Simulation based Evaluation of a Code Diversification Strategy

Brady Tello, Michael Winterrose, George Baah and Michael Zhivich

MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 244 Wood Street, Lexington, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

Keywords: Security, Multi-compiler, Optimization.

Abstract: Periodic randomization of a computer program’s binary code is an attractive technique for defending against several classes of advanced threats. In this paper we describe a model of attacker-defender interaction in which the defender employs such a technique against an attacker who is actively constructing an exploit using Return Oriented Programming (ROP). In order to successfully build a working exploit, the attacker must guess the locations of several small chunks of program code (i.e., gadgets) in the defended program’s memory space. As the attacker continually guesses, the defender periodically rotates to a newly randomized variant of the program, effectively negating any gains the attacker made since the last rotation. Although randomization makes the attacker’s task more difficult, it also incurs a cost to the defender. As such, the defender’s goal is to find an acceptable balance between utility degradation (cost) and security (benefit). One way to measure these two competing factors is the total task latency introduced by both the attacker and any defensive measures taken to thwart him. We simulated a number of diversity strategies under various threat scenarios and present the measured impact on the defender’s task.

1 INTRODUCTION

Over the last several years, organizations across the globe have shown a great deal of interest in finding better ways to make their computer systems more secure. This interest is the direct result of several high profile security incidents involving major corporations (Target, 2014; Home Depot, 2014), governments (Greenwald et al., 2014; Bumiller, 2014), and even the infrastructure of the web itself (MITRE, 2014). In response, researchers and developers have developed defensive technologies and techniques to mitigate advanced classes of threats (Microsoft, 2014; Abadi et al., 2014).

An interesting class of advanced defense techniques involves the randomization of system components in an effort to confuse the adversary. Strategies that conform to this paradigm are often referred to as “Moving Target (MT)” strategies (Okhravi, 2014; Cox, 2006; Franz, 2010). Moving Target strategies are attractive because they make it harder for an adversary to analyse and exploit targets due to the fact that the system under defense is constantly changing.

Despite the obvious benefits of MT strategies, they are not zero-cost solutions: as one might imagine, randomizing a computer system in a way that doesn’t noticeably reduce the system’s performance is a difficult problem. Moving target engineers must ensure that their solutions maintain adequate speed, functionality, performance, and compatibility. All of these conditions are necessary in order for a moving target technology to have a chance at acceptance. Often, achieving these goals involves calibration to a specific operational environment because what is acceptable to one user may not be acceptable to another.

One particularly interesting MT technology, developed by researchers at the University of California at Irvine (UCI), is known as the multi-compiler (Franz, 2010). The multi-compiler generates variants of computer programs that are functionally identical but physically distinct. One technique the multi-compiler uses to accomplish this objective is to probabilistically distribute null-operations (NOPs) throughout the program binary code. NOP insertion is meant to defend against an attack technique known as Return Oriented Programming (ROP). In a ROP attack, the adversary repurposes existing chunks of code in the defended program’s memory space – known colloquially as “gadgets” – to build complex attacks. The diversity created by the multi-compiler makes it much more difficult for an attacker to write reliable gadget based exploits by both relocating and breaking up gadgets across variants. By making ROP attacks less...
reliable, the multi-compiler is very attractive as a defensive technology.

The multi-compiler is a powerful tool that can provide varying notions of security depending on how it is used. One threat the multi-compiler is particularly well suited to address is that of the “write once, compromise everywhere” attacker. In this threat scenario, an attacker writes a single exploit and can then re-use it to compromise a large number of hosts. The multi-compiler solves this problem by generating a unique variant of the software under defense for each defended machine. Using the multi-compiler this way strips the attacker of the ability to write reusable exploits which creates a sort of herd immunity in which individual actors can be compromised but the population as a whole experiences a dramatic reduction in risk. Our study focuses on an enhanced rotation-based usage in which each defender periodically rotates to new variants of the program, rather than using the same variant for a long period of time. Under this strategy, diversification provides defensive advantages at both the individual and aggregate scales.

The goal of our work is to use a computer simulation to evaluate the effectiveness of a rotation-based multi-compiler defense strategy under a number of different threat scenarios. If the defender is overly aggressive with his diversity/rotation strategy, he incurs costs related to system utility: if a program is spending all of its time defending itself, it’s not spending any of its time doing anything productive. Conversely, if he is not aggressive enough, he risks system compromise and then must pay the costs related to recovery (if recovery is an option).

