Keywords: Security Engineering, Security Policies, Access Control Models, Operating System Security, SELinux.

Abstract: Modern operating systems increasingly rely on enforcing mandatory access control through the use of security policies. Given the critical property of policy correctness in such systems, formal methods and models are applied for both specification and verification of these policies. Due to the heterogeneity of their respective semantics, this is an intricate and error-prone engineering process. However, diverse access control systems on the one hand and diverse formal criteria of correctness on the other hand have so far impeded a unifying framework for this task.

This paper presents a step towards this goal. We propose to leverage core-based model engineering, a uniform approach to security policy formalization, and refine it by adding typical semantic abstractions of contemporary policy-controlled operating systems. This results in a simple, yet highly flexible framework for formalization, specification and analysis of operating system security policies. We substantiate this claim by applying our method to the SELinux system and practically demonstrate how to map policy semantics to an instance of the model.

1 INTRODUCTION

In order to meet tightening security requirements in most modern application areas, IT systems increasingly rely on formally specified security policies (Watson, 2013). These policies define rules that, reliably enforced by a system's implementation, can be proven to achieve application-specific formal properties concerning security goals such as confidentiality and integrity of a system and the information it processes. A major field of application for such security policies is the operating systems domain, which yielded an increasing number policy-controlled operating systems over the past years (Spencer et al., 1999; Loscocco and Smalley, 2001; Watson and Vance, 2003; Smalley and Craig, 2013; Russello et al., 2012; Bugiel et al., 2013; Faden, 2007; Grimes and Johansson, 2007).

While new methods emerged for design, implementation and enforcement of OS security policies, their specification and verification also received increasing attention. Formal models have been developed for such policies based on two major objectives: (1) To precisely specify the semantics of a particular system, which are determined by its respective application domain (such as roles (Sandhu et al., 2000) or user relationships (Fong and Siahaan, 2011)); (2) to formalize and subsequently analyze a security property, which results from the security requirements of a particular application domain (such as right proliferation (Harrison et al., 1976; Ferrara et al., 2013) or information flows (Kafura and Gracanin, 2013)). Both approaches yield models that are available to formal methods; however, models resulting from both approaches are often incompatible: when focusing on a formally analyzable property such as dynamic right proliferation, system-independent access control models based on state machines have proven to be valuable; when focusing on a formal framework for policy specification and communication on the other hand, system-specific models such as for the SELinux operating system have evolved, which may in turn sacrifice analyzability with respect to a whole family of security properties.

This problem has been addressed by the design paradigm of model-based security policy engineering (Barker, 2009; Kühnhauser and Pölk, 2011; Kafura and Gracanin, 2013; Amthor et al., 2014; Pölk, 2014). Its goal is to derive a uniform pattern for designing security models, which flexibly fits (1) diverse security policy semantics as well as (2) diverse formal analysis goals. Such a uniform pattern would then...
Contribute and Paper Organization. To introduce the context of this paper, we briefly discuss relevant related work (Sec. 2), followed by a summary of the fundamental concepts of one typical representation, SELinux (Sec. 3). Sec. 4 focuses on a formalization of the discussed concepts: First, the fundamentals of core-based modeling are introduced (Sec. 4.1). We then present a novel, abstract policy modeling pattern based on entity labeling (Sec. 4.2), which enriches the core pattern by adequate access control semantics for the operating systems domain. It hence eases analysis and verification of contemporary operating system security policies with respect to an actual system’s protection state (dynamic analysis) using existing formal methods and tools.

To substantiate this claim, we applied our pattern to SELinux. We create an entity labeling model of the SELinux access control system (Sec. 5) and discuss, how a real-world system’s protection state and security policy can be transformed into an instance of this model (Sec. 6). This paves the way for subsequently applying tried and tested analysis methods for core-based models to SELinux. We conclude with Section 7.

2 RELATED WORK

In the AC model community, considerable research has already been done to unify model semantics and formalisms. Notably, the access control meta-model by Barker (2009), the Policy Machine (Ferraiolo et al., 2011), and core-based security models (Kühnhauser and Pöck, 2011; Pöck, 2014) provide general formal frameworks for a precise specification of access control semantics and policies. While Barker’s unifying meta-model and the Policy Machine are primarily designed for policy specification, core-based modeling aims at both specifying and analyzing/verifying a policy.

Another family of formal AC models is specifically tailored to OSs. Among numerous work in this area, most is tailored to specific operating systems such as SELinux (Sarna-Starosta and Stoller, 2004; Zanin and Mancini, 2004; Xu et al., 2013) or special types of OS policies such as MLS (Naldurg and Raghavendra, 2011). While all of these approaches emphasize policy analysis with respect to a particular formal security property, they cannot be easily adapted to other OS AC semantics or other formal analysis goals. In our approach, we aim for both: streamlined adaption to versatile OS AC semantics that share only the abstract concept of labeling, and accessibility to a bandwidth of security properties and their appropriate formal analysis methods.

The basic idea of label-based AC modeling is far from being new. Dating back to the historical BLP model (Bell and LaPadula, 1976), which effectively introduced access permissions based on labels, a whole new class of attribute-based AC models (ABAC) evolved based on this principle (Zhang et al., 2005; Kuhn et al., 2010). However, they usually focus policy specification in the domain of service-oriented architectures (Yuan and Tong, 2005; Shen, 2009; Park and Chung, 2014) rather than system architectures. To this end, both the goal of formal policy analysis and the focus on the OS domain cannot be easily incorporated into existing ABAC models.

