Trust-based Secure Cloud Data Storage with Cryptographic Role-based Access Control

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Abstract: Role-based access control (RBAC) model is a widely used access control model which can simplify security management in large-scale systems. Recently, several cryptographic RBAC schemes have been proposed to integrate cryptographic techniques with RBAC models to secure data storage in an outsourced environment such as a cloud. These schemes allow data to be encrypted in such a way that only the users who are members of an appropriate role can decrypt and view the data. However, the issue of trust in such a data storage system is not addressed in these schemes. In this paper, we propose trust models to improve the security of such a system which uses cryptographic RBAC schemes. The trust models provide an approach for the users and roles to determine the trustworthiness of individual roles and owners in the RBAC system. The users can use the trust models to decide whether to join a particular role for accessing data in the system. The roles can use the trust models in their decision to ensure that only data from data owners with good behaviours are accepted by the roles. The proposed trust models take into account role inheritance and hierarchy in the evaluation of trustworthiness of the roles. In addition, we present a design of a trust-based cloud storage system which shows how the trust models can be integrated into a system that uses cryptographic RBAC schemes.

1 INTRODUCTION

Controlling the access to data is an important issue in data storage systems. A proper access control mechanism is needed depending on the context and the requirement of the system. Many access control models have been proposed over the years in the literature. Role-based access control (RBAC) is a well-known access control model which can help to simplify security management especially in large-scale systems. In RBAC, roles are used to associate users with permissions on resources. Users are assigned roles and permissions are allocated to roles instead of individual users; only users who have been granted membership to roles can access the permissions associated with the roles and hence can access the resources. Since being first formalised in 1990’s (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992), RBAC has been widely used in many systems to provide users with flexible controls over the access to their data. The RBAC model was extended and updated in 1996 (Sandhu et al., 1996), and the RBAC standard was proposed in 2000 (Sandhu et al., 2000).

In traditional systems, access control policies are usually specified and enforced by a central authority who has administrative control over all the resources in the system. With the rapid increase in the amount of digital information that needs to be stored, cloud storage has attracted much attention in recent years because of its ability to deliver storage resources to users on demand in a cost effective manner. In such an environment, there may not exist a central authority as the data may be stored in distributed data centres which cannot be under the control of a single authority. One approach to control the access to data in an untrusted environment is to encrypt the data and give the key to users who require access to the data.

Several cryptographic RBAC schemes have been developed to allow data encryption in the context of the RBAC model. A hierarchical cryptographic access control scheme (Akl and Taylor, 1983) was proposed in 1983. Because of the similarity in structures between hierarchical access control and RBAC, a hierarchical cryptographic access control scheme can be easily transformed into a cryptographic RBAC scheme. The problem of access control for securely outsourcing data using cryptographic techniques was first considered in (Miklau and Suciu, 2003). Some other schemes were proposed afterwards, such as in (Samarati and di Vimercati, 2010; di Vimercati et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2011). Recently, a new
role-based encryption (RBE) scheme has been proposed in (Zhou et al., 2011). In this scheme, the user memberships are managed by individual roles as opposed to a central administrator like in other cryptographic RBAC schemes. These schemes combine cryptographic techniques and access control to protect the privacy of the data in an outsourced environment where data can be encrypted in such a way that only the users who are allowed by the access policies can decrypt and view the data.

In some cases though the access control policies may be specified by the cloud provider authority itself in a centralised way, there could be multiple authorities to enforce these access policies distributed throughout the cloud system. Therefore there would be a need to trust these authorities to correctly specify the access control policies and enforce them properly. In some cryptographic RBAC schemes, roles and their users are managed by administrators who hold the master secrets of the system. All the administration tasks in these schemes are centralised. Therefore, if one wants to know if a RBAC system is secure, s/he only needs to determine the trustworthiness of the administrator of the system.

However, in large-scale RBAC systems, it is impractical to centralise the task of managing these users and permissions, and their relationships with the roles in a small team of security administrators. The paper (Zhou et al., 2011) proposes a new cryptographic RBAC scheme called Role-based Encryption (RBE) in which the user management can be decentralised to individual roles; that is, the administrators only manage the roles and the relationship among them while the role managers have the flexibility in specifying the user memberships themselves. In this paper, we consider trust models for cloud storage systems that are using cryptographic RBAC schemes like RBE, where each individual role manager can manage their user memberships without the need of involving the administrators. We believe this case is more general and can be used in large-scale RBAC systems. In such systems, the trust on the individual roles needs to be considered instead of the trust on the administrators.