The contributions of this work are as follows:
1. We present a case study in the use of software-based simulation to evaluate deployment strategies of the multi-compiler.
2. We provide non-intuitive guidance for the setting of a key security parameter of the multi-compiler (NOP insertion rate). The multi-compiler has a number of additional security parameters that we hope to study in future work.
3. We introduce the notion of “impact landscapes” which are useful tools for visualizing and reasoning about task impact due to cyber security threats
4. We utilize observed impact landscapes to generate practical insights for a diversity based cyber defense strategy
5. We present the results of a study that suggest certain parameter settings for the multi-compiler may be robust across a wide array of performance cost scenarios

2 RELATED WORK

In related work at Lincoln Laboratory, we studied a code diversification strategy that is dependent on the results of an output scanner (Priest, 2015). This strategy’s Achilles’ heel is the output scanner, as it is well known that Intrusion Detection Systems are imperfect (Denning, 1987). In the current work we consider a strategy in which the defender simply assumes that he is under constant attack and proactively rotates.

In a recent paper, it is suggested that BBN Technology’s A3 platform could be used to manage a proactive code diversification strategy (Pal et al., 2014) similar to the one we outline in this paper. We believe the work laid out in our study bolsters the case for this defensive mechanism by highlighting how it performs under a number of scenarios.

Our approach resembles some aspects of the Data Farming methodology described in (Alfred, 1998, Horne, 2004, Barry, 2004). Specifically, our approach shares with Data Farming an emphasis on simple agent-based models, extensive parameter space exploration, visualizing outputs as landscapes, and decision support. Data Farming goes on to emphasize high-performance computing and the discovery of outliers in the simulation results, two aspects that are not emphasized in the present work, though these topics are of interest for future work.

3 ATTACK MODEL

In order to carry out our strategy evaluation, we have implemented a model-based simulation of an attacker and defender interaction. Through the use of computer simulation, we are able to study a wide array of attacker-defender scenarios and outcomes.

3.1 Defender Model

In the model there are two actors: a defender and an attacker. The defender is responsible for protecting a running computer program, A, from being exploited by the attacker. It is assumed that A is a program that continuously performs processing in support of a notional task. To evade compromise, the defender is allowed to periodically rotate the variant of A that processes user requests, A*, to a new variant of A.
Each rotation resets the attacker’s cumulative effort to zero, thus delaying system compromise.

In our model, the task takes a fixed amount of work to complete which is specified by the parameter $w_m$, measured in work units. The baseline defender (no attacker, no multi-compiler) completes a single work unit during a single time unit. Once the defender completes $w_m$ work units, the simulation ends and the total time expended to complete the task, $t_m$, is recorded. In the baseline case, it would take $w_m$ time units to complete $w_m$ work units so $t_m = w_m$ but in the presence of an attacker and the accompanying defense strategies, that relationship no longer holds. The difference between these two numbers is what we refer to as task delay, $d_m$:

$$d_m = t_m - w_m \quad (1)$$

The task delay is important because it allows us to objectively compare defense strategies and, indeed, this is the primary metric we use in our evaluation.

There are two costs associated with rotation and compromise that directly affect how quickly the defender accomplishes his task. The cost of a compromise to the defender, $\beta_{CMP}$, is an increase in $d_m$. The cost of rotation, $\beta_{ROT}$, is also an increase in $d_m$.

### 3.2 Threat Model

Much of the ground truth in our model is built into the threat model. Our attacker is a remote actor who we assume has the ability to query the memory space of $A^*$, in an effort to guess the location of each of the $r_G$ gadgets required to build a working ROP exploit. Once the attacker is able to correctly guess the location of all required gadgets he launches an exploit against $A^*$. It is also assumed that the attacker has access to the multi-compiler, can compile versions of the target binary, and has a priori knowledge of the fixed NOP insertion rate used by the defender’s instance of the multi-compiler. The attacker uses these tools to build probability distributions over the locations of the desired gadgets. These distributions allow the attacker to make guesses in order of decreasing likelihood, thus minimizing the average number of guesses that need to be made to find a particular gadget. The attacker is also allowed to set the guess rate, $r_G$, so the amount of time it would typically take an attacker to find a single gadget is $r_G$ multiplied by the average number of guesses required for that gadget.