3 SELinux ACCESS CONTROL

Today’s operating systems increasingly rely on mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms governed by a security policy. In large parts, their authorization semantics are based on assigning policy-specific labels to entities, which are divided into subjects (an activity abstraction such as process or thread) and objects (OS resources, described by abstractions such as files, handlers, sockets, etc.). The idea of label-based OS policies dates back to SELinux
SELinux as a typical representative of modern policy-controlled OSs, and has been adopted by a wide range of later operating systems such as SEBSD (Watson and Vance, 2003), Oracle Solaris (Faden, 2007), Microsoft Windows (Grimes and Johansson, 2007), and Google’s Android (Smalley and Craig, 2013).

The goal of this section is to take a closer look at the security architecture and policy semantics of SELinux as a typical representative of modern policy-controlled operating systems.

### 3.1 Security Architecture

The original goal of SELinux was to enforce MAC in the Linux operating system. To achieve this, the *Flask* security architecture (Spencer et al., 1999) was implemented, which clearly distinguished between policy enforcement points (PEP) and a singular policy decision point (PDP). The PDP logically encapsulates the whole security policy.

Today, SELinux is implemented as a dynamically loadable kernel module. Its architecture merges into the Linux kernel through the LSM interface (*Linux Security Modules*). It provides ready-made PEP hooks for all system call implementations, which are connected to the PDP (the *security server*) via the SELinux kernel module. In addition to the processing logic, that translates information about an OS resource access into the policy-related data structures that are used by the security server, this module also includes a caching mechanism for previously made decisions (the *access vector cache*, AVC).

To illustrate how an access request by an application process (1) is handled in SELinux, we consider the following example based on Linux kernel 3.19 (cf. Fig. 1): Once an according syscall is processed by the kernel, e.g. `read()` for accessing a file (2), the LSM hook `security_file_permission()` invokes the according interface of the SELinux Security Module (3). Here, the permissions needed for authorizing the specific request (here: FILE_READ) are checked against the AVC (calling `asvc_has_perm()` or, in case of a miss, the security server’s `security_compute_avc()`-interface (4). The decision is then returned through the LSM hook and enforced by the `read()`-implementation in `vfs_read()` (either invoking the respective file system interface to ultimately access the storage hardware (5), or returning to the caller with an “access denied” error).

Inside the security server logic, access decisions are based on the policy rules and SELinux security contexts associated to entities. The latter is a label consisting of four attributes, which is usually represented by a string

\[
\text{user} : \text{role} : \text{type} [: \text{range}] 
\]

where *user* is the name of an SELinux user the process belongs to, *role* is the name of an SELinux role the process assumes, and *type* is the name of the domain (or type) in SELinux type enforcement (TE) in which the process currently runs. Finally, *range* is a collection of confidentiality classes and categories used by multi-level security (MLS) policy rules based on the BLP model. Since support for the MLS mechanism is neither required by the SELinux policy semantics nor by the security server, this fourth attribute is optional. We will discuss the semantics of these attributes in a security policy in the next section.

Technically, security contexts of processes are stored in their management data structures, represented as a part of the non-persistent `/proc` file system, while those of objects such as files or sockets are stored in extended attributes of the respective file system.

### 3.2 Policy Semantics

As already mentioned, the PDP logic in SELinux is configured by a security policy. At runtime, a binary representation of this policy resides in kernel address space; however, as for the rest of this paper, we will refer to its human-readable specification in SELinux policy language (Smalley, 2005) as “the (security) policy”.

An SELinux security policy consists of statements, which can be classified into different types of rules. Each rule basically supports one of three fundamental AC concepts supported by SELinux: type enforcement (TE), role-based access control (RBAC), and multi-level security (MLS). The most basic authorization mechanism is implemented through TE, using TE-allow-rules which basically associate a
pair of types with a set of permissions: The rule 
\texttt{allow system\_t etc\_t : file \{read execute\}} 
for example will grant any process labeled with the 
\texttt{system\_t} type the right to read and execute any 
file-class object labeled with \texttt{etc\_t}. We call 
\texttt{(system\_t etc\_t file)} the key of above TE-
allow-rule. A second authorization mechanism, 
whose support by an SELinux kernel is still optional, 
is MLS. Its rules are based on defining a dominance 
relation over the attributes \textit{confidentiality class} and 
category, which is then used to limit all read- or write 
access to particular objects.

Lastly, the RBAC mechanism is used for 
limiting attribute changes of a process. Since 
all attributes are changeable except for the user, 
this provides a policy administrator with an additional, 
user-centric layer of AC configuration. RBAC rules define compatible combinations of all 
three major attributes: The role declaration rule 
\texttt{role user\_r types \{ user\_t passwd\_t \}} is necessary to label any process with the user\_r role 
with both types user\_t and passwd\_t. Similarly, 
you can be tied to one or more users by the user 
declaration rule: user user\_r roles \{ admin\_r \} is necessary to label any process with user attribute 
user with the admin\_r role.

As mentioned before, the type- and role-attribute 
of a security context may change during runtime 
(known as \textit{transitions}). Accordingly, there are policy 
rules to control these changes: For role transitions, 
a role-allow-rule \texttt{allow user\_r admin\_r is necessary} 
to change the role-attribute user\_r of a process 
to admin\_r. Note that, despite of the same keyword, 
this rule has nothing to do with access authorization 
through TE.