There have been several trust models (Chakraborty and Ray, 2006; Toahchoodee et al., 2009) for RBAC proposed in the literature. These trust models considered the trust on users to assist the decision making about whether or not to grant permissions to the users. In a cloud storage system using cryptographic RBAC schemes, it would also be helpful if a user could determine whether or not a role in the system is trusted before joining it. This would be useful especially in systems where there is a cost for users to join a role, for example, users need to pay the subscription fee for joining roles. When a user evaluates the trust value of a role, s/he will only proceed with joining the role if the trust value of the role is above a certain trust threshold (this threshold being set by the users, and being different for different applications and context). In a system where owners are allowed to choose the roles to assign their data, from the users’ perspective, malicious owners can also cause negative behaviours of roles by assigning bad resources (e.g. virus, malware) to roles. Therefore, roles will also need to consider the trust of the data owners so that only data from well-behaved owners will be accepted.

**Contributions of this Paper.** The main contributions of this paper are trust models for securing data storage in cloud storage systems that are using cryptographic RBAC schemes. Though much work exists on trust models in RBAC, none of this work considers the trust on the RBAC system itself. The proposed trust models address the missing aspect of trust in cryptographic RBAC schemes to improve the decision making for entities (users and role managers) in the cloud system. This paper proposes trust models to assist (i) the users to evaluate the trust on the roles in a RBAC system and use this trust evaluation to decide whether to join a particular role or not, and (ii) the role managers to evaluate the trust on the owners in the RBAC system and use this trust in the decision to accept data from an owner. We refer to these trust models as User RBAC and Role RBAC trust models respectively. These trust models can not only prevent users from joining roles which have bad historical behaviour in terms of sharing poor quality resources or misleading users on the content of resources, but also assist the roles to identify the malicious owners who have caused bad impact on the roles’ trustworthiness. Our users’ trust model takes into account the effect of role inheritance in RBAC systems on the trust evaluation. If a role A inherits all the permissions that a role B has, then we say role A is a ancestor role of role B, and role B is a descendent role of role A. We also present the architecture of a trust-based cloud storage system which integrates the trust models in a cryptographic RBAC system. Furthermore, we describe the relevance of the trust models by considering practical application scenarios and then illustrate how the trust evaluations can be used to enhance the quality of secure decision making by users and roles of cloud storage service.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant preliminary knowledge that is needed for the design of our trust models. Section 3 describes the trust issues in a cryptographic RBAC system and
discusses the trust requirements for users and roles. We give the formal User and Role RBAC trust models in Section 4. The architecture of our secure cloud storage system is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we illustrate how our trust models can be used in a cloud service application to enhance the quality of security decision making. Section 7 discusses relevant related works and compares them with our proposed trust models. Section 8 concludes the paper.

2 PRELIMINARIES

2.1 Experience-based Trust

Trust has played a foundational role in security for a long period of time. It is clear that two entities may not trust each other on the identity alone. There are a range of other attributes and credentials such as different types of privileges, the state of the platform being used as well as reputations, recommendations and histories that come into play in decision making. An experience-based trust model is one trust management system which enables the trust decisions to be made based on the historical behaviour of an entity. Such a system allows an entity to rate the transactions with other entities, and the trustworthiness of an entity is determined using the collection of ratings of the transactions that other entities have had with this entity. In most experience based trust systems, one entity derives the trustworthiness of another entity from both experience of the former with the latter and the feedback on transactions provided by other entities which have had interactions with target entity in the past. An entity is able to evaluate its trust in another entity and the former can make a decision as to whether to not to continue its transaction with the latter, based on whether the trust value exceeds a certain threshold; this threshold is dependent on the context of the application at hand.

2.2 Bayesian Trust Model

Many approaches have been proposed that use probabilistic models to evaluate trust based on evidence which contains the number of “positive” and “negative” transactions in which a given entity have been involved. Perhaps the most common probabilistic model is the one based on Bayesian trust (Mui et al., 2001; Mui et al., 2002; Jøsang and Ismail, 2002) using the beta probability distribution function. The beta family of distributions is a collection of continuous probability density functions defined over the interval [0, 1]. Suppose a beta distribution used for a parameter \( \theta \) is defined as

\[
P(\theta) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha + \beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha) \Gamma(\beta)} \theta^{\alpha-1} (1 - \theta)^{\beta-1}
\]

where \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are two parameters controlling the distribution of the parameter \( \theta \), and \( 0 \leq \theta \leq 1, \alpha > 0, \beta > 0 \). Assume \( X = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \) is the collection of the feedbacks from the past \( n \) transactions, and \( X \) has \( r \) “positive” feedbacks and \( s \) “negative” feedbacks. Then the likelihood function can be defined as

\[
P(X|\theta) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} P(x_i|\theta) = \theta^r (1 - \theta)^s
\]

The posterior distribution \( P(\theta|X) \) is proportional to the multiplication of the prior \( P(\theta) \) and the likelihood function \( P(X|\theta) \), and we then have

\[
P(\theta|X) = \frac{P(X|\theta)P(\theta)}{P(X)} = \frac{\Gamma(r + \alpha + s + \beta)}{\Gamma(r + \alpha) \Gamma(s + \beta)} \theta^{r+s+1} (1 - \theta)^{s+\beta-1}
\]

