Transformation from R-UML to R-TNCES: New Formal Solution for Verification of Flexible Control Systems

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Abstract: Unified Modeling Language (UML) is currently accepted as the standard for modeling software and control systems since it allows to concentrate on different aspects of the system under design. However, UML lacks formal semantics and, hence, it is not possible to apply, directly, mathematical techniques on UML models to verify them. UML does not feature explicit semantics to model flexible control systems sharing adaptive shared resources either. Thus, this paper proposes a new UML profile, baptized R-UML (Reconfigurable UML), to model such reconfigurable systems. The profile is enriched with a PCP-based solution for the management of resource sharing. The paper also presents an automatic translation of R-UML into R-TNCES, a Petri Net-based formalism, to support model checking.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a semi formal language developed by the Object Management Group to specify, visualize and document models of both software and non-software systems. Driven by software engineering industries, it became well developed and supported with dozens of tools (Bahill and Daniels, 2003). UML provides two types of diagrams to create a specific profile for a given system: structural and behavioral. The first is designed to visualize and document the static aspects of systems, while the second aims at visualizing the dynamic aspects (Warmer and Kleppe, 1998). UML has unquestionable advantages as a technique for visual modeling, nevertheless, it does not guarantee that the generated models are correct. Actually, no step of system development, including the modeling one, is spared from human errors. Consequently, the cost to detect and remove such defects considerably increases through the system development (Fenton and Neil, 1999).

The idea of being able to, more or less automatically and systematically, verify and validate UML-based models has been around for a while, so there is a rather large body of literature on the topic. For example, the authors in (Lilius and Paltor, 1999) use statecharts and sequence diagrams in a combined manner to check temporal logic formulas over a statechart-based description of the system, and the model checker produces, then, counterexamples through sequence diagrams. Another approach is described in (Cardoso and Sibertin-Blanc, 2001) where sequence diagrams are formally translated into Petri nets, based on the UML collaborations package metamodel. The authors check the correctness of the sequence diagrams through the resulting Petri nets. A work described in (Cortellessa and Mirandola, 2000) uses the sequence diagram in conjunction with use cases and deployment diagrams to obtain queuing network models for performance evaluation. An execution graph from the sequence diagram is later obtained thanks to a given algorithm. Another work reported in (Mikk et al., 1998) translated Statecharts into PROMELA, the input language of SPIN verification system, whereas (Lam, 2007) formally analyzed activity diagrams using NuSMV model checker to determine the correctness of activity diagrams. The authors in (King and Pooley, 1999) produce Petri net models starting from UML diagrams, however, they only describe the methodology at an intuitive level, through an example and no translation procedure is described. The work described in (Bondavalli et al., 1999) proposed new UML stereotypes to enrich UML diagrams with dependability aspects. The purpose is to exploit the latter to build generally distributed stochastic Petri net models. The authors didn’t focus...
on an automatic translation, but rather on detecting the dependability aspects from the UML diagrams.

We see in the previous related works that no one of our community was interested in modeling the reconfiguration aspect which is featured by many control systems and their shared resources. Nevertheless, reconfiguration has become, nowadays, a crucial feature to consider when designing new embedded systems. It is actually the ability to dynamically improve the latter’s performance and quality of service at run-time, according to well defined conditions (Salem et al., 2015b). Increasing safety constraints and growing flexibility pushed developers to focus on designing systems that are able to fit their environment and shifting user requirements under functional and temporal constraints (Salem et al., 2015a). In this work, a reconfiguration scenario is assumed to be any run-time automatic operation that modifies the system’s structure by adding or removing tasks or resources according to user requirements in order to adapt the whole architecture to its environment (Salem et al., 2014). Whence, we propose, in this work, a new UML profile, baptized R-UML (Reconfigurable UML), endowed with a formal semantics enabling UML to model flexible control systems sharing adaptive shared resources. R-UML relies on UML’s extensibility mechanisms to enhance class and statechars diagrams, respectively called RCD and R-StD henceforth. The latter are extended to support Priority Ceiling Protocol (PCP), a well-known synchronization protocol for shared resources. It was proved in (Salem et al., 2014) the relevance of this protocol to solve the issue of concurrent access to adaptive shared resources in reconfigurable control systems. We propose then a new solution to translate R-UML into Reconfigurable Timed Net Condition/Event Systems (R-TNCES) (Zhang et al., 2013), a Petri net-based formalism to model flexible control systems. An application of formal verification is, then, performed and aims to (dis)prove certain properties of the system using a formal model. This contribution is original since R-TNCES is a new and original formalism for reconfigurable systems, and no one in our community worked on the translation of UML into R-TNCES to combine their respective assets, i.e. the easiness and relevance of UML for visual modeling and the formal semantics of R-TNCES to verify and validate models.