For type transitions on the other hand, a special 
set of SELinux permissions exists that must be as-
signed to types through the already discussed TE-
allow-rules. Rules with these permissions can be 
used for fine-grained control over allowed, forbidden, 
or even mandatory type transitions; however, it should 
be noted that their semantics are entirely different to 
those intended for object access:

- \texttt{allow init\_t apache\_t : process} 
  \textit{transition is necessary for a process to} 
  \textit{change its type from init\_t to apache\_t}.

- \texttt{allow apache\_t apache\_exec\_t : file} 
  \textit{entrypoint is necessary for a process to change} 
  \textit{its type to apache\_exec\_t during execution of a} 
  \textit{program file of type apache\_exec\_t}.

- \texttt{allow init\_t apache\_exec\_t : file} 
  \textit{execute\_no\_trans is necessary for a process} 
  \textit{with type init\_t to execute a program file} 
  \textit{of type apache\_exec\_t without a type transition}.

Since type transitions are intended to exclusively 
happen on program execution, the regular per-
mission \texttt{execute on apache\_exec\_t : file} will also 
be necessary in each case.

As a last rule type, SELinux policies support con-
straints, that may further restrict (i.e. override) any ac-
cess decision based on the mechanisms discussed so 
far. Supported by a limited syntax for nested boolean 
expressions, constraints can be used to explicitly for-
bid an access based on the security contexts of both 
involved entities and the given logical expression.

4 MODELING PATTERNS

This section introduces the two basic formal ap-
proaches we will use to model the SELinux AC sys-
tem: the core-based modeling pattern by Pöck, and 
the novel EL pattern which aims at simplifying a domain-specific model engineering for OS AC poli-
cies. Throughout the rest of this paper, we will use 
the following conventions for formal notation:

- \( \models \) is a binary relation between variable assign-
ments and formulas in second-order logic, where \( I \models \phi \) 
iff \( I \) is an assignment of unbound variables to values 
that satisfies \( \phi \). In an unambiguous context, we will 
write \( \langle x_0, \ldots, x_n \rangle \models \phi \) for any assignment of variables 
\( x_i \) in \( \phi \) that satisfies \( \phi \).

For any mapping \( f, f[x \mapsto y] \) denotes the mapping 
which maps \( x \) to \( y \) and any other argument \( x' \) to \( f(x') \). 
For any mapping \( f : A \rightarrow B, f\|_{A'} \) denotes a restriction 
of \( f \) to \( A' \subset A \) that maps any argument \( x' \in A' \) to \( f(x') \), 
whereas \( f\|_{A'} (x) \) is undefined for any \( x \in A \setminus A' \).

For any set \( A, 2^A \) denotes the power set of \( A, B = \{ \top, \bot \} \) is the set of Boolean values, where \( \top \) (\textit{true}) is 
interpreted as “allow”, \( \bot \) (\textit{false}) as “deny”.

4.1 Core-based Modeling

The goal of the core-based model engineering 
paradigm is to establish a uniform formal basis for 
specification, analysis and implementation of diverse 
security models. In this work, we build our modeling 
pattern on top of this paradigm to leverage its gener-
ality regarding formal analysis methods and its uniform 
yet flexible design.

A core-based access control model is described by 
an extended state machine

\[ (Q, \Sigma, \Delta, \lambda, q_0, \text{EXT}) \]  
(1)

where \( Q \) is a (finite or infinite) set of protection states, 
\( \Sigma \) is a (finite or infinite) set of inputs, \( \Delta : Q \times \Sigma \rightarrow Q \) is 
the state transition function, \( \lambda : Q \times \Sigma \rightarrow B \) is the output 
function, \( q_0 \in Q \) is the initial protection state, and \( \text{EXT} \) is an arbitrary tuple of static model extensions.
The state machine serves as a common basis for formalizing policy semantics, called model core, which can be tailored to any domain-specific security policy in terms of state members and model extensions. Based on the abstract definition above, three steps are required to describe a particular AC system through a core-based model (cf. Pöllck, 2014, pp. 25 et seq.): (1.) Specializing Q, i.e. explicitly defining the automaton’s state space members (dynamic model components). (2.) Specializing EXT, i.e. defining static model components which are not part of the automaton’s state. (3.) Specializing δ and λ, i.e. describing the dynamic behavior of the AC system. Depending on step (1), the initial protection state 𝑞₀ has to be specified according to the particular analysis goal. Depending on both steps (1) and (2), the input alphabet Σ has to be specified according to the interface of the modeled access control system.

In step (3), protection state dynamics are described by the state transition function δ through predefined post-conditions of every possible state transition. This is done by comparing each input with two formulas in second-order logic, PRE and POST. We then define δ by formally specifying the conditions that each pair of states 𝑞 and 𝑞’ has to satisfy w.r.t. an input 𝜎 ∈ Σ for a state transition from 𝑞 to 𝑞’ to occur:

\[ \delta(𝑞, 𝜎) = \begin{cases} 𝑞’, & (𝑞, 𝜎) |= \text{PRE} \land (𝑞’, 𝜎) |= \text{POST} \\ 𝑞, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \]

Since an access control system is usually deterministic, POST fundamentally requires that 𝑞’ equals 𝑞 where not redefined.