Now let \( x_{i+1} \) be the possible feedback of the next transaction. The probability that \( x_{i+1} \) is a “positive” feedback given the transaction history \( X \) can be represented as

\[
P(x_{i+1}|X) = \int_{0}^{1} d\theta P(x_{i+1}|\theta)P(\theta|X) = \int_{0}^{1} d\theta \theta P(\theta|X) = E(\theta|X)
\]

Then we write the probability that the next transaction will be a “good” one as follows:

\[
E(r,s) = P(x_{i+1}|X) = \frac{r + \alpha}{r + \alpha + s + \beta} \tag{1}
\]

Using Equation 1, one entity can derive the probability that the next transaction with another entity will be positive from the transaction history of the other entity. Most Bayesian trust systems assume that the parameters \( \alpha = \beta = 1 \), such as in (Jøsang and Ismail, 2002). Some other approaches allow the parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) to be chosen depending on the system context.

3 TRUST ISSUES IN USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC RBAC SCHEMES IN SECURE CLOUD STORAGE

Cryptographic RBAC schemes integrate cryptographic techniques with RBAC models to secure the
data storage. They inherit the features and concepts from RBAC models, and also have additional components that are specific to data storage systems. In the standard RBAC model, permissions are assigned to roles by the administrator of the system. However, in a system using cryptographic RBAC schemes, “permissions” are the data encrypted to roles, and the security policies are specified to control the users’ access to data. Because data are usually not owned by a single party, cryptographic RBAC systems assume that data can be encrypted to a role by whoever owns the data as opposed to the administrator in the standard RBAC system. In this paper, we address trust issues for cryptographic RBAC systems. Therefore we adopt the above described concepts for cryptographic RBAC systems in our trust models.

Using cryptographic RBAC schemes in cloud storage systems, a data owner can encrypt the data to a role, and only the users who have been granted membership of that role or an ancestor role of that role can decrypt the data. In this paper, we assume that the data owners and users reside outside this role system infrastructure (where the roles are being administered). Hence the issues to consider are how the users can decide whether or not to trust the roles (role managers) in the system and how the roles can decide whether to trust the data owners in the system and how much to trust them. Users consider their trust in roles in order to ensure that joining roles guarantee access to data assigned to these roles, and roles consider their trust in data owners to ensure that data owners who have assigned malicious data to the roles will not be allowed to assign data to the roles any more. In this section, we discuss the trust issues that need to be considered by the users and roles of a cryptographic RBAC system.

### 3.1 Users’ Trust on Roles in RBAC Systems

Some cryptographic RBAC schemes assume that user-role assignment is managed by administrators of the systems where the administrators check the qualification of users and grants role membership to them. In these schemes, users trust all the roles at the same level as they are all managed by the same administrators. The roles are trusted as long as the administrators are trusted.

In some other cryptographic RBAC schemes, users-role assignment is decentralised to individual role managers to allow more flexibility in user management especially in large-scale systems. In systems using these schemes, assume that users join a role based on subscription for accessing the data assigned to that role. It is clear that users need to choose a trusted role when subscribing.

If the data that a user wants to access is encrypted to one role only, the user considers the trustworthiness of that role in deciding whether or not to join that role. When the same data is encrypted to multiple roles, users will need to evaluate the trustworthiness of these roles to choose the most reliable role to join. From the user’ perspective, a trusted role should meet the following requirements.

- **Requirement 1:** The role manager should grant membership to the users who are qualified for that role.

  In order to access data, a user needs to join a role to which the data is encrypted. When the user requests to join the role, the role (manager) should give access (grant the membership) to the user if the user qualifies for that role, e.g. the user has paid for the subscription fee. Refusing to do so will be considered as bad behaviour of the role.

- **Requirement 2:** The data that a role claims to have should have been encrypted properly to that role.

  When users want to access data, they will need to know what data has been encrypted to which role so that they can choose a particular role to join. The list of the data is provided by roles. However, a user may find that s/he cannot locate or decrypt the data even after s/he has joined that specific role. This may happen if the data was not encrypted properly to that role by the owner, or the role claims to possess data that has not been encrypted to the role. Each role should take the responsibility of providing a valid and up-to-date list of the data that is in its possession.

- **Requirement 3:** The data that the descendant roles of the role claim to have should have been encrypted properly to the descendant roles.

  Since a role can inherit permissions from its descendant roles, a user who has joined a role should be able to access the data that is encrypted to any of its descendant roles. Each role is liable for the validity of the data that its descendant roles claim to have, as it is considered to be part of the data that this role has.

### 3.2 Roles’ Trust on Owners in RBAC Systems

In cryptographic RBAC systems, owners can encrypt their data to any role. Obviously, roles do not
want owners to encrypt malicious data (e.g. virus, malware) to them. Therefore, roles need to decide whether or not to accept data that owners want to assign to them. Having malicious data assigned to a role may result in a low trust value of the role because users who have joined the role will place negative trust records against the role if they detect that the data they get from the role is malicious. In the case where roles are profiting from users’ subscriptions, low trust values in roles implies the risk of losing business.