This paper is organized as follows: the next section describes useful preliminaries for the reader. Section 3 introduces a running example which will be used throughout the paper to prove the relevance of our contribution. We expose, in Section 4, the new profile R-UML and a solution to translate the latter into R-TNCES. We finish the paper in Section 5 by a conclusion and an exposition of our future works.

2 BACKGROUND

We start, in this section, by presenting the formalisms TNCES (Hanisch et al., 1997) and R-TNCES (Zhang et al., 2013) which extend Petri nets for the modeling of adaptive control systems. We provide, then, an overview of the well-known PCP.

2.1 Timed Net Condition/Event System

The formalism was introduced by (Hanisch et al., 1997). A TNCES is a tuple:

\[
TNCES = (P, T, F_m_0, \Psi, C_N, E_N, D_C)
\]

where (i) \( P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\} \) is a finite set of places; (ii) \( T = \{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n\} \) is a finite set of transitions; (iii) \( F \subseteq (P \times T) \cup (T \times P) \) is a finite set of flow arcs between places and transitions; (iv) \( m_0 \) is initial marking; (v) \( C_N \subseteq (P \times T) \) is a finite set of condition arcs; (vi) \( E_N \subseteq (T \times T) \) is a finite set of event arcs.

\( \Psi \) is input/output structure of TNCES module which is represented by the following tuple:

\[
\Psi = \{C^i_n, E^i_n, C^o_n, E^o_n, B_c, B_e, C_s, D_t\}
\]

where (i) \( C^i_n \) defines a finite set of TNCES module condition input signals; (ii) \( E^i_n \) defines a finite set of TNCES module event input signals; (iii) \( C^o_n \) defines a finite set of TNCES module condition output signals; (iv) \( E^o_n \) defines a finite set of TNCES module event output signals; (v) \( B_c \subseteq C^i_n \times T \) is a set of TNCES module input condition arcs; (vi) \( B_e \subseteq E_n \times T \) is a set of TNCES module input event arcs; (vii) \( C_s \subseteq P \times C^o_n \) is TNCES module output condition arcs; (viii) \( D_t \subseteq T \times E^o_n \) is a set of TNCES module output event arcs.

Time intervals are assigned to the pre-transition flow arcs \( F \subseteq P \times T \), which impose time constraints to the firing of the transition:

\[
D_C = \{D_R, D_L, D_0\}
\]

where (i) \( D_R \) represents the set of minimum times that the token should spend at particular place before the transition can fire; (ii) \( D_L \) is the final set of limitation time that defines maximum time that the place may hold a token (if all the other conditions for transition firing are met); (iii) \( D_0 \) is the initial set of the clocks associated with the places.
2.2 Reconfigurable Timed Net
Condition/Event System

An R-TNCES, as defined in (Zhang et al., 2013), is a structure RTN=(B, R), where R is the control module consisting of a set of reconfiguration functions R = r1,...,rn and B is the behavior module that is a union of multi TNCESs, represented as

\[ B = (P, T, F, W, CN, EN, DC, V, Z) \]  

(4)

where: (i) \( P \) (respectively, \( T \)) is a superset of places (respectively, transitions), (ii) \( F \subseteq (P \times T) \cup (T \times P) \) is a superset of flow arcs, (iii) \( W : (P \times T) \to \{0,1\} \) maps a weight to a flow arc, \( W(x, y) = 0 \) otherwise, where \( x, y \in P \cup T \), (iv) \( CN \subseteq (P \times T) \) (respectively, \( EN \subseteq (T \times T) \)) is a superset of condition signals (respectively, event signals), (v) \( DC : F \cap (P \times T) \to \{[l_i, h_i], i \in \mathbb{N}, l_i < h_i\} \) is a superset of time constraints on output arcs, where \( i \in [1, |F | \cap (P \times T)|], l_i, h_i \in \mathbb{N} \), and (vi) \( V : T \to \{\text{AND}, \text{OR}\} \) maps an event-processing mode (AND or OR) for every transition, (vii) \( Z = (M_0, D_0) \), where \( M_0 : P \to \{0,1\} \) is the initial marking and \( D_0 : P \to \{0\} \) is the initial clock position.

