

Ontology-based Access Control Management: Two Use Cases

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Abstract: Access control management is an important area of research within the security field. Several models have been proposed to manage the access rights of users over restricted resources, which are mainly based on defining rules between specific entities and concrete resources. Though these approaches are enough to manage organizations involving a limited number of entities and resources, the specification of rules or constraints for large and heterogeneous scenarios may imply a considerable burden to the administrators. To palliate this problem, we propose a generic ontology-based solution to manage the access control that can greatly simplify and speed up the definition of rules in complex scenarios and that can also improve the interoperability between heterogeneous settings. Moreover, we show its potential by applying it in two highly dynamic and large scenarios, i.e., Online Social Networks (OSNs) and the Cloud.

1 INTRODUCTION

Thanks to the advent of the Internet, computer resources (which include hardware, computer services, data, etc.) can be easily shared in distributed environments in order to increase the productivity of users and companies. In recent years, worldwide environments such as Online Social Networks (OSNs) or the Cloud have attracted billions of users willing to share online resources and outsource data and computation. Nevertheless, because of the potential confidentiality of the data to be shared, access control management is required to avoid privacy threats.

The management of access rights implies granting or denying access to specific resources according to the credentials of the users, the content of the resource and the privacy requirements of the owner. To achieve this goal, system designers have offered several solutions that are based on either RBAC or ABAC as generic models to manage access control. These include: classifying resources into categories (Cheng et al., 2012), itemizing profile data into different elements (Aimeur et al., 2010) or classifying users into lists (e.g., blacklist users) (Cramer et al., 2015). However, these methods do not scale well in large and complex environments because of: i) the growing privacy configuration requirements and the incapability of existing solutions to handle them in an

efficient manner (Beato et al., 2009), and ii) the burden of the definition and management of rules by users and administrators (Daud et al., 2015).

To overcome these shortcomings, the scientific community has proposed solutions to manage access control that model entity types as graphs (Pang and Zhang, 2014; Cramer et al., 2015); within ontologies (Masoumzadeh and Joshi, 2010; Carminati et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2014); for role-based access control (Ben-Fadhel et al., 2015); or for attribute-based access control (Smari et al., 2014). Ontologies are particularly helpful to formally specify the conceptualization and interrelations of a domain (Mika, 2007), so that specific entities (e.g., users and resources) can be defined as instances of this conceptualization. Then, access control can be easily managed according to the (privacy-oriented) interrelations defined in the ontology for the involved entities. Usually, ontology-based approaches define ad-hoc ontologies for concrete scenarios, which limit their generality and hamper the interoperability between heterogeneous settings (i.e., each one is based on a different ontological backbone) (e.g., see (Pang and Zhang, 2014)).

To tackle these limitations, we present a generic ontology-based solution inspired in the Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) paradigm that models entities and their access policies. This system provides the following benefits: i) a generic ontology

that can be easily extended for specific environments, so that access control can be defined at different levels of granularity; and ii) it simplifies the definition and enforcement of rules, thanks to the automatic ontology-based inference of rules. In order to demonstrate its applicability and benefits, we have applied it to two large and open scenarios: OSNs and the Cloud.

2 A GENERAL ONTOLOGY FOR ACCESS CONTROL MANAGEMENT

The backbone of our ontology (which is shown in Figure 1) is inspired in the ABAC model. It models the three basic (ABAC) entities required to manage access control: *subject*, *object* and *policy*. *Subjects* can be the owners of the resources that define access rights for other users or they can be the target users over whom the access control should be enforced. *Objects* are the resources (e.g., services, files, messages, etc.) that require protection from unauthorized access; they are protected by defining *policies* that contain access rules. The access rule is represented by the following tuple.

$$\text{rule} \equiv \langle s_i, o_j, a \rangle$$

where s_i is the subject target user, o_j represents the object resource and the element a is the action that holds access decision (e.g., allow, deny).

The ontological property (i.e., *access rights on*) between the *subject* and the *object* determines the role of the user w.r.t. the resource (i.e., owner of the resource or the one who requests access to the resource). Likewise, the *defines* property between the *subject* and the *policy* indicates the relationship of policy maker with the policy, whereas, the *written for* property shows the relationship between the target user and the policy itself. Finally, each *resource* is associated with the *policy* through the *has* property.