To help roles detect malicious owners, and hence avoid accepting data from them, another trust model is required to assist roles in evaluating the trustworthiness of owners. Each time an owner wants to assign data to a role, the role will use the trust model to determine whether the data is coming from a trusted owner or not. From a role’s perspective, a trusted owner should meet the following requirements.

- **Requirement 1**: The data from the owner should be the same as its description.
  
  When owners encrypt and assign data to a role, the role may not be able to verify each individual record from the owners. When a user who has joined a role finds that the data s/he has accessed is not the data it claims to be or contains malicious records, the user will complain to the role about the data, and the role should place a negative trust record against the owner who owns that data. Then next time this owner wishes to assign another data to the role, this trust record will be used by the role in making the decision whether or not to accept the data.

- **Requirement 2**: The owner should not be considered as untrusted by any role in the system, if the owner has assigned data to more than one role before.

An owner may have had interactions with more than one role in the system. A trusted owner is supposed to act consistently in the interaction with different roles. An owner may still be considered as untrusted even though s/he has good interaction histories with a small portion of roles in the system. Therefore a trusted owner should try to maintain good interaction histories with all the roles in the system. When a role is interacting with an owner with which it has not interacted before, the trust opinions from other roles can assist this role to determine the trustworthiness of the owner.

### 4 Trust Models for Cryptographic RBAC Systems

In this section, we consider the trust models for a cryptographic RBAC system. There are three types of entities in our trust models, **Owner**, **User** and **Role**. Our trust models can assist a **User** to decide whether a **Role** to interact with is trusted, and assist a **Role** in determining the trustworthiness of an **Owner**. We first define these three entities as follows.

- **Owner**: the entity who owns the data and stores it in an encrypted form for particular roles in the cloud.
- **User**: the entity who wishes to access the data stored in the cloud.
- **Role**: the entity that associates users with the access to owners’ data, and each role manages the user membership of itself. Here when we say that users are managed by a role, we refer to the managers of the role who determine the user set of that role.

In our trust models, we assume that all the feedback and recommendations provided are honest. In other words, we assume that the trust system has the ability to verify the submitted feedback and recommendations, and only the valid ones will be considered in the trust evaluations.

#### 4.1 Users’ Trust on Roles

In this subsection, we consider the trust model about user’s trust on roles in a RBAC system.

**Definition 1 (Interaction).** From a user’s perspective, an interaction is a transaction in which a user accesses data that is encrypted to a role to which the user belongs.

A successful interaction is an interaction where a user has successfully accessed the data. An unsuccessful interaction is an interaction where a user failed in accessing the data to which s/he should have legitimate access. Next we define two types of unsuccessful interactions.

- **User Management Failure**: User management failure is an unsuccessful interaction caused by incorrect user membership management of a role; that is, the role did not grant the membership to the user even when the user qualifies for the role.

- **Permission Management Failure**: Permission management failure is an unsuccessful interaction where the data encrypted to a role is invalid, or the data is not encrypted to the role. In other words, the owner of the data did not encrypt the data to
the role in question or encrypted an invalid data to the role.

**Definition 2 (Trust Vector).** We define a trust vector to represent the behaviour history of a role as follows:

\[ v = (r, s_U, s_P) \]

In the trust vector, \( r \) is the value related to successful interactions that users have had with a given role, \( s_U \) is the value related to User Management Failure of the role, and \( s_P \) is the value related to the Permission Management Failure.

Using the function \( \mathcal{E} \) in Equation 1, we define the trust function \( T(v) \) that represents the trust value derived from the trust vector \( v \) as

\[ T(v) = \mathcal{E}(r, s_U + s_P) \]

**Definition 3 (Interaction History).** We assume that there exists a central repository in the system that collects and stores the ratings from users on the interactions between users and roles. We define the trust record history derived from the ratings of the role \( R \) from \( n \) users as

\[ \text{Hist}_U(R) = \{H^1_R, H^2_R, \ldots, H^n_R\} \]

Each entry \( H^k_R \) in \( \text{Hist}_U(R) \) is defined as a pair of parameters, \( H^k_R = (U_i, v^k_I) \), where \( v^k_I = (r, s_U, s_P) \) is a trust vector that represents the trust record of interactions that the user \( U_i \) has had with the role \( R \). \( r \) is the number of \( U_i \)'s positive feedbacks on the interactions with \( R \), \( s_U \) is the number of negative feedbacks on the interactions with \( R \) due to User Management Failure, and \( s_P \) is the number of negative feedbacks on the interactions with \( R \) due to Permission Management Failure.

In a cryptographic RBAC system, a user who belongs to a role not only has access to the data of the role, but also has access to the data of descendant roles. Therefore, an invalid resource from a descendant role may also cause an unsuccessful interaction. Since a role knows whether a resource comes from its descendant roles, we assume that users give feedback to the roles to whom the resources are directly assigned; that is, if a user detects an invalid resource from a descendant role, s/he will update the feedback for the descendant role directly instead of the role s/he belongs to.