2.3 Priority Ceiling Protocol

The Priority Ceiling Protocol (PCP) (Goodenough and Sha, 1988) in real-time computing is a synchronization protocol for shared resources to avoid unbounded priority inversion and mutual deadlock due to wrong nesting of critical sections. In this protocol, each resource \( R \) is assigned a priority ceiling \( Cl(R) \), which is equal to the highest priority of the tasks that may lock it. A task can acquire a resource only if the resource is free and has a higher priority than the priority ceiling of the rest resources in lock by other tasks.

Let us assume a system to be composed of the tasks \( T_1, T_2, T_3 \) and \( T_4 \) (having respectively the increasing priorities 1, 2, 3 and 4) and two resources \( R \) and \( Q \). \( R \) can be used by \( T_1 \) and \( T_2 \) and \( Q \) by \( T_3 \) and \( T_4 \). Then, \( Cl(R)=2 \) and \( Cl(Q)=4 \). Thus, \( T_2 \) is blocked if it tries to block \( R \) which is free when \( Q \) is locked.

3 RUNNING EXAMPLE

Let us assume a reconfigurable discrete event system to be composed of two tasks \( A \) and \( B \). We suppose that these two tasks share initially the resources \( Q \) and \( R \) (as shown in Figure 1) before applying a reconfiguration scenario which will add a new resource \( S \) (to be used by both \( A \) and \( B \)). This case was not treated in any related work and forms a new problem dealing with reconfigurable resources. We suppose that \( B \) has the highest priority (\( B > A \)). We suppose that the system is safe before the reconfiguration scenarios. But, once the reconfiguration is applied, a deadlock certainly occurs according to Figure 2. In fact, \( A \) starts by using \( R \) and then \( S \) before being interrupted by \( B \) due to the latter's higher priority. \( B \) is then blocked because it tries to lock \( R \) (\( P(R) \)) which is still hold by \( A \). \( A \) continues progressing until it frees \( R \) (\( V(R) \)) and \( B \) interrupts it. When \( B \) asks for \( S \) (\( P(S) \)), it is interrupted because \( S \) is hold by \( A \). \( A \) is in its turn blocked because it is asking for \( Q \) which is hold by \( B \). A deadlock occurs thus, because \( A \) is waiting for \( Q \) while \( B \) for \( S \). Regarding to this situation, we apply the PCP.
on this running example which solves the deadlock issue as illustrated in Figure 3.

This running example features two tasks sharing three adaptive resources like in (Salem et al., 2014), however, the tasks’ behavior and the reconfiguration scenario are different. Besides, in (Salem et al., 2014), a deadlock occurs because A is waiting for S while B for Q, whereas, in this work, it occurs because A is waiting for Q while B for S.

4 CONCEPTION AND VALIDATION OF FLEXIBLE CONTROL SYSTEMS

We expose, in this section, the new profile R-UML to model and validate flexible control systems sharing adaptive resources. A new solution is proposed, then, to transform an R-UML into an R-TNCES.

4.1 R-UML

In this section, we define how to model the structure and the behavior of a flexible control system using R-UML. The contribution is applied on the running example of Section 3.

4.1.1 Structure Modeling

UML provides the class diagram to show the logical structure of a system. This diagram highlights conceptual connections showing the relations between the system’s modules or components, each of which having its distinctive properties defined by a class. It is possible to extend the core semantics of UML and express new properties by using stereotypes. The latter is a mechanism to categorize an element. Thus, we extend the contribution proposed in (Lobov et al., 2005) and define the following eight stereotypes of the class’s attribute:

- **<< input >>**: the given attribute is a system input;
- **<< output >>**: the given attribute is a system output;
- **<< in >>**: the given attribute is a system module input;
- **<< out >>**: the given attribute is a system module output;
- **<< eventInput >>**: the given attribute is a system module event input;
- **<< eventOutput >>**: the given attribute is a system module event output;
- **<< integer >>**: the given attribute is an integer;
- **<< boolean >>**: the given attribute is a boolean attributed which can be evaluated to TRUE or FALSE.

