Lowest Unique Bid Auctions with Resubmission Opportunities

Yida Xu, Hamidou Tembine

Abstract

The recent online platforms propose multiple items for bidding. The state of the art, however, is limited to the analysis of one item auction. In this paper we study multi-item lowest unique bid auctions (LUBA) in discrete bid spaces under budget constraints. We show the existence of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria for an arbitrary number of bidders and items. The equilibrium is explicitly computed in two bidder setup with resubmission possibilities. In the general setting we propose a distributed strategic learning algorithm to approximate equilibria. Computer simulations indicate that the error quickly decays in few number of steps by means of speedup techniques. When the number of bidders per item follows a Poisson distribution, it is shown that the seller can get a non-negligible revenue on several items, and hence making a partial revelation of the true value of the items.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Xu Y. and Tembine H. (2018). Lowest Unique Bid Auctions with Resubmission Opportunities.In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-758-275-2, pages 330-337. DOI: 10.5220/0006548203300337


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart18,
author={Yida Xu and Hamidou Tembine},
title={Lowest Unique Bid Auctions with Resubmission Opportunities},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2018},
pages={330-337},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0006548203300337},
isbn={978-989-758-275-2},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF

JO - Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - Lowest Unique Bid Auctions with Resubmission Opportunities
SN - 978-989-758-275-2
AU - Xu Y.
AU - Tembine H.
PY - 2018
SP - 330
EP - 337
DO - 10.5220/0006548203300337