As discussed in Subsection 3.1, from the users' perspective, the trustworthiness of a role is affected by the interaction history of the role and its descendant roles. Therefore users need to consider the following types of trust classes when evaluating the trust on roles.

**Individual Trust.** Individual trust is a belief that is derived directly from interaction history of the role \( R \).

When a user \( U_i \) wishes to evaluate the trust value of a role \( R \), the user first obtains the interaction history \( \text{Hist}_U(R) \) of the role from the central repository. Assume that \( w_u \) is the weight that the user \( U_i \) assigns to the feedbacks from other users. Then the individual trust value of the role \( R \) can be computed as follows,

\[ T_U(R)^D = T(v^D_{k,R}), \]

where \( v^D_{k,R} = v^D_{k,R} + w_u \cdot \sum_{i=1,i \neq k}^n v_i,R \)

The second element is set to zero because User Management Failure is not considered in inheritance trust as user management of descendant roles will not cause any unsuccessful interaction for this role. The inheritance trust of roles in a hierarchy is computed as follows:

\[ T_U(R)^I = T(v^I_{k,R}), \]

where \( v^I_{k,R} = \sum_{i=1}^m \left[ (v^D_{k,R} + v^I_{k,R}), w_{R_i} \right] \)

In the above equation, \([v,w] : = v^T w\) is the usual dot product on \( \mathbb{R}^n \).

**Combination Trust.** To compute the trust value of a role, we define a combination trust function for a role \( R \) as \( T_U(R) \) to combine the above described two type of trust together. Assume that \( w \in [0,1] \) is the weight of the inheritance trust. The trust value is computed as

\[ T_U(R) = (1 - w) \cdot T_U(R)^D + w \cdot T_U(R)^I \]

### 4.2 Example of Users’ Trust on Roles

Now we use an constructed example to show how the users’ trust on a role is affected by feedback for different roles in a RBAC system. In this example, we consider all the bad feedback as Permission Management Failure, as our intention is to show how the role hierarchy affects the trust value of roles. Consider the role hierarchy example shown in Figure 1.

In Figure 1, the role \( R_1 \) inherits from role \( R_2 \) and role \( R_3 \), and the role \( R_4 \) inherits from \( R_1 \) and \( R_4 \). We set the weight between every two roles and the weight
of other owners’ feedback to 1; that is, the weight vector for each role $R_i$ where $k \in [1,5]$ is defined as $w_{R_k} = (1,0,1), \forall i \in [1,5], i \neq k,$ and $w_{R_5} = (1,1,1)$. When a user wants to access a resource that has been assigned to the role $R_2$, s/he will need to evaluate the trust value of $R_2$ to decide whether $R_2$ is reliable to join. In Figure 2, we show the trust values of $R_2$ when only different individual roles in the RBAC system have feedback. For example, the curve for $R_1$, $GFP = 75\%$ shows the trust values of $R_2$ when only $R_1$ in the RBAC system has feedback, and 75% of the feedback is positive.

When the good feedback percentage is 75%, the trust value for $R_2$ goes up with the increasing number of feedbacks that $R_2$ and $R_1$ have. This trend implies that the more resources a role has, the more impact the good feedback percentage has on the trust value of the role. Note that the feedback for $R_1$ does not affect the trust value of $R_2$. This is because an untrusted $R_1$ will not cause an unsuccessful interaction of $R_2$. When the feedback is only given for $R_2$, the increase in the trust value is the fastest. This is because the individual trust of the role has more weight than the inheritance trust by our assumption. Therefore the decrease in the trust value of $R_2$ is slower when the feedback is for $R_3$ only.

From Figure 2, we see that the feedbacks for different roles in the system have different impact on the trust value of $R_2$. Firstly, the feedback for ancestor roles does not affect the trust of the role. Secondly, the more resources that have been assigned to a role, the more impact the feedback for the role will have on its ancestor roles as well as itself. These results show that our users’ trust model is useful in assisting users to determine properly the trust of roles in RBAC systems.

4.3 Roles’ Trust on Owners

In the case when any owner can choose roles to encrypt their resources to, assigning malicious resources or invalid resources to a role may cause the Permission Management Failure of the role. Therefore, it would be useful to have a trust model to assist roles in determining the trustworthiness of an owner, and hence decide whether or not to accept the resources from the owner.

As discussed in Subsection 3.2, the trust requirement on owners is simpler when compared with the users’ trust on roles. When comparing these two types of trust, we can see that there are some important differences. The trust on owners is not related to the role hierarchy; that is, the role hierarchy does not affect the trust computation on owners. We note that a general trust model can be used in this scenario. For completeness purposes, we also give the definition of the trust model for the roles’ trust on owners in this subsection.

