A Design of Secure and ReliableWireless Transmission Channel for Implantable Medical Devices

Lake Bu, Mark G. Karpovsky

Abstract

Implantable medical devices (IMDs) have increasing impact in people’s life nowadays. With the development of electrical and computer engineering, the IMDs are of great convenience to patients by their small sizes and portable wireless monitors or controllers. However, because of the insecure wireless communication between the devices and their controllers, it makes way for attackers to passively and actively attack the devices and so the patients. Unlike other attacks which target on victims’ information or property, the medical attacks threat victims’ life directly. Up to now there are few efficient solutions to those attacks which balance security, reliability, and power consumption. In response to the situation, this paper proposes a scheme against the existing and potential attacks to IMDs while keeping a low overhead in hardware and power consumption.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Bu L. and G. Karpovsky M. (2017). A Design of Secure and ReliableWireless Transmission Channel for Implantable Medical Devices . In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP, ISBN 978-989-758-209-7, pages 233-242. DOI: 10.5220/0006270502330242


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icissp17,
author={Lake Bu and Mark G. Karpovsky},
title={A Design of Secure and ReliableWireless Transmission Channel for Implantable Medical Devices},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,},
year={2017},
pages={233-242},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0006270502330242},
isbn={978-989-758-209-7},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy - Volume 1: ICISSP,
TI - A Design of Secure and ReliableWireless Transmission Channel for Implantable Medical Devices
SN - 978-989-758-209-7
AU - Bu L.
AU - G. Karpovsky M.
PY - 2017
SP - 233
EP - 242
DO - 10.5220/0006270502330242