The description above distinguishes between system and module. System denotes the whole system under control, whereas module a part of the system. A system may actually have internal connections between the modules specified by means of the stereotypes << in >> and << out >>, and a module may provide to the controller the connections that are specified by means of the stereotypes << input >> and << output >>. Two system modules may also be interconnected by an event which is an action which occurrence may be detected by another module in the system. An event is different from an input/output, since the first is just a signal informing that a certain action took place. The << eventInput >> and << eventOutput >> stereotypes respectively represent the event inputs and outputs that a module may have.

The information provided by a class diagram can be formally written as a tuple:

\[
CID = \{C, A, M, S, \alpha, \beta\}
\] (5)

where (i) \(C = \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_n\}\) is a finite set of classes in class diagram \(CID\); (ii) \(A = \{attr_1, attr_2, ..., attr_m\}\) is a final set of attributes that belong to the classes; (iii) \(M = \{setInput, resetInput, setOutput, resetOutput, setCeiling\}\) is a set of methods of the classes; (iv) \(S\) is a set of stereotypes \(S = \{<< in >>, << out >>, << input >>, << output >>, << eventInput >>, << eventOutput >>, << integer >>, << boolean >>\}\); (v) \(\alpha : st_i \rightarrow attr_j\) is a function that maps the stereotype \(st_i\) from \(S\) to the \(attr_j\) from \(A\); (vi) \(\beta : attr_i \rightarrow cl_j\) is a function that maps attribute to the class.

According to the previous class diagram definition, we create two classes to model the running example of Section 3: a class named Task to model, as its name suggests, the different tasks of the system, and a second one, named Resource, to model the different reconfigurable shared resources. We instantiate for each task or resource an object from the corresponding class.

The class Task, as showed in Figure 4, has an integer-stereotyped attribute, named priority, translating the task’s priority. It also has a boolean-stereotyped one, added, indicating whether the task in added to the system (added=TRUE) or not (added=FALSE), depending on the applied reconfiguration scenario. The Figure 5 shows that the class...
Resource features an integer-stereotyped attribute, named ceiling, translating the ceiling that each resource has according to PCP definition in Section 2.3. The class also features a method named setCeiling that recompute a resource’s ceiling after applying a reconfiguration scenario. This method’s code will be detailed later. Just as tasks, resources have a boolean-stereotyped attribute, added, because a reconfiguration scenario may add or remove a task or a resource (Salem et al., 2014).

Running Example 1

The static description of a system is often made through the class diagram. This simplifies the modeling by synthesizing the common characteristics and covering a large number of objects. However, it is sometimes useful or even necessary to add an object diagram. The latter allows, depending on the situation, to illustrate the class diagram (showing an example that explains the model), clarify certain aspects of the system (by highlighting imperceptible details in the class diagram), express an exception (by modeling specific cases of non-generalizable knowledge) or take an image (snapshot) of a system at a given time. The class diagram models the rules, whereas the object diagram models facts. Often the class diagram is a model to instantiate the binders in order to obtain the object diagram (Rumbaugh et al., 1991). Thus, we propose here to realize the object diagram of the running example described in Section 3. The said diagram illustrated in Figure 6 features two objects of the Task class (modeling the tasks A and B) and three of the Resource class (modeling the resources R, Q and S) while highlighting the links between them.

4.1.2 Behavior Modeling

UML features the State diagram as powerful tool to represent the behavior of an object which is the implementation of a particular class. We define for the system or its components a set of states which they may take. Each state is distinguished by its name. The change of the states is represented via transitions. The latter specify the laws that cause the change of the state and the consequences of the change. The rules which fire transitions may be expressed by event and guard which is a boolean expression that has to be evaluated to TRUE to fire the transition. A given transition may be fired through three manners: an event (if a certain action took place somewhere in the system), a guard (if the certain properties are assigned with the particular values) or combination of both. The different states are interconnected by transitions which determine the rules that cause transition to fire and the consequences of a transition’s firing. Events, guards and the combination of both specify these rules. A time event, after (n) where n is a positive integer, is also used to specify that n time units should elapse before the transition may fire. Events may also be specified by << eventInput >> or << eventOutput >> stereotyped attributes. A transition firing may be accompanied by the activation of an action which can modify some properties of the system. This activation may call attribute-modifying methods defined in the classes, such as setInput, resetInput, setOutput, resetOutput and setCeiling.