Definition 4 (Interaction). From a role’s perspective, an interaction with an owner is a transaction in which an owner assigned a resource to that role, and that the role has accepted the resource.

Definition 5 (Trust Vector). We define a trust vector to represent the behaviour history of an owner as follows:

$$ v = (h, s) $$

where $h$ is the value related to resources owned by the owner, $s$ is the value related to malicious or invalid resources owned by the owner.

Using the function $E$ in Equation 1, we define the trust function $T(v)$ that represents the trust value derived from the trust vector $v$ as

$$ T(v) = E(h - s, s) $$

Definition 6 (Interaction History). We assume that there exists a central repository in the system that collects and stores the behaviour histories provided by roles to which the owner has assigned the resources. We define the trust record history provided by a set $\mathcal{R}$ of $n$ roles as

$$ Hist_{\mathcal{R}}(O) = \{H^0_1, H^0_2, \cdots, H^0_n\} $$
Each entry $H^O_k$ in $\text{Hist}(O)$ is defined as a pair of parameters, $H^O_k = (v_{k,O}, v_{k,O})$ where $v_{k,O} = (h,s)$ is a trust vector that represents the trust record of the owner $O$ on the resources that s/he has assigned to the role $R_i$. $h$ is the total number of $O$’s resources that has been assigned to $R_k$, and $s$ is the number of bad resources assigned by $O$.

We assume that an owner $O$ has a resource and wants to assign it to a role $R_k$. When this resource is assigned to the role $R_k$, $R_k$ updates the trust record of the owner by increasing the value $h$ in the trust vector $H^O_k$ of $O$ by 1. Now assume that a user has found the resource to be invalid, and then s/he reports to the role of this resource. If the role has confirmed that the user’s complaint is true after verifying the resource, $R_k$ will find out that it is $O$ who uploaded this resource, and $R_k$ will increase the value $s$ in trust vectors $H^O_k$ for this owner by 1.

A user that belongs to a role has the permission to access resources of the descendant roles of the role. When the user reports a bad resource from its descendant role, this role may not be able to identify the owner of the resource as the resource is not assigned to this role directly. Hence the role cannot update the trust records of the owner. In this case, the role can notify all its descendant roles about this bad resource, and the role to which the resource is assigned will update the trust record of the owner who owns the resource.

Assume that $w$ is the weight that the role $R_k$ assigns to the feedback from other roles. Taking as input the interaction history of an owner, the trust value of the owner can be computed as follows:

$$T_{R_k}(O) = \sum_{i=1, i \neq k} w_i \sum_{i=1, i \neq k} v_{i,O}$$

This trust value is evaluated based on a combination of all trust records in $\text{Hist}_{R_k}(O)$ considering the weighting for the trust records from other roles.

5 ARCHITECTURE

In this section, we present the design of a secure cloud storage system by combining the trust models for RBAC proposed in Section 4 with a cryptographic RBAC system. This architecture provides a practical solution for building a reliable and trusted RBAC system while retaining the use of cryptographic techniques. We have implemented a prototype of this architecture and have been conducting a range of experiments.

5.1 System Overview

Consider the system architecture shown in Figure 3. Each solid line in the figure shows the communication channel set by the system between two components joined together by the line, and the arrows indicate the direction in which the information flows. Since our trust models are based on cryptographic RBAC schemes, our system contains all the entities that a cryptographic RBAC scheme has, including an administrator, roles, users, and owners. The administrator is the certificate authority of the RBAC system, and it generates the system parameters and issues all the necessary credentials. In addition, the administrator manages the role hierarchy of the system. To put a role into the role hierarchy, the administrator needs to compute the parameters for that role. These parameters represent the position of the role in the role hierarchy. They are stored in the cloud, and are available publicly. Roles are the entities that associate users and owners together. Each role has its own role parameters which define the user membership. These role parameters are stored in the cloud, and a role needs to update them in the cloud when updating the user membership of the role. Owners are the parties who possess the data and want to store the
encrypted data in the cloud for other users to access, and they specify the roles who can access the data. In the RBAC model, they are the parties who manage the relationship between permissions and roles. Users are the parties who wish to acquire certain data from the cloud. When a user wishes to access stored data in the cloud, s/he first sends the request to the cloud, and decrypts the data upon receiving the response from the cloud.

In addition to these four entities in a basic cryptographic RBAC scheme, our trust enhanced cryptographic RBAC system by integrating an extra trust management system, which consists of five components. Next, we describe the details of these components.

**Central Repository.** In our trust models, all the interaction histories and trust records related to roles and users are stored in a central repository. The central repository is used to keep the records of all these interaction histories and trust records which are used by the Trust Decision Engine (described below) in evaluating the trust value of roles and owners. Any entity that is residing outside the trust management system is not able to access the central repository.

**Role Behaviour Auditor.** In order to protect the integrity of the feedback on roles, a role behaviour auditor collects the feedback for roles from users. The role behaviour auditor needs to ensure that a user who uploads feedback against a role has been granted the membership of the role or an ancestor role of that role. All the valid feedback will be forwarded to the central repository, and invalid feedback will be discarded.