The way we simulated this was to build distributions over the number of guesses required to locate a specific gadget, as shown in Figure 1. These were generated from an empirical analysis of the multi-compiler’s effects on the popular gzip program. This analysis involved the generation of a control binary as well as 10,000 multi-compiled variants for all NOP insertion rates between 0 and 100% that are multiples of 5. For each variant, it was
necessary to take inventory of all the surviving gadgets by aligning them with the control binary. This was required because the multi-compiler can break up previously existing gadgets as a useful side effect. For each surviving gadget in each variant, we calculated the displacement from the corresponding gadget in the control binary and used those displacements to build probability distributions over the displacements. From the displacement distributions, we constructed our guessing distributions using a password guessing metric known as $\alpha$-guesswork as proposed by Bonneau with an $\alpha$ value of 0.1 (Bonneau, 2012). This metric captures the expected number of guesses required to guess a gadget’s location in at least $\alpha$ percent of the variants. Figure 2 illustrates how gadget displacements were measured for the $i^{th}$ variant of the program.

### 3.3 Multi-compiler Model

Another key component of our model is the multi-compiler itself. As described in the introduction, the multi-compiler generates unique variants of a computer program by probabilistically inserting NOP instructions into the program’s binary code. The probability that the multi-compiler will insert a NOP instruction before any given instruction is specified by the model parameter, $p_{NOP}$. Modifying $p_{NOP}$ directly affects the shape of the attacker’s guess distributions, which makes it a critical security parameter. Although one’s intuition might be to crank $p_{NOP}$ up to 100% for optimal security, this actually leads to an entirely deterministic strategy, which is obviously undesirable. The optimal setting for $p_{NOP}$ is 50% when performance costs are not accounted for.

One drawback of the multi-compiler, however, is that it inflates the number of instructions in the program’s binary code. A multi-compiled program will take longer to run than the control program due to the large number of extraneous NOP instructions that must be executed by the CPU. The UCI team is well aware of this problem and conducted a study into how NOPs might be more strategically placed (Homescu, 2013). In that paper, data was provided describing the measured slowdown due to a Naïve NOP placement strategy. In (Homescu, 2013) data is provided for both a Naïve NOP placement strategy as well as a profile-guided strategy. We decided to model the naïve strategy. We made this choice because we think it has the highest potential for wide scale use due to its ease of configuration. In contrast, profile guided NOP insertion requires runtime performance profiling which we feel makes it more likely to be adopted by “power users” who are extremely concerned with performance degradation.

One final metric of interest in this model is the amount of task progress that the defender has made at time $T$:

$$m(T) = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \left(1 - s_b(p_{NOP}) - \beta_{\text{ROT}}^t - \beta_{\text{CMP}}^t\right)$$

(3)

Where $\beta_{\text{ROT}}^t$ = $\beta_{\text{ROT}}$ if the defender rotates at time $t$ and is 0 at all other times. Similarly, $\beta_{\text{CMP}}^t$ = $\beta_{\text{CMP}}$ if the defender becomes compromised at time $t$ and is 0 at all other times.

This metric is useful because it is only once it reaches $w_m$ that the simulation ends. Note that $\beta_{\text{CMP}}^t$ is the only stochastic element of this function.

### 3.4 Strategy Evaluation

We define a defense strategy, $S$, given an operational environment, $\Theta$, as the tuple:

$$S_\theta = (p_{NOP}, r_{\text{ROT}})$$

(4)

Where $\Theta$ is the set of model parameters that define the operational environment:

$$\Theta = \{n_G,T_G,\beta_{\text{ROT}},\beta_{\text{CMP}},w_m,s_b\}$$

(5)

The effectiveness of a given $S_\theta$ is evaluated based on the average observed value of $d_m$. The average is calculated over several scenario replicates using Monte Carlo methods. We define a scenario as a fixed set of model parameters and a replicate as a single simulation run of a scenario.

The baseline from which we measured relative performance was the scenario in which there was no task delay. This corresponds to a scenario in which attackers and multi-compilers are both disabled. Alternatively, we could have used a scenario in which the attacker is still turned on but $r_{\text{ROT}} = \infty$ which would allow us to evaluate the marginal benefit of the rotation strategy.