Finally, to describe authorization decisions at an AC system’s interface, the automaton features an output function λ. It enables the analysis of correct policy behavior and thus supports a formally verified specification. λ defines a binary access decision based on PRE:

\[ \lambda(𝑞, 𝜎) \leftrightarrow (𝑞, 𝜎) |= \text{PRE}. \]

### 4.2 Entity Labeling

This section describes entity labeling (EL), an abstract semantic modeling pattern for the formalization of contemporary operating system security policies. Based on the observations on OS policy semantics discussed in Section 3, the design goal of an entity labeling model is to describe access control policies which

1. use attributes (labels) of system entities for access decisions
2. have a dynamic protection state
3. are governed by additional constraints, possibly subject to a dynamically changing context

The domain-specific semantics of such models is directly derived from these goals: (1.) To support labeling, a basic set of possible label values is needed. Since our goal is a complete description of an access control system, a set of entity identifiers is needed as well as an association of these entities with one or more label values. Then, label-based access rules can be formalized as well. (2.) To model a dynamic protection state, these formal concepts can be mapped on the model core as discussed in Section 4.1. On top of it, the rules for changing labels of existing entities (which are also part of a system’s policy) have to be modeled. (3.) Lastly, model constraints express time-invariant side conditions for correct behavior of the AC system. Due to their static nature, such conditions are not part of the automaton’s state; however, they can of course include variables referencing any system interface outside the AC system—which is of increasing importance in mobile systems (e.g. time of day, NFC device proximity, geographic location, etc.) (Conti et al., 2012; Shebaro et al., 2014).

In summary, we define six abstract components of an EL model, which may be specialized by the semantically appropriate components for describing a particular policy:

- **Label Set (LS):** A set containing legal label values.
- **Relabeling Rule (RR):** Rule for legal label changes. Formally, it is usually expressed by a graph.
- **Entity Set (ES):** A set containing identifiers of existing entities in the system.
- **Label Assignment (LA):** An associations between each entity and its label (or labels). It is usually expressed by a mapping.
- **Access Rule (AR):** Rule that describes, based on two or more labels, which operations entities with these labels are allowed to perform. It is usually expressed by a mapping or a relation.
- **Model Constraints (MC):** Constraints over the other components that must be satisfied in every model state. It is usually modeled by a logical formula.

This design follows the basic idea of model component specialization, which has been adopted by the core-based modeling paradigm from object-oriented programming.

The above list already implies a suitable formal notation of these components that we will adhere to; however, the modeling pattern itself does not dictate any specific formalism (other than the extended state machine required by the model core).

For specializing these abstract model components, their semantics have to be matched to policy abstractions of a real system. In order to support model
dynamics, this also includes decisions about which specialized components are modifiable during policy runtime—these should be defined within the core-based model’s state—and which are not. Again, the EL design does not impose any restrictions on this.

Note that EL spans a subfamily of core-based models by adding domain-specific semantic abstractions to the calculus, which are however orthogonal to those of the core paradigm. Models in this family can be further tailored to match contemporary OS security policies. In the next section, we will show an example of this based on the SELinux security policy.

5 SELinux SECURITY MODEL

In this section, we will demonstrate the application of EL on the SELinux operating system. In Section 5.1, the concepts of the SELinux security policy as described in Section 3 will be formalized using the EL modeling scheme. In Section 5.2, a full core-based access control model will be defined from these components. At last, Section 5.3 proposes a specification for the SELinux-specific commands and their impact on protection state transitions and model output.

5.1 EL Components

The abstractions of system resources that are managed by the Linux operating system are completely covered by the SELinux security policy. Therefore, we can define a separate entity set for each of these abstractions (processes, files, message queues, sockets, ...). However, the policy semantics are written on a higher level of granularity: instead of singular entities, object classes are used to distinguish between OS abstractions. Since these classes are assigned to each system entity on runtime much similar to its respective security context, we will uniformly model these information as labels. Consequently, we define the following label sets:

- $C$ is the set of SELinux object classes
- $U$ is the set of SELinux users as defined in the policy
- $R$ is the set of all roles as defined in the policy
- $T$ is the set of all types and domains as defined by the policy

Moreover, a single entity set $E$ represents all processes and other system resources (such as files, sockets, etc.).

To allow label changes, an SELinux policy uses special permissions such as transition or entrypoint, whose semantics drastically differ from those of other permissions used in TE-allow-rules (cf. Section 3). To this end, we refrain from modeling these elements of the policy language as actual access rules. Instead, type- and role-transitions are modeled by two relabeling rules as follows:

- $\Rightarrow_s \subseteq R^2$ is a binary relation defined as $r \Rightarrow_s r'$ iff a role transition from $r$ to $r'$ is allowed according to the policy’s role-allow-rules
- $\Rightarrow_t \subseteq T^3$ is a ternary relation defined as $t \Rightarrow_t t'$ via an entrypoint type $et$ is allowed according to the policy’s TE-allow-rules

User transitions can never be allowed by an SELinux policy and are therefore not modeled. The above notation serves as a shorthand here: for model checking purposes, both relations can be interpreted as edges (weighted in case of $\Rightarrow_t$) of directed graphs.

Consequently, the remaining portion of TE-allow-rules in a policy is modeled by the following access rule. The mapping $allow : T \times T \times C \rightarrow 2^P$ represents the combined semantics of all TE-allow-rules:

$allow(t; t; c) = \{p | \text{an allow rule for } p \text{ with key } (t; t; c) \text{ exists in the policy}\}

where $P$ is the set of SELinux permissions.