We extend the contribution proposed in (Lobov et al., 2005) and formally represent a state diagram by the tuple:

\[ SI = \{ St, Tr, Ev, G, Ac, \gamma, \delta, \epsilon, \zeta \} \] (6)

where (i) \( St = \{ st_1, st_2, \ldots, st_n \} \) is a finite set of states in a state diagram \( SI \); (ii) \( Tr = \{ tr_1, tr_2, \ldots, tr_m \} \) is a finite state of transitions in a state diagram \( SI \); (iii) \( Ev \) is a finite set of events in transitions of \( SI \); (iv) \( G \) is a finite set of the guards in \( SI \); (v) \( Ac \) is a final set of actions; (vi) \( \gamma : ev_i \rightarrow tr_j \) is a function that maps the event \( ev_i \) of \( Ev \) to the transition \( tr_j \) of \( Tr \); (vii) \( \delta : gr_k \rightarrow tr_j \) is a function that maps the guard \( gr_k \) of \( G \) to the transition \( tr_j \) of \( Tr \); (viii) \( \epsilon : act_l \rightarrow tr_j \) is a function that maps the action \( act_l \) of \( Ac \) to the transition \( tr_j \) of \( Tr \); (ix) \( \zeta : tr_j \rightarrow \{ st_b, st_e \} \) is a function that maps transition \( tr_j \) of \( Tr \) to the pair of states \( st_b \) and \( st_e \), where \( st_b \) is the state from which the transition is taken and \( st_e \) is the next state if \( tr_j \) fires.
According to the reconfiguration feature expected from the system, we define a reconfigurable state diagram as a structure:

\[ R\text{-}StD = (B,R) \]  

(7)

where (i) \( B \) is the behavior module that is a union of multi \( \text{StD} \); (ii) \( R \) is the control module consisting of a set of reconfiguration functions \( R=\{r_1,...,r_n\} \).

A reconfiguration function \( r_i \) makes the necessary changes to the system after a reconfiguration scenario in accordance with the definition given in Section 1. Hence, we define \( r \) as the structure:

\[ r = (\eta,\theta,\iota) \]  

(8)

where (i) \( \eta : t_i \to \{0,1\} \) is a function controlling tasks, \( \eta(t_i) = 1 \) if the task \( t_i \) is added to the system, \( \eta(t_i) = 0 \) otherwise; (ii) \( \theta : \text{res}_j \to \{0,1\} \) is a function controlling resources, \( \theta(\text{res}_j) = 1 \) if the resource \( \text{res}_j \) is added to the system and \( \theta(\text{res}_j) = 0 \) otherwise; (iii) \( \iota : (\text{res}_j,t_i) \to \{0,1\} \), \( \iota(\text{res}_j,t_i) = 1 \) if \( \text{res}_j \) is used by \( t_i \) in this triggered reconfiguration scenario, \( \iota(\text{res}_j,t_i) = 0 \) otherwise.

According to the previous definitions, we define in this section the Resource class's method, setCeiling, as follows:

\[
\text{if } \theta(\text{res}) == 1 \\
\text{for } i=1 \text{ to } |\text{Tasks}| \\
\text{if } \eta(t_i) == 1 \text{ AND } \iota(\text{res}_j,t_i) == 1 \\
\text{AND } t_i.\text{priority} > \text{res}.\text{ceiling} \\
\text{res}.\text{ceiling} := t_i.\text{priority}
\]

We propose, then, R-StD diagrams to model a task and a resource on the basis of PCP definition and the reconfiguration feature expected from the system.

Thus, we propose the R-StD illustrated in Figure 7 to model a reconfigurable shared resource:

A resource may actually be free or hold by a task \( T_i \). Thus, we propose the states "Free", "Hold by \( T_i \)" and "Hold by \( T_n \)" where \( R \) may be exclusively hold by a task from a set of \( n \) different tasks (\( n \) is an integer \( \in (1, +\infty) \)). The guards associated to the transitions leaving the state Free guarantee the respect of PCP rules before locking a resource, i.e. a task \( T \) may hold a given resource if, first, the latter is free and, secondly, the resources hold by other tasks have a ceiling lower than \( T \)'s dynamic priority, a condition verified by the guard named \( X \). \( E3.i \) is an event coming from \( T_i \) and asking to unlock \( R \).