**Owner Behaviour Auditor.** An owner behaviour auditor is an entity to collect the feedback on owners’ behaviour. However, different to the role behaviour auditor, the owner behaviour auditor listens for feedback on two channels. One is from the roles who may report the invalid data, and another is from the owner behaviour controller which reports the ownership of the stored data in the cloud. This auditor will determine whether an owner has uploaded any malicious or invalid data to the cloud, and can update the central repository.

**Owner Behaviour Controller.** Owner behaviour controller acts as a proxy server between owners and the cloud. It controls and forwards the owners’ encrypted data to the cloud. The controller can decide whether to store data in the cloud based on the decision from the role to which the data is assigned. The controller will inform the owner behaviour auditor the information about which owner the uploaded data belongs to.

**Trust Decision Engine.** The trust decision engine is the entity which evaluates the trust of the roles for users and the trust of the owners for roles. The trust decision engine takes as input the interaction histories or trust records stored in the central repository, and outputs the trust value of a particular role or owner.

### 5.2 System Workflow

All the entities in the system are connected through different communication channels which are labelled with numbers in Figure 3. We explain how the system works by describing the information flow through these channels.

First, the administrator initialises the system and specifies the role hierarchy of the system. The generated system parameters are uploaded to the cloud via channel 1. Roles grant the membership to users, and upload role parameters to the cloud via channel 2. Users download and decrypt data from the cloud via channel 3. When an owner wants to encrypt and store data in the cloud to a particular role, s/he first encrypts the data and sends a request to the owner behaviour controller via channel 6. Then the owner behaviour controller notifies the role via channel 11 and forwards the request to the cloud through channel 7 if the role agrees to accept the data from this owner. The cloud then communicates with the owner as in a normal cryptographic RBAC scheme. The controller also sends the owner behaviour auditor the information about the owner’s identity and the resource’s identity via channel 8.

When a user wants to access a resource in the RBAC system, the system first returns a list of roles who claim to have this resource. Then the user requests the trust evaluation on these roles from the trust management system. The trust value of the roles will be returned to the user through the channel 13. The user may choose a role who has the highest trust value to send the join request. When a user has found
that the data s/he has accessed from the role is malicious or invalid, s/he then provides a feedback on the role to whom the resource is encrypted to the role behaviour auditor through channel 4. Once the role behaviour auditor verifies that the feedback is from an authorised user, it will forward the feedback to the central repository.

When a negative feedback of a role has been raised by a user because of an invalid resource, the role will send the identity of the resource to the owner behaviour auditor via channel 10 if it believes that the resource was invalid when the owner uploaded the resource. The auditor then updates the trust records of the owner of this resource to the central repository via channel 9. When an owner wants to assign a resource to a role, the role can ask the trust management system about the trust evaluation for an owner, and the trust value will be returned by the trust decision engine through channel 14. Upon receiving the trust values for the owner from the trust decision engine, the role can inform the owner behaviour controller via channel 11 whether to accept the data. Moreover, this trust evaluation process can be made automatically by connecting owner behaviour controller to the trust decision engine directly. Roles can pre-determine a trust threshold for accepting data from owners. Every time an owner wants to upload a resource, the owner behaviour controller can check the trust value of the owner from the trust decision engine directly, and decide whether to accept the resource by comparing the trust value with the role’s threshold.

6 APPLICATION SCENARIO

In this section, we describe a digital library system which uses our proposed trust models to illustrate how the trust models can assist the security decision making in this system. The digital library system uses an external public cloud to store all the digital format resources such as books, papers, theses, and other types of publications. There are many distributors who use the platform provided by the digital library system to share digital resources. Each distributor can get the authorisations for sharing the digital resources from the publishers directly. A party who subscribes to a distributor can access all the resources of the distributor. Assume that the distributors have two types of subscription licenses: personal licenses that allow only the subscribed user to access the resources, and business licenses that allow another distributor to resell the resources to other users or distributors.

Now let us consider an example distributors network for this digital library system. The hierarchical relationship of the distributors is shown in Figure 4. In this system, distributors choose the resources to share by their categories. The distributors AD, CS, PR, C, M1 get the authorisations for selling digital resources in the categories Advertising, Customer Service, Public Relations, Commerce and Marketing respectively from the publishers. Distributors M2 and E sell a wider range of resources which cover all the categories in Marketing and Economics respectively, and these two distributors get authorisations from the distributors of sub-categories instead of the publishers directly. Note that the categories of resources sold by M1 and M2 are overlap. The difference is the channels they get the resources from: M1 from publishers, and M2 from sub-distributors. Similarly, distributors B1 and B2 get authorisations from M1, E and M2, E respectively, and their resources both cover the categories Business.