As already mentioned, SELinux stores label assignments as part of its protection state rather than in the policy. Nevertheless, we need to model the following label assignments for a meaningful analysis of the model’s dynamic protection state:

- $cl : E \rightarrow C$ is the class assignment, which labels each entity with its SELinux object class.
- $con : E \rightarrow SC$ is the context assignment, which labels each entity with its SELinux security context. Here, the set of security contexts $SC = U \times R \times T$ represents all possible security contexts (labels) for entities under the given policy.

Concluding, two further restrictions on type- and role transitions have to be taken into account: those imposed by user and role declarations. For both, we use the following model constraints:

- $UR \subseteq U \times R$ associates users with roles they are allowed to assume according to the security policy’s user declaration statements
- $RT \subseteq R \times T$ associates roles with types they are allowed to assume according to the security policy’s role declaration statements
- $\tau_{UR} ::= \forall e \in E : con(e) = \langle u, r \rangle \Rightarrow \langle u, r \rangle \in UR$ ensures that no role is assumed a user is not authorized for
- $\tau_{RT} ::= \forall e \in E : con(e) = \langle u, r, t \rangle \Rightarrow \langle r, t \rangle \in RT$ ensures that no type is assumed a role is not authorized for
5.2 Core-based Model

The formal EL components defined above will be put into context of a core-based model now. Therefore, it has to be decided which component is part of the automaton’s state (thus dynamic) and which is part of the extension vector (thus static). In case of SELinux, these components directly reflect the semantics of a policy, which again is static during runtime—except for the SELinux system may be modeled on at least two different levels of abstraction (see Fig. 2): (I) at PEP level, i.e. based on the access handling logic in the SELinux security module; (II) at API level, thus covering the rich and complex semantics of all API calls.  

According to the basic definition of the model core (1), we define an EL model for SELinux as a tuple

SELX = (Q, \Sigma, \delta, \lambda, q_0, \text{EXT})

where

- Q = 2^E \times CL \times CON
- \Sigma = \Sigma_C \times \Sigma_X
- \text{EXT} = (C, U, R, T, \mapsto, \mapsto_T, allow, P, \tau_{UR}, \tau_{RT}, UR, RT)

Each state q \in Q of the model is a triple \langle E_q, cl_q, con_q \rangle with the semantics defined above, where we use the sets E_q \subseteq E of all entities in state q, CL = \{cl_q : E_q \to C\} of all state-specific class assignments, and CON = \{con_q : E_q \to SC\} of all state-specific context assignments. The input set \Sigma is defined by a set of commands \Sigma_C (that may be SELinux system calls, but also operations on application level for different implementations) and a set of arbitrary parameter sequences \Sigma_X = (E \cup C \cup P \cup U \cup R \cup T'). \delta and \lambda are defined as in definitions (2) and (3) on page 5. The extensions in EXT are defined as given in Sec. 5.1.

Both \delta and \lambda are controlled by the conditions PRE and POST, which are partially defined using the following scheme. For each element of a model-specific set of commands cmd \in \Sigma_C along with its parameters vector x_{cmd} \in \Sigma_X, we write:

\text{PRE}: \phi_0 \land \cdots \land \phi_n;
\text{POST}: \psi_E \land \psi_CL \land \psi_CON \land \psi_MC

where \phi_i and \psi_j are expressions that q, q' and x_{cmd} should satisfy. While the above notation is used to define PRE(cmd) and POST(cmd) of each command, these conditions constitute the global terms:

\text{PRE} = \bigvee_{cmd \in \Sigma_C} \left( \sigma = \langle cmd, x_{cmd} \rangle \land \text{PRE}(cmd) \right)
\text{POST} = \bigvee_{cmd \in \Sigma_C} \left( \sigma = \langle cmd, x_{cmd} \rangle \land \text{POST}(cmd) \right)

While any number of arbitrary pre-condition clauses can be used in this scheme, post-conditions require a stricter pattern due to the fact that each command definition should yield exactly one possible follow-up state. Since post-conditions describe the modifications that q' should undergo with respect to q, the first three boolean clauses ensure an unambiguous definition of the entity set (\psi_E), class assignment (\psi_CL), and context assignment (\psi_CON) of q'. This requirement has to be considered for each specific EL model based on its particular state members. The last clause \psi_MC is mandatory, since it ensures that model constraints are satisfied in each follow-up state. In case of SELinux, it is defined as

\psi_MC := q' \models \tau_{UR} \land q' \models \tau_{RT}

while q_0 \models \tau_{UR} \land q_0 \models \tau_{RT} must also hold for every correct SELinux model instance.

For brevity, we will omit any of these clauses when writing command definitions iff the respective state component in q and q' is equal. \psi_MC will be generally considered implicit due to its mandatory nature.

5.3 Specifying SELX Commands

As an input to the state machine that triggers state transitions and output (access decisions), commands are the interface between a formalized security policy and a formalized analysis goal. As in most complex security architectures, security-relevant commands in an SELinux system may be modeled on at least two different levels of abstraction (see Fig. 2): (I) at PEP level, i.e. based on the access handling logic in the SELinux security module; (II) at API level, thus covering the rich and complex semantics of all API calls.  