The generic design of the ontology allows us to define general rules that refer to the abstract classes (i.e., *subject*, *object* and *policy*) rather than to specific entities. Then, entities involved in the specific scenario (i.e., concrete users and resources) can be represented as instances of ontological classes and, thus, access control over these entities can be enforced on the basis of general rules by relying on the ontological structure (i.e., specific rules at an entity level can be automatically derived from the general rules defined at a class level). Moreover, the generic ontology can be specialized with more specific classes that are appropriate for a concrete

scenario and, accordingly, more specific rules can be tailored (in any case, without require to define them on entity-basis).




Figure 1: Access control ontology.

In order to take authorization decisions, the access control mechanism evaluates the interrelationship and the attributes of *subject*, *object* and *policy*, as stated in the ABAC model. Specifically, the system determines the following information from the ontology: i) the resource requestor, ii) the owner of the resource, iii) the resource itself, and iv) the policy defined by the owner of resource.

In the following subsections, we show how our generic ontology can be extended to model the entities involved in two widespread scenarios: OSNs and the Cloud.

3 OSNs USE CASE

Nowadays, billions of users are active members of OSNs and share digital information (e.g. photos, videos, text, profile data, etc.) with their social circle of friends. In many occasions, this information may carry sensitive data such as political and religious orientations, medical data or other sensitive information that can be misused by third parties for discriminatory purposes (Viejo et al., 2013). To prevent the misuse of such data, an access control mechanism should be implemented. For that purpose, in the following we extend our general ontology for OSNs.

Figure 2 depicts the extended ontology that models OSN entities and their interrelationships. In

this scenario, the *subject* entities of the OSN (i.e., owners of the resources) manage their access rights on *objects* (e.g., photos, text messages, videos, etc.) by defining access control *policies* over other *subjects* (i.e., other users with whom the owners are in contact). The *rules* are the attributes of these *policies* that hold access right decisions (i.e., allow or deny access to a resource uploaded by the owner). Since OSNs allow users to classify their contacts into different categories (e.g., close friends, family friends, strangers, etc.), the *subject* class has been specialized with a *contact* subclass that encompasses the contact types of the users. This specialization is also helpful for the users to define different access rules according to the contact category of the users. Finally, *user* is modeled in a subclass of the *subject* class; their membership to a certain contact type of the owner of a resource is represented with the *has* property.




Figure 2: Extended access control ontology for OSNs.

The *object* class constitutes the resources that require protection from unauthorized access. In the context of OSNs, objects are specialized in specific *resource* types (i.e., *photo*, *video*, *profile*, *text*, etc.) so that a more fine-grained access control can be enforced; that is, managing access control on each resource type rather than applying the same rule for all the resources. The *profile* class is further classified into two subclasses: i) *profile data*, which details the identity of the users, and whose access could be protected in order to avoid identity disclosure and ii)

other related information (e.g., interests of the users), which may refer to confidential information.

Even though this ontology represents the entity types involved in an OSN, it can be further extended to accommodate the specificities of a particular vendor (e.g., Facebook), such as predefined contact types or more specific resource types.

3.1 Access Control Management and Enforcement

As discussed in section 2, a user may limit the access to her resources by defining an access rule for a set of target users. With our ontology-based approach, the rule can be defined for ontological classes at any level of abstraction so that it would be automatically enforced for the corresponding subclasses and, finally, instances (entities) of such classes. Within the OSNs scenario, the default rule for all the resources is *deny* access, so that the user only needs to define *allow* permissions. The following example illustrates the extension and instantiation of the OSN ontology for a specific scenario and the automatic inference of rules and their enforcement.