We propose, then, a second R-StD, illustrated in Figure 8 to model a reconfigurable task:

The task's R-StD is composed of the following states: (i) Idle: as its name suggests, the task is idle, (ii) Execute: the task is running, (iii) Wait: the task was interrupted by another one, so it is waiting, (iv) \( P(R) \): the task \( T \) is asking to lock a resource \( R \), (v) \( Q(R) \): the task \( T \) is unlocking the resource \( R \). The R-
StD of a task $T$ should include as many $P(R)$ and $Q(R)$ as the resources it may lock, but, in this running example, we decide that $T$ will use just one resource ($R$). The different events indicated on the figure above stand for: (i) $E2$: an event confirming the lock of $R$ by $T$, (ii) $E8.1$ and $E8.2$: when $T$ switches from $Idle$ to $Execute$, the event $E8.1$ forces the running tasks with lower priorities to switch from $Execute$ to $Wait$. $T$'s $E8.1$ is actually the $E8.2$ of tasks with lower priorities. Whence, the $E8.2$ on Figure 8 is an event announcing that a task with a higher priority than $T$'s switched from $Idle$ to $Execute$. (iii) $E9.1$: when $T$ switches from $Execute$ to $Idle$, the event $E9.1$ will force the waiting tasks with lower priorities to switch from $Wait$ to $Execute$. $T$'s $E9.1$ is actually the $E9.2$ of tasks with lower priorities. Whence, the $E9.2$ is translating that a task with a higher priority that $T$'s has switched from $Execute$ to $Idle$.

### Running Example 2

Now that we formalized R-StD and proposed patterns to model control tasks and shared resources, we can model our running example. We propose, as examples and respectively in Figure 9 and Figure 10, the modeling of the control task $A$, which uses the resources $Q$, $R$ and $S$, and the resource $R$ which is shared by the tasks $A$ and $B$.

In our case study, the different resources have the same modeling since they have the same ceiling and are used by the same tasks. We choose to model the resource $R$ as shown in Figure 10. The guards named $X$ are used to guarantee that, when a task $T$ tries to lock the resource, all the other resources, whose ceilings are not lower than the task’s priority, are free or hold by $T$. Thus, we avoid any eventual deadlock and see the relevance of the PCP.

### 4.2 Transformation

We present, in this section, R-TNCES-based models using PCP to solve the issue of concurrent access to adaptive shared resources. We propose, then, a new solution to translate R-StD models into the said R-TNCES-based ones. A formal verification is, then, performed to prove the relevance of our contribution.

#### 4.2.1 PCP-based Solution for Resource Sharing in R-TNCES

We aim in this section to check the safety of each reconfiguration scenario by enriching the Reconfigurable Timed Net Condition/Event System (R-TNCES) with the PCP protocol. We propose, then, to use new patterns introduced in (Salem et al., 2014) to model reconfigurable discrete event systems according to R-TNCES by using PCP. This contribution is
original since R-TNCES is an original formalism for reconfigurable systems, but lacks of useful mechanisms to manage reconfigurable shared resources.

Formalization

We present in this section the formalization of Distributed Reconfigurable Control Systems (DRCS) sharing resources.

DRCS

The authors in (Salem et al., 2014) assume a DRCS $D$ to be composed of $n_1$ networked reconfigurable sub-systems sharing $n_2$ resources. They extend the formalization of DRCS in (Zhang et al., 2013) by adding the new set of resources as follows:

$$ D = (\sum R - TNCES, \sigma, \sum M, \sum R) \quad (9) $$

where: (i) $\sum R - TNCES$ is a set of $n_1$ R-TNCES, (ii) $\sigma$ a virtual coordinator handling $\sum M$, a set of Judgment Matrices, (iii) $\sum R$, a set of $n_2$ shared resources.

Shared Resources

On the basis of PCP’s definition and the flexibility expected from the DRCS, a resource $R$ is defined as follows:

$$ R = (Rec, S, Cl) \quad (10) $$

where: (i) $Rec$ (Reconfiguration) indicates whether $R$ is added to the system / $Rec \in \{added, added\}$, (ii) $S$ indicates the state of $R$ / $S \in \{free, hold \text{ by } a \text{ task}, \}$, (iii) $Cl$ is used for the ceiling of $R$.

Tasks

Based on the expected reconfiguration of the system, the authors in (Salem et al., 2014) defines a task $T$ by:

$$ T = (Rec, S) \quad (11) $$

where: (i) $Rec$ (Reconfiguration) indicates whether $T$ is added to the system / $R \in \{added, added\}$, (ii) $S$ indicates the state of $T$ / $S \in \{idle, execute, wait, P(R_i), V(R_i)\}$ and $P(R_i)$ means locking $R$ and $V(R_i)$ unlocking it.