\footnote{In practice, there is another choice to make here: either modeling library wrapper functions only, or including the syscall interface of the Linux kernel. Again, the decision depends on whether our respective analysis scenario includes applications that directly use syscalls. We will not further go into detail on when to prefer which degree of detail, and assume in the following that both are modeled.}

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Table 1: Classification of SELX model components in EL and core-based modeling patterns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EL Component</th>
<th>Q Members</th>
<th>Ext Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>C, U, R, T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>cl, con</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>allow, P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>\tau_{UR}, \tau_{RT}, UR, RT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\begin{align*}
\text{cmd}(x_{cmd}) := \\
\text{PRE}: & \phi_0 \land \cdots \land \phi_n; \\
\text{POST}: & \psi_E \land \psi_CL \land \psi_CON \land \psi_MC
\end{align*}\]

where \phi_i and \psi_j are expressions that q, q' and x_{cmd} should satisfy.
Both semantical levels may be used depending on a particular analysis scenario: If a security engineer has the goal to verify a given policy based on the behavior of the security server, she will opt for Level I (in practice, this may be relevant e.g. if an attacker model includes control flow or code manipulation in a user process’ address space). On the other hand, if the focus is on OS behavior from a user space perspective—considering kernel implementation as a black box—Level II commands have to be specified, accepting the more comprehensive and detailed degree of security-relevant interaction that is encapsulated in an SELinux API call. In practice, given the huge flexibility of the Linux kernel with respect to differing library wrappers, kernel features and architectures, API implementations may vary in any case—thus yielding different command specifications in the model.

Moreover, complexity of the state transition function that results from command specification is another important point in question. As previous work on model analysis has shown (Harrison et al., 1976; Sandhu, 1992; Stoller et al., 2011; Amthor et al., 2013), most approaches stand or fall with a certain degree of complexity. Thus, a clean separation of Level I and Level II commands serves two goals:

I. Keep command specifications as small and uniform as possible, even across different SELinux implementations, to support dynamic model analysis.

II. Enable flexible specification of tailored, implementation-specific model dynamics that expose a high-level interface for security analyses on application level.

Since Level II commands have to partially include the semantics of Level I commands, a two-step approach for modeling dynamics in SELX seems promising: We first specify a small number of commands on Level I (Sec. 5.3.1), that are general enough to be used for every SELinux implementation. We then define a pattern for specifying commands on Level II (Sec. 5.3.2), that leverages the previous specifications and may thus be disassembled into Level I commands.

5.3.1 Basic Commands

Level I commands, which we call basic commands, are access, create, remove, and relabel. They are defined as follows.

- **access** specifies the semantics of any access decision. It does not model any state transitions and thus impacts only the automaton’s output ($\lambda$). Any access by a process $e$ to an entity $e'$ that requires permission $p$ is defined as

  \[
  \text{access}(e, e', p) ::= \\
  \text{PRE:} \{e, e'\} \subseteq E_q \\
  \land \ cl_q(e) = \text{process} \\
  \land \ cl_q(e') = e' \\
  \land \ con_q(e) = (u, r, t) \\
  \land \ con_q(e') = (d', c', t') \\
  \land \ p \in \text{allow}(t, t', c') \\
  \text{POST:} \top \\
  \]

- **create** specifies how a new entity is created in the protection system. In SELX, this entity may represent a resource such as a file, directory, or a socket, but also a process. Any creation of an entity $e'$ of class $c'$ with parent entity $e$ is defined as

  \[
  \text{create}(e, e', c') ::= \\
  \text{PRE:} \ e \in E_q \\
  \land \ e' \in E \setminus E_q \\
  \land \ c' \in C \\
  \land \ con_q(e) = (u, r, t) \\
  \text{POST:} \ E_q = E_q \cup \{e'\} \\
  \land \ cl_q' = cl_q[e' \mapsto c'] \\
  \land \ con_q' = con_q[e' \mapsto (u, r, t)] \\
  \]

Corresponding to create, remove specifies removing an entity $e$ from the system:

- **remove** ($e$) is defined as

  \[
  \text{remove}(e) ::= \\
  \text{PRE:} \ e \in E_q \\
  \text{POST:} \ E_q = E_q \setminus \{e\} \\
  \land \ cl_q' = cl_q \setminus \{e\} \\
  \land \ con_q' = con_q \setminus \{e\} \\
  \]

---

3SELinux uses the term “parent entity” to generalize the concept of label inheritance: whenever a process is created, $e$ is its parent process; whenever a file or directory is created, it is the respective parent directory.
In an EL model, assigning new permissions to entities is done through labels. For SELX, a last basic command is needed that describes relabeling processes with a new security context. In SELinux, such process transitions occur on the execution of an “entrypoint” program. Changing the security context of a process e to a role r′ and a type t' via an entrypoint program file f is defined as

\[ \text{relabel}(e, f, r', t') ::= \]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PRE:} & \quad e \in E_q \\
& \quad \land \quad cl_q(e) = \text{process} \\
& \quad \land \quad con_q(f) = \langle u, r, t \rangle \\
& \quad \land \quad r \mapsto r' \\
& \quad \land \quad t \mapsto t' \\
\text{POST:} & \quad con_q = con_q[e \mapsto \langle u, r', t' \rangle]
\end{align*}
\]

Note that, from an abstract view, this collection of basic commands expresses operations fundamental to any EL model—even though their particular PRE and POST terms have been tailored to SELinux policies. This is another example for our basic assumption towards the generality of the EL model family, and how it can be leveraged to enhance the model-based engineering idea in the OS domain.