Example 1: Figure 3 illustrates the ontological specialization and instantiation of social network entities associated to the *Alice's* social account (e.g. Facebook). As privacy preferences, she defines a *rule* to allow her *family friends* to access her *resources* (i.e., $\text{rule}_{\text{Alice}} \equiv <\text{family friends}, \text{resource}, \text{'allow}'>$). This *rule* is encompassed in the *policy* instance that is linked with the instance of the *resource* being referenced and the instance of the target *subject* (i.e., contact type *family friends*). Since, this rule is defined at a class level (i.e., *family friends* in *contact* and *resource* as a whole), by ontological inference, it will be automatically enforced on all the subsequent entities. Since *Bob* is a *family friend* of *Alice* and by the inference of generic rule, the system grants full access to *Bob* on *photo* and *video* instances. Specifically, the following *rules* are generated for the instances of the *user* that are *family friends* of *Alice* (only *Bob* in the given case).

```

ruleAlice ≡ <Bob, "college.jpg", 'allow'>
ruleAlice ≡ <Bob, "family.jpg", 'allow'>
ruleAlice ≡ <Bob, "party.avi", 'allow'>
ruleAlice ≡ <Bob, "festival.avi", 'allow'>
  
```

In any case, *Alice* can also define rules for specific instances of the *user* class. For example: *Alice* may only allow *Alex*, from *close friends* contacts, to access all of her photos (i.e., $\text{rule}_{\text{Alice}} \equiv <\text{Alex}, \text{photos}, \text{'allow}'>$). Thus, the following rules are inferred from this generic rule.

$\text{rule}_{\text{Alice}} \equiv < \text{Alex}, \text{"college.jpg"}, \text{'allow'} >$
 $\text{rule}_{\text{Alice}} \equiv < \text{Alex}, \text{"family.jpg"}, \text{'allow'} >$




Figure 3: Instantiation of the OSN ontology for user *Alice*.

4 CLOUD USE CASE

Cloud computing provides a ubiquitous platform to share resources and to provide cloud services to tenants. Because of its open nature, it requires a scalable mechanism that manages access control on the shared resources. For this purpose, we extend our general ontology to incorporate the cloud entities and the attributes that are relevant to manage access rights in the cloud environment.




Figure 4: Extended access control ontology for the cloud.

Figure 4 illustrates the extended ontology that lists cloud entities (*tenant*, *cloud service* and *cloud*

resource) and their interrelationships. In this illustration, *tenant* is a subclass of *subject* that holds cloud actors, which are: i) *user* (which use cloud services) and ii) *cloud service provider (CSP)* (which provides and shares cloud services). Likewise, *service* is a subclass of *subject* that represents the services provided by the CSPs, these services may require access to shared resources to accomplish their tasks. On the other hand, *service* is also a subclass of *object* because the tenants may access them as *cloud service*. Finally, cloud resources can be *hardware resource* (e.g., servers, storage space, etc) or *software resource* (e.g., web application, web services, etc.). Cloud service providers can manage the access to their shared resources and services by defining a *rule* that is encompassed within a *policy*, as explained for OSNs in the previous section. The following example illustrates the enforcement of rules in the cloud scenario.

4.1 Access Control Management and Enforcement

Example 2: Figure 5 illustrates the extension and instantiation of the cloud ontology for CSP (*Google*) that offers its *services* and *resources* to the *users*. In this example, Google offers different cloud services at different service levels (i.e., SaaS, PaaS and IaaS) for standard users and educational institutions (e.g., educational institutions are offered more space on Google drive and a professional domain for email). *Google* configures the access to its resources and services with the following two rules: i) it allows *SaaS* services to access all the *resources* (hardware and software); and ii) it grants *users* belonging to any educational institution with special access to its *Cloud services* that are meant for an educational purpose. In this last case, and in coherency with the ABAC model, we can rely on the attributes defined for the ontological classes and instances. Thus, the following generic rules are defined:

$\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}} \equiv < \text{SaaS}, \text{resource}, \text{'allow'} >$
 $\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R2}} \equiv < \text{Users } <\text{U_Type}=\text{"Education"}>, \text{Cloud Services } <\text{S_Type}=\text{"Education"}>, \text{'allow'} >$

The rule $\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}}$ is defined at the conceptual level (i.e., at *resource* and *SaaS* classes) of the ontology and, thus, it covers all the entities below the *hardware resource* and *software resource* classes. By inferring specific rules at the instance level, we obtain the following ones:

$\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}} \equiv < \text{Gmail}, \text{e-mail server}, \text{'allow'} >$
 $\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}} \equiv < \text{Gmail}, \text{storage drive}, \text{'allow'} >$
 $\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}} \equiv < \text{Gmail}, \text{e-mail applications}, \text{'allow'} >$

$\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}} \equiv < \text{GmailEdu}, \text{e-mail server}, \text{'allow}' >$
 $\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}} \equiv < \text{GmailEdu}, \text{storage drive}, \text{'allow}' >$
 $\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R1}} \equiv < \text{GmailEdu}, \text{e-mail applications}, \text{'allow}' >$

On the other hand, rule_{Google-R2} grants access to cloud services that are specifically allocated to educational institutions. To manage this, the type of users is determined through the value of the *U_Type* attribute of the entities, whereas the educational services are determined by the value of the *S_Type* attribute. As a result, the educational instances of the user class are distinguished and granted access to all cloud services that are allocated for educational institutions. The following rules are, thus, generated due to the inference of this generic rule.

