with the master biometric,
previously and securely stored. Some benefits of
biometrics over password are that the biometric
cannot generally be lost, forgotten, or written down
and it is much more attractive either to developers
and users. Unfortunately the reality is not so easy
(Ratha, 2001). In order to be useful, biometrics must
be stored and accessible on some secure place, and
here begins the first problem. The type of identity
recognition model determinates the storage option. If
the template matching process is made on the server
side, they are typically stored in a central database.
However, if the matching is made on client side the
templates are typically stored in a secure hardware
token, like a smart card.
We see little advantage for the user in adopting
systems that require a biometric to be passed over a
network like any other shared secret. Moreover,
actually the ideal use of biometrics is in the
replacement of a PIN or password in situations
where the connection from the reader to the verifier
ICEIS 2004 - SOFTWARE AGENTS AND INTERNET COMPUTING
392

is secure (Grant, 2001) like, for instance, when a
biometric unlocks a private key on a smart card
(Castle, 2001). A clear advantage of this last
application scenario is that the owner retains always
the control of his biometric template. Furthermore,
the storage and matching of the master template can
be made inside this tamperproof device, providing a
more secure application environment – the master
biometric template never leaves the protected user
token.
3 A PIC HOLDER
AUTHENTICATION MODEL
As we have already highlighted, particularly in
mission-critical PIC systems, that is crucial to have
mechanisms for differentiating between the
authorised card user and someone else that has
obtained this identification and is making
illegitimate use of it – this can be achieved, most of
the times, with the right owner permission or
delegation. In other hand, it is equally important to
give emphasis to separate authorization trust level
according with organization security policies. In this
last case, one the most important elements is, for
example, the user access provenience or platform.
Many times, common sense puts the access
provenience problematic in the indoor versus
outdoor scenario. However, it is possible to have,
different trust level inside the institution walls. In
any case, must be always a central application
system to analyse and define the trust level
according with pre-defined security policies, i.e. the
type of second authentication factor demanded to the
end user.
In a trusted or controlled access zone, it is easy
to detect this PIC illegitimate use, however the same
could not be guaranteed, for instance, in a remote
access. What we want to obtain is the
implementation of a recognition model to strongly
enforce identity of authorised user from distrusted
access scenarios like a physically uncontrolled
installation and, at the same time, continuing to
allow the usage of single PIN/card pair in trusted
access areas (although the strongest control can be
practicable anywhere if desirable).
In summary, the proposed model imposes
different levels of user identification proof,
depending on security policies like the access origin,
trusted versus uncontrolled. It must guarantee that
the authorised person is at the remote access, not
being limited to prove that he provided a correct
authentication credentials. This is where the
biometrics can offer an effective contribution to the
problem (Hachez, 2001) (Alliance, 2002), by
replacing the pair smart card/PIN by the
authentication set smart card-biometry-PIN (“what
you have”-“what you are”-“what you know”).
3.1 Model Architecture
The first important aspect to emphasize is related
with the fact that is always the application server
that analyses and defines the trust level in every
access, i.e. the server forces, or not, the biometric
factor. When a user tries to access to the central
application, the server generates an access pre-ticket
that is sent to the client on-card application (the
javacard applet). This ticket includes an internal
timestamp element to prevent the capture and reply
attacks, a trust flag that defines the necessity of
biometric matching mechanism and the challenge-
response message to authentication purposes (Figure
2).
The smart card PIN that protects the PKC private
key sets, results from the processing of input
parameters owned by distinct intervenient elements
(user and server) and from a securely protected on-
card application stored at issue time. In other hand,
making use of an on-card Bio-API (like the Precise
BioMatch (Ola, 2003)), the user master template(s)
on the smart card is kept protected and totally
inaccessible. It is not possible to retrieve, in any
circumstances, a previously stored user template. In
operation mode, the card hosted client application
just has available a BioAPI “verify” function, that
accepts as input arguments the live template and the
Id of master template to make the matching. If the
match fails more that N consecutive times, the
respective master template container is locked.
The NIST/Biometric Consortium presented
recently a Java Card Biometric API (NIST, 2002). It
is a high level and biometric neutral on-card API
that supports, among other characteristics, secure
template Match-on-Card with resource to Java Card
smart cards. As referred, in this way the sensitive
user master template never leaves the secure
tamperproof token, with evident risk of capture and
misuse. Considering this, we are currently exploring
these new functionalities, in the second development
phase, including the migration of file-oriented crypto
smart cards to java cards technology and the
development of applications in Java language
(Microsystems, 2001), named cardlets, that are
stored and executed inside smart card environment.
This way, the presented model is very simplified,
reducing the risk attack to the physical layer.