### 5.3.2 Composed Commands

Based on the specifications of basic commands, we can now give a design pattern for such commands that model a specific system’s API. For this purpose, we compose such Level II commands by using the composition operator \( \circ : \Sigma \times \Sigma \cup \{ e \} \rightarrow \Sigma \), which is defined as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle c_1, x_1 \rangle \circ e & ::= \langle c_1, x_1 \rangle \\
\langle c_1, x_1 \rangle \circ \langle c_2, x_2 \rangle & ::= \langle c_12, x_1, x_2 \rangle
\end{align*}
\]

where \( x_3, x_3 \in \Sigma_X \) is a concatenated parameter sequence and \( c_12 \in \Sigma_C \) is a composed command defined as

\[ \text{c12}(x_3, x_3) ::= \]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{PRE:} & \quad \text{PRE}(c_1) \land \text{PRE}(c_2) \\
\text{POST:} & \quad \text{POST}(c_1) \land \text{POST}(c_2)
\end{align*}
\]

We can then model any interface to the SELinux security policy by the resulting composed commands. As an example, an `execve()` call may be composed as follows:

\[ \text{execve}(\text{caller}, \text{exec file}, \text{exec_dir}, \text{post } \mathcal{F}, \text{post } \mathcal{J}) ::= \]

\[ \text{access}(\text{caller}, \text{exec_dir}, \text{search}) \\
\circ \quad \text{access}(\text{caller}, \text{exec file}, \text{execute}) \\
\circ \quad \text{access}(\text{caller}, \text{exec file}, \text{read}) \\
\circ \quad \text{access}(\text{caller}, \text{exec file}, \text{open}) \\
\circ \quad \text{access}(\text{caller}, \text{exec file}, \text{getattr}) \\
\circ \quad \text{relabel}(\text{caller}, \text{exec file}, \text{post } \mathcal{F}, \text{post } \mathcal{J})
\]

where `caller` ∈ \( E_q \) is the calling process, `exec file` ∈ \( E_q \) is the program file to execute, `exec_dir` ∈ \( E_q \) is the directory of the program file, `post \mathcal{F}` is the role that should be assumed by `caller` after execution, and `post \mathcal{J}` is the type that should be assumed by `caller` after execution.

Note that using composed commands, access control semantics of different granularity can be modeled: since basic commands cover all relevant behavior of the security policy, they can be composed on API level (outlined above), but as well on bare syscall level or even on level of a particular middleware interface.

### 6 MODEL INSTANTIATION

The goal of this section is to demonstrate how to extract model components from a real-world SELinux system. Note that this is only one of two possible model analysis use cases in practice: the other one focuses on designing an SELinux-based AC system from scratch, including API design and the policy itself. The practical process however can be considered symmetrical to the one outlined in the following.

As discussed in Sec. 4.1, there are generally three specialized definitions required to tailor a core-based model to a particular AC system: the automaton’s state space (\( \mathcal{Q} \)), model extensions (\( \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{X} \)), and model dynamics (\( \delta \) and \( \lambda \)). In the following, we present our methods to perform each of these three steps in practice. We used a Linux 3.19 kernel in a Debian distribution with SELinux enabled: for most of the following steps, tools of our model engineering workbench \textit{WorSE} (Amthor et al., 2014) have been used.

#### 6.1 State Space

A protection state in SELX consists of an entity set and label assignments. Entities in SELinux are processes, whose labels are stored in the \texttt{attr} namespace of the `/proc` file system, and files representing OS objects, whose labels are stored in extended file system attributes.

Consequently, a protection state can be extracted from an SELinux system by parsing the whole file system. In practice, we build on our previous work described in Amthor et al. (2011) and Amthor et al. (2014, p. 49): a file system crawler, originally intended for extracting ACLs from inodes, was slightly modified to recursively scan through a file system and extract each inode number \( i \) along with its associated file type \( f_i \) and the associated SELinux security context \( sec \) using \texttt{stat}. These information are then compiled to form the initial state of the model, where
\[ i \in E_{cl}(i) = ft, con_{cl}(i) = sec. \]

For processes, the directories /proc/\*pid/attr are scanned with a similar result.

Further information about more technical questions such as snapshot consistency can be found in the aforementioned papers.

### 6.2 Model Extensions

The static model extensions in SELX consist of authorization and relabeling rules, which are equivalent to particular rule types in the SELinux security policy, and label sets these rules are based on. Model constraints regarding user-role-type-compatibility correspond to another type of policy rules.

To extract model extensions, we have modified the policy compiler sepol2hrut from Amthor et al. (2011). It parses policy source files in plain syntax, i.e. after expanding auxiliary m4-macros and produces an XML-based specification for the components of EXT. For evaluation purposes, we have applied it on a basic, non-MLS configuration of the reference policy by Tresys Technology (PeBenito et al., 2006).

The modified compiler is designed to isomorphically map statements in the SELinux policy language to definitions of the EXT components as follows:

Elements of \( C, P, U, R \) and \( T \) are explicitly declared through the statements class, common, user, role, and type.

\( \text{allow} \) is defined by assembling all TE-allow-statements as described in Sec. 5.1. We do not take into account the neverallow rule of the policy language, since it acts similar to an assertion tested by the policy compiler, but not reflected in any way in the resulting binary policy that steers the security server.

