Promoting Cooperation and Fairness in Self-interested Multi-Agent Systems

Ted Scully, Michael G. Madden

Abstract

The issue of collaboration amongst agents in a multi-agent system (MAS) represents a challenging research problem. In this paper we focus on a form of cooperation known as coalition formation. The problem we consider is how to facilitate the formation of a coalition in a competitive marketplace, where self-interested agents must cooperate by forming a coalition in order to complete a task. Agents must reach a consensus on both the monetary amount to charge for completion of a task as well as the distribution of the required workload. The problem is further complicated because different subtasks have various degrees of difficulty and each agent is uncertain of the payment another agent requires for performing specific subtasks. These complexities, coupled with the self-interested nature of agents, can inhibit or even prevent the formation of coalitions in such a real-world setting. As a solution, an auction-based protocol called ACCORD is proposed. ACCORD manages real-world complexities by promoting the adoption of cooperative behaviour amongst agents. Through extensive empirical analysis we analyse the ACCORD protocol and demonstrate that cooperative and fair behaviour is dominant and any agents deviating from this behaviour perform less well over time.

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Paper Citation


in Harvard Style

Scully T. and Madden M. (2016). Promoting Cooperation and Fairness in Self-interested Multi-Agent Systems . In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART, ISBN 978-989-758-172-4, pages 172-180. DOI: 10.5220/0005754001720180


in Bibtex Style

@conference{icaart16,
author={Ted Scully and Michael G. Madden},
title={Promoting Cooperation and Fairness in Self-interested Multi-Agent Systems},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,},
year={2016},
pages={172-180},
publisher={SciTePress},
organization={INSTICC},
doi={10.5220/0005754001720180},
isbn={978-989-758-172-4},
}


in EndNote Style

TY - CONF
JO - Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence - Volume 2: ICAART,
TI - Promoting Cooperation and Fairness in Self-interested Multi-Agent Systems
SN - 978-989-758-172-4
AU - Scully T.
AU - Madden M.
PY - 2016
SP - 172
EP - 180
DO - 10.5220/0005754001720180