Modeling

The authors in (Salem et al., 2014) proposes new solutions to introduce PCP in R-TNCES to avoid any blocking problem after reconfiguration scenarios. An R-TNCES model is proposed for each resource of $\sum R$ and task of $\sum R - TNCES$.

Shared Resources

Each shared resource is modeled by an R-TNCES as shown in Figure 11. The latter is composed of three TNCES modeling the resource’s reconfiguration ($Rec$), state ($S$) and ceiling ($Cl$). Here is the modeling of a resource $R$:

![Figure 11: A shared resource’s modeling.](image)

Control Tasks

The authors in (Salem et al., 2014) model each task $T$ by an R-TNCES to be composed of two TNCESs as shown in Figure 12: the first one is illustrating its reconfiguration ($Rec$), the second its state ($S$).

![Figure 12: A task’s modeling.](image)

4.2.2 R-Std Translation into R-TNCES

The paper proposes Table 1 which is given above to show the correspondence between R-Std and R-TNCES. The numbers given in parentheses show the reference to the formulas that give details on the syntax used in the table.

The seven translation rules are explained hereafter:
Table 1: Correspondence table for R-StD translation into R-TNCES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rules</th>
<th>R-StD</th>
<th>R-TNCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule 1</td>
<td>St (6)</td>
<td>P (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 2</td>
<td>Tr (6)</td>
<td>T (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 3</td>
<td>{s_{lb}, s_{le}} := \zeta(\text{tr}) \ (6)</td>
<td>{p_{out}, p_{to}} \subseteq P; {f_{a1}, f_{a2}} \subseteq F \ (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 4</td>
<td>gr := \delta^{-1}(\text{tr}) \ (6)</td>
<td>ci \in C^\text{in} \ (2); co \in C^\text{out} \ (2); ca \in CN \ (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 5</td>
<td>ac := \varepsilon^{-1}(\text{tr}) \ (6)</td>
<td>ei \in E^\text{in} \ (2); eo \in E^\text{out} \ (2); ea \in EN \ (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 6</td>
<td>ev := \zeta^{-1}(\text{tr}) \ (6) AND \langle&lt; \text{eventInput} \rangle \rangle := \alpha^{-1}(ev) \ (5)</td>
<td>ev := \zeta^{-1}(\text{tr}) \ (6) AND ev is an after(n) event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 7</td>
<td>ev := \zeta^{-1}(\text{tr}) \ (6) AND ev is an after(n) event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13: The illustrative example’s R-TNCES.

- Rule 1: A state \( St \) in an R-StD corresponds to a place \( P \) in an R-TNCES.
- Rule 2: A transition \( Tr \) in an R-StD corresponds to a transition too (\( T \)) in an R-TNCES.
- Rule 3: Each transition \( tr \) in an R-StD is mapped to a pair of states, \( s_{lb} \) and \( s_{le} \), where the first is the state from which \( tr \) is taken and the second is the next state if \( tr \) fires. The corresponding transition (\( t \)) and two places (\( p_{out} \) and \( p_{to} \)) will be created using, respectively, Rule 2 and Rule 1. Rule 3 creates actually in the R-TNCES a flow arc, \( f_{a1} \), linking \( p_{out} \) to \( t \), and another one, \( f_{a2} \), linking \( t \) to \( p_{to} \).
- Rule 4: In an R-StD, some guards can be mapped to some transitions. A guard \( gr \) corresponds to a condition arc, \( ca \), in an R-TNCES. A condition output signal, \( co \), is added to the place from which \( ca \) is leaving and a condition input signal, \( ci \), to the place which is pointed by \( ca \).
- Rule 5: In an R-StD, some actions can be mapped to some transitions. An action \( ac \) corresponds to an event arc, \( ea \), in an R-TNCES. An event output signal, \( eo \), is added to the place from which \( ea \) is leaving and an event input signal, \( ei \), to the place which is pointed by \( ea \).
- Rule 6: In an R-StD, each \( \langle< \text{eventInput} \rangle \rangle \)-stereotyped event, \( ev \), is translated into an event arc, \( ea \), in the corresponding R-TNCES. An event output signal, \( eo \), is added to the place from which \( ea \) is leaving and an event input signal, \( ei \), to the place which is pointed by \( ea \).
- Rule 7: An R-StD may feature after(n)-typed events, where \( n \in \mathbb{N}^+ \). If so, \( n \) is added to \( DR \), the set of minimum times that the token should spend at particular place before the transition can fire, and \( \infty \) to \( DL \), the set of limitation time that defines maximum time that the place may hold a token, since the place from which the after(n)-typed event is leaving may indefinitely hold the token.