Returning to the model architecture (Figure 2),
the second core element is the bypass to the
matching process dependent on the kind of the trust
policy included in the issued server pre-ticket. As
E-SERVICES IN MISSION-CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: IDENTIFICATION ENFORCEMENT
393

referred, the evaluation of this situation is made by
the server side, which will check the IP address and
platform of client workstation in the trusted access
list. If the client, for instance, is not in the private
departmental network, the server sends the
encrypted information (timestamp + yes-flag +
challenge) demanding the biometric match.
Otherwise, the matching is suppressed with the
follow message (timestamp + no-flag + challenge).
This information is encrypted with the server private
key and the java card routine makes use of server
public key to decrypt the message and determine the
matching procedure to execute.
The other achieved goal of the proposed model
is related with the risk of forging user identification.
Now it is restricted to the conjugation of three
factors: the token possession, the user password
knowledge and the physical capture and forging of
biometric element.
3.1.1 E-Service Model Workflow
In Figure 2 it is presented a flowchart with the
model architecture workflow to the authentication
service. However, this flowchart could equally
represent the two other PIC security services
presented before (no-repudiation and decryption
facilities) replacing the challenger with a doc-data or
a session key.
When the user needs to use any of the services
(ServerApp) which security credentials are stored
inside the PIC (ClientApp) the following steps will
be taken:
1 The user holds a PIC smart card containing the
cryptographic keys and their biometric template
data.
2 The ServerApp send a ticket to the ClientApp.
3 The user inserts their PIC into a reader and
provides his password.
4 If it is not a trusted access (depends on
ServerApp policy), then the ClientApp must:
4.1 Read the user fingerprint;
4.2 Compare this live template with the card
owner template;
4.3 If it does not match, the access is denied;
5 The user’s password is used to generate the
smart card PIN to grant access permission to
private key functions.
6 The unlocked private key on the smart card is
used to sign or decrypt the message data. The
output message is encrypted with server public
key and then sent back to the ServerApp.
7 The ServerApp decrypts the received message
using the user public key and process data
according to the specific application proposal
(signed challenger to authentication, signed
document to no-repudiation, or decrypted
session key to decipher private documents).
N
Policy Trusted
Access ?
3.2 Deployment Scenario
The proposed control access system have been
implemented and deployed in an information system
with sensitive data, the CHVNG Cardiology
Department Healthcare Information System (HIS)
that integrates 45.000 electronic patients’ records
(EPR) and a Picture Archiving and Communication
Systems (PACS). For this particular environment,
we have developed a healthcare PIC, denominated
Healthcare Professional Card (HPC).
The HPC was implemented over a Web-based
HIS that uses XML/XSL technology for dynamic
content creation and formatting (Bexiga, 2003),
according to the user terminal and to his access
privileges (Figure 3). This HPC provides access
control to the institution’s spaces, and indoor and
Password
Y
Acquire Live
Fingerprint
Templates
Match ?
Live
Template
SmartCard
PIN
Calculates
SmartCard CHV1
(PIN)
Acquire
Password
Y
N
Unlocks
Private Key ?
Authentication
Failed
Y
Sign the
Server
Challenge
N
Authentication
Completed
Access to
E-Service
Card Stored
Templates
Server
Timestamp
Trust Flag
Challenge-Response
Calculus Flow
Procedure Flow
Mission-Critical PIC
On Card Biometry API
Figure 2: Model Architecture Workflow to an
Authentication Security Service
ICEIS 2004 - SOFTWARE AGENTS AND INTERNET COMPUTING
394

Figure 3: A PIC Deployment Scenario in a Healthcare Information System
outdoor access control (Web) to the HIS and to the
PACS (Costa, 2003a) (Costa, 2003b).
In the Web-based access platform we realize
that, inside the institution the professional is
authenticated through an HPC-PIN pair (‘a+c’ in
Figure 3), but to obtain a similar access level from a
remote access our system can impose the use of the
HPC-PIN and fingerprint validation (‘a+b+c’). Our
main goal is to assure that clinical persons, such as
physicians, do not delegate access control on other
persons.
The implementation of this smart card system
was ruled by the major standards and industry
initiatives. The physical level and lower layer
protocols of smart cards are defined by the formal
standard ISO 7816 (ISO-7816, 1997) in a way that
can accommodate components manufactured by
different suppliers. The application level was based
upon the Schlumberger Cyberflex Access SDK 4.3
(SchSDK, 2002) and PC/SC (PC/SC, 1997). The
product was built over a GemPC-Touch reader
(fingerprint + card) using Schlumberger Cryptoflex-
16k and Cyberflex-32k smart card. The healthcare
professional digital certificates and respective
private key are stored following a full compliance
with PKCS #11 (PKCS11, 2001) for compliance
with Netscape products.
4 CONCLUSION
Current enterprise’s dependency on IT is putting
major requirements on security solutions namely on
access control mechanisms. These are several
approaches mostly based on PIN and in Public Key
Cryptography (PKC). Despite these techniques can
be already broadly disseminated, the storage and
retrieval of security secrets is yet a sensitive and
open issue for organization and users. Smart cards
allow storing digital certificates and private keys.