To use cryptographic RBAC schemes to protect the resources so that only the authorised users can access, the administrator of the digital library system first sets up the system parameters based on the relationships of the distributors. Then the publishers can encrypt their resources to the distributors whom they authorised to sell the resources. Here we consider the distributors as roles in the RBAC, and publishers as owners of the resources. When a user subscribes to a distributor, the distributor simply adds the user to the role. Then the user can use the key given by the system administrator to decrypt the resources of the role. Because the cryptographic RBAC schemes support role hierarchy, in this example, users who subscribed to the role M2 can also access the resources of the role AD, CS and PR, and users subscribed to B1 can access the resources of all the roles M1, E, C.

First let us consider how the trust model can assist the users. Assume that the distributor M2 also gets some resources, which the distributors AD, CS, PR do not have directly from the publishers. To save the cost of storing resources in the cloud, M2 chooses to reprint some resources in a lower quality to reduce the file size. Users subscribed to M2 may give negative feedbacks on M2 because they have difficulties...
in reading some of the resources. Later on, when a user wants to access marketing resources, s/he evaluates the trust of $M_1$ and $M_2$, and the trust model will output a higher trust value for $M_1$ than for $M_2$ because of the negative feedbacks of $M_2$. Then the user will know the quality of resources from $M_1$ is better than those from $M_2$. However, the distributors $AD, CS, PR$ will not be affected because the poor quality resources are not coming from them. When a user wants to subscribe to a distributor for Business, $B_2$ will have lower trust value than $B_1$ as resource the user would get from $B_1$ may come from $M_2$.

Now let us look at the trust model for roles’ trust on owners. Assume that publishers want to promote their digital resources, and they actively assign their resources to distributors. The resources that have come from some publishers may be of poor quality or alternatively some resources are not what the publishers claim to be. The distributors may not be able to verify each individual resource due to the lack of expertise in certain areas. When users complain about a bad resource, the role can give a negative feedback on the publisher who owns the resource, after confirming that the users’ complaints is valid. The feedback of the publisher can be accessed by all the distributors so they can avoid using this publisher in the future.

7 RELATED WORKS

There have been some related works which have addressed only trust on users in RBAC systems. (Chakraborty and Ray, 2006) proposed a trust model for RBAC system which considers users’ trust by assigning trust levels to users. These trust levels are based on a number of factors such as user credentials, user behaviour history and recommendations from other users. Trust levels are then mapped to roles. Another trust model for RBAC was proposed in (Takabi et al., 2007) to assist roles with the decision of user-role assignment based on a wide range of criteria of users, including behaviour history and reputation. In (Feng et al., 2008), a trust model for RBAC was introduced which evaluates the trust in the users based on user behaviours and context, in a context-aware access control model. Another trust model was discussed in (Toahchoodee et al., 2009) which also uses trust level to determine the access privileges of users. All these trust models only consider the trust on users in a RBAC system. None of these works address the users’ trust on roles in the RBAC system. The trust for roles is critical in cloud storage systems which has been addressed in this paper. As an extension of the users’ RBAC trust model, our trust models have also addressed the roles’s trust on owners. Another difference between our model and the previously proposed ones is that our trust models work in RBAC systems which use cryptographic RBAC schemes. That is, our models take into account cryptographic operations and the access privileges to decrypt the data stored in the cloud, which none of the previous works address.

8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we have addressed trust issues in cryptographic role-based access control systems for securing data storage in a cloud environment. We have proposed trust models for users and roles in RBAC systems which are using cryptographic RBAC schemes to secure stored data. These trust models assist the users and roles to determine the trustworthiness of individual roles and owners in the RBAC system respectively. They allow the users to perform the trust evaluation to decide whether or not to access a resource from a particular role. Our trust model takes into account role inheritance and hierarchy in the evaluation of trustworthiness of roles. The models also enable the roles to use the trust evaluation in their decision to accept the resources from a particular owner. We have given the design of an architecture of a trust-based cloud storage system which has integrated these trust models with the cryptographic RBAC schemes. We have also described the application of the proposed trust models by considering a practical scenario and illustrating how the trust evaluations can be used to reduce the risks and enhance the quality of security decision making by users and roles of the cloud storage service.

The proposed trust models used a centralised trust management system to assist users and roles with their trust evaluations. Though the users and roles in the system still need to trust the centralised trust management components, we believe that this approach has improved the cases where users and roles need to trust each individual roles and data owners in the system. We note that the auditing components in our designed architecture need to collect all the provided feedback. In large-scale systems, the load of these auditing components could be high. One solution to this issue is using decentralised auditing components which will be considered in our future work. In addition, we only considered two types of feedbacks in our trust models, positive and negative. However, a user who has unsatisfactory experiences with roles may want to provide varying levels of negative feed-
back. For example, the user may have retrieved a malware instead of valid data from a role and a poor quality data instead of a good quality one from the same role. It is clear that the latter case is less harmful than the former one, and the user may want to rate the role less untrusted for the latter case. We will also consider this issue in our future work.

REFERENCES