4.2.3 Verification

We propose in this section to check the relevance of the our solution and the contribution of PCP in solving several issues threatening a DRCS’s safety and deadlock-freedom. Thus, we start by modeling the running example of Section 3 in UML and then transforming the latter in R-TNCES according to (Zhang et al., 2013).
Figure 15: The tasks A and B’s modeling using PCP.

Figure 14: Screenshot from SESA.

Thus, we don’t call out the PCP. We obtain the model illustrated in Figure 13. To verify it, we use model-checking which is a technique for automatically verifying the correctness properties of finite-state systems. Model checking for R-TNCES is based on its reachability graphs. ZiZo (Salem et al., 2015b) is a new and effective software environment for the analysis of R-TNCES, which computes the set of reachable states exactly. It exports, then, files exploitable by the model-checker SESA (Starke and Roch, 2002). Typical properties which can be verified are boundedness of places, liveness of transitions, and reachability of states. In addition, temporalfunctional properties based on Computation Tree Logic (CTL) specified by users can be checked manually. We apply, then, the CTL formula AG EX TRUE which checks the deadlock-freedom of the system. The said formula turned out to be false as shown in Figure 14, meaning that the system features a deadlock issue.

Whence, we call out the solution we proposed in the previous sections. We start by modeling the two tasks and the three resources in R-StD and transform, then, the models to R-TNCES based on the transformation rules specified in Section 4.2.2. We obtain, thus, the R-TNCES model of the tasks A and B illustrated in Figure 15.

Once the R-TNCES model of the DRCS is enriched with PCP, the next step is to verify whether the models meet users requirements. So, any reconfiguration scenario dealing with adding/removal of resources does not lead to a blocking situation. The following CTL formula is applied:

\[ AG \ EX \ TRUE \] (12)

This formula is proven to be true by SESA as shown in the screenshot in Figure 16, so there is no deadlock in our R-TNCES.

Figure 16: Screenshot from SESA.

We also check the safety property by checking if a given resource may be simultaneously locked by two different tasks. The following CTL formula is checked:

\[ EF \ p_{22} AND p_{23} \] (13)

where \( p_{22} \) is the place translating that the resource \( R \) is locked by the task \( A \); \( p_{23} \) means that \( B \) locks \( R \). This formula is proven to be false as illustrated in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Screenshot from SESA.

The formula 13 is applied six times of the R-TNCES modeling, changing at each time \( p_{22} \) and \( p_{23} \) by the places which correspond to the ones translating that the resource \( R \) (and then \( Q \) and \( S \)) is locked by the task \( A \) (and then \( B \)). We check thus whether a given resource can be locked by the two tasks at the same time. The six formulas turned out to be false.
are sure, then, that our system doesn’t feature a deadlock issue caused by a concurrent access to shared resources after a reconfiguration scenario.

5 CONCLUSIONS

Our work consisted, through this paper, in proposing a new UML profile, the R-UML, to model and verify flexible control systems sharing adaptive resources. Whence, we chose to enhance class and statecharts diagrams to support PCP. We proposed, then, a new and original solution to translate the generated R-UML models into R-TNCES-based patterns which were proposed in (Salem et al., 2014). This aims at proving the correctness of the R-UML models by performing model-checking on the generated R-TNCES models. The relevance of our contribution was proved thanks to model-checking using ZiZo, a new R-TNCES editor, simulator and model-checker (Salem et al., 2015b). This approach is original since R-TNCES is a new formalism dedicated to flexible control systems modeling and ZiZo is a new tool supporting the said formalism.

The next step is to apply this contribution on BROS, a new surgical robotic platform (Salem et al., 2015a). BROS is a flexible system since it can run under different operating modes: it is reconfigurable. The concurrent access to adaptive shared resources is present in the said system, which can be rather hazardous in such medical systems. Whence, applying our contribution on BROS can be very relevant to certify that the robotic platform is safe and does not run any risk after any reconfiguration scenario.

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