However, in organizations where users deal with
sensible data and it is mandatory to prevent the
delegation of access privileges to third persons the
access to secrets must be enforced by a three-factor
scheme: the possession of the token, the knowledge
of a PIN code and the fingerprint validation.
We presented a model that integrates smart
cards, digital credential, biometric fingerprint and
user password (PIN), according to the organization
access policy. Our main goal was the achievement of
a flexible and robust security access system to verify
and ensure that the users are in fact who they claim
and that avoids the delegation of authority. As a
result we build a Professional Information Card
system that assure stronger authentication and that
can be used indistinctly in Internet and Intranet
scenarios. The system was designed to fulfill current
mission-critical enterprises access control
requirements, and was deployed in a major
Portuguese Hospital.
REFERENCES
Alliance, S., 2002. Smart Cards and Biometrics in Private-
Sensitive Secure Personal Identification Systems.
Smart Card Alliance. www.smartcardalliance.org
E-SERVICES IN MISSION-CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: IDENTIFICATION ENFORCEMENT
395

Bexiga, A. and Augusto, F., 2003. IWBDC - Interface
WAP para Base de Dados Clínica. Revista do
DETUA. 827-841. vol.3, issue. 8
Booz, A. and Hamilton, November 2000. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corpotation (FDIC) Deploys Smart Cards &
PKI to Internal Staff. Smart Card Alliance.
http://estrategy.gov/smartgov/information/fdic_case_st
udy_full.pdf.
Castle, T., 2001. Online Authentication Using Combined
Smart Card and Fingerprint Recognition. Centre for
Applied Reseach into Education Technology -
University of Cambridge.
Costa, C., et al., 2003. An Integrated access interface to
multimedia EPR. CARS2003. London - UK
Costa, C., et al., 2003. A New Concept for an Integrated
Healthcare Access Model. Health Technology and
Informatics - IOS Press. 101-106,95,
DataKey and DSI, S., Largest Dutch bank deploys 33000
smart cards to authenticate internal users and secure
online transactions. Smart Card Alliance.
www.smartcardalliance.org.
DSI, S. and Virginia, U., Department of Defense to issue
up to 13 million. Common Access Cards for smart
card-enabled PKI. Smart Card Alliance.
www.smartcardalliance.org.
Grant, M. and Pai, G., 2001. Biometrics Authentication
and Secure Processing in Networked Embedded
Systems. Departement of Electric and Computer
Engineering -University of Virginia.
Hachez, G., et al., 2001 October. Biometrics, Access
Control, Smart Cards: A Not So Simple Combination.
Security Focus Magazine. issue.
HCP Deutsche - Specifications Ver 1.0. National
Association of Office Based Physicians and German
Medical Association. 1999www.hcp.de
ISO-7816, 1997. ISO 7816 Identification Cards -
Integrated circuit(s) cards and terminals.
http://www.scia.org/aboutSmartCards/iso7816_wimag
es.htm.
Johner, H., et al., 2000 February. Deploying a Public Key
Infrastructure. IBM. http://www.redbooks.ibm.com.
Jones, M., et al., Shell Group's info security initiatives
center around 85000 smart cards with PKI and single
sign on. Smart Card Alliance.
www.smartcardalliance.org.
Lutz, S. and Thomas, H., 2002. PKI based Access Control
with Attribute Certificates for Data held on
Smartcards. Technical University of Berlin Research
Center for Network and Multimedia Technology.
Marvie, R., Pellegrini, M. et al, 2000. Value-added
Services: How to Benefit from Smart Cards.
GDC2000. Montpellier, France
Menezes, A. J., et al., 1996. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRC Press.
Microsystems, S., 2001. Java Card 2.1.2 - Development
Kit User´s Guide.
NIST/Biometric, 2002. Biometric Application
Programming Interface (API) for Java Card.
NIST/Biometric Consortium Biometric.
Norbert, P., Practical Deployment of Biometrics and IT
Security,2003,
Ola, S., et al., 2003. Precise BioMatch™ Fingerprint
Technology. Precise Biometrics.
www.precisebiometrics.org
PC/SC, 1997. PC/SC Specifications 1.0. ("Interoperability
Specification for ICCs and Personal Computer
Systems"). http://www.pcscworkgroup.com/.
PKCS11, 2001. PKCS #11 v2.11: Cryptographic Token
Interface Standard, revision 1. RSA Laboratories.
Ratha, N. K., et al., 2001. Enhacing security and privacy
in biometrics-based authentication systems. IBM
Systems Journal. 614-634,40, 3
Riha, J. and Matyas, V., 2000. Biometric Authentication
Systems. Masaryk University Brno.
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/riha00biometric.html
SchSDK, 2002. Cyberflex Access Cards Programmer's
Guide. Schlumberger.
ICEIS 2004 - SOFTWARE AGENTS AND INTERNET COMPUTING
396