However, since this is a probabilistic baseline, we feel that the first alternative is more straightforward.
Table 1: Table of Symbols.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>The software under defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A^*$</td>
<td>The current variant of $A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{\text{NOP}}$</td>
<td>The NOP insertion probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n_G$</td>
<td>The number of gadgets required to build an exploit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_{\text{ROT}}$</td>
<td>The defender rotation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_G$</td>
<td>The attacker guess rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{\text{ROT}}$</td>
<td>The time penalty of rotation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{\text{CMP}}$</td>
<td>The penalty due to compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_m$</td>
<td>The amount of work required to complete a task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d_m$</td>
<td>The total task delay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_k(p_{\text{NOP}})$</td>
<td>The multi-compilation slowdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_m$</td>
<td>The time to complete $w_m$ units of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m(T)$</td>
<td>The cumulative task progress up until time $T$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Setup

Although our model has many parameters, several of them are fixed across both scenarios and replicates. We set $n_G$ to 10, motivated by the observation that attackers tend to prefer to use a small number of ROP gadgets as a compact first stage of a full exploit. For example, many of the ROP chains published on the Corelan ROP database (Corelan, 2014) simply disable various virtual memory protection mechanisms to set the stage for more efficient/reliable techniques to finish the rest of the attack. The amount of work required to complete a task, $w_m$, was kept fixed at $10^3$ for all experiments. This choice allows for reasonable simulation execution efficiency while allowing enough time for the important dynamics in the model to manifest. The cost of rotation, $\beta_{\text{ROT}}$, was set to 25 because it is small compared to the values we used for $\beta_{\text{CMP}}$. The reason for this decision was because it seemed reasonable to assume that nobody would deploy a rotation strategy if they didn’t have an efficient mechanism for doing the actual rotations. We also had a maximum tick count of 10,000 in place to prevent the model from running for too long. If the model runs for over 10,000 ticks, it simply halts and reports the maximum task delay of 9,000.

Our strategy for varying the remaining parameters was to define nine distinct task scenarios using different values for $\beta_{\text{CMP}}$ and $r_G$ and then for each scenario, perform a parameter sweep on both $p_{\text{NOP}}$ and $r_{\text{ROT}}$. This allows us to analyze the task delay landscape (henceforth, referred to as the “impact landscape”) for a wide range of strategies under a number of task scenarios. We ran 100 replicates for each scenario and measured $d_m$ for each.

Nine task scenarios were defined corresponding to various combinations of attacker efficiency and defender costs due to compromise. In three of our scenarios, the attacker guesses once every time unit. This is the strongest possible attacker under our model. In another three scenarios the attacker guesses once every other time unit and in the remaining three he guesses once every fourth time unit. For each of the three attacker strength levels, we set three different levels of $\beta_{\text{CMP}}$. The levels we use are 125, 250, and 2500. These three values correspond to five, ten, and one hundred times $r_G$.

4.2 Results and Analysis

In order to visualize how the various parameters impacted our model task, we created “impact landscapes” for each of our scenarios. Each impact landscape is a surface plot of the average response in $d_m$ (averaged over the 100 replicates) as a function of $r_{\text{ROT}}$ and $p_{\text{NOP}}$.

In Figure 3, the various landscapes are laid out with the attacker getting more aggressive from left to right and the impact due to compromise getting more severe from top to bottom. Within each landscape, the rotation rate increases from left to right and the NOP insertion probability increases from bottom to top. Each landscape provides a clear picture of how the two factors in our experiments affected the total task delay. The dark blue regions correspond to scenarios with small amounts of task delay while the darker red regions correspond to scenarios in which the defender took much longer to complete the task. The landscapes in Figure 3 provide some practical strategic insights. Visual inspection makes it immediately obvious that failure to rotate at all will always lead to a compromise. It also clear that being overly zealous with rotations has a negative impact on the task on average.

Perhaps surprisingly, we see that a low value for $p_{\text{NOP}}$ does not always lead to a high impact situation. This is due to the fact that the cost of the additional instructions is accrued during every step of the simulation.
These impact landscapes also highlight the fact that the attacker’s aggressiveness has a strong effect on the defender’s ability to maneuver in the parameter space. In the leftmost scenarios the defender has a wide array of parameter settings that can be used to achieve acceptable task delay. In the rightmost scenarios, however, the defender must restrict his setting of the rotation rate to a narrow band or risk being “pinned down” by the attacker.

Table 2: Ideal Operating Points For All Threat Scenarios.

The baseline delay (no attacker, no rotations) is 0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$r_G$</th>
<th>$\beta_{CMP}$</th>
<th>$r_{\text{ROT}}^2$</th>
<th>$p_{\text{NOP}}$</th>
<th>$d_m$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.25</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>550 (and 5 others)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.25</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.25</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>550 (and 6 others)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also used the impact landscape data to determine optimal parameter settings for each of the nine attacker scenarios. For each scenario, we found the values of $r_{\text{ROT}}$ and $p_{\text{NOP}}$ corresponding to the lowest task delay. We labeled these optimal parameter settings $r_{i, \text{ROT}}^2$ and $p_{i, \text{NOP}}$ respectively and refer to them jointly as an Ideal Operating Point (IOP). Table 2 provides the IOPs for each scenario and the corresponding task delay.