\( \text{UR} \) and \( \text{RT} \) are defined by assembling all user- and role-statements as described in Sec. 5.1.

\( \Rightarrow_r \) is defined by assembling all role-allow-statements. For each parsed rule \( i > 0 \) of the form \( \text{allow} \{ \mathcal{m}_0...\mathcal{m}_n \} \{ \mathcal{r}_0...\mathcal{r}_m \} \), \( \Rightarrow_r \) is extended iteratively as follows:

- \( \Rightarrow_0^r = \emptyset \)
- \( \Rightarrow_{i+1}^r = \Rightarrow_i^r \cup \{ \mathcal{m}_0...\mathcal{m}_n \} \times \{ \mathcal{r}_0...\mathcal{r}_m \} \)

The result is \( \Rightarrow_r = \Rightarrow_n^r \), where \( n \) denotes the total number of parsed role transition rules.

\( \Rightarrow_t \) is defined by assembling all TE-allow-statements for one of the three permissions: transition, entrypoint, and execute_no_trans (we investigated their respective semantics in Sec. 3.2). Depending on which permission \( p \) is assigned to a key \( \langle t_1, t_2, c \rangle \) by a parsed rule \( i > 0 \), \( \Rightarrow_t \) is extended iteratively using the \text{transition graph union} operator \( \sqcup \) as follows:

- \( \Rightarrow_t^0 = \emptyset \)
- \( \Rightarrow_{i+1}^t = \Rightarrow_i^t \sqcup \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \)
- \( \Rightarrow_{i+1}^t = \Rightarrow_i^t \sqcup \langle t_1, t_2, t_1 \rangle \)

where \( \sqcup : 2^T \times T \rightarrow 2^T \) is defined as in Def. 4 on page 11. The result is \( \Rightarrow_t = \Rightarrow_m^t \), where \( m \) denotes the total number of parsed type transition rules.

### 6.3 Model Dynamics

The dynamic behavior of the SELinux AC system is based on the implementation of both the SELinux security module and library wrappers of API calls. While the combination of both leads to the definition of composed commands, basic commands solely depend on the PDP logic and thus stick to their fundamental semantics, independent from an actual AC interface. As already discussed in Sec. 5.3, we consider this one of their essential merits.

In contrast to the other model components, extracting the definitions of composed commands is a task that cannot be automated. It requires insight into the implementation behind the desired interface, to our case both of the kernel and any wrapper functions. We have restricted to a subset of common syscalls in this study, such as \text{fork()}, \text{execve()}, \text{read()}\ etc. Once LSM hooks involved in a syscall have been identified, such as \text{security_file_permission()} in the example of \text{read()} in Sec. 3.1, specifying a composed command usually boils down to tracking subsequent calls of the \text{avc_has_perm}()-function in the SELinux security module. These give information about which parameters for the \text{access} basic command are needed. Moreover, protection-state-changing system calls such as \text{fork()} or \text{execve()} include more logic such as for relabeling or entity creation, and thus require the corresponding basic commands. An example of this was shown in Sec. 5.3.2.

Note that, when specifying composed commands, we are not interested in mere information retrieval concerning entity names and contexts, default type transitions and the like (which is why we did not consider the latter in the \text{execve} composed command). Instead, our goal is to model AC-related logic as precisely as possible, while any additional management logic for protection state data is deliberately excluded. This supports a clean separation of security model and
analysis scenario, that may provide any of this information through the model’s formal interface (i.e. via command parameters).

6.4 Result

Using the techniques described in this section, our method yields a machine-readable specification of a formal SELEX model in ELM, an XML-based EL model format, which can be parsed by model analysis and verification tools such as WorSE (cf. Amthor et al., 2014, Sec. 4).

To get a better understanding of model complexity and scalability in real-world scenarios, we are currently conducting studies on different SELinux-based setups whose evaluation with respect to different analysis goals will be subject to future work. As a quantitative example, a real policy of one of our group’s web servers included 2,847 types, 22 roles, 18 users, 4,330 relabeling rules, and 130,912 authorization rules. The corresponding protection state consists of approx. 390,000 entities, each with their associated security context labels.

7 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we addressed the problem of creating a uniform yet flexible access control model for operating system security policies. We aimed at complementing the core-based model engineering approach with an abstract, label-based modeling pattern that helps in tailoring the automaton’s components to an OS AC system.

After discussing essential properties of a typical policy for the SELinux OS, we have presented the design of a formal policy model for this OS based on core-based entity labeling pattern. We have substantiated its feasibility by demonstrating a model instantiation method for the analysis of a real-world system. This provides the basis for a tool-based formal analysis of SELinux-style security policies.

Regarding the costs of model engineering in this case study, we made two major observations: First, tailoring the core-based pattern to the SELinux AC system was streamlined considerably by using the ready-made abstract categories of the EL pattern. We thus argue that, based on these categories, other OS security policies can be formalized in a very similar manner. Second, instantiating the model for a real-world system essentially required manual effort for formalizing commands. Here, a two-stage pattern consisting of basic commands and composed commands helps to reduce modeling complexity; again, we argue for this approach to be adaptable to other policy-controlled OSs.

Major ongoing work includes (1) an adaption of formal analysis methods for standard security properties based on state reachability, (2) generalization and evaluation of our framework based on a large family of OS policies, and (3) a pattern-based formal proof of model-to-policy isomorphism.

REFERENCES