$\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R2}} \equiv < \text{Institute-1}, \text{GmailEdu}, \text{'allow}' >$
 $\text{rule}_{\text{Google-R2}} \equiv < \text{Institute-1}, \text{Google DriveEdu}, \text{'allow}' >$




Figure 5: Instantiation of the Cloud ontology for Google.

5 RELATED WORK

To manage access control in OSNs, Masoumzadeh and Joshi (2010) proposed ontologies that model OSN resources (e.g., photos, messages, etc.) and the access rights of the users. The proposed solution is ad-hoc in nature and only models entities (e.g. digital object, person and event) and their relationships for a specific OSN (i.e., Facebook). Furthermore, it offers coarse-grained access management that allows or denies access to the whole resource and it does not support access management on a specific instance of the resource (e.g., restriction on photos will prohibit access to all photos and there is no mechanism for access management on the single instance of photos).

Choi et al., (2014) proposed ontology-based content-aware approach for the cloud that determines the type of users (i.e., service provider or normal user), their context information from the ontology (i.e., relationship type of the user with the resource) and their access rules from the policies that are managed locally in a repository. The ontology they propose only provides context information of the users and resources (i.e., type of users and their relationship with the resources) and it does not model policies defined for these entities. Thus, the system needs to map context information with the policy database in order to get appropriate policy, which is an extra burden and makes it more complex to process any access request.

In another approach, Liu (2014) modeled, by means of an ontology, a set of operations of cloud business services: i) payment status (to keep record of users' payment to access cloud resources), ii) service level agreement (the level of access on the resource) to manage access control of the users on cloud resources and iii) role of users (to distinguish valued users from standard ones). In addition, several rules are specified to tackle policy conflicts and to manage unauthorized access of users. Again, the ontology is not generic and it is limited to model specific cloud services, thus, it provides ad-hoc inference system for rules.

In an ABAC-based approach, Jin et al., (2012) proposed a unified model that adopts the advantages and tackles the limitations of the discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC) and RBAC models. In this model, the unified features of existing models are represented in the form of attributes that are associated with the subjects and objects of the system. The backbone of this system is the ABAC model that manages access control. This model, however, only details high-level concepts and does not describe how it can be implemented in the real scenarios.

In comparison, our solution does not rely on the ad-hoc graphs/ontologies but on a general purpose ontology inspired in the standard ABAC model that can be easily extended for heterogeneous environments by specializing classes. Moreover, due to the fact that the backbone of the ontology (Figure 1) is common for all specific scenarios, it is also possible to achieve interoperability between the rules and the instances defined between different scenarios (e.g., between users and resources shared between clouds and OSN).

6 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we proposed a generic ontology that models entities, their interrelationships and access control policies, and it can be easily extended for specific environments. To show its applicability, we extended it for two large and open scenarios: OSNs and the cloud. We also illustrated through examples how the definition of rules and the management of access control are greatly simplified for system administrators, because they can be intuitively made at a conceptual -class- level. Then, specific (and dynamic) rules can be automatically inferred according to the specific entities, which would also be likely dynamic in open scenarios such as those tackled in the paper.

As future work, we plan to extend the generic ontology to other specific scenarios (e.g., business organizations) and propose automatic and scalable inference mechanisms to manage other aspects of access control (e.g., delegation). At this respect we will study and formalize more complex inference rules that exploit the ontological structure, and develop algorithms to deal with cases in which policy conflicts may appear. Moreover, we also plan to study the interoperability issues that arise in access control between heterogeneous systems and evaluate whether our ontology-based mechanism (with its common ontological backbone) may provide a suitable solution to interoperate between rules and entities of different scenarios.

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