The first thing to notice in this data is that the value for $p_{\text{NOP}}$ never rises above 0.3. The reason for this phenomenon is not intuitive. It is important to know that the randomness added to a set of application binaries by the multi-compiler peaks when $p_{\text{NOP}} = 0.5$. To understand this, consider the case in which $p_{\text{NOP}} = 1$: the adversary would be able to reconstruct any multi-compiled application by simply taking the control binary and adding a NOP after every instruction. The inverse parabolic shape of the distribution means in Figure 1 captures this phenomenon more clearly. It is important to note, however, that although setting the NOP insertion rate to 50% provides the highest benefit with respect to system security, it also imposes a performance cost due to a NOP being executed after every other instruction. It is due to this security-performance tradeoff dynamic that the ideal NOP insertion rate hovers around 0.3.

Because the ideal value for $p_{\text{NOP}} (p_{\text{NOP}}^*)$ is the result of a tradeoff between security and performance, it is interesting to study the sensitivity of $p_{\text{NOP}}$ to different performance penalty models. To study this, we ran an experiment in which we fixed the rotation rate at 375 and varied the effect of multi-compilation (the $b$ parameter in the slowdown function, $s_b(p_{\text{NOP}})$ ) from no penalty ($b=0$) up to a moderate penalty ($b=0.4$) in increments of .05 and...
studied the resultant value for $p_{\text{nop}}$. Surprisingly, although changes in $b$ did cause shifts in the overall impact landscape, the ideal NOP insertion rate remained fixed at .3 for all ten penalty settings. This was surprising to us and seems to indicate that the NOP insertion rate can be set in a way that leads to robustness across various security and performance trade-off scenarios.

Another interesting result is the presence of multiple points at which $d_m$ takes on its minimal value in the scenarios where the attacker is weakest ($r_c = .25$). This might lead one to question whether any of these points should be preferred over the others. One option would be to choose the point with the smallest variance. In our simulations, the data seemed to indicate that points closer to the IOP experienced smaller amounts of variance. In fact, nearly all the optimal delay values in table 2 had zero variance. This seems to indicate that using variance as a selection criterion would not be unreasonable. In future work, we plan to use various risk metrics to explore alternative answers to this question.

5 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we presented a simulation-centric evaluation of a cyber defense strategy based on proactively rotating binary variants generated by a multi-compiler. The strategy in question is one that has been considered in previous work but as far as we know has not been the subject of a serious investigation.

We used the delay to a notional task as an evaluation metric to help us understand the impact of this code diversification strategy. We generated a number of comprehensive impact landscapes to help us understand how different deployment configurations and adversarial assumptions affect the overall task impact. Our analysis of these landscapes showed that this strategy facilitates safe and efficient execution even in the presence of a highly motivated adversary.

Our study also suggested the existence of parameter settings for the multi-compiler that are highly resilient across a broad spectrum of scenarios. In our simulations, setting the multi-compiler’s NOP insertion rate to 30% resulted in minimal task impact in a large number of experiments including when the performance cost of NOP insertion was nearly zero.

This work was intended to shed light on various strengths and weaknesses of the strategy and would likely be of greatest interest to those hoping to deploy such a strategy in a production environment.

6 FUTURE WORK

In this study we have carried out extensive sweeps through the parameter space of an abstract model of a rotation-based multi-compiler defense, resulting in global visualizations of the task delay landscape caused by multi-compiler related latencies and attacker success. The methodology of performing extensive parameter sweeps is only feasible when the underlying model is highly abstract and simplified. In a future study we plan to enhance our rotation-based multi-compiler model with additional operational details and explore the applicability of metaheuristic search techniques, such as genetic algorithms (Mitchell, 1996) and simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983) to efficiently navigate complex output landscapes to discover optimal operation points for a multi-compiler defense.

As part of this work we noticed that there are situations in which it is not clear which of several operating points are “ideal” (e.g. they all have the same task delay). Future work will involve the use of various risk metrics to attempt to find operating points that are truly ideal.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Dr. William Streilein, Dr. Neal Wagner, and Dr. Kevin M. Carter of MIT Lincoln Laboratory for their advice on this paper.

This work is sponsored by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under Air Force Contract #FA8721-05-C-0002. Opinions, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Government.

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this article are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

